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THE AFGHAN WARS 
I P A R T  I 
C H A P T E R  I 
PRELIMINARY 
SINCE it was thc British complications with Persia which 
mainly furnished what pretest there was for thc invasion 
of Afghanistan by an Anglo-Indian army in 1839, some 
brief recital is necessary of the relations between Great 
I Britain and Persia prior to that aggression. 
By a treaty, concluded between England and Persia 
in 1814, the former state bound itself, in casc of the in- 
vasion of l'ersia by any European nation, to aid the Shah 
either with troops from India or by the payment of an 
annual subsidy in support of his war expenses. I t  was a 
dangerous engagement, even with the caved rendering 
thc unclcrtaltir~g inoperative if such invasion should be 
provoltecl by Persia. During the fierce struggle of 1825-7, 
between Abbas Meerza and the Russian General Paslie- 
vitch, England refrained from supporting Pcrsia either 
\\lit11 mcn or with money, and when prostrate Persia was 
in financial extremities because of the war indemnity 
which the treaty of Turlc~nanchai imposed upon her, 
A 
England took advantage of her needs by purchasing the 
cancellation of the inconvenient obligation a t  the cheap 
cost of about A;3oo,ooo, I t  was the natural result of this 
transaction that English influence with thc Persian Court 
should sensibly declinc, and it was not less natural that in 
conscious weakness Persia should fall under the domina- 
tion of Russian influence. 
Futteh Ali, thc old Shah of Pcrsia, died in I 834, and 
was succeeded by his grandson Prince Mahomed Mccrza, 
a young man who inhcritecl much of the ambition of his 
gallant father Abbas Meerza. His especial aspiration, 
industriously stimulated by his Russian advisers, urged 
him to the enterprise of conqucring the indcpcndcnt 
principality of I-Ierat, on the wcstern border of Afghan- 
istan. Herat was thc only remnant of Afghan territory 
that still remained to a member of the legitimate royal 
house. Its rulcr was Shah Kamran, son of that Mahmoud 
Shah who, after ousting his brother Shah Soojall from thc 
throne of Cabul, had himself bcen driven from that eleva- 
tion, ancl had retired to the minor principality of Herat. 
The young Shah of Pcrsia was not destitute of justifica- 
tion for his designs on Herat. That this was so was 
frankly admitted by Mr Ellis, the British cnvoy to his 
Court, who wrote to his Government that the Shah had 
fair claim to the sovereignty of Afghanistan as far as 
Ghuznee, ancl that KamranJs conduct in occupying part 
of the Persian province of Seistan had given the Shah ' a  
full justification for commencing hostilities against I-Ierat.' 
The serious phasc of the situation for England and 
India was that Russian influence was bchincl Persia in 
this hostile action against I-Icrat. Mr Ellis pointed out 
that in the thcn existing statc of relations bctwcen Persia 
and Russia, the progress of thc former in Afghanistan 
was tantamount to the advancement of the latter. But 
unfortunately thcre remained valid an articlc in the 
treaty of 1814 to the effect that, in case of war between 
the Afghans and the Persians, the English Government 
should no7 interfere with either party unless when callccl 
on by both to mediate. In vain did Ellis and his 
successor McNeill remonstrate with the Persian monarch 
against the Ilcrat especlition. An  appcal to St Yeters- 
burg, on thc part of Grcat Britain, produced tnercly an 
evasive reply. How diplomatic disquictudc hacl become 
intcnsified may be inferred from this, that whcrcas in 
April 1836 Ellis wrote of Persia as a Russian first 
parallel of attack against India, Lord Auclcland, then 
Govcrnor-General of India, directed McNeill, in the early 
part of 1837, to urge thc Shah to abandon his cnterprisc, 
on the ground that he (thc Govcrnor-General) ' must vicw 
with umbrage and displeasure schemes of interferencc 
ancl conquest on our wcstern frontier.' 
Thc Shah, unrnovecl by thc reprcscntations of the 
British cnvoy, marched on Herat, and the siege was 
opened on November 23d, 1837. Durand, a capable 
critic, clcclares that the strength of the place, the resolution 
of the besiegers, the skill of their Russian military advisers, 
ancl the gallantry of the besieged, were alike objccts of 
much exaggeration. ' Thc siege was from first to last 
thoroughly ill-conducted, and the clefencc, in reality not 
better managed, owed its r'clad to Pcrsian ignorance, 
timidity and supineness. Thc advicc of Pottingcr, the 
gallant English officer who assistccl thc defence, was 
scldom asked, and  still more seldom taken ; ancl no one 
spolce more plainly of thc conduct of both besieged ancl 
besiegers than did Pottingcr hirnself,' M'Neill effcctcd 
nothing definite during a long stay in the l'crsian camp 
before Herat, the  counteracting influence of the Russian 
envoy being too strong with the Shall; and the British 
representative, wcary of continual slights, at  length 
quitted the Persian camp complctcly foilcd. Aftcr s ix  
days' bombardment, the l'crsians and their Russian 
auxiliaries dclivcrccl an assault in force on June 23dl I 838. 
I t  failccl, with hcavy loss, and the dispirited Shah 
detcrmincd on raising thc sicgc. His resolution was 
quickened by the arrival of Coloncl Stoddart in his camp, 
with the information that a military forcc from 1301nbay, 
supported by ships of nw,  had landed on the island of  
ICarrack in  the Persian Gulf, and with thc peremptory 
ultimatum to thc  Shah that he must retire from Herat 
a t  once. Lord Palmcrston, in ordering this diversion in 
the Gulf, had thought hirnself justified by circumstances 
in overriding the clear and prccise terms of an article 
in a treaty to which England had on several occasions 
engaged to adhere. As for thc Shah, he appears to  have 
been relieved by thc ultimatum. On the 9th September 
he mounted his horsc and rode away from Hcrat. The  
siege had lasted nine and a half months. To-day, half 
a century after Simonich the Russian envoy followcd 
Mahomed Shah from battcrcd but unconquered Herat, 
that city i i  still an Afghan place of arms. 
Shah Soojah-ool Moolk, a grandson of the illustrious 
Ahmcd Shah, reigned in Afghanistan from 1803 till 1809. 
His youth had bcen full of trouble and vicissitude. He 
had becn a watrderer, on the vergc of starvation, a pedlar 
and a bandit, who raised money by plundering caravans. 
His courage was lightly reputed, and it was as a mere 
creature of circumstance that he reached the throne. His 
rcign was perturbed, and in 1809 he was a fugitive and 
an exile. Runjeet Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjaub, 
defrauded him of the famous Koh-i-noor, which is now 
the most precious of the crown jewels of England, and 
plundered and imprisoned the fallen man. Shah Soojall 
a t  length escaped from Lal!ore. .After furthcr misfortunes. 
he at Icngth reached the 13ritish frontier station of Loodi- 
anah, and in 1816 bccarne a pensioncr of the East India 
Company. 
After the downfall of Shah Soojah, Afghanistan for 
many years was a prey to anarchy. At length in 1826, 
Dost Mahomcd succeeded in making himself supreme a t  
Cabul, and this masterful man thenceforward held sway 
until his death in 1863, uninterruptedly save during the 
thrce years of the British occupation. Dost Mahomed 
was neither kith nor kin to the legitimate dynasty which 
he displaced. I-Iis fathcr Poyndah Khan  was an able 
statcsman and gallant soldier. He left twenty-one sons, 
of whom Futteh Khan was the eldest, and Dost Mahomed 
one of the youngest. Futteh Khan was the Warwick of 
Afghanistan, but the Afghan ' Kingmaker ' had no Barnet 
as the closing scene of his chequered life. Falling into 
hostile hands, he was blinded and scalped. Refusing to 
betray his brothers, he was leisurcly cut to pieces bjr the 
order and in the presence of the monarch whom he had 
madc. His young brother Dost Mahomed undertook to 
avcngc his dcath. After years of varied fortunes the 
Dost had worsted all his enemies, and in 1826 he be- 
calne the ruler of Cabul, Throughout his long rcign 
Dost Mahomcd was a strong and wise rulcr. H i s  youth 
had been neglcctcd and clissolutc. His education was 
clcfectivc, and he had been addicted to  wine. Once seated 
on the thronc, the reformation of our Hcnry Fifth was 
not more thorough than was that of Dost Mahomecl. 
He taught himself to read and write, studied the  Koran, 
bccame scrupulously abstemious, assiduous in affairs, no 
longcr truculent but courteous. H e  is said to have madc 
a public acknowledgment of the errors of his previous 
lifc, and a firm profession of reformation ; nor did his after 
lifc belie the pledges to which he cornmittcd himself. 
Therc mas a fine rugged honesty in his nature, and a 
streak of genuine chivalry; notwithstanding thc dcspite 
he suffered at our hands, he had a real regard for the 
English, and his loyalty to us was broken only by his 
armed support of the Sikhs in the second Punjaub war. 
The fallen Shah Soojah, from his asylum in Loodianah, 
was continually intriguing for his restoration. His schemes 
were long inoperativc, and it was not until 1832 that 
certain arrangements were entered into between him and 
the Maharaja Runjcct Singh. T o  an application on 
Shah Soojah's part for countcnance and pecuniary aid, 
the Anglo-Indian Government replied that to afford him 
assistancc woulcl bc inconsistent with thc policy of 
neutrality which the Government had imposed on itself; 
but it unwiscly contributed financially toward his under- 
talcing by granting him four months' pension in advance. 
Sixteen thousand rupees formed a scant war fund with 
which to attempt the rccovery of a thronc, but the  Shah 
startcd on his crrand in Fcbruary 1833, After a success- 
ful contest with the Ameers of Scinde, hc marched on 
Candahar, and besieged that fortress, Canclahar was in 
extremity when Dost Mahomcd, hurrying from Cabul, 
relieved it, and joining forces with its defenders, he de- 
feated and routed Shah Soojah, who fled precipitately, 
leaving behind him his artillery and camp equipage. 
During the Dost's absence in the south, Runjeet Singh's 
troops crossed the Attock, occupied the Afghan province 
of Peshamur, and drove the Afghans into the Khyber 
Pass. No subsequent efforts on Dost Mahomed's part 
availed to expel the Sikhs from l'eshawur, and suspicious 
of British connivancc with Runjeet Singh's successful 
aggression, he took into consideration the policy of fortify- 
ing hitnself by a counter alliance with Persia. As for 
Shah Soojah, he had crcpt back to his refuge at Loodi- 
anah. 
Lord Auckland succeeded Lord William Bcntinclc as  
Governor-Gcneral of India in March 1834. In reply to  
Dost Mahomed's letter of congratulation, his lordship 
wrote : ' You are aware that it is not the practice of the 
British Government to  interfere with the affairs of other 
independcnt states ; ' an abstention which Lord Aucltland 
was soon to violate. H e  had brought from England the 
fceling of disquietude in regard to the designs of Pcrsia 
and Russia which the communications of our envoy in 
Persia had fostered in the Home Government, but it 
would appear that he was wholly undecided what line of 
action to  pursue. ' Swayed,' says Durand, ' by the vague 
apprehensions of a remote danger entertained by others 
rather than himself,' h e  despatched to Afghanistan Captain 
Burnes on a nominally comlnercial mission, which, in fact, 
was one of political discovery, but without dcfinite instruc- 
tions. Burnes, an able but rash and ambitious man, 
reached Cabul in Septembcr 1837, two months beforc the 
Persian army bcgan thc sicge of Hcrat. H e  had a strong 
prepossession in favour of thc Dost, whose guest he had 
already bccn in 1832, and the policy he favoured was not 
the revival of the legitimate dynasty in thc person of 
Shah Soojah, but the attachment of Dost Mahomed to  
British interests by strengthening his throne and afford- 
ing him British countenance. 
Burnes sanguinely bclicvccl that he had arrived a t  
Cabul in thc nick of time, for an cnvoy from thc Shah of 
Pcrsia was already at Candahar, bearing prescnts and 
assurances of support. Thc Dost made no concealmcnt 
to Burncs of his approaches to Persia and Russia, in 
despair of British good officcs, and bcing hungry for 
assistance from any source to meet the encroachments of 
the Sikhs, he professed himself ready to  abandon his 
negotiations with the western powers if he  were given 
reason to expect countenance and assistance at  the hands 
of the Anglo-Indian Government. Burncs communicated 
to his Government those friendly proposals, supporting 
them by his own strong representations, and meanwhile, 
carried away by enthusiasm, he esceecled his powers by  
making efforts to dissuade the Candahar chiefs from the 
Persian alliance, and by offering to support them with 
money to enable them to rnalrc hcad against the offensive, 
by which Pcrsia would probably seek to revenge the re- 
jection of her overtures. For this unauthoriscd cscess of 
zeal Durnes was severely rcprirnanded by his Government, 
\ 
ancl was clirectcd to retract his offers to thc Candahar 
I 
I chick. The  situation of Burnes in rclation to the Dost 
i was presently complicated by the arrival at Cabul of a Russian officcr claiming to bc an envoy from the Czar, 
whose crcdentials, howcvcr, were rcgardecl as dubious, and 
I who, if that circumstance has the lcast wight,  was on his 
I 
return to Russia uttcrly repudiated by Count Nesselrodc. 
The Dost took small account of this emissary, continuing 
to assure Uurnes that he cared for no connection cxcept 
I 
with the English, and Burnes professed to his Governmcnt 
his fullest confidences in the sincerity of thosc clcclara- 
tions. But the tone of Lord Aucltland's rcply, addresscd 
to thc Dost, was so dictatorial ancl supercilious as to indi- 
catc thc writcr's intention that it should'give offencc. It 
had that effect, ancl Burnes' mission a t  once bccame hope- 
', 
Icss. Yet, as a last resort, Dost Mahomed lowered his 
pride so far as to write to the Governor-General imploring 
him ' to  remedy the grievances of the Afghans, and afford 
them some little encouragement and power.' The pathetic 
rcprcsentation had no effect. The Russian envoy, who 
was profuse in his promises of everything which the Dost 
was most anxious to obtain, was rcceived into favour and 
treated with distinction, and on his return journey hc 
effected a treaty with the Candahar chiefs, which was pre- 
. ' 
sently ratificd by the Russian minister at the Persian 
Court. Burnes, fallen into discredit at Cabul, quitted 
that place in August 1838. He had not been discreet, 
I but it was not his indiscretion that brought about the 
failure of his mission. A nefarious transaction, which 
ICaye denounces mith thc passion of a just indignation, 
connects itself with Burned negotiations mith the Dost; 
his official correspondence was unscrupulously mutilated 
and garbled in the published Blue Book with deliberate 
purpose to dcccivc the British public. 
Burnes had failed becausc, sincc hc had quitted India 
for Cabul, Lord A ~ ~ c l i l a ~ ~ d ' s  policy had gradually altered. 
Lord Auclcland had Iandcd in India in the character of 
a man of peace. That, so late as April 1837, he had no 
design of obstructing the existing situation in Afghan- 
istan is proved by his written statement of that datc, 
that 'the British Governmcnt had resolved decidedly to 
discourage the prosecution by the ex-Icing Shah Soojah- 
001-Moollc, so long as he may remain under our protec- 
tion, of frwthcr schemes of hostility against thc chicfs 
now. in powcr in Cabul and Candahar.' Yet, in thc 
following June, he concluded a treaty which sent Shah 
Soojah to Cabul, escorted by British bayonets. Of this 
inconsistency no explanation pi-csents itself. I t  was a 
far cry from our fronticr on the Sutlcj to Herat in thc 
confines of Central Asia-a distance of more than 1 2 0 0  
miles, over some of the most arduous marching ground in 
the known world. No doubt the Anglo-Indian Govcrn- 
mcnt was justified in being sornewhat colicerncd by thc 
facts that a Persian army, backed by Russian voluntecrs 
and Russian roubles, was besieging Herat, and that Pcr- 
sian and Russian crnissaries wcre at work in Afghanistan. 
Both phenomena werc rather of thc 'bogey' character ; 
how much so to-day shows when the Afghan frontier 
is still beyond Herat, and mhcn a descendant of Dost 
Mahomed still sits in the Cabul 7msilid But neithcr 
England nor India scruplcd to make the Karrack counter- 
threat which arrcsted the siege of Herat; and the obvious 
-. policy as regardcd Afghanistan was to watch the rcsults 
of the intrigues which were on foot, to ignore thcm should 
thcy comc to   lo thing, as was probable, to counteract 
thcrn by familiar methods if serious conscqucnces should 
seem irnpcnding. Our alliance with Rulljeet Sing11 was 
solid, and the quarrel bctwcen Dost Mahomed and him 
concerning the Pcshawur province was notoriously easy 
of arrangement. 
On whose memory rests the dark shadow of rc- 
sponsibility for the first Afghan war? Thc late Lord 
Broughton, who, when Sir John Cam Hobhousc, was 
President of thc Board of Control from 1835 to 1841, 
declared before a House of Commons Committee, in 
185 I ,  'The Afghan war was clone by myself; entircly 
without the privity of the Board of Directors.' The 
meaning of that declaration, of course, was that it was 
\ 
the British Government of the day which was respon- 
sible, acting through its membcr charged with the con- 
trol of Indian aFTairs ; ancl f~~r ther ,  that the directorate 
of the East India Company was accordcd no voicc in 
the mattcr. But this utterance was materially qualified 
by Sir J. C. I-Tobhouse's statemcnt in the House of 
Commons in 1842, that his despatch indicating the 
policy to bc adopted, ancl that written by Lord Auck- 
-. land, informing him that the expedition had already bcen 
undertaken, had crossed each other on the way. 
I t  woulcl be tcdious to detail how 1-ord Auckland, 
under evil counsel, gradually boxed the compass from 
peace to war. The scheme of action embodied in thc 
treaty which, in thc early summer of 1838, was cot~cluded 
bet\veen the Anglo-Indian Government, Runjcct Singh, 
and Shah Soojah, was that  Shah Soojah, with a forcc 
officcred from a n 3  Indian army, and paid by British 
money, possessing also thc goodwill and support of the 
Maharaja of the Punjaub, should attempt thc rccovcry 
of his thronc without ally stiffening of British bayoncts at  
his back. Then it was urgcd, and the rcprcscntation was 
it~dcccl acccptcd, that thc  Shah woulcl necd thc buttrcss 
afforclccl by English troops, and that a couplc of rcgi- 
ments only would suffice t o  afford this prcstigc. But 
Si r  I-Iarry Fanc, the Gommandcr-in-Chief, judiciously 
intcrposcd his vcto on thc clespatch of a hanclful of British 
solclicrs on so distant and hazarclous an  cxpcditioii. 
Finally, thc Governor-Gcncral, committed already to a 
mistalccn linc of policy, and urgcd forward by those 
about liii-n, took thc unfortunate rcsolution to gathcr 
togcthcr a n  Anglo-Indian army, and to send it, with the 
ill-otncned Shah Soojah on its shoulders, into the un- 
Icnown a n d  distant wilds of Afghanistan. This .action 
cletcrinined on, i t  was in accorclatice with thc Anglo- 
Il-rdian fitness of things that  thc Governor-General s h d d  
p-omulgate a justificatory manifcsto. Of this cornposi- 
ti011 it is unnecessary to  say more than to quote Durancl's 
observation that  in it ' thc words " justicc and necessity " 
wcrc applicd in a manncr for which therc is fortunately 
no  precedent in thc English language,' and Sir Henry 
Eclwarcles' not lcss trenchant comment that ' the views 
and conduct of Dost Mahomed wcrc misrcprcsented with a 
llardihood which a Russian statesman might have envied.' 
All lnen whose cxpcricncc gave weight to their words 
this ' prcl3ostccoi1s cntcrprisc.' Mr Elphinstot-re, 
had been the  head of a mission to Cabul thirty years 
earlier, hcld that ' if an army \vas scnt LIP tllc ~RSSCS,  and
i f  we could feed it ,  no doubt wc might t a l a  Cabul and set 
up Shah Soojah ; but it was hopelcss to  maintain him 
in a poor, cold, strong and remote country, among so 
turbulent a pcople.' Lord William Bentinck, 1,orcI Auck- 
land's prcdccessor, clenounccd the project a s  an act of 
incredible folly. Marquis Wcllcsley rcgarclccl ' this wild 
expedition into a distant region of rocks and dcserts, of 
sands and icc a n d  snow,' as an act of infatuation. Thc 
Duke of Wellington pronounced with prophetic sagacily, 
that thc consequence of once crossing thc Inclus to sctllc 
a governmcnt in Afglianistan would be a pcrcnnial march 
into that country. 
T H E  MAKCI-I TO C A B U L  
TIIE two main objects of the vcnturesorne oKensive 
movement to which Lord Auckland had committed 
himself wcre, first, the raising of the Persian siege of 
Herat if the place should hold out until reached-the 
recapture of it if it should have fallen ; and, secondly, 
the establishment of Shah Soojah on the Afghan throne. 
Thc  forlncr object was the more pressing, and time was 
very precious ; but the  distances in India are great, the 
means of communication in 1538 did not admit of cel- 
erity, and the seasons control thc safe prosecution of 
military operations. Nevertheless, the concentration of 
the  army a t  the frontier station of Ferozepore was fully 
accornplishcd toward the end of November. Sir Harry 
Fane was to be the  military head of the cxpedition, 
and he had just right to be proud of the 14,000 carcf~illy 
selected and well-seasoned troops who constitutcd his 
Bengal contingent. Thc force consisted of two in- 
fantry divisions, of which the first, commanded by Major- 
General Sir Willoughby Cotton, containecl thrce brigades, 
commanded respectively by Colonels Sale, Nott, and 
Dennis, of whom the  two former were to attain high 
distinction within the borders of Afghanistan. Major- 
General Duncan comrnandcd thc second infantry division 
of the two brigades, of which onc was commanded by 
Colonel Robcrts, the gallant father of a gallant son, the 
other by Colonel Worsley. Thc 6000 troops raised for 
Shah Soojah, who were under Fane's orders, and were 
oficered from our army in India, had bcen reccntly and 
hurriedly recruited, and although rapidly improving, wcre 
I not yet in a state of high cfficicncy. Thc contingent which the Bombay I'resiclency was to furnish to thc 
'Army of the Indus,' and which landecl about thc close 
of the year ncar the moulh of thc Inclus, was unclcr the 
command of Gcneral Sir John Keanc, thc Commancler- 
in-Chief of the Bombay army. The Bombay force was 
about 5000 strong. 
I3efore the concentration at Ferozepore had bccn com- 
plcled, Lord Auckland reccived official intimation of thc 
retreat of the Persians from bcfore IIcrat. With their 
departure had gone, also, the sole legitimate object of 
the expedition; thcrc remained but a project of wanton 
aggression and usurpation. The Russo-Persian failure at 
Iierat was scarcely calculated to maintain in the astutc 
and practical Afghans any hope of fulfilment of the pro- 
mises which the western powers had thrown about so 
lavishly, while it made clear that, for some time a t  least 
to come, the Persians woulcl not be found dancing again 
to Russian fiddling. The abandonment of the siege of 
I-Ierat rendercd the invasion of Afghanistan an ag, ures- 
sion destitute even of pretext. The  Governor-General 
endeavoured to justify his resolution to persevere in it 
by putting forth the argument that its prosecution was 
16 The First Afghan War 
required, ' alike in obscrvation of the treaties entered into 
with Runjeet Sing11 and Shah Soojah as by paramount 
considerations of defensive policy.' A rcrnarlcable illus- 
tration of 'clcfensive policy' to take the offensive against 
a rcmotc country from whose further confines had faded 
away foiled aggression, leaving behind nothing but a 
bitter consciousness of brokcn promises ! As for the 
othcrplca, thc ttipartitc treaty contained no covenant that 
wc should send a corporal's guard across our frontier. 
If Shah Soojah had a powcrful following in Afghanistan, 
he could regain his throne without our assistance ; if he 
had no holding thcre, it was for us a truly discreditable 
enterprise to foist him on a recalcitrant people a t  thc 
point of the bayonet. 
One result of thc tidings from Herat was to reduce by 
a division thc strength of the cxpeclitionary force. Fane, 
who had never talccn kindly to the project, declined to 
associate himself with the diminished array that remained. 
The command of the Bengal column fcll to Sir Willoughby 
-Cotton, with whom as his aide-dc-camp rode that Henry 
Ilaveloclc whosc name twenty years later was to ring 
throughj India and England. Duncan's division was to  
stand fast a t  Ferozepore as a support, by which disposition 
the strcngth of the Bengal marching force was cut down 
to about 9500 fighting men. After its junction with the 
Bombay colurnn, the army would be 14,500 strong, with- 
out reckoning the Shah's contingent. There was an in- 
terludc at Ferozepore of reviews and high jinks with the 
shrewd, debauched old Runjeet Sing11 ; of which procced- 
ings Ilaveloclc in his narrative of the expedition gives 
a detailed account, dwelling with extreme disapprobation 
on Runjeet's addiction to a (pe t  tipple' strong cnough 
to lay out the hardest drinker in the British camp, but 
which the old reprobate quaffed freely without turning a 
hair. 
At length, on December ~ o t h ,  1838, Cotton began the 
long march which was not to terminate a t  Cabul until 
August 6th of the following year. The  most direct route 
was across the Punjaub, and up the passes from Peshawm, 
but the Governor-General had shrunk from proposing to 
Runjeet Singh that the force should march through his 
territories, thinking it enough that the IVIaharaja had per- 
mitted Shah Soojah's heir, Prince Timour, t o  go by Pesha- 
wur to Cabul, had engaged to support him with a Sikh 
force, and had agreed to maintain an a rmy of reserve at 
Peshawur. The chosen route was by the left bank of the 
Sutlej to its junction with the Indus, down the left bank 
of the Indus to the crossing point a t  Roree, and from 
Sulckur across the Scinde and northern Belooch provinces 
by the Bolan and Kojulc passes to  Candahar, thcnce by 
Khelat-i-Ghilzai and Ghuznee t o  Cabul. This was a line 
excessively circuitous, im~nensely long, full of difliculties, 
and equally disadvantageous as  to supplies and com- 
munications. On the way the column would have to 
effect a junction with the Bombay force, which a t  Viklcur 
was distant 800 miles from Ferozepore. Of the distance 
of 850 miles from the latter post to Canclahar the first half 
to the crossing of the Indus presented no serious diffi- 
culties, but from Sukkur beyond the country was inhos- 
pitable and cruelly rugged. I t  needed little military 
. lcnowledge to realise how more and yet  more precarious 
\\lould become thc communications as the chain lengthened, 
n 
to discern that from Fcrozeporc to the Indus they would bc 
at the mercy of the Sikhs, and  to cornprchend this also, 
that a single serious check, in or beyond thc passes, woulcl 
involve all but incvitnblc ruin. 
Shall Soojah and his lcvies moved inclepenclcntly some 
marches in advance of Cotton. Thc Doorancc monarch- 
clcct had already crossed t he  Indus, and was cncamped 
at Shikarporc, whcn he was joincd by Mr William H a y  
i\[acnaghten, of the Company's Civil Scrvicc, thc high 
functionary who had been gnzetkcl as 'Envoy and 
IIinistcr on thc part of the Government of India at the 
Court of Shah Soojah-001-Moolk.' Durancl pronounces 
the selection an unhappy onc, ' for Macnaghten, long 
accustomed to irrcsponsiblc office, incspericnccd in men, 
and ignorant of the country and pcople of Afghanistan, 
was, though an cruclite Arabic scholar, neither practised 
in the fcld of Asiatic intrigue nor a Inan of action. His  
ambition was, however, great, and the expedition, holding 
out the promise of distinction and honours, had tnct with 
his strcnuous advocacy.' Macnaghten was one of the 
tllrec men who chiefly inspired Lord A~icklancl j~lith the 
policy to which he had committed himself. H c  was 
the negotiator of the tripartite trcaty, I-Ie was noiv on 
his way toward a region whcrein he was to concern 
himself in strange adventures, thc outcon~e of which 
was to darken his reputation, consign llim to a sudden 
cruel dcath, bring awful ruin on the ellterprise had 
fostered, and inflict incalculable damage on British 
prestige in India. 
Marching through Bhawulpore and Northern Scinde, 
without noteworthy incident save heavy losses of draught 
cattle, Cotton's army reached ICoree, the point a t  which 
the Indus was to be crossed, in the third weck of January 
1839. Here a delay was encountered. T h e  Scinde 
Amccrs were, with reason, angered by the unjust and 
exacting terms which Pottinger had been instructed to 
enforce on them. They had been virtually indcpendcnt 
of Afghanistan for nearly half a century ; there was now 
masterfully demanded of them quartcr of a million stcrling 
in name of back tribute, and this in the face of thc fact 
that they held a solcmn rclcasc by Shah Soojah of all 
past and future claims. When t h y  demurred to this, 
and to other exactions, they wcre peremptorily told that 
' neithcr the rcady power to crush and annihilate them, 
nor the will to call it into action, was wanting if it 
appeared requisite, howevcr remotely, for the safety and 
integrity of the Anglo-Indian empire and frontier.' 
I t  was little wonder that the Arneers were reluctant 
to fall in with terms advanced so arrogantly. Iceane 
marched up the right bank of the Indus to  within a 
couple of marches of I-lyderabad, and having heard of thc 
rejection by the Ameers of Pottinger's terms, and of the 
gathering of some 20,000 armcd Belooches about the 
capital, he called for the co-operation of part of the 
Bengal column in a movement on Hyderabad. Cotton 
started on his march down the left bank, on January 30th) 
with 5400 men. Undcr menaces so ominous the unfor- 
tunate Ameers succumbed. Cotton returned to Roree ; 
the Bengal column crossed the Indus, and on February 
20th its headquarters reached Shikarporc. Ten  days 
later, Cotton, leading the advance, was in Dadur, at the 
foot of the Bolan Pass, having suffered heavily in trans- 
110rt animals almost from thc start. Supplics wcrc scarce 
in a region so barren, but with a month's partial food on 
his beasts of burden he quitted Dadur March loth, got 
safely, if toilsomely, through the Bolan, and on 26th 
rcach~d Quctta, where he was to halt for orders. Shah 
Soojah and Keanc foliowed, their troops suffering not a 
little from scarcity of supplics and loss of animals. 
ICeane's error in detaining Cotton a t  Quetta until he 
should arrive proved itself in thc semi-starvation to which 
thc troops of the Bengal column were reduced. The  
Khan of I<hclat, whethcr from disaffection or inability, 
lcft unfulfilled his promise to supply grain, and the 
result of the quarrel which Rurnes picl<ed with him was 
that he shunned coming in and paying homage to 'Shah 
Soojah, for which default he was to suffer cruel and 
i~njustifiable ruin. The sepoys were put on half, the 
camp followers on quarter rations, and the forcc for 
eleven days had been idly consuming the waning supplies, 
when a t  length, on April 6th) Keane came into camp, 
having already formally assumed the command of the 
whole army, and made certain alterations in its organisa- 
tion and subsidiary commands. There still remained to 
bc traversed 147 miles before Candahar should be reached, 
and thc dreaded Kojuk Pass had still to be penetrated. 
Keane was a soldier who had gained a reputation for 
couragc in Egypt and the Peninsula, I-Ie was indebted 
to the acuteness of his engineer and the valour of his 
troops, for the peerage conferred on him for Ghuznec, and 
it cannot bc said that during his command in Afghanistan 
he disclosed any marked military aptitude. But  he had 
sufficient perception to recognise that he had brought tile 
Bengal column to the verge of starvation in Quetta, and 
sufficient coinmon sense to discern that, since if it remained 
there it would soon starve outright, thc best thing to be 
done was to push it forward with all possible spccrl into 
a region where food should be procurable. Acting on 
this reasoning, he marched the day after his arrival. 
Cotton, while lying in Quetta, had not taken the trouble to 
reconnoitre the passes in advance, far less to make a prac- 
ticable road through the Kojuk defile if that should prove 
the best route. The resolution taken to march through 
it, t\vo days werc spent in making the pass possible for 
wheels ; and from the 13th to the zrst the column was 
engaged in overcoming the obstacles it presented, losing 
in the task, besides, much baggage, supplies, transport and 
ordnance stores. Further back in the Bolan Willshire 
with the Bombay column was faring worse; he was 
plundered severely by tribal marauders. 
By May 4th the main body of the army was encamped 
in the plain of Candahar. From the I<ojuk, Shah Soojall 
and his contingent had led the advance toward the 
southern capital of the dominions from the throne of 
which he had been cast down thirty ycars before. The 
Canclahar chiefs had meditated a night attack on his raw 
troops, but Macnaghten's intrigues and bribes had wrought 
defection in their camp ; and while Kohun-dil-Khan and 
his brothers were in flight to Girishk on the Helmuncl, 
the infamous Hadji Khan I<alzur led the venal herd sf 
turncoat sycophants to the fect of the claimant who came 
backed by the British gold, which Macnaghten was 
scattering abroad with lavish hand. Shah Soojah re- 
covered from his trepidation, hurried forward in advancc 
of his troops, and entered Candahar on April 24th. I-Iis 
reception tvas cold. The influential chiefs stood aloof, 
abiding the signs of the times ; the populace of Candahar 
stood silent and lowering. Nor did the sullenness abate 
when the presence of a large army with its follo\vers 
promptly raised the price of grain, to thc great distrcss 
of the poor. The ceremony of the solemn recognition of 
the Shah, held close to the scene of his defeat in 1834, 
Havclock describes as an imposing pageant, with homag- 
ings and royal salutes, parade of troops and prescntation 
of mzzttrs; but the arena set apart for the inhabitants 
was empty, spite of Eastern love for a kz?,mshn, and the 
display of enthusiasm was confined to the immediate 
retainers of His Majesty. 3 
The Shah was eager for the pursuit of the fugitive 
chiefs; but the troops wcre jaded and sickly, the cavalry 
wcre partially dismounted, and what horscs remained were 
feeble slteletons. The transport animals neeclcd grazing 
and rcst, and their loss of numbers to be made good. The 
crops were not yet ripe,'and pro,~isions were scant and 
dear. When, on May gth, Sale marched toward Girishk, 
his dctachmcnt carried half rations, and his handful of 
regular cavalry was all that two regiments coulcl furnish. 
Rcaching Girishk, he found that thc chiefs had fled toward 
Seistan, and leaving a regiment of tlte Shah's contingent 
in occupation, he rclurned to Candahar. 
Macnaghten professed the belief, and perhaps may 
have dcluded himself into it, that Candahar had receivcd 
the Shah with enthusiasm. He was sanguine that the 
~ ~ r c h  to Cabul would be unopposcd, and he urged on 
Keane, who was wholly dependent on the Envoy for 
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political information, to move fonvarcl at once, lighten- 
ing the difficulties of thc march by lcaving the nombay 
troops at Candahar. But Iceane clcclined, on the advice 
of Thomson, his chief engineer, who asked significantly 
whether he had found the information given him by the 
political dcpartment in any single instance correct. Food 
prospects, however, did not improve at Candahar, and 
leaving a strong garrison there as well, curious to  say, 
as the siege train which with arduous labour had bcen 
brought up the passes, Iccane began the march to Cabul 
on June 27th. H e  had supplies only sufficient to carry 
his army thither on half rations. Macnaghten had 
lavished money so frcely that the treasury chest mas all 
but empty. How the Afghans regarded the invasion was 
evinced by condign slaughter of our stragglers. 
As the army advanced up the valley of thc Turnulc, 
the climate became morc tempcrate, the harvest was 
later, and the troops improved in health and spirit. Con- 
centrating his forces, Kcane reached Ghuznee on July 
~ 1 s t .  The reconnaissance he made proved that fortress 
occupicd in force. Thc outposts driven in, and a close 
inspection made, the works were found strongcr than 
had been represented, and its rcgular reduction was out 
of the without the battering train which Keanc 
had allowed himself to  be persuaded into leaving be- 
hind. A wall some 70 fcct high and a wet ditch in its 
front macle mining and escalade alike impracticable. 
Thornson, however, noticed that the road and bridge to 
the Cabul gate were intact. I-Ie obtained trustworthy 
information that up to a rccent date, while all the other 
gatcs had bccn built up, the Cabul gate had not been so 
deal t  with. As hc watcl~ecl, a horscman was seen to 
en ter  by it. This was conclusive. The  ground within 
400 yards of the gate  offered good artillery positions. 
Thomson therefore reported that although thc operation 
w a s  full of risk, and success if attainecl rnust cost dear, yet 
ili the  absence of a less hazardous method of reduction 
there offered a fair chance of success in an attempt to blow 
open  the Cabul gate, ancl then carry the place by a cot$ 
de wain. Keane was precluded from the alternative of 
masking the place and continuing his advance by thc all 
b u t  total exhaustion of his supplies, which the capture of 
Ghuznce would replenish, and he thcrefore rcsolved on 
a n  assault by the Cabul gate. 
During the ~ 1 s t  July the army circled round the place, 
a n d  camped to the north of it on the Cabul road. T h e  
following day was spent in preparations, ancl in defeating 
an  attack madc on the Shah's contingent: by sevcral 
thousand Ghilzai tribcsmcn of the adjacent hill country. 
I n  the gusty darkness of the early morning of the 23d the 
field artillcry was placed in battery on the heights opposite 
thc northern face of the fortress. The 13th regimcnt was 
extended in skirmishing order in the gardens under the 
wall of this facc, and a detachment of sepoys was detailcd 
to make a false attack on the eastern face. Near the 
centre of the northern face was the Cabul gate, in front 
of which lay waiting for the signal, a storming party con- 
sisting of the light companies of the four European regi- 
ments, under command of Colonel Dennie of thc I 3th. 
The main column consisted of two European regiments 
and  the support of a third, the whole commanded by 
Brigadier Sale ; the native regiments constituted the 
reserve. All those dispositions were completed by 
thrcc A.M., and, favoured by the noise of the wind and 
the darkness, without alarming the garrison. 
Punctually at this hour the little party of engineers 
charged with the task of blowing in the gate started for- 
ward on the hazardous errand. Captain Peat of the 
Bombay Engineers was in command. Durand, a young 
lieutenant of Bengal Engineers, who was later to attain 
high distinction, was entrusted with the service of heading 
the explosion party. The lattcr, leading the party, had 
advanced unmolested to within 150  yards of thc works, 
when a challenge, a shot and a shout gave intimation of 
his detection. A musketry fire was promptly opened by 
the garrison from the battlements, and blue lights illumi- 
nated the approach to the gate, but in the fortunate absence 
of fire from the lower works the bridge was safely crossed, 
and Peat with his handful of linesmen halted in a sally- 
port to covcr the explosion opcration, Durand advanced 
to the gate, his sappers piled their powdcr bags against it 
and withdrew; Durand and his scrgeant uncoilcd the hosc, 
ignited thc quick-match undcr a rain from the battlements 
of bullets and iniscellancous missiles, and then retired to 
cover out of reach of the explosion. 
At  the sound of the first shot from the battlements, 
Keane's cannon had opened their fire. The skirmishers 
i n  the gardens engaged in a brisk fusillade. The rattle of 
Hay's musketry was heard from the east. Thc garrison 
was alert in its reply. The  northern ramparts became a 
sheet of flame, and everywhere thc cannonade and musketry 
fire nrascd i n  noise and volume. Suddenly, as the day 
~vas beginning to dawn, a dull, heavy sound was heard by 
the l~ead of thc waiting column, scarce audiblc clsewhcre 
because of the boisterous wind and the din of the firing. 
A pillar of black smoltc shot up from where had been the 
Afghan gate, now shattered by thc 300 pounds of gun- 
powder \vhich Durand had explodcd against it. The  
signal to the storming party was to be thc Laclvance' 
sounded by the hugler who accompanied Pcat. But thc 
bugler had bccn shot through the hcad. Durand could 
not find Peat. Going back through thc bullets to the 
marcst party of infantry, he experienced some delay, but 
a t  last the column was apprised that all was right, the 
'advance' was sounded, Dennie ancl his stormers sped 
forward, and Salc followecl at thc head of the main 
column. 
After a temporary chcck to the latter, because of a 
misconception, it pushed on in close support of Dentlie. 
Tha t  gallant soldicr and his gallant followers had rushed 
into the smoking and gloomy archway to find themselves 
met hand to hand by thc Afghan defcnders, who had re- 
covered from their surprise. Nothing could be distinctly 
seen in the narrow gorge, but the clash of sword bladc 
against bayonet was heard on every side. The  stormers 
had to grope their way bctween the yet standing walls in 
a dusk which the glimmer of the blue light only made 
more pcrplexing. But some clbow room was gradually 
gained, and then, since there was neither time nor space 
for mcthoclic street fighting, each loaded section gave its 
volley and then made way for the next, which, crowding 
to the front, poured a dcnclly clischarge a t  half pistol-shot 
into the densely crowdcd defcnders. Thus the storming 
party won steadily its way, till at lcngth Dcnnic ancl his 
leading files discerned ovcr the heads of their opponents 
a patch of blue sky and a twinlding star or two, and with 
a final charge found themselves within the place. ' 
A body of fierce Afghan swordsmen projected them- 
selves into the interval between the storming party and 
the main column. Sale, at the head of the latter, was cut 
. down by a tulwar stroke in the face; in the effort of his 
blow the assailant fell with the assailed, and they rollcd 
together among the shattered timbcrs of the gatc. Salc, 
wounclccl again on thc ground, and faint with loss of blood, 
called to one of his officers for assistance. Icershaw ran 
the Afghan through the body with his sword ; but hc still 
struggled with the Brigadier. At  length in the grappld 
Sale got uppermost, and the11 he dealt his adversary. 
a sabre cut which cleft him from crown to eyebrows. 
There was much confused fighting within the place, for 
the Afghan garrison made furious rallies again and again ; 
but thc citadel was found open and unclefended, and by 
sunrise British banners \ \we  waving abovc its battlements'. 
Hydcr Khan, the Governor of Ghuznec, one of the sons of 
Dost Mahomccl, was found concealed in a house in the 
town and taken prisoner. The British loss amounted to 
about 200 killed and wounded, that of the garrison, which 
was estimated at from 3000 to 4000 strong, was over 500 
killed. The number of wounded was not ascertained ; of 
prisoners taken in arms there were about 1600. The 
booty consisted of numerous horses, camels and rnulcs, 
orclnancc and military weapons of various descriptions, 
and a vast quantity ot supplies of all kinds. 
Kcane, having garrisoned Ghuznee, and left there his 
sick and wounded, resumed on July 30th his march on 
Cabul. Within twenty-four hours after the event Dost 
Mahomed heard of the fall of Ghuznee. Possessed of thc 
adverse intelligence, the Dost gathercd his chiefs, rcceived 
their facile assurances of fidelity, sent his brother the 
Nawaub Jubbar Khan to ask what terms Shah Soojah and 
his British allies mere prepared to offer him, and recalled 
from Jellalabad his son Akbar Khan, with all the force he . 
could muster there. The Dost's emissary to thc allied 
camp was informed that ' an honourable asylum' in 
British India was at the servicc of his brother; an offer 
which Jubbar Khan declined in his name without thanks. 
Before he left to share the fortunes of the Dost, the Sirdar 
is reported to have asked Macnaghten, ' If Shah Soojah is 
really our king, what need has he of your army and name? 
You have brought him here,' he continued, 'with your 
money and arms. Well, leave him now with us Afghans, 
and let him rule us if he can.' When Jubbar Khan re- 
turned to Cabul with his sombre message, the Dost, hav- 
ing bcen joincd by Akbar Khan, concentrated his army, 
and found himself at the hcad of 13,ooo men, with thirty 
guns ; but he mournfully realised that he could lean no 
reliance on thc constancy and courage of his adherents. 
Neverthcless, he marched out along the Ghuznee road, and 
drew up his force at  Urguncleh, where he commanded the 
most direct line of retreat toward the westcrn hill country 
of Ramian, in case his people would not fight, or should 
they fight, if they were beatcn. 
There was no fight in his following ; scarcely, indeed, 
was there a loyal supporter among all those who had 
eaten his salt for years. Therc was truc manhood in this 
chief whom we were replacing by an cffcte puppet. The 
Dost, Koran in hand, rodc among his perfidious troops, 
and conjurcd them in thc namc of God and the I'rophct 
not to dishonour thcmsclves by transfcrring thcir allegi- 
ance to one who had fillcd Afghanistan with infidcls and 
blasphemers. ' If,' he continued, 'you are rcsolved to 
be traitors to me, at least enable mc to die with honour. 
Support the brother of Futteh Khan in one last charge 
against these Fcringhce dogs. In that charge he will fall ; 
then go and make your own terms with Shah Soojah.' 
The high-souled appcal inspired no worthy rcsponsc ; but 
one is loth to credit the testimony of the soldier-of-for- 
tune Harlan that his guards forsook the Dost, ancl that 
the rabble of troops plundered his pavilion, snatched from 
under him thc pillows of his divan, seizcd his prayer 
carpet, and finally hackcd into pieccs thc tcnt and its 
appurtenances. On thc evening of August 2d thc hap- 
less man shook the dust of thc camp of traitors from his 
feet, and rode away toward Ramian, his son Akbar 
Khan, with a handful of resolutc men, coxring the retreat 
of his father and his family. Tidings of the flight of 
Dost nIaliomed reached Keanc on the jd, at  Sheilcabad, 
where he had haltecl to concentrate ; and Outram volun- 
teered to head a pursuing party, to consist of some 
British officers as volunteers, some cavalry and some 
Afghan horse. I-Iadji Khan I<akur, thc carlicst traitor of 
his race, undertook to act as guide. This man's devices 
of delay defeated Outram's fiery energy, perhaps in dc- 
ceit, perhaps because he regarclcd it as lacking discretion. 
For Alcbar Khan rnade a long halt on thc crown of the 
pass, ivaiting to checlc any endeavour to press closely on 
his fugitive father, and it would havc gonc hard with 
Outram, with a few fagged horserncn at his back, if  Hadji 
Khan had allowcd him to overtake thc resolute young 
Afghan chief. As Kcanc moved forward, thcre fcll to 
him the guns which thc Dost had left in thc Urgundeh 
position. On August 6th hc cncamped closc to Cabul ; 
and on thc following clay Shah Soojah made his public 
cntry inlo thc capital which hc had last seen thirty years 
prcviously. After so many years of vicissitude, adventure 
and intriguc, hc was again on the throne of his ancestors, 
but placccl tllcre by the bayoncts of thc ~ o v e r n m e n t  
whosc crcaturc hc was, an insult to the nation whom he 
had the insolcncc to call his pcople. 
The cntry, ncverthelcss, was a goodly speclacle enough. 
Shah Soojah, dazzling in coronet, jewellcd gircllc and 
bracelets, but with no ICoh-i-noor now glittering on his 
forelicaci, lscstrode a white charger, whose equipments 
glea~ncd with gold. Ry his side rode Macnaghten and 
Burnes ; in the pagcant were the principal officers of the 
British army. Sabres flashed in front of the procession, 
bayonets sparkled in its rear, as it wended its may 
through the grcat bazaar nhich I'ollock was to dcstroy 
three years later, and along the tortuous street to the 
gate of the Bnlla Hissar. But neither thc monarch nor 
his pageant lcindled the enthusiasm in the Cabulees. 
There was no  voicc of welcoinc ; the citizens did not 
care to trouble themsclvcs so much as to make him a 
salaam, and they stared at the European strangers harder 
than at his restored majesty. There was a touch of pathos 
in the burst of cagerriess to which the old man gave 
way as he reachccl the palace, ran through the gardcns, 
visitccl the apartments, and commented on thc neglect 
everywhcrc apparcnt. Shah Soojah was rather a poor 
crcaturc, but hc was by no means altogether clcstitutc of 
good points, and far worse men tha i~  he were actors in 
thc strangc historical episode of which hc was thc figure- 
head. He was humane for an Afghan ; hc ncver was 
proved to have been untrue to us; he must have had 
sornc courage of a I<ind elsc he would never have re- 
mained in Cabul whcn our pcople left it, in thc a11 but 
full assurance of thc fate which presently overtook him as 
a mattcr of course. J-Iavclock thus portrays him : ' A  stout 
person of the rnidclle I~eight, his chin covcred with 
a long thick and neatly trimmed beard, dyed black to 
conceal thc cncroachrnents of time, His manner toward 
the English is gcntlc, calm and dignified, without haughti- 
ness, but his own subjects have invariably complained of 
his rcception of thcrn as cold and rcpulsive, cven to rude- 
ness. His complexion is darkcr than that of thc generality 
of Afghans, and his features, if not decidedly I~andsomc, 
are not the rcverse of pleasing; but thc esprcssion of his 
countenance would betray to a skilful physiognomist that 
rnixture of timidity and cluplicity so often obscrvablc i n  
the character of thc higher order of men in Southern 
Asia.' 
C H A P T E R  , 1 1 1  
TIXE FIRST Y E A R  OF OCCUPATION 
S1lc JOHN KAYE, in his picturesque if diffuse history of 
the first Afghan war, lays it down that, in seating Shah 
Soojah on the Cabul t h r o ~ ~ c ,  ' the Uritish Govcrnmcnt had 
done all that it had undertaltcn to do,' and Durand argues 
that, having accornplisl~d this, 'thc British army could 
have thcn been \vithdrawn with the honour and famc of 
entire success.' The facts apparently do not justify the 
reasoning of either writcr. In thc Simla manifesto, in 
which Lord Auclzland embodied the rationalc of his policy, 
he  expressed the confident hope ' that the Shah will be 
speedily replaced on his thronc by his own subjects and 
adherents, and when oncc hc shall be+received in power, 
and thc independence and integrity of Afghanistan estab- 
lishecl, the British army will be withdra\vn.' The Shah 
had becn incleecl resto~*ecl to his thronc, but by British 
bayonets, not by 'his own subjects and adherents.' It  , 
could not seriously bc maintained that Ilc was secure in 
power, or that the inclcpendcnce and integrity of Afghan- 
istan were established when British troops wcre holding 
Candahar, Ghuznee and Cabul, the only three positions 
where the Shah was nominally paramount, whcri the 
fugitive Dost was still within its borders, when intrigue 
and disaffection werc seething in every vallcy and on every 
hill-side, and when the principality of Herat maintained 
a contemptuous independence. Macnaghten might avow 
himself convinced of the popularity of the Shah, and 
believe or strive to believe that the Afghans had received 
the puppct king ' with feelings  early amounting to ado- 
ration,' but he did not venture to support the conviction 
hc avowed by advocating that the Shah should bc aban- 
doned to his adoring subjects. Lord Auclcland's policy 
was gravely and radically erroneous, but it had a definite 
object, and that object certainly was not a futile march to 
Cabul and back, dropping incidentally by the waysidc the 
aspirant to a throne whom he had himsclf put forward, 
and leaving him to take his chance among a truculent and 
adverse population. Thus early, in all probability, Lord 
Auckland mas disillusioned of the expectation that the 
effective restoration of Shah Soojah would be of light and 
easy accomplisl~rnent., but at lcast he could not afford to 
have the enterprise a cotip ~mntrp~dwlicn as yet it was little 
beyond its inception. 
The cost of the expcdition was already, however, a 
strain, and the troops engagcd in it werc needed in India. 
Lord Auclclancl intimated to Macnaghten his expectation 
that a strong brigade would suffice to hold Afghanistan in 
conjunction with thc Shah's contingent, and his desire that 
the rcst of the army of the Indus should at once return to 
India. Macnaghten, on the other hand, in spite of his 
avowal of the Shah's popularity, was anxious to retain in 
Afghanistan a large body of troops. H e  rneditatcd strange 
enterprises, and proposed that Kcane should support his 
C 
project bf scnding a force toward Bolthara to give check 
to  a Russian column which Pottinger at Ilerat had heard 
was assembling at Orenburg, with Khiva for its objcctivc. 
ICeane dcrided the proposal, ancl Macnaghten reluctantly 
abandoned it, but he demanded of Lord Aucltland with 
success, the retention in Afghanistan of the Bengal division 
of thc army. I n  t l ~ c  lnidclle of September Gcneral Will- 
shire marched with the Bombay column, with orders, on 
his way to the Inclus to pay a hostile visit to Khelat, and 
punish its khan for the 'disloyalty' with \~hich  hc had 
been charged, a com~nission which the Dritish officer ful- 
filled with a skill and thoroughness that could be admired 
with less reservation had the aggression on the gallant 
Mehrab been less wanton. A month later ICeane started 
for India by the IChyber route, which Wade had opened 
without serious resistance when in August and September 
he escorted through the passes Prince Timour, Shah 
Soojah's heir-apparcnt. During the temporary absence 
of Cotton, who accompanied Iceane, Nott had the com- 
 nand a t  Candahar, Sale a t  and about Cabul, and the 
troops were quartered in those capitals, and in Jellala- 
bad, Ghuznee, Charikar and Bamian. The Shah and 
the Envoy wintered in the milder climate of Jellalabad, 
and Burries was in political charge of the capital and its 
vicinity. 
It  was a prophetic utterance that the acco~nplishment 
of our military succession would mark but the commence- 
ment of our real difficulties in Afghanistan. In theory 
and in name Shah Soojah was an independent monarch; 
it was, incleecl, only in virtue of his proving himself able 
to rule independently that he could justify his claim to 
rule at 111. But that he was independent was a con- 
tradiction in terms while British troops studded the 
country, and whilc the real powers of sovereignty were 
exerciscd by Macnaghten. Certain functions, it is true, 
the latter did permit the nominal monarch to exercise. 
Whilc debarrcd from a voice in measures of external 
policy, and not allo\ved to sway thc lincs of conduct to he 
acloptcd toward independent or revolting tribes, thc Shah 
was allowcd to concern himself with thc administration of 
justicc, and in his hands were the settlement, collection 
and appropriation of thc revenue of those portions of thc 
l~ingclorn from which any rcvenuc could be cxactcd. He 
was allowed to appoint as his minister of state, the com- 
panion of his exile, old Moolla Shikore, who had lost 
both his memory and his ears, but who had sufficient 
faculty left to hate the English, to oppress the people, to 
bc corrupt and venal beyond all conception, and to appoint 
suborclinatcs as flagitious as himsclf, ' Bad ministers,' 
wrote Uurnes, 'are in every government solid ground 
for unpopularity; and I doubt if ever a Icing had a worsc 
set than has Shah Soojah! The oppressed people ap- 
pcalcd to the British functionaries, who remonstrated with 
the minister, and the minister punishcd the people for ap- 
pealing to the British fi~nctionarics. The Shah was free to 
confer grants of land on his creatures, but when the holders 
resisted, he was unable to enforce his will since he was not 
allowed to enlploy soldiers; and the odium of the forciblc 
confiscation ultimately fell on Macnaghten, who alone had 
the ordering of expeditions, and who could not see the 
Shah belittled by non-fulfilment of his requisitions. 
Justice sold by venal judges, oppression and corruption 
rampant in every department of internal administration, 
it was no wonder that nobles and people alike resented 
the inflictions under whose sting they writhed. They 
were accustomed to a certain amount of oppression; Dost 
Mahomed had chastised them with whips, but Shah 
Soojah, whom the English had brought, was chastising 
them with scorpions. And they felt his yolie the more 
bitterly because, with the shrewd acutcness of the race, 
they rccognised thc really servile condition of this ncw 
king. They fretted, too, under the sharp bit of the-British 
political agents who were strcwn about the country, in 
the exccution of a miserable and futile policy, and whose 
lives, in  a few instances, did not maintain the good name 
of their country. Dost Mahomed had maintained his 
sway by politic management of the chiefs, ant1 through 
them of the tribes. Macnaghten would have done well 
to impress on Shah Soojah the wisdom of pursuing the 
same tactics. There was, it is true, the alternative of 
destroying the power of the barons, but that policy in- 
volved a stubborn and doubtful struggle, and prolonged 
occupation of thc country by British troops in great 
strength. Macnaghten professcd our occupation of 
Afghanistan to be temporary ; yet he was clearly ad- 
venturing on the rash expcrimcnt of weakcning the nobles 
when he set about the enlistment of local tribal levies, 
who, paid from the Royal treasury and commanded by 
British officcrs, were espected to be staunch to the 
Shah, and useful in curbing the powers of the chiefs. 
The latter, of course, were alienated and resentf~~l, and 
the levies, imbued with the Afghan attribute of fickle- 
ness, proved for the most part undisciplined and faithless. 
The First Y e a r  of Occ@atio?t 
The winter of 1839-40 passcd without much notc- 
worthy incident. The  wintcr climate of Afghnuistan is 
severe, and the Afghan, in ordinary circumstanccs, is 
among the hibernating animals. But down in thc I<hybcr, 
in October, the tribes gave somc trouble. Thcy werc dis- 
satisfied with the amount of annual black-mail paid thcm 
for the right of way through thcir passes. When the 
Shah was a fugitive thirty years previously, they had con- 
cealed and protccted him ; and m'indful of thcir kindly 
services, hc had promised thcm, unlanomn to  Macnaghten, 
the augmentation of their subsidy to the old scalc from 
which it llad gradually dwindled. Watlc, returning from 
Cabul, did not bring them the assurances they expected, 
whereupon they rose and concentratcd and invested Ali 
Musjid, a fort which they regarded as thc kcy of thcir 
gloomy defile. Mackeson, thc Peshawur polilical officer, 
threw provisions and ammunition into Ali Musjid, but 
the force, on its rcturn march, was attacked by thc hillmcn, 
t l ~ c  S i k h ~ ~ b e i n g  routccl, and the sepoys incurring loss of 
men and transport. Thc emboldcncd Khyhcrccs now 
turned on Ali Musjid in earnest; but thc garrison was 
strengthened, and the place was hclcl until a couple of 
regiments inarched down from Jellalabad, and \ \we  prc- 
paring to attack the hillmen, whcn it was announced that 
Maclceson had rnadc a compact with the chiefs for tllc pay- 
ment of an annual subsidy which they considered adcquatc. 
Afghanistan fifty years ago, and the same is in a 
lneasure true of it to-clay, was rather a bundlc of provinces, 
some of which owned scarccly a nominal allegiance to the 
ruler in Cabul, than a concrete stale. Hcrat and Canda- 
liar were wholly independent, thc Ghilzai tribcs inhabiting 
thc wide tracts from thc Suliman rarigcs wcstwarcl beyond 
the road through Ghuzncc, betwccn Candahar atid Cabul, 
and north\vard into thc ruggcd country betwccn Cabd  
and Jellalabad, acknowleclgcd no other authority than 
that of their own chick. T h e  Ghilzais arc agriculturists, 
shepherds, and robbers ; they arc constantly cngagcd in 
internal feucls ; they are jealous of their wild independ- 
cnce, ancl through thc centuries havc abatcd littlc of 
their untamed ferocity. Thcy had rejcctcd Macnagliten's 
advances, and had attackcd S h d i  .FioojaliJs camp on the 
clay before thc fall of Ghuzncc. Outram, in reprisal, 
had promptly raidcd part of thcir country. Latcr, the 
winter had restrained thcm from activity, but they brolce 
out again in thc spring. I n  May Captain Aridcrson, 
marching from Candahar with a mixcd force about 1200 
strong, was offcrcd battle near Jazce, in the Turnuli, by 
some 2000 Gliilzai horsc ancl foot. Anclcrson's guns told 
heavily among the Ghilzai horsctneo, who, impatient of 
thc fire, made a spirited clash on his Icft flank. Grapc 
and muskctry checkcd them ; but they rallicd, and twicc 
charged homc on tllc bayoncts bcforc they withdrew, 
leaving 200 of their number dead on thc ground. Nott 
sent a detachment to  occupy thc fortress of Khclat-i- 
Ghilzai, between Candahar and Ghuzncc, thus rc~ldering 
the communications more securc ; and latc;, Macnaghten 
bribcd the chief5 by a n  annual subsidy of A600 to abstain 
from infesting the highways. The terms wcrc cheap, 
for the Ghilzai tribcs niusterccl some 40,000 fighting 
men. 
Shah Soojah and the Envoy returned from Jellalabad 
to Cabul in April 1840. A couple of regiments had 
wintered not uncomfortably in the Balla Hissar. That 
fortress was then the ltey of Cabul, and v.d~ile our troops 
remained in Afghanistan it should not havc been left 
ungarrisoned a single hour. The soldicrs did thcir bcst 
to impress on Macnaghten the all-importance of the 
position. But the Shah objected to its continued occupa- 
tion, and Macnaghtcn weakly yieldcd. Cotton, who had 
returned to the chief military commancl in Afghanistan, 
made no remonstrance ; thc Balla I-Iissar was evacuated, 
and the troops w r c  quartered in cantonments built in an 
utterly defenceless position on the plain north of Cabul, 
a position whose environs wcre cumbered with walled 
gardens, and coinmanded by acljaccnt high ground, and by 
native forts which were neither demolished nor occupied. 
Thc troops, now in permanent and regularly constructed 
quarters, ceased to bc an expeditionary force, and became 
substantially an army of occupation, Thc  officers sent 
for their wives to inhabit with thcm thc bungalows in 
which they had settled down. Lady Macnaghten, in the 
,spacious mission residence which stood apart in its own 
grounds, prcsiclcd over the society of thc cantonmcnts, 
which had all thc cheery surrounclings of the half-settlcd, 
half-nomadic life of our military people in the East. 
There (were thc ' coffee house ' after the morning ride, the 
I gathering round the bandstand in the evening, thc 
impromptu dance, and thc buvra khnna occasionally in 
the largcr houses. A racecourse had been laid out, and 
there were ' sky '  races and morc formal meetings, And 
so 'as  in the days that wcre before the flood, they w r c  eat- 
ing and drinking, ancl marrying and giving in marriage, and 
knew not until the flood came, ancl took them all away.' 
I 
Macnaghten cngagecl himself in a welter of internal I 
and external intrigue, his mood swinging from singular I 
complacency to a disquietude that sometimes approachcd 
despondency. It  had come to be forced on him, in spite 
of his intermittent optimism, that the Government was 
a government of scntry-boxes, and that Afghanistan was 
not governed so much as garrisoned. The utter failure ot 
the winter march attempted by Pcroffski's Russian column 
across the frozen stcppcs on Khiva was a rclief to him ; 
but the state of affairs in 1-Icrat was a constant trouble 
and anxiety. Major Todd had been sent there as political 
agent, to make a treaty with Shah Kamran, and to super- 
intend the repair and improvcment of the fortifications of 
the city. Karnran was plenteously subsidisecl ; he tool< 
Macnaghten's lakhs, but furtivcly maintained close relations 
with Pcrsia. Detecting the double-dealing, Macnaghten 
urged on Lord Auckland the annexation of Hcrat to 
Shah Soojah's dominions, but was instructed to condone 
Kamran's duplicity, and try to bribe him higher. Kamran 
by no means objected to this policy, and, while continu- 
ing his intrigues with Pcrsia, cheerfully accepted thc 
money, arms and ammunition which Macnaghten sup- 
I plied him with so profusely as to cause remonstrance on 
the part of the financial authorities in Calcutta. The 
Commander-in-Chief was strong enough to counteract thc 
pressure which Macnaghten brought to bear on Lord 
Auckland in favour of an expedition against Herat, which 
his lordship at length finally negatived, to the great dis- 
gust of the Envoy, who wrote of the conduct of his 
chief as ' drivelling bcyoncl contcmpt,' and ' sighed for a 
Wellesley or  a Hastings.' The  ultimate result of Mac- 
naghten's rlegotiations with Sha11 I<amran was Major 
Todd's withdrawal from I-Icrat. Todd had suspenclcd thc  
monthly subsidy, to the great wrath of I<amranls rapacious 
and treachcrous minister Yar Mahorned, who made a 
peremptory demand for increased advances, and refused 
Todcl's stipulation that a British force should be admitted 
into I-Ierat. Todd's action in quitting Ilerat was severcly 
censured by his superiors, and he was relegated to regi- 
mental duty. Perhaps he acted somewhat rashly, but he  
had not been kept wcll informcd ; for instance, hc had 
been unaware that Persia had becomc our friend, and had 
engaged to cease relations with Shah ICainran-an irn- 
portant arrangement of which he certainly should havc 
been cognisant. Macnaghten had squandered more gold 
on Ilerat than the fee-simple of the principality was worth, 
and to no purpose; he left that state just as he found it, 
treacherous, insolent, grecdy and independent. 
The precariousness of thc long lines of communicatio~vi 
betwcen British India and thc army in Afghanistan-a 
source of dangcr which from thc first had disquieted 
cautious soldiers-was making itsclf seriously fclt, ancl 
constituted for Macnaghtcn another cause of solicitude. 
Old Runjeet Singh, a faithful if not disinterested ally, 
had died on Junc 27th, 1839, the day on which I<eane 
marched out from Candahar. The breath was scarcely 
out of the old reprobate whcn thc Punjaub bcgan to drift 
into anarchy. So far as the Sikh share in it was con- 
cerncd, the tripartite treaty threatened to become a dead 
Ictter. The Lahore Durbar had not adequately fulfilled 
the undertaking to support Prince Tirnour's advance by thc  
Khyber, nor was it duly regarding thc obligation to main- 
tnin a forcc on the Pcshawur fronticr of the Punjaub. But C 
thosc things were trivial in comparison with the grom- 
ing reluctance manifested frccly, to accord to  our troops 
and convoys permission to travcrse the runjaub on the 
march to  and from Cabul. T h e  Anglo-Indian C ~ ~ X I -  
ment scnt Mr Cldrlc to Lahore to  settlc the question as to 
the  thoroughfare. Hc had instructions to be firm, and the 
Sikhs did not challenge Mr Clerk's stipulation that the 
Anglo-Indian Government must have unmolested right of 
way through the P~tnjaub, while he undertoolc to restrict 
the  usc of it as much as possible. This arrangcment by 
no means satisfied the exacting Macnaghtcn, and he 
continued to worry himself by foreseeing all sorts of troub- 
lous contingencies unless mcasures were adopted for 
. '  macadamking' thc road through the Punjaub. 
The summer of I Sqo did not pass without serious 
Y interruptions to the British communications bctwcen 
Candahar and the Indus;  nor without unexpected and 
ominous disasters before they were restored. General 
Witlshire, with the returning Bombay column, had in the 
prcvious November stormed Mehrab Khan's ill-manned 
and worse armed fort of Khelat, and the Khan, disdaining 
t o  yield, had fallen in the hopelcss struggle. His son 
Nusseer Khan had been put  aside in favour of a col- 
lateral prctendcr, and becamc a n  active and dangerous 
malcontent. All Northern Beloochistan fell into a state 
of anarchy. A detachment of sepoys escorting supplies 
was cut to  pieces in one of the passes, Quettawas attacked 
with great resolution by  Nusseer Khan,but was opportunely 
relievecl by a force sent from another post. Nusseer made 
himself Inaster of Khclat, and there fell into his cruel hands 
Lieutenant Idovcday, the British political officer stationed 
there, whom he treated with great barbarity, and finally 
murdered. A British detachment under Colonel Clibborn, 
was defeated by the Reloochees with heavy loss, and com- 
pclled to retreat. Nusseer Khan, clesccnding into the low 
country of Cutch, assaulted the important post of Dadur, 
but mas repulsed, and taking refuge in thc hills, was routed 
by  Colonel Marshall with a forcc from Kotrce, whereupon 
he became a skulking fugitive, Nott marched down from 
Candahar mith a strong force, occupied I<helat, and fully 
re-cstablishecl communications mith the line of the Indus, 
while fresh troops movcd forward into Upper Scinde, and 
tllcnce gradually advancing to Quetta and Candahar, 
materially strengthened the British position in south en^ 
Afghanistan. 
Dost Mahomed, after his flight from Cabul in 1839, had 
soon left the hospitable rcfuge afforded him in Khooloom, 
a tcrritory west of the I-Iindoo Koosh beyond Bamian, 
and had gonc to Bo1;hara 011 thc treacherous invitation of 
its Amcer, who threw him into captivity. T h c  Dost's 
family remaincd at 1Chooloom, in the charge of his brother 
Jubbar Khan. The advance of British forces beyond 
Barnian to Syghan and Bajgah, induced that Sirdar to com- 
lnit himself and the ladies to British protection. Dr Lord, 
Macnaghten's political officer in the Ramian district, was a 
rash althongll well-meaning man. The errors he had com- 
mitted sincc the opening of spring had occasioned disasters 
to the troops whose dispositions he controlled, and had 
incited thc neiglibouring hill tribes to active disaffection. 
In July Dost Mahomed made his escape from Bokhara, 
hurried to I<hooloom, found its ruler and the tribes h l l  of 
zeal for his cause, and rapidly grew in  strength. Lord 
found it was timc to call i n  his advancc posts and con- 
centrate at Barnian, losing in the operation an Afghan 
regiment which deserted to thc Dost. Macnaghten re- 
inforced Bamian, and sent Colonel Dcnnie to command 
there. On September 18th Dennie moved out with two 
guns and 800 men against thc Dost's advance parties raid- 
ing in an adjacent valley. Those rletachments driven back, 
Dennie suddcnly found himself opposed to the irregular 
mass of Oosbeg horse and foot which constituted the army 
of the Dost. Mackenzie's cannon fire shook the undis- 
ciplined horde, the infantry pressed in to close quarters, 
and soon thc nondescript host of the Dost was in panic 
flight, with Dcnnic's cavalry in eager pursuit. The Dost 
escaped with difficulty, with the loss of his entire personal 
equipment. H e  was once more a fugitive, and the Wali of 
Khooloom promptly subrnittcd himself to the victors, and 
pledged himself to aid and harbour thc broken chief no 
more. Macnaghten had been a prey to apprehension 
while the Dost's attitude was threatening; he was now i n  
a glow of joy and hope. 
But the Envoy's elation was short-lived. Dost Ma- 
ho~necl was yet to cause him much solicitude. Defcated in 
Bamian, he was ready for another attempt in the Kohistan 
country to the north of Cabul. Disaffection was rife every- 
whcrc throughout the Itingdom, but it was perhaps most 
rife in  the I<ohistan, which was seething with intrigues 
in favour of Dost Mahomed, while the local chiefs were 
intensely exasperated by thc exactions of the Shah's 
revenuc collectors. Macnaghten summoned the chiefs to 
Cabul. Thcy came, they did homage to thc Shah and 
swore allegiance to him ; they wcnt away from the capital 
pledging each other to his overthrow, ancl jeering a t  the 
scantiness of the force they had seen a t  Cabul. Inter- 
cepted lettcrs disclosed their schemes, and in the cnd of 
September Sale, with a considerablc force, marched out to  
chastise the disaffccted Kohistanees. The  fort of Tootun- 
durrah fcll without resistance. Julgah, however, the next 
fort assailed, stubbornly held out, and officers and men fell 
in the unsuccessful attempt to storm it. In three weelis 
Sale marched to and fro through thc Kohistan, pursuing 
will-o'-the-wisp rumours as to the whereabouts of the Dost, 
dcstroying forts on the course of his weary pilgrimage, 
ancl subjected occasionally to night attacks. 
Meanwhile, in the bclief that Dost Mahomed was close 
to Cabul, and mournfully conscious that the capital and 
surrounding country were ripe for a rising, Macnaghtcn 
had relapsed into nervousness, and was a prey to gloomy 
forebodings. The troops at Bamian were urgently re- 
called. Cannon \ \we mounted on the Balla Hissar to 
ovcrawe the city, thc conccntralion of the troops in the 
fortress was under consideration, and men mere talking 
of preparing for a siegc. How Macnaghten's English 
nature was undergoing deterioration under the strain of 
. cvents is shown by his writing of the Dost : ' Would it be 
justifiable to set a price on this fellow's head ? ' How his 
perceptions were warped was further evinced by his 
talking of 'showing no mercy to the man who has been 
the author of all the evil mow distracting the country,' 
and by his complaining of Sale and Burncs that, 'with 
moo good infantry, they are sitting down before a 
fortificd place, and are afraid to attack it.' 
Lcarning that for certain thcDost had crossed tI~I3.indoo 
ICoosh from Nijrao into the Kohistan, Sale, who had been 
rcinforccd, sent out reconnaissances which ascertained that 
he was in the Purwan Durrah valley, stretching down 
from the I-Iindoo Koosh to the Gorebund river; and 
the British forcc marched thither on zd November. AS 
the villagc was neared, the Dost's peoplc wcre seen 
cvacuating it and thc adjacent forts, and making for 
thc hills. Sale's cavalry was some distance in advance of 
the infantry of the advance guard, but time was precious. 
Anderson's horse went to the left, to cut OK retreat down 
thc Gorebund valley. Fraser took his two squadrons 
of Dengal cavalry to the right, advanccd along thc 
foothills, ancl gaincd the head of the valley. Hc  was too 
late to intercept a small body of Afghan horsemen, who 
were already climbing Lhc upland; but badly mounted 
as Lhe latter were, hc coulcl pursue them with cffcct. 
But it scerricd that thc Afghans preferred to fight rather 
than be pursucd. The Dost himself was in command 
of the little party, and the Dost was a man whose nature 
was to fight, not to run. He  wheeled his handful so that 
his horsemen faced Fraser's troop down there below them. 
Then the Dost pointed to his banner, bared his head, 
called on his supporters in the name of God and the . 
Prophet t o  follow him against the unbelievers, and led 
them down the slopc. 
Frascr had formed up his troopers when recall orders 
lrached hiin. Joyous that the situation entitlcd him to 
disobey them, he gave instead the word to charge. As 
the Afghans came down at no great pace, they fired occa- 
sionally ; either b~cause  of the bullets, or because of an 
access of pusillanimity, Fraser's troopcrs broke and Rcd 
ignominiously. The British gentlemen charged home un- 
supported. Broadfoot, Crispin and Lord wcre slain; Pon- 
sonby, severely \voundecl and his rcins cut, was carried 
out of the m W e  by his charger ; Fraser, covcred with 
blood and wounds, brolie through his assailants, and 
brought to Sale his report of the disgrace of his troopers.. 
After a sharp pursuit of thc poltroons, the Dost and his 
followers leisurely quilted the field. 
Burnes wrote to the Envoy-he was a soldier, but hc 
was also a ' political,' and political employ see~necl often 
in Afghanistan to deteriorate the attribute of solclierhoocl 
-that there was no altcrnative for the force but to fall 
back on Cabul, and cntreatcd Macnaghten to order im- 
mediate concentration of all the troops. This letter Mac- 
naghten received the day after the disaster in the Kohistan, 
when he was taking his aftcrnoon ride in the Cabul plain. 
His heart must have been vcry hcavy as he rode, whcn 
suddenly a horscman gallopccl up to him and announced 
that the A~neer  was approaching. ' What A~neer ? ' aslicd 
Macnaghten. Dost Maholncd Khan,' was the reply, and 
sure enough there was thc Dost close at hand, Dis- 
mounting, this Afghan prince and gentleman saluted the 
Envoy, and olfercd him his snrord, which Macnaghten 
declinccl to takc. Dost and Envoy rode into Cabul to- 
gether, and such was thc impression the former made on 
the latter that Macnaghten, who a month before had per- 
mitted himself to think of putting a price on ' the fellow's' 
head, begged now of the Governor-General ' that the Dost 
be treated more handsomely than was Shah Soojah, who 
had no claim on us.' And then follo\vecl a strange con- 
fession for the man to makc who made the tripartite 
treaty, a ~ i d  approvcd the Simla manifesto : ' WC had no 
hand in depriving the Shah of his kingdom, whevcas we 
tyccfetz! the Dost, who vevw ofe?tded us, i?t s?@$ort of our 
poh'cy, of which he auns the victim.' 
Durand regards Dost Mahomed's surrender as ' evinc- 
ing a strange pusillanimity.' This opprobrious judgment 
appears unjustified. No doubt he was weary of the 
fugitivc life he had been leading, but to pronounce him 
afraid that the I<ol~istanccs or any othcr Afghans would 
betray him is t o  ignore the fact that hc had bccn for 
lnontl~s among people who might, any hour of any day, 
have betrayed him if thcy had chosen. Nobler motivcs 
than thosc ascribed to him by Durand may be supposed 
t o  have actuated a Inan of his simplc and lofty nature. 
H e  had given thc arbitrament of mar a trial, and had 
rcalised that in that way he could make no head against 
us. I le  might, indecd, have continued the futile struggle, 
but he was the sort of man to rccognise the selfishness of 
that persistency which would involve ruin and death to 
thc dcvoted people who mould not desert his cause while 
he  claimed to havc a cause. When historians write of 
Afghan trcachcry and guile, it seems to have escaped 
their perception that Afghan treachery was but a phase of 
Afghan patriotism, of an unscrupulous character, doubt- 
Icss, according to our notions, but neverthclcss practical 
in its methods, and not wholly unsuccessful in  its results. 
I t  may have been a highcr and purer patriotism that 
movcd Dost Mahomed to cease, by his surrender, f ro~n  
being an obstacle to the tranquillisation of the country of 
which hc had been the rulcr. 
C I - I A P T E R  
T I I E  SECOND YEAR O F  OCCUPATION 
DOST M A H O ~ ~ E D  remained for a few clays in thc British 
cantonments on the Cabul plain, an lionourecl gucst rathcr 
than a prisoner. 13s  soldierly frankness, his bearing at 
once manly and courteous, his honest liking for and trust 
in our racc, notwithstanding the experiencs which he had 
undergone, won universal respect and cordiality. Officers 
who stood aloof from Shah Soojah viecl with each other 
in evincing to Dost Mahomed their sympathy with him 
in his fallen fortunes. Shall Soojah would not: sec the 
man whom he had ingloriously supplanted, on the pre- 
text that he ' coulcl not bring himself to show common 
civility to such a villain.' I-Iow Macnaghten's fccling in 
regard to the two men had altered is disclosed by his 
comment on this refusal. ' I t  is well,' hc mrotc, 'as the 
Dost must have suffered much humiliation in being sub- 
jectcd to such an ordeal.' 
In the middle of November 1 8 4  the Dost began 
his journcy toward British India, accompanied by Sir 
Willoughby Cotton, who was finally quitting Afghanistan, 
and under the escort of a considerable British force which 
had completccl its tour of duty in Afghanistan. Sale suc- 
D 
ccccled Cotton in temporar~r divisional command pcncling 
the  arrival of tlic lattcr's successor. About thc middle of 
December Shah Soojah and his Court, accompanied by 
the British Envoy, arrived at Jcllalabad for the winter, 
Burnes remaining at Cabul in political chargc. 
Macnaghtcn was ~ncntally so constitutccl as to bc con- 
tinually alternating between high elation and the depths 
of  dcsponclency ; discerning to-day ominous indications of 
ruin in an incident of no account, and to-morrow scorning 
imperiously to recognisc danger in the fierce rising of a 
province. It  may almost bc said that cach lctter of his to 
Lord Aucltland was of a diffcrcnt tonc from the one which 
had prcccdcd it. Burncs, who was nominally Macnaghten's 
chieflieutenant, with more sclf-restraint, had much tlic samc 
tcmpcramcnt. IZayc writcs of hiin : ' Sometimes sanguine, 
sometimes despondent, sometimes confident, sometimes 
crcdulous, nuriles gavc to fleeting impressions all the iin- 
portance and sccming permanency of settlecl convictions, 
and imbucd surrounding objccts with the colours of his 
own varying mind.' But if Burncs had bccn a discreet and 
stcadfast man, he could have cscrciscd no influence on the 
autocratic Macnaghtcn, since betwen thc two lncn there 
was neither sympathy nor confidencc. Burnes had, inclecd, 
no  specific dutics of any kind ; in his o \ ~ n  rorcls, he was in 
' the  most nondescript situation.' Macnaghten gave h i ~ n  
n o  rcsponsibility, and while Rurnes waited for the pro- 
mised revcrsion of the office of envoy, he chiefly employed 
hiinself in writing long memorials on thc situation ancl 
prospects of affairs, on which Macnaghtcn's marginal com- 
ments wcrc brusquc, and occasionally contemptuous. Thc  
rcsolute and clear-hcaded I'ottinger, \\rho, i f  thc oppor- 
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tunity had been givcn him, might haw buttresscd and 
steadied Macnaghten, was relegated to provincial service. 
Throughout his career in Afghanistan the Envoy could not 
look for much advicc from the successive commanders of 
the Cabul force, even if he had cared to cornmunc with 
them. ICeane, indeed, did save him from the perpetra- 
tion of one folly. But Cotton appears to have been a re- 
spectable nonentity. Sale was a stout, honest soldicr, who 
was not forLunatc on thc only occasion which callccl him 
outside of his restricted f~u(iiel: Poor Elphinstone was an 
objcct for pity rathcr than for censurc. 
I t  happcnecl fortunately, in the impending misfor- 
tunes, that two men of stable tcmpcrament and lucid 
perception were in authority at Candahnr. Gencral Nott 
was a grand old Indian oficcr, in whom there mas no 
guile, but a good dcal of tcmper. I-le was not supplc, 
and he had the habit of spealring his mind with great 
directness, a propensity which accounted, perhaps, for 
the rcpcaLec1 superscssions he had undcrgone. A clear- 
headed, shrewd man, he was disgustccl with very many 
things which he recognised as unworthy in the conduct of 
the affairs of Afghanistan, and he was not the man to 
choose mild phrascs in giving vcnt to his convictions. H e  
had in full measure that chronic dislilte which the Indian 
commander in the ficld nourishes to the polilical officer 
who is imposed on him by the authorities, and who con- 
trols his measures and trammels his actions. Nott's 
'political,' who, the sole survivor of the men who were 
prominent during this unhappy period, still lives among 
us estecmecl and rcvered, was certainly thc ablest officer 
of the unpopular department to which he bclongcd ; and 
how cool was Henry Rawlinson's temper is evinced in his 
ability to live in amity with the ruggccl and outspolten 
chief who addressed him in such a philippic as the follom- 
ing-words all the more trenchant because he to whom 
they were addressed must have realised how intrinsically 
true they mere :- 
' I have no right to interfere with the affairs of this 
country, and I nevcr do  so. But in refcreace to that part 
of your note where you speak of political influence, I will 
candidly tell you that thcse are not times for inere cere- 
mony, and that under present circumstances, ancl a t  a dis- 
tance of 2000 miles from thc scat of the suprcmc Govern- 
ment, I throw responsibility to the wind, and tell you that 
in my opinion you have not had for some time past, nor 
have you at present, one particlc of political influence in 
this country.' 
Nott steadily laboured to  maintain the wol-ale and 
discipline of his troops, and thus watching the flowing 
tide of misrule ancl embroilmcnt, he calmly made the 
best preparations in his power to mcct the storm the 
sure and early outbreak of which his clear cliscernmcnt 
prognosticated. 
Shah Soojah's viceroy a t  Candahar was his heir-ap- 
parent Princc Timour. The Dooranee chiefs of Western 
Afghanistan had not unnaturally expected favours and 
influence undcr the rule of the Doorance monarch ; and 
wliile in Candahar beforc proceeding to Cabul, and still 
uncertain of what might occur there, Shah Soojah had 
been lavish of his promiscs. The chiefs had anticipated 
that they would bc called around the vice-throne of Prince 
Timour ; but Shah Soojall made thc sarnc error as that 
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into which Louis XVIII. fell on his restoration. I-Ie 
constituted his Court of the men who had shared his 
Loodianah cxile. The counsellors who went to Candahar 
with Timour mere rcturned h11&~4 . . ,  in whom fitness for 
duty counted less than the qualification of companionship 
in exile. Those people had come back to Afghanistan 
poor; now they made haste to be rich by acts of oppres- 
sive injustice, in thc cxaction of revenue from the pcople, 
and by intercepting from thc Doorancc chiefs thc flow of 
royal bounty to which they had looked forward. 
Uktar Khan was prominent among thc Dooranec 
noblcmen, and he had the double grievancc of having 
been disappointed of the headship of the Zemindalvar 
province on the westcrn bank of the Helmund, and 
having been evilly cntreated by the minions of Prince 
Timour. He had raised his clan and routed a force undcr 
a royalist follower, when Nott sent a detachment against 
him. Uktar Khan had crossed the Helmund into Zemin- 
danrar, when Farrington attackcd him, and, aftcr a brisk 
fight, routcd and pursued him. The action was fought 
on January 3, 1841, in thc very dead of minter ; the in- 
tensity of the cold dispersed Uktar's levies, and Farrington 
returned to Candabar. 
In reply to Macnaghten's demand for information 
rcgarding the origin of this outbreak, Rawlinson wrote 
him some home truths which were very distasteful. 
Ra~vlinson warned his chief earnestly of the danger 
threatened the false position of the British in 
Afghanistan. He pointed out how crucl must be the 
revenue exactions which enabled Prince Timour's courtiers 
to absorb great sums. He  expressed his suspicion that 
Shah Soojah had countenat~ccd Uktar Khan's rising, and 
spoke of iiitrigues of dark and dangerous character. Mac- 
naghten scoutcd Rawlinson's warning, and instructed him 
that 'it will makc the consideration of all questions more 
simple if you will hereafter take for granted that as  
rcgarcls us " thc king can do  no wrong."' I-Iowcver, he 
and the Shah did remove from Canclahar the Valcecl and 
his clique of obnosious persons, who had been grinding 
the faccs of the people ; and the Envoy allo\vcd himsclf 
to hope that this measure would restore order to the 
province of Canclahar. 
The hope was vain, thc evil lay deepcr ; disaffection 
to the Shah and hatred to tllc BriLish powcr were becom- 
ing intensified from day to day, and the aspiration for 
rclief was s~velling into a passion. In the days beforc our 
advent thew had been venality and corruption in public 
places-occasionally, likcly cnough, as Macnaghtcn as- 
serted, to an estcnt  all but incredible. But exaction so 
swecping could have occurrccl only in rcgions under com- 
plete domination; and in Afghanistan, cven to this day, 
thcrc are few regions wholly in this condition. When the 
yoke became ovcr-weighty, a people of a nature so intract- 
able knew how to  resent oppression and oppose exaction. 
But now thc tax gatherer swaggered over the land, and thc 
people had to cnclurc him, for a t  his back were the solcliers 
of the Feringhees and the levies of the Shah. The  latter 
werc paid by assignments on the revcnues of specified 
districts ; as thc levics constitutcd a standing army of 
some size, the contributions demanded were heavicr and 
more pcrrnanent than in bygonc times. Macnaghtcn, 
anrare of the discontent cngcndered by the system of 
assignments, dcsircd to alter it. 13ut thc Shah's nceds 
werc prcssing ; the Anglo-Indian trcasury was strainccl 
already by the cxpenditurc in Afghanistan ; ancl it was 
not easy i n  a pcriod of turmoil ancl rcbcllion to carry out 
the arncndment of a fiscal system. That, since thc sur- 
rcndcr of the Dost, thcrc hacl been no scrious rising in 
Northern or Eastcrn Afghanistan, sufficccl to makc Mac- 
naghten an optimist of thc ~norncnt. I i c  hacl cornc by 
this timc to a rcluclant acl~nission of tlic fact against 
which hc had set his facc so long, that Shah Soojah was 
unpopular. ' I-Ic has incurred,' hc ivrotc, ' thc odium that 
attachcs to him from his alliancc with us '; but thc Envoy 
would not admit that our position in  Afghanistan was a 
falsc onc, in that we wcrc maintaining by our bayonets, 
against the will of thc Afghans, a sovcrcign whom they 
detested. ' I t  would,' hc plcatlecl, ' bc an act of downright 
dishonesty to clescrt His Majcsty bcfore hc has found the 
means of taking root in thc soil to which wc havc trans- 
planted him.' Whilc hc wrotc, Macnaghten must havc 
cxpcricncccl a sudclcn thrill of optimism or of sclf-delusion, 
for hc continuccl: 'All things consiclcrccl, thc prescnt 
tranquillity of this country is to my mind perfectly miracul- 
ous. Alrcady our presencc has bcen infinitely bcncficial 
in allaying animosities and in pointing out abuses.' If 
it had been tllc casc that the country was tranquil, his 
adjective would have becn singularly appropriate, but not 
precisely in the scnse he meant to convey. 
But there was no tranquilliLy, miraculous or otherwisc. 
While Macnaghten was writing thc letter which has just 
been quoted, Brigadier Shelton, who, about the New 
Year, had reached Jcllalabad with a brigade from British 
India in rclief of the force which was withdrawing with 
Cotton, was contending with an outbreak of the wild 
and la\vless clans of t he  Khyber. When Macnaghten 6 
wrote, he had already received intelligence of the collapse 
of his projccts in I-Ierat, and that Major Todd, who had 
bcen his representative there, judging it imperative to 
break up the mission of which he was the head, had 
abruptly quitted that city, and was on his way to Canda- I 
har. Mischief was simmering in the Zernindaivar country. 
The Ghilzai tribes of the  1.egion between Candahar and 
Ghuznee had accepted a subsidy to remain quiet, but the 
indomitable independence of this wild and fierce race was 
not to be tamcd by bribes, and the spirit of hostility was 
manifesting itself so truculently that a British garrison 
had been placed in Khelat-i-Ghilzai, right in the heart 
of the disturbed territory. This warning and defensive 
measure thc tribcs had rcgardecl with angry jealousy ; but 
it was not until a rash ' political ' had dirccted the unpro- 
voled assault and capture of a Ghilzai fort that the tribes 
passionatcly flew to arms, bent on contesting the occupa- 
tion of their rugged country. Colonel Wymer was sent 
from Canclahar with a force, escorting a convoy of stores 
intended for the equipment of Khelat-i-Ghilzai. The tribes 
who had been loosely beleaguering that place marched 
down the Turnulz upon Wymer, and on May 19th at- 
tacked him with great impetuosity, under the command 
of a principal chicf who was lcnown as the 'Gooroo.' 
Wymer, in the protection of his convoy, had to stancl on 
the defensive. The  Ghilzais, regardless of the grape which 
torc through their masses, fell on sword in hand, and with 
an intuitive tactical perception struck Wymer simultane- 
ously in front and flank. His sepoys had to change their 
I dispositions, and the Ghilzais took the opportunity of their 
I momentary dislocation to charge right home. They were 
met firmly by the bayonet, but again and again the hill- 
men renewed their attacks ; and it was not till after five 
hours of hard fighting which cost them heavy loss, that 
at length, in the darkness, they sudclcnly drew off. Had 
they been Swiss peasants defending their mountains, or 
Poles struggling against the ferocious tyranny of Russia, 
their gallant effort might have excited praise and sym- 
pathy. Had they been Soudanese, a statesman might 
have spoken of them as a people ' rightly struggling to be 
free I; as it was, the Envoy vituperated them as ' a parcel 
of ragamuffins,' and Wymer's sepoys were held to have 
' covered themselves with glory.' Macnaghten proceeded 
to encourage a sense of honour among the tribes by pro- 
posing the transfer to another chief, 011 condition of his 
seizing and delivering over the inconvenient ' Gooroo,' of 
the share of subsidy of which the latter had been in receipt. 
While this creditable transaction was under consider- 
ation, Uktar Khan was again making himself very un- 
pleasant ; so much so that Macnaghtcn was authorising 
Rawlinson to offer a reward of 10,000 rupees for his 
capture, which accomplished, Rawlinson was instructed 
to 'hang the villain as high as Haman.' The  gallows 
was not built, however, on which Ulctar was to hang, 
although that chief sustained two severe defeats at the 
hands of troops sent from Candahar, and had to become 
a fugitive. The Ghilzais, who had gathered again after 
their defeat under the ' Gooroo,' had made little stand 
against the detachment which Colonel Chambers led out 
Can&Jlar, and they were azain tclllporarily dis- 
persed. The c Gooroo' llimsclf was in our hands. I f  the 
disaffectioll was in no degree din~inishecl, the activc cbulli- 
tions of it \\rere a s su rcd l~  qucllcd for thc timc. I t  was 
true, to be sure, that Altbar IChan, thc ficrcc and resolute 
son of Dost Mahorned, had refused the ELIVOY'S overtures 
to comc in, and was wandering and plotting in I<hooloom, 
quite rcady to fulfil Macnaghten's prol~hetic apprehensioll 
that ' the  fcllow will bc after some mischief should the 
opportunity prcscnt itself '; that the Dooranees wcre still 
defiant; that an insurgent force was out in the Dehra- 
wat ; and that the ta~nelcss chief Altram Khan was being 
blown from a gun by the crucl and feeble Timour. But 
unquestionably therc was a cornparativc although short- 
lived lull in the ovcrt hostility of the Afghan peoples 
against Shah Soojah and his foreign supporters ; and Mac- 
naghten characteristically announced that 'thc country 
was quiet from Dan to Beersheba.' To one of his corrc- 
spondents he wrote : ' From Mookoor to the Khybcr Pass, 
all is content and tranquillity ; and whercvcr we Europeans 
go, we are received with respect, attention and wclcome. 
I think our prospects are most cheering; and with the 
materials wc have there ought to bc little or no difficulty 
in the managemcnt of the country. The people are per- 
fect children, and they should be treated as such. I f  
we put one naughty boy in the corner, the rest will be 
terrified.' 
General Nett a t  Candahar, who 'never interfered in the 
government of  the country,' but regarded the situation 
with shrewd, clear-headed common sense, differed utterly 
from the Envoy's view. T h e  stout old soldier did not 
squanclcr his fire ; it mas a close volley he cliscl~argcd in 
the following words : ' The conduct of the thousand and 
one politicals has ruined our cause, and bared the throat 
of evcry European in this country to the sword and knifc 
of the revengeful Afghan and bloody Belooch; and unless 
several regiments be quiclrly sent, not a man will be left 
to describe the fate of his comrades. Nothing will ever 
make the Afghans submit to the hatcd Shah Soojah, who 
is most certainly as great a scoundrel as cver livcd.' 
Nott's conclusions wcre in the main justified by after 
events, but thc correctness of his prcmiss may bc ques- 
tioned, That the conduct of some of the political 
officers intensified the rancour of the Afghans is un- 
happily true, but the hate of our domination, and of thc 
puppct thrust upon them by us, seems to have found its 
.origin in  a dceper feeling. The patriotism of a savage 
race is marked by features rcpi~lsivc to civiliscd com- 
munities, but through the ruthless cruelty of the inclis- 
,criminate massacre, the treachery of the stealthy stab, 
and thc lightly broken pledgcs, thcre may shine out the 
noblest virtue that a virilc peoplc can possess. A semi- 
barbarian nation whose manhood pours out its blood 
like water in stubborn resistance against an alien yoke, 
may be pardoned for many acts shocking to civilised 
communities which have not known the bitterness of 
stern and masterful ssubj~~gation. 
C H A P T E R  V 
THE BEGINNING OF TI-IB END 
TIIE deceptive quietude of Afghanistan which followed 
the sharp Icssons administered to the Dooranees and the 
Ghilzais was not seriously disturbed during the month 
of September 1841, and Macnaghten was in a full glow of 
cheerfulness. His services had been recogniscd by his 
appointment to the dignified ancl lucrative post of Governor 
of the Bombay PresidencyJ and he was looking forward to 
an early departure for a less harassing ancl tuinultuous 
sphere of action than that in which he had been labour- 
ing for two troubled years. T h e  belief that he would leave 
behind him a quiescent Afghanistan, and Shah Soojah 
firmly established on its throne, was the complement, to a 
proud and zealous man, of the satisfaction which his 
promotion afforded. 
One distasteful task he had to perform before he 
should go. The  I-Iome Government had become seriously 
disquieted by the condition of affairs in Afghanistan. 
The Secret Committee of thc Court of Directors, the 
channel through which the ministry communicated with 
the Governor-General, had espressed great concern a t  
the heavy burden imposed on the Indian finances by the 
cost of the maintenance of the British force in Afghanistan, 
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and by the lavish expenditure of the administration which 
Macnaghten directed. The Anglo-Indian Government 
was urgently required to review with great earnestness 
the question of its future policy in regard to Afghanistan, 
and to consider gravely whether an enterprise at once so 
costly and so unsatisfactory in results should not be 
frankly abandoned. Lord Auckland was alive to the 
difficulties and embarrassments which encompassed the 
position beyond thc Indus, hut he was loth to admit that 
the policy of which he had been the a~~ tho r ,  and in which 
the Home Government had abetted him so eagerly, was 
an utter failure. I-Ie and his advisers finally decided in 
favour of the continued occupation of Afghanistan ; and 
since the Indian treasury was empty, and the annual 
charge of that occupation was not less than a million and 
a quarter sterling, recourse was had to a loan. RIacnaghten 
was pressed to effect economics in the administration, 
and he was specially enjoined to cut down the subsidies 
which wcre paid to Afghan chiefs as bribes to keep them 
quiet. Macnaghten had objected to this retrenchment, 
pointing out that the stipends to the chiefs wcre simply 
compensation for thc abandonment by them of their 
immemorial practice of highway robbcry, but he yielded 
to pressure, called to Cabul the chief5 in its vicinity, and 
informed them that thenceforth thcir subsidies would be 
reduced. The chiefs strongly remonstrated, but without 
effect, and they then formed a confederacy of rebellion. 
The  Ghilzai chiefs were the first to act. Quitting Cabul, 
they occupied the passes between the capital and 
Jellalabad, and entirely intercepted the colnrnunicatio~~s 
with India by the Khyber routc. 
Macnaghten did not take alarm at this significant de- 
monstration, regarding the outbreak mcrely as ' provoking,' 
and writing to Rawlinson that ' the rascals would be well 
trounced for their pains.' Yet warnings of gathering 
danger were rife, which but for his mood of optimism 
should have struck home to his apprehension. Pottinger 
had come down from thc Kohistan, wherc he was acting 
as political officer, bent on  impressing on him that a 
gcneral rising of that region was certain unless strong 
measures of prcvcntion mere resorted to. For some time 
bcfore the actual outbrcalc of the Ghilzais, the Afghan 
hatred to our people had been showing itself with excep- 
tional openness and bitterness. Europeans and camp 
followers had been murdered, but the sinister cvida~ces of 
growing danger had bcen regarded merely as ebullitions 
of private rancour. Alcbar Khan, Dost Mahorned's son, 
had nlovecl forward from I<hooloom into the Bamian 
country, and there was little doubt that he was fomenting 
the disaKection of the Ghilzai chiefs, with some of whom 
this indomitable man, who in his intense hatred of the  
English intruders had resolutely rejected all offers of 
accommodation, and preferred the life of a homeless exile 
to the forfeiture of his independencc, was closely con- 
nected by marriage. 
The time was approaching when Sale's brigade was to  
quit Cabul on its return journey to India. Macnaghten 
seems to  have originally intended to accompany this 
force, for he wrote that he 'hoped to settle the hash of 
the Ghilzais on the way down, if not before.' The rising, 
however, spread so widely and so rapidly that immediate 
action was judged ncccssary, and on October 9th Colonel 
Monteath marched towards thc passes with his own 
,regiment, thc 35th Native Infantry, some artillery and 
cavalry details, and a detach~nent of Broadfoot's sappers. 
How able, resolute, and high-souled a man was Georgc 
Broadfoot, the course of this narrative will later disclose. 
I-Ie was one of thrcc gallant brothers, all of whom died 
sword in  hand. The  corps of sappers which he com- 
manded was a remarkable body - a strange medley 
of IHinclustanees, Goorlihas, and Afghan tribesmen of 
divers regions. Many were desperate and intractable 
characters, but Broadfoot, with mingled strength and 
kinclness, ~noulcled his hetcrogeneous recruits into skilful, 
obedient and disciplined soldiers. Broadfoot's descrip- 
tion of his endeavours to learn something of the nature 
of the duties expected of him in the expedition for which 
he had been detailed, and to obtain such equipment as 
those duties might require, throws a rnclancholy light on 
the deteriorated statc of affairs among our people a t  this 
period, and on the relations between the military and 
civilian authorities. 
Broadfoot went for information, in the first instance, to 
Colonel Monteath, who could give him no orclers, having 
received none himself. Monteat11 declined to apply for 
details as to the expedition, as he knew 'these people' 
(the authorities) too well; he was quite aware of the 
danger of going on service in the dark, but explained 
that it was not the custom of the military authorities a t  
Cabul to consult or even instruct the commanders of 
expeditions. Broadfoot then went to the General. 
Cotton's successor in the chief military command in 
Afghanistan was poor General Elphinstonc, a most gal- 
lant soldier, but with no esperience of' Indian warfarc, 
and utterly ignorant of the Afghans and of Afghanistan. 
Wreclted in bocly and impaired in mind by physical ail- 
ments and infirmities, hc had lost all faculty of energy, 
and such mind as remained to him was swayed by the 
opinion of the person with whom he had last spoken. 
The poor gentleman was so exllausted by the exertion of 
getting out of bed, and being helpcd into his visiting-room, 
that it was not for half-an-hour, and after several ineffectual 
efforts, that he could attend to business. He knew nothing 
of the naturc of the service on which Monteath was ordered, 
could givc Broadfoot no orders, and was unwilling to refer 
to  the Envoy on a matter which should have bcen left to 
him to arrange. I-Ie complained bitterly of the way in 
which he was reduced to a cypher-'degraded from a 
gencral to the " Lord- Lieutenan t's hcad constablc." ' 
Broadfoot went from the General to the Envoy, who 
'was peevish,' and denounced the Gencral as fidgety. 
Hc cleclarcd the cnemy to be contemptible, and that as  
for Broadfoot and his sappers, twenty men with piclcaxes 
wcre enough ; all they were wanted for was to pick stones 
from undcr the gun wheels. When Broadfoot represented 
thc inconvenience with which imperfect information as to 
the objects of the expedition was fraught, Macnaghten 
lost his temper, and told Broaclfoot that, if he t l ~ o ~ ~ ~ l ~ t  
Monteath's movcment likely to bring on an attack, he 
nced not go, hc was not wanted'; whereupon Broadfoot 
declined to listen to such language, and made his bow. 
Returning to thc General, whom he found 'lost and pcr- . 
plexed,' he was told to  follow his own judgment as to 
what quantity of tools he should take. Thc Adjutant- 
General came in, and 'this officer, aftcr abusing thc 
Envoy, spoke to the General with an imperiousness and 
clisrespect, and to me, a stranger, with an insolence it 
was painful to see the influence of on the General. His 
advicc to his chief was to have nothing to say to Mac- 
naghten, to me, or to the sappers, saying Monteath had 
men cnough, arid needed neithcr sappers nor tools.' A t  
parting the poor old man said to Broadfoot : ' If you ,no 
out, for God's sakc clear the passes quickly, that I may 
get away; for if anything were to turn up, 1 am unf i t  for 
it, donc LIP in body and mind.' This was the man whom 
Lord Auclcland had appointed to the most responsible 
and arduous command at his disposal, and this not in 
ignorance of Gcneral Elphinstone's disqualifications for 
active service, but in the fullest l<nowleclge of thcm ! 
Monteath's camp at Bootl<hal<, thc first halting-place 
on thc Jellalabad road, was sharply attaclced on thc 
night of the gth, and the assailants, many of whom 
were the arnlcd retainers of chiefs livini in Cabul sent 
out specially to take part in the attack, although unsuc- 
cessf~~l, inflictcd on Monteath consiclerablc loss. Next 
day Sale, with 13.M.'~ 13th, joined Monteath, and 'on 
the 13th llc forced the long and dangerous ravine of the 
Khoord Cabul with sharp fighting, but no very serious 
loss, although Sale hirnself was wou~~decl, and had to re- 
linquish thc active command to Coloncl Dennie. Man- 
teat11 encampcd in the valley beyond the pass, and Sale, 
with the 13th, returned without opposition to Uootl~hal:, 
there to await reinforce~nents and transports. In  his 
isolated position Montcath remained unmolcsteci until the 
night of the 17th, when he repulsed a Ghilzai attack made 
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in considcrable strength, and aided by the treachery of 
' friendlyJ Afghans who had been admitted into his camp; 
but hc had many casualties, and lost a number of camcls. 
On the 20th Sale, reinforced by troops returned from the 
Zurmut expedition, ~noved forward on Montcath, and on 
the 22d pushed on to thc Tezeen valley, meeting with 
no opposition cither on the steep summit of the Huf t  
Kotul or in thc dccp narrow ravine opening into the 
valley. The  Ghilzais wcrc in force around the mouth of 
thc dcfile, but a few cannon-shots brolcc them up. T h e  
advance guard pursued \\.it11 over-rashness ; the Ghilzais 
rallied, in the sl<irmish which ellsued an officcr and several 
mcn were killed, and the retirement of our people un- 
fortunately degenerated into prccipitate flight, with the 
Ghilzais in hot pursuit. T h e  13th~ to which the fugitive 
cletacl~me~~t mainly belonged, now consisted mainly of 
young soldiers, whose constancy was impaired by this 
untoward occurrcnce. 
Macnaghten had f~~rnishcd Sale with a force which, 
in  good hcart and vigorously commanded, was strong 
enough to have cffccted grcat things. The Ghilzai chief 
of Tezeen possessed a strong fort full of supplies,. which 
Dennie was about to  attack, when thc wily Afghan sent 
to Major Macgregor, the political officer accompanying 
Salc, a tender of suhmission. Macgrcgor fell into the 
snare, desircd Salc to countermand the attack, and 
entered into negotiations. In doing so hc committed a 
fatal crror, and hc cxcecdecl his instructions in the conces- 
sions which he made. Macnaghten, it was true, had lcft 
matters greatly to Macgrcgor's discretion ; and i f  ' the 
rebels were vcry humblc,' thc Envoy was not disposcd to 
be too hard upon them. Rut one of his firm stipulations 
was that the defences of Khoda Ruxsh's fort must be 
demolished, and that Goo1 Mahomcd Khan 'should have 
nothing but war.' Both injunctions were disregarded by 
Macgrcgor, who, with unimportant exceptions, surrendered 
all along the line. The Ghilzais claimed and obtained 
the restoration of thcir original subsidies ; a sum was 
handcd to them to enable thcm to raise the tribes in order 
to keep clear the passes ; I<hocla B ~ x s h  held his fort, and 
sold the supplies it contained to Sale's commissary at a 
fine pricc. Every item of thc arrangcment was clcacl in 
favour of thc Ghilzais, and contributory to their devices. 
Sale, continuing his march, would be separated further and 
further from the now di~ninishcd force in Cabul, and by 
the feigned submission the chiefs had madc they had 
escaped the permanent establishment of a strong dctach- 
ment in their midst at  Tezeen. 
Macnaghten, discontented though he was with the 
sweeping concessions which Macgregor had granted to 
the Ghilzais, put: thc best face he could on thc completccl 
transaction, and allowed himself to believe that a stable 
settlcment had been effected. On thc 26th Salc con- 
tinued his march, having made up his baggage animals at 
the expense of the 37th Native Infantry, which, with half 
of the sappers and three guns of the mountain train, 
he sent back to Kubbar-i-Jubbar, thcrc to halt in a 
dangerously helpless situation until transport should be 
sent down from Cabul. His march as far as ICutti 
Sung was unmolested. Mistrusting the good faith of liis 
new-made allies, he shunned thc usual route through the 
Purwan Durrah by taking thc mountain road to the south 
of that defile, and thus reached thc J~~gclull~~l; valle~r with 
little opposition, baulking the dispositions of the Ghilzais, 
l~r]lo, espccting him to travcrsc the Purwan Durrah, were 
massed about the southern end of thc defile, ready to 
f a l l  on the column when committed to the tortuous 
gorge. 
From thc Jugdulluk camping ground there is a stcep 
and winding ascent of three miles, commanded until near 
the su~nnlit by heights o n  either sidc. Salc's main body 
had attained Lhe crest with trivial loss, having detachcd 
parties by the way to ascend to  suitable flanking posi- 
tions, and hold those until thc long train of slow-moving 
baggage should have passed, when they were to fall in 
and come on with the rear-guard. Thc dispositions would 
havc been successful but that: on reaching the crest the 
main body, instead of halting there for the rear to close 
up, liurricd down the reverse slope, leaving baggage, de- 
tachments, and rear-guard to endure the attacks which 
the Ghilzais promptly delivered, pressing fiercely on the 
I rear, and firing down from cither sidc on the confused mass in the trough below. The flanking detachments had 
relinqnishcd their posts in panic, and hurried forward in 
confusion to get out of thc pass. The rear-guard was in 
disordcr, when Broadfoot, with a few officers and some of 
his sappers, valiantly checked the onslaught, but the crest 
was not crosscd until upwards of 120 men had fallen, the 
wounded anlong whom had to be abandoned with the 
dead. On October 30th Sale's force reached Gundamuk 
ivithout further molestation, and halted there temporarily 
to await orders. During the halt melancholy rumours 
filtered down the passes from thc capital, and later came 
confirmation of the evil tidings from the Envoy, and 
orders from Elphinstone directing the immediate return 
of the brigade to Cabul, if the safety of its sick and 
wounded could be assured. Sale called a council of war, 
which pronounced, although not unanimously, against a 
return to Cabul ; and it was resolved instead to march 
on to Jellalabad, which was regarded as an eligible 
I)oini d'cjpzci on which a relieving forcc might move up 
and a retiring force might move clown. Accordingly 
on Novcmber I ~ t h  the brigade quittecl Gundamuk, and 
hurried down rather precipitately, and with some fight- 
ing by the way, to Jellalabad, which was occupied on 
the 14th. 
Some members of the Gunclamul< council of war, fore- 
most among whom was Uroaclfoot, argued vigorously in 
favour of the return march to Cabul. Havelocl<, who 
was with Sale as a staff-officer, strongly urged the further 
retreat into Jellalabad. Others, again, advocated the 
middle course of continuing to  hold Gundamuk. I t  may 
be said that a daring general would have fought his way 
back to Cabul, that a prudent general mould have re- 
mained a t  Gundamuk, and that the occupation of Jellala- 
bad was the espcdient of a weak general. That a well- 
led march on Cabul was feasible, although it might have 
been difficult and bloody, cannot be questioned, and the 
advent of such men as Broadfoot and Havelocl< would 
have done much toward rekindling confidence and stimu- 
lating the restoration of soldierly virtue, alike in the mili- 
tary authorities and in the rank and file of the Cabul force. 
At  Gundamuk, again, the brigade, \veil able to maintain 
its position there, would have made its influence felt all 
through the Ghilzai country and as far as Cabul. The 
evacuation of that capital decided on, it would have been 
in a position to give the hand to the rctiring army, and 
so to  avert at lcast the worst disasters of the retreat. The 
rctirement on Jellalabad, in the terse language of Durancl, 
'served no conceivable purpose esccpt to betray wcak- 
ncss, and still further to encourage revolt.' 
While Sale was struggling through thc passes on his 
way to Gundamuk, our peoplc a t  Cabul were enjoying un- 
wonted quietude. Casual cntries in Lady Salc's journal, 
during the later days of October, afford clear eviclence how 
utterly unconscious wcre thcy of the close gathcring of 
thc storm that so soon was to break upon thcm. Her 
husband had writtcn to hcr from Tezecn that his wound 
was fast healing, and that the chiefs were extremely polite. 
Shc complains of thc intcrruption of the mails owing to 
the Ghilzai outbreak, but comforts herself with the antici- 
pation of their arrival in a day or two. Shc was to leave 
Cabul fol; India in a fcw days, along with the Macnaghtens 
and General Elphinstone, and her. diary expresses an 
undernote of regret at having to leave the snug house in 
the  cantonments which Sale had built on his own plan, 
the excellent kitchen gardeain which her warrior husband, 
in the intervals of his soldiering duties, grew fine crops of 
peas, potatoes, cauliflowers and artichokes, and thc par- 
terres of flowers which she hcrself cultivated, and which 
were the admiration of the Afghan gentlemen w11o came 
to  pay their morning calls. 
The defencelessness of the position at Cabul had long 
engaged the solicitucle of men who were no alarmists. 
Engineer oficer after engincer officcr had unavailingly 


urged the construction of barracks in the Balla Hissar, 
the repair and improvement of the defences of that strong- 
hold, and the occupation of it by our troops. The canton- 
ments on the plain northward of the city would have 
served their purpose fairly as residential quarters in peace 
time if the Balla Hissar, which in case of need could 
have accommodated all our people, had bcen repaired 
and adequately garrisoned. Rut the fateful errors were 
made of yielding to the Shah Soojah's objections lo the 
British occupation of the Ualla I-Iissar, and of making a 
pretence of rendering thc cantoninents defensible by sur- 
rounding the great parallelogram with the caricature of 
an obstacle in the shape of a skallow ditch and feeble 
earthwork over which an active cow could scramble. The 
enclosed area was commanded on all sides by Afghan 
forts, i&ch were neither occupied nor destroyed. The 
commissariat stores were actually located in a fort out- 
side the cantonments altogether, the communication with 
which was commanded by a fort held by the Afghans. 
In all essentials of a defensive position the Cabul canton- 
ments, at the beginning of the outbreak, wcre simply 
contemptible. 
Sir William Macnaghten and his political staff occupied 
the Mission compound, an annexe of the cantonments. 
General Elphinstone had his quarters in the cantonments ; 
Sir Alexander Rurnes lived in a house in the city opposite 
to the Treasury, which was in charge of Captain Johnson, 
and several other officers resided in the suburbs. Brigadier 
Shelton, a brave and experienced soldier, but of curiously 
impracticable and ill-conditioned nature, was in camp with 
a considerable force on the Seah Sung hills, about a mile 
and a half from the cantonmcnts, with the Cabul river 
intervening. With Shelton's troops and thosc in the 
cantonments General Elphinstone had at his disposition, 
apart from the Shah's contingent, four infantry regiments, 
two batteries of artillery, three companies of sappcrs, a 
rcgiment of cavalry, and some irregular horse-a force 
fully equipped and in good order. In the Balla Hissar 
Shah Suojah had a considerable, if rather mixecl, body of 
military and sevcral guns. 
Thc rising of thc ad Xovember may not have been 
the result of a fully organisecl plan. Therc are indica- 
tions that it was premature, and that the revolt in force 
would have bcen postponed until after the cxpcctcd 
departure of the Envoy and the General with all the 
trodps except Shelton's brigade, but for an irrepressible 
burst of personal rancour against Uurnes. Durand holds, 
ho\vever, that the malcontents actcd on the belief that to 
kill Burncs and sack thc Treasury was to inaugurate tlic 
insurrection with an imposing success. Re this as it 
may, a truculent mob early in thc morning of November 
zd assailed Burnes' house. He  a t  first regarded the 
outbreak as a casual riot, and wrote to Macnaghten to 
that effect. Having harangued the throng without effect, 
he and his brother, along with William Broadfoot his 
secretary, prepared for defence. Broadfoot was soon 
killed, ancl a little later Burnes and his brother mere 
hacked to pieces in the garden behind the house. The  
Treasury was saclced; the sepoys who had guarded it ancl 
Burnes' house were massacred, and both buildings were 
fired ; the armed mob swelled in numbers, and soon the 
whole city was i n  a roar of tumult. 
Prompt and vigorous military action would no doubt 
have crushed the insurrection, at  least for the time. But the 
i~~difference~vacillation and delay of the British authorities 
greatly encouraged its rapid development. Macnaghten 
at first 'did not think much of it.' Shclton was ordercd 
into the Balla Hissar, countcrmandcd, a second time 
ordered, and again instructcd to halt for orders. At last 
the Envoy himself despatchecl him, with the loosc ordcr 
to act on his own judg~ncnt in communication with the 
Shah. Shelton marchcd into tlic Balla I-Iissar \\lit11 part 
of his forcc, and thc rest of it was moved into the canton- 
mcnts. When tlic Brigadier wcnt to thc Shah, that 
potcntate demanded to know who sent him, and what 
he had come for. But the Shah, to do him justicc, had 
himself taken action. Informed that Burncs was attaclccd 
and the city in revolt, he had ordercd Campbell's regiment 
of his own levics and a couple of guns to n~arch to his 
assistance. Carnpbcll recltlcssly attempted to push his 
way through thc hcart of the city, instead of rcaching 
13urncsJ house by a circuitous but opcncr route, and after 
some sharp street fighting in which he lost hcavily, he 
was driven back, unable to  pcnetratc to the sccnc of 
plunder and butchcry. Shelton remained inactive i n  the 
Balla Hissar until Ca~npbell was reported beatcn and 
retreating, when hc took some feeble measures to covcr 
the retrcat of the fugitive?, who, however, abandoned their 
guns outsidc the fortrcss. Thc day was allowed to pass 
without anything further being done, except the despatch 
of an urgent rccall to Major Griffiths, whom Sale had left 
at  Icubbar-i-Jubbar, and that good soldier, having fought 
evcry step of the way through the passes, brought i n  his 
detachment in unbroliell order and without loss of baggage, 
notwithstanding his weakness in transport. Sllcltoll, re- 
inforccd in the Balla I-Iissar, maintained an  intcl-mittent 
and ineffectual fire on thc city. Urgent orders were  de- 
spatched to Sale, recalling him and his brigade-orders 
with \vhich, as has been mentioned, Sale did not comply- 
and also to Nott, at Candahar, begging him to send a 
brigade to Cabul. I n  compliance with this requisition, 
Maclaren's brigade immediately started from Candahar, 
but soon returned owing to the incleme~lcy of the weather. 
Captain Maclwnzie was in charge of a fort containing 
the Shah's commissariat stores; this fort was o n  the 
outsliirts of a suburb of  Cabul, and was fiercely at tacked 
on thc 2d. For two days Maclienzie maintained h i s  post 
with unwearying constancy. His garrison was short  of 
water and of ammunition, and the fort was crowded with 
women and children, but he hcld on resolutely unt i l  the 
night of the gd. No assistance was sent, no  noticc, 
indeed, of any kind was taken of him ; his garrison was 
discouraged by heavy loss, and by the mines which the 
enemy were pushing forward. At length, when the gate 
of the fort had been fired, and his wounded were dying' 
for lack of medical aid, he cvacuated the fort, and fought 
his way gallantly into cantonments, bringing in his 
wounded and tlie women and children. With t h i s  soli- 
tary exception the Afghans had nowhere encountered 
resistance, and the strange passiveness of our people en- 
couraged them to act  with vigour. From the enclosed 
space of  tlle Shah Ragh, and the adjacent forts of  Mah- 
mood Khan and Mahomed Sherecf, they were threatening 
thc Commissariat fort, hindering acccss to it, a n d  bc- 
setting the south-western flank of the cantonments. A 
young officer commanded the hundrcd sepoys garrisoning 
the Commissariat fort ; he reported himself in dauger of 
being cut off, and Elphinstone gave orders that hc and 
his garrison should be brought off, and the fort and its 
contents abandoned. Sevcral efforts to accomplish the 
withdrawal were thwarted by the Afghan flanking firc, 
with the loss of sevcral oficers and many mcn. Thc 
commissary officer urgcd on the Gcneral thc disastrous 
consequenccs which the abanclonment of the fort \\.auld 
entail, containing as it did all the stores, adding that 
in cantonments there wcre only two days' supplies, with- 
out prospcct of procuring any morc. Orders nrcre then 
sent to Warren to hold out to thc last extremity ; which 
instructions he denied having received. Early in thc 
morning of the 5th troops were preparing to attack the 
Afghan fort and reinforce thc Commissariat fort, whcn 
Warren and his garrison rcached the cantonments. The 
gate of thc Commissariat fort had been fired, but tlic 
enemy had not effccted an ent~ance, ycl Warrcn and his 
people had evacuatcd the fort through a hole cut in its 
'wall. Thus, with scarcely a struggle to savc it, was this 
vital fort allowed to fall into thc cnemy's hands, ancl 
thenceforward our unfortunate people were to be reduced 
to precarious and scanty sources for their food. 
From the 5th to the 9th Novembcr there was a good 
dcal of desultory fighting, in the course of which, aftcr onc 
failure, Mahomed Sherccf's fort was stormed by a detach- 
ment of our people, under the command of Major Griffiths ; 
but this success had little influence on the threatening 
attitilde maintained by the Afghans. On the gth, owing 
to  the mental and physical weakness of poor General 
Elphinstone, Brigadier Sllelton was summoncd into can- 
tonments from the  Balls Hissar, hri~lging with him part of 
the garrison with which h e  had been holding the latter post. 
T h e  hopes entertained tha t  Shclton would display vigour, 
and restorc the confidence of the troops, wcre not realised. 
H e  from the first had n o  belief in the ability of the occu- 
pants of the cantonment t o  maintain thcir position, and he  
ncver ceased to urge prompt retreat on   el la lab ad. From 
the purely military point of view he was  roba ably right ; the 
Duke of Wellington shared his opinion when hc said in 
the House of Lords : 'After thc first fcw days, particularly 
after the negotiations at  Cabul had commenced, it became 
h o i ~ l c s s  for General Elphinstone to maintain his position.' 
Shclton's situation was ~ ~ ~ c l ~ ~ s t i o n a b l y a ~ e r y u n c o m f ~ r t a b ~ ~  
one, for Elphinstone, brolccn as hc was, yet allowed his 
second in command n o  frcedom of action, and was testily 
pertinacious of his prerogative of command. If in Shelton, 
who after his manncr w a s  a strong man, thcre had been 
combined with his resolution some tact and temper, he  
might have exerciscd a beneficial influence. As it was he 
became sullen and clespondcnt, and rctired behind an ' un- 
communicative and disheartening rescrve.' Brave as hc 
was, he secms to  have l a c l d  thc inspiration which alone 
could rcinvigoratc the drooping spirit of thc troops. I n  a 
word, though he probably was, in army language, a 'good 
duty soldier,' he certainly was nothing more. And some- 
thing more was nceded thcn. 
Action on Shelton's part became necessary the day after 
he came into cantonmcnts. The  Afghans occupied all thc 
forts on the plain bctwccn the Seah Sung heights and thc 
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cantonments, and from the nearest of them, the Rika- 
bashcc fort, poured in a heavy fire a t  close range, which 
the return artillery fire could not quell, On Macnaghten's 
urgcnt requisition the General ordered out a strong force, 
under Shelton, to storm the obnoxious fort. Captain 
Bcllew missed the gate, and blew open merely a narrow 
wicket, but the storming party obeyed the signal to ad- 
vance. Through a heavy fire the leadcrs reached the 
wiclcet, and forced their way in, followcd by a few soldiers. 
The garrison of the fort hastily evacuated it, and all seeinecl 
well, when a sudden stampede ensued-the handful which, 
lcd by Colonel Macltrell of the 44th and Lieutenant Bird 
of the Shah's force, had already cntercd the fort, rcrnaining 
inside it. The runaway troops were rallied with diffi- 
culty by Shelton and the subordinate officers, but a call for 
volunteers from the European regiment was responded to 
but by one solitary Scottish private. After a second ad- 
vance, and a second retreat-a retreat made notwithstancl- 
ing strong artillery and muslcctry support-Shclton's efforts 
brought his people forward yet again, and this time the 
fort was occupied in force. Of those who had previously 
entercd it but two survivors were found. The Afghans, 
re-entering the fort, had hacltcd Maclcrell to pieces and 
slaughterccl the men who tried to escape by thc wiclcet. 
Lieutenant Bird and a sepoy, from a stable'the door of 
which they had barricaded with logs of wood, had fended 
off their assailants by a steady and deadly fire, and when 
they were rescued by thc cntrance of thc troops they had 
to clamber out over a pile of thirty dead Afghans whom 
the bullets of the two men had struck down. 
I t  had come to our people in those gloomy days, to 
regard as a ' triumph' a combat in which they wcrc not 
actually worsted ; and even of such dubious successcs 
the last occurrcd on November 13, whcn the Afghans, 
after having pressed our infantry down the slopes of thc 
Behmaroo ridge, were driven back by artillery fire, and 
forced by a cavalry charge to retreat further, leaving be- 
hind them a coup:c of guns from \vhich they had been 
sending missiles into the cantonments. One of those guns 
was brought in without difficulty, but the other the Afghans 
covcrcd with thcir jezail fire. The Envoy had sent a mes- 
sage of entreaty that ' the triumph of the dayJ should be 
completed by its capture. Major Scott of the 44th made 
appeal on appeal, incffcctually, to the soldierly feelings 
of his men, and while tllcy would not move the sepoys 
coulcl not be induced to advance. At  length Eyrc spilced 
the piece as a precautionary measurc, and finally some 
men of thc Shah's infantry succeeded in bringing in the 
prize. The return march of the troops into cantonments 
i n  the dark, was renclercd disorderly by the close pressure 
ofthe Afghans, who, firing incessantly, pursued the broken 
soldiery up to the cntrance gate. 
On the depressed garrison of the Cabul cantonments 
tidings of disaster further afield had been pouring in apace. 
Soon after the outbreak of the rising, it was lcnown that 
Lieutcnant Maule, commanding the Kohistanee regiment 
at Kurdurrah, had bcen cut to pieces, kvith his adjutant 
and sergeant-major, by the men of his own corps ; and on 
November 6th intelligence had come i n  that the Goorlcha 
regiment stationed a t  Charikar in thc Kohistan, where 
Major Pottinger was Resident, was in dangerous case, and 
that Codrington, its commandant, and some of his officcrs 
had already fallen. And now, on the 15t11, therc roclc 
wearily into cantonments two wou~~decl men, who bclicved 
the~nselves the only British survivors of the Chariliar 
force. Pottinger was wounded in the leg, Haughton, the 
adjutant of the Goorliha corps, had lost his right hand, 
and his head hung forward on his breast, half severed 
from his body by a great tulwar slash. Of the miserable 
story urhich it fell to Pottinger to tell only the briefest 
summary can be given. His residence was a t  Lughmanee, 
a few miles from thc Charikar cantonments, when carly 
in the month a number of chiefs of the Kohistan and the 
Nijrao country assembled to discuss with him the terms on 
which they would reopen the communications with Cabul. 
Those chiefs pro\ml treacherous, slew Rattray, Pottinger's 
assistant, and besieged Pottinger in Lughmanee. Finding 
his position untenable, he withdrew to Chariliar under cover 
ofnight. On the morning of the 5th the Afghans assailed 
the cantonrncnts. Pottingcr was wounded, Codrington was 
killed, and the Goorkhas were driven into the barraclis. 
Haughton, who succcedcd to the command of the regiment, 
made sortic on sortie, but was finally clrivcn in, and thc 
enemy renewed thcir assaults i n  augmentcd strength. 
Thenceforward the position was all but hopeless. On 
the 10th the last scant remains of water was distributed. 
Efforts to procure water by sorties on the nights of the I rth 
and 12th wcre not successful, and the corps fell into disor- 
ganisation because of losses, hardships, exhaustio!~, hunger 
and thirst. Pottinger and Ilaughton agreed that there was 
no prospect of saving eveii a remnant of the regiment unless 
by a retreat to Cabul, which, however, was clearly possiblc 
only in the case of the stronger men, unencumbered with 
I? 
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women and children, of whom, unfortunately, there was 
a great number in the garrison. On the afternoon of the 
13th Haughton was cut down by a treacherous native 
officer of the artillery, who then rushed out of the gate, 
followed by all the gunners and most of the Mahom- 
medans of the garrison. In  the midst of the chaos of 
disorganisation, Dr  Grant amputated Haughton's hand, 
dressed his other wounds, and then spiked all the guns. 
When it was dark, thc garrison moved out, Pottinger lead- 
ing the advance, D r  Grant the main body, and Ensign 
Rose the rear-guard. From the beginning of the march, 
discipline was all but entirely in abeyance ; on reaching 
the first stream, the last remains of control were lost, 
and the force was rapidly disintegrating. Pottinger and 
Haughton, thc latter only just able to keep the saddle, 
pushed on toward Cabul, rested in a ravine during thc 
day, evaded the partisan detachment sent out from Cabul 
to intercept them, rode through slceping Cabul in the 
small hours of the morning, and after being pursued and 
fired upon in the outsltirts of the city, finally attained 
the cantonments. I t  was aftcrwarcls learned that a. por- 
tion of the regiment had struggled on to within twenty 
miles from Cabul, gallantly headed by young Rose and 
Dr Grant. Thcn the remnant was destroyed. Rose was 
Idled, after despatching four Afghans with his own hand. 
Dr Grant, escaping the massacre, held on until within 
three miles of the cantoi~inents, when he too was killed. 
Macnaghten was naturally much depressed by the ncws 
cominunicated by Pottinger, and realised that the Afghan 
masses already encompassing the position on the Cabul 
plain would certainly be increased by bands from the 
I<ohistan ancl Nijrao, flushed already with tllcir Charilmr 
success. H e  sided strongly with the large party among 
the officers who were advocating the measure of abandon- 
ing the cantonments altogether, and moving the force now 
quartered thcre to the safer and more commanding posi- 
tion in the Balla Missar. The military chiefs opposed the 
project, and propounded a varicty of objections-to it, none 
of which were without n ~ i g h t ,  yct all of which might hare 
been overconie by energy ancl proper clispositiol~s, Shclton, 
l~owcvcr, was opposccl to the scheme, sincc i f  carried out it 
. would avert or postpone thc accomplishmci~t of his policy 
of rctrcat on Jellalabad ; Elphitistone was against it in the 
inertia of debility, and thc project gradually came to bc 
5 regarded as abandoned. Anothcr projcct, that of driving 
the Afghans from Mallmood Khan's fort, commanding 
thc direct road between thc cantonincnts and the Balla 
Hissar, and of occupying it with a British force, was so 
far advanced that tlic timc for thc attempt was fixed, and 
the storining party actually warned, \ \ J ~ C I I  some petty 
objcction intervened and the enterprise was abaiicloiied, 
never to be revived. 
The  rising was not three clays old whcn already 
Elphinstone had lost heart. 011 the 5th he had written 
to Macnaghten suggesting that the latter should 'consider 
what chance there is of making terms,' and since then he 
had been repeatedly pressing on thc Envoy the ' hopeless- 
I 
3 ness of further resistance.' Macnaghten, vacillating as  he 
was, yet had more pith i n  his nature than was left in the 
dcbilitated old general. He wrote to Elpl~instone on the 
18th recommending, not very strenuously, the policy of 
holding out where they were as long as possible, and 
indeed throughout the winter, if subsistence could be 
obtained. H e  pointed out that in the cantonments, 
which he believed to be impregnable, there were at least I 
the  essentials of wood and \\rater. Arguing that a retreat 
- - 
on Jellalabad must be most disastrous, and was to be 
avoided except in the last extremity, he nevertheless 
ended somewhat inconsistently by leaving to the military 
authorities, if in eight or tcn days there should appear no  
prospect of an improvement of the situation, the decision 
whether it would bc wiser to attempt a retrcat or to with- 
draw from the cantonments into the Balla Hissar. 
Far from improving, the situation was speedily to be- 
colne all but hopelcss. The  village of Behmaroo, built on 
the north-eastern slope of thc ridge of the same namc 
- 
bounding the plain on the north-west, lay about half a 
mile clue north of the cantonments, part of which some 
of the houses on the upper slope commanded. From 
this village, after the loss of the Co~nmissariat fort, our 
people had been drawing supplies. On the morning of 
the 22d the Afghans were seen moving in 'force from 
Cabul toward Behrnaroo, obviously with intent to occupy 
the village, and so deprive the occupants of the canton- 
ments of thc resource it had becn affording them. A de- 
tachment: under Major Swayne, sent out to forestall this 
occupation, found Bchmaroo already in  the possession of 
a body of l<ohistanees, who had so blocked the approaches 
that  S\vayne did not consider himself justified in attempt- 
ing the fulfilment of his orders to storm the place ; and he 
contented himself with maintaining all day an ineffectual 
musketry fire on it. A diversion in his favour by a gun 
supported by cavalry had no result save that of casualties 
to the gunncrs and troopers ; reinforccments brought out 
by Shelton effected nothing, and in the evening the troops 
were recalled. On this ill-fated day Akbar Khan, Dost 
Mahorned's fierce and implacable son, arrived in Cabul, 
and the evil influence on the British fortunes which hc 
exerted immediately made itself felt, for thc events of 
the following day were to bring about a crisis in the fate 
of our ill-starred people. 
Recognising the mischief wrought by the hostile occupa- 
tion of our only source of supplies, the Envoy strongly urged 
the immediate clespatcli of a strong force to occupy the 
Behmiroo ridge, and dislodge from the village its Kohi- 
stanec garrison. Shelton opposcd the measure, urging the 
dispirited state of the troops, their fatigue from constant 
defensive duty, and their ~veakened physique because of 
poor and scanty rations. H e  was overruled, and before 
daybreak of the 23d a force under his command, consisting 
of five companies of the 44th, twelve cornpjnies of native 
infantry, some cavalry, and one horse-artillery gun, was in  
position on the north-castern extremity of the ridge ovcr- 
hanging the village. The gun opened fire on the village 
with grapc, and after'a short resistance the greater part of 
its garrison quitted it. The storming party intrusted to 
Major Swaync did not, however, act, and mas withclrawn. 
Leaving a detachment on the lcnoll above the village, . 
Shelton moved his force along the upland to a position 
near the gorge intersecting the ridge, forming his infantry 
into two squares, with the cavalry in rcac The further hill 
beyolid the gorge was crowded with hostile Afghans from 
Cabul, and the long-range firc of their jezails across the 
dividing depression, carried execution into the squares 
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\vhicll Sheltoll had inexplicably formed as i f  to furnish his 
foes with a target which they could not miss. The rnuslcets 
of his Inell could not retaliate, and the slcirmishers he threw 
forward to the brow of his hill could not endure the Afghan 
fire. Shclton's single gun maintained a hot and telling fire 
on the Afghan masses on thc opposite hill, and baullced an 
attempt against his right flank made by the Afghan cavalry 
swarming i n  the outer plain; but when its vent became too 
hot for the gunners to serve it, the dullest comprehension 
became ativc to the folly of sending a single gun into the 
field. 
Shelton's men, falling fast though they were, and faint 
wit11 fatigue and thirst, yet had endured for hours a fusil- 
lade to which they could not reply, when a body of Afghan 
fanatics suddenly sprang up out of the gorge, swept back 
with their fire the few skirmishers who had been still 
holding the brow of the hill, and planted their flag within 
thirty yards of the front of the nenrcr of the squarcs. 
Shelton offered a large reward to the man who should 
bring it in, hut there was no responsc. In a passion of 
soldierly wrath, the vetcran commanded a bayonet charge; 
not a man sprang forward at the summons which British 
soldiers are wont to welcome with cheers. The cowed in- 
fantry remained supine, when their officers darted forward 
and threw stones into the faces of the enemy ; the troopers 
heard but obeyed not that trumpet-call to ' Charge ! ' 
which so rarely fails to thrill ,the cavalryman with the 
rapture of the fray. T h e  gunners only, men of that noble 
force the Company's Horse-Artillery, quitted themselves 
valiantly. They stood to their piece to the bitter end. 
Two of them were killed beside it, another was severely 
wounded, a fourth, refusing to run, took refuge under the 
gun, and miraculously escaped death. But the gallant 
example of the artillerymen in their front did not hearten 
the infantrymen of the leading square. The panic spread 
among them, and they brolcc and fled. Fortunately they 
were not pursued. The rear square stood fast, and the 
officers by great exertion succeedecl in rallying the fugi- 
tives under the cover it afforded. The news that a prin- 
cipal chief, Abcloolah Khan, had bccn severely woundcd 
in the plain gave pause to the offensivc vigour of the 
Afghans, and the assailants fell back, abandoning the gun, 
but carrying off the limber and gun-team. Our people 
reoccupied the position, the gun recommenced its fire, and 
if the cavalry and infantry could have been persuaded to  
take the offensive the battle might have bcen retrieved. 
But they remained passive. The reinforced Afghans 
renewed their long-range fire with terrible effect ; most of 
the gunners had fallen, and the Brigadier, recognising the 
growing unsteadiness of his cotnlnand and the imminent 
danger of capture to which the solilary gun was again 
exposed, ordel-ed a retirement on the detachment left near 
Behmaroo and the limbering up of the gun, to which a 
second limber had been sent out from thc cantonments. 
The movement was scarcely begun when a rush of fanatic 
Afghans completely broke the square, and all order and 
discipline then disappeared. A regular rout set in down 
the hill toward cantonments, the fugitives disregarding 
the efforts of the officers to rally them, and the enemy in 
full pursuit, the Afghan cavalry making ghastly slaughter 
among the panic-striclcen runaways. Thc detachment 
near Bchmaroo attempted to fa11 back in orderly fashion, 
but thc reinforced garrison of the villagc swept out upon 
it, surroundecl it, broke it up, and threw it into utter rout 
with the loss of a large proportion of its strcngth, one 
whole company being all but annihilated. I t  seemed as if 
pursued and pursucrs would enter the cantonments togethcr 
so closely were thcy comminglccl; but the fire from the ram- 
parts and an opportune chargc of horse arrested thc pur- 
suit. Yet  Eyre  reckons as the chief reason why all the 
British force that  had gone out to battle was not destroyed, 
the fact that a leading Afghan chief forced his men to 
spare the fugitives, and ultimatcly halted and withdrew 
his peoplc when the opportunity for wholcsalc slaughter 
lay open to then?. Most of the wounded were left on 
thc field, where they werc miserably cut to pieces; and the 
gun, which had been overturned in thc attempt of the 
drivers to  gallop clown thc face of the hill, finally passed 
into the possession of the Afghans. Shelton's dispositions 
as  a commander could not well have been worsc; his 
bearing as a soldier, although undaunted, imparted to his 
haplcss troops nothing of inspiration. The obstinacy 
with which he held the hill after the impossibility of 
even partial succcss must have been patent to him, was 
~~niversally condcmnecl. I t  necd scarcely be adclcd that 
his loss was very sevcre. 
No more fighting was possiblc. What, then, was to 
be done? Elphinstone and Shclton nerc at one in oppos- 
ing removal into the Balla Ilissar. Macnaghten, to \\,horn 
Shah Soojal~ had communicated his urgcnt recommcnda- 
tion of that measure as the only expedient which could 
securc the safety of thc British troops, fell in with tile 
vicws of the military authorities. Thcre calnc to hiln a 
I letter from Os~nan Khan, the chief who had called OK his 
adherents on the previous day from pursuing the fugitives 
'r flccing into cantonments. Osman wrote that, if his troops 
had followcd u p  their successes, the loss of the canton- 
I 
I ments and the dcstruction of the British force werc in- 
I 
evitable; but, hc continued, that it was not the wish of 
the chiefs to proceed to such cxtrcmities, their sole desire 
being that our peoplc should quietly cvacuatc the country, 
lcaving the Afghan sirdars to govern it according to their 
own customs, and with a king of their own choosing. In 
communicating this letter to Gcneral Elphinstone, Sir 
William askcd for the latter's opinion on the military 
possibility, or the reverse, of thc retention of the British 
position in Afghanistan. Elphinstone, in reply, enumerated 
sundry reasons which led him to the conclusion which 
he stated, that ' i t  is not feasible any longer to maintain 
our position in this country, and that you ought to avail 
yoursclf of thc offer to negotiate which has bccn made 
to you.' 
C H A P T E R  V I  
THE R O A D  TO R U I N  
As the result of the military disaster of November 23d, 
and of the representations of the General, recorded in 
the last chapter, Macnaghten, with whatever reluctance, 
permitted himself .to entertain proposals for an arrange- 
, 
rnent made by the Afghan leaders. From the begin- 
ning of the outbreak, while urging on the military 
authorities to exert themselves in putting down the 
revolt, he had been engaged i n  tortuous and dangerous 
intrigues, with the object of sowing discord among the 
Afghan chiefs, and thus wealcening the league of hostility 
against Shah Soojah and his British supporters. I n  
the conduct of these intrigues he used the services of 
Mohun Lal, who had been one of Burnes' assistants, 
and who, having escaped the fate of his chief, had 
found refuge in the city residence of a I<uzzilbash 
chiet Mohun La1 was a fitting agent for the sort of 
work prescribed to him, and he burrowed and suborned 
with assiduity, and not altogether without success. But 
it is unhappily true that he was comn~issioned to carry 
out a darker enterprise, the removal by assassi~~ation of 
certain of the more virulently hostile among the Afghal~ 
Icaders. The incident is the blackest of the many dis- 
creditable transactions which chequer the inner political 
history of this melancholy chapter of our annals. I t  is 
unfortunately certain that Lieutenant John Conolly, Mac- 
naghten's kinsman and his confidential representative 
with Shah Soojah, authorised Mohun Lal, in writing, to 
compass the taking off of prominent Afghan leaders. I n  
a letter to Mohun Lal, of 5th Novcmbcr, Conolly wrote : 
' I promise I O , ~  rupees for thc hcad of each rebel chief' 
Again, on the 11t11, he wrotc: 'Therc is a man called 
Iladji Ali, who might be induced by a bribe to try and 
bring in the heads of one or two of the Mufsids. 
Endeavour to let him know that ~o,ooo rupees will be 
given for each head, or even I 5,000 rupees.' Two chiefs 
certainly did die under suspicious circumstances, and in 
each case the blood-money mas claimed. It  was refused 
by Mohun La1 on the plea that thc stipulation that the 
heads of the dead Afghans shor~ld be brought in was 
not fulfilled. 
Whether Macnagl~ten inspircd those nefarious machi- 
nations, whether indeed he was activcly aware of them, are 
questions \vhich, in the absence of conclusive cvidcnce, may 
judiciously bc left unanswered. Thcre is extant a letter 
from him to Mohun Lal, written Dccember 1st) which has 
the following passage: ' I am sorry to find from your 
letter of last night that you sl~ould have supposed it was 
ever my object to cncouragc assassination. The rebcls 
are very wicked men, but wc must not talcc unlawful 
means to dcstroy them.' And latcr he is reported to 
have informed an Afghan dcputation that, 'as a British 
functionary, nothing ~~~oulc l  induce him to pay a pricc for 
blood.' Durancl holds that it was thc belief on the part 
of the Afghan chiefs that tthc British Envoy had sct a 
price on their heads which destroycd all confidencc in 
Macnaghten's good faith, ancl which was Alcbar Khan's 
chief incentive to his murder. 
The terms proffered on Novcmbcr 25th by an Afghan 
deputation were so humiliating that Macnaghtcn per- 
emptorily rcjectecl thcrn; ancl thc thrcat of inlmecliatc 
hostilitics udcss our pcople promptly surrenclerccl their 
arms and withclrcw was not carried out. A pcriod 
of inaction strangely ensucd, which on thc Afghan side 
was a t~cacl~erous lull, but which Macnaghten, hoping 
against hopc that somc turn in our favour might yet 
occur, regarded with complacency. The chiefs, awarc 
that winter was approaching with added hardship to 
the forlorn garrison, temporarily dcsisted from urging 
negotiations. But the British military authorities, with 
troops living from hand to mouth on precarious half 
rations, and with transport cattlc dying fast of starva- 
tion, kept urging the Envoy to activity in making 
tcrms, if absolute starvation was to be averted. Futile 
projccts wcre discussecl betwecn Envoy and General, 
only to bc put aside. As the dreary days of inaction 
and depletion passed, the deterioration of military spirit 
among our people manifested itself inore and more 
plainly. British soldiers stolidly watched the Afghans 
destroying our bridge across the Cabul' river, within a 
quarter of a mile from cantonments. Scared by the 
threat of an assault, which, in the scornful words of 
brave Lady Sale, a child with a stick might have re- 
pulsed, the garrison of the Mahomed Shcreef fort aban- 
cloned it in a panic, the while soldiers of the 44th 
sI~.owing the example of pusillanimity to the sepoys 
whom thcir cowardice demoralisecl. Next clay the cle- 
tachment of the 44th which had guarded an exposed 
position had to be withdrawn, ceding the post of honour 
to thc stauncher sepoys. The camp followers were 
living on carrion ; the commissaries reported but four 
days' provisions in store, ancl their inability to procure 
any more supplies. At length on December 8th the 
four scnior military officers informed ~ I I C  Etlvoy that it 
was imperatively necessary he should negotiale a retreat, 
on the bcst t e r m  he could obtain. 
Macnagllten had to bring himself to recognise that 
thc alternatives were negotiation or starvation, and on 
the 11th December, with a draft treaty in his hand, hc 
met the principal Afghan chiefs on the river side be- 
tween thc cantonments and the city. After the intro- 
ductory palavers, Macnaghten read thc proposed treaty, 
whose purport was as follo~vs: that the British should 
cvacuate Afghanistan forthwith unmolested, furnished 
with supplies and accompanied by hostages, on their 
march to India; that the Dost, his family, and other Afghan 
political exiles, should be allowed to return to their 
country ; that Shah Soojah should have the option of re- 
maining at Cabul or going d o ~  to India ; that amnesty 
should be accorded to all adherents of Shah Soojah and 
his British allies; that all prisoners should bc released ; 
and that perpetual friendship ancl mutual good offices 
should thenceforth endure between the British and the 
Afghans. 
Alcbar Khan madc demur to some of thc provisions, 
but was overruled, and thc main stipulations of the treaty 
were agreed to by the chiefs. The conference brokc up 
with the understanding that the British troops should 
evacuate cantonments within threc days, and that mean- 
while provisions sl~oulcl be sent in for thcir use. T h e  
treaty was simply a virtual capitulation all along the 
line; but the inherent falseness of our position, the in- 
capacity of the military chicfs, and the debased spirit of 
the troops, consequent partly on low rations but mainly 
because of the utter absence of competent and vigorous 
leadership such as a Broadfoot or a I-Iavclocl~ would havc 
supplied, enforced on thc reluctant Envoy conditions 
humiliating bcyond previous parallel i n  the history of our 
nation. 
From the outset the Afghan chiefs defaulted from 
their promise of sending in supplies, but some grain was 
brought into cantonments by the troops, whose evacua- 
tion of the Balla Nissar on the 13th was cffccted under 
humiliating circumstances. The Afghans de~nandcd the 
surrender of the forts in British occupation in the vicinity 
of the cantonments. The requisition was complied wih ,  
and thc Magazine fort furnished the enemy with both 
arms and ammunition. 
The three stipulated days passed away, and still the 
British force remained motionless in the cantonments. 
Macnaghten was bent on procrastination, and circum- 
stances seemed to favour a policy which to all but hi~nself 
was inesplicable. By the treaty, Shah Soojah was in 
effect committed to withdraw to India, but soon after its 
acceptance the chiefs had invited him to remain in Cabul 
as king, on the stipulation that he should give his daughters 
in marriage to leaders of the malcontents. After con- 
siderable deliberation, thc Shah had consented to remain 
on the condition named, but a few days lates he withdrew 
his acceptance. His vacillation increased the suspicions 
of the chiefs, and they demanded the immediate evacua- 
tion of the cantonments, refusing to f~irnish provisions 
until that was done. Meanwhile they sent in no trans- 
port animals, although large sums had becn handed over 
for their purc l~~se .  Our pcoplc were still immobile, and 
already, on the 18th~ there had occurred a fall of  snow 
several inches dccp. 
Thc Envoy was engagcd in strange and dubious in- 
trigues, and sincc the Afghans were not fulfilling their sharc 
of the treaty obligations, he appears to  have regarclcd him- 
self as no longer bound by its conditions, ancl frec to try 
to obtain better terms from other sources, in pursuit o f  
which purpose he was espcnding moncy in a variety of 
dircctions. Thc  dark and unscrupulous Mohun La1 was 
his confidant and instrumcnl. Akbar Khan and the 
chiefs of his party had bccoine awarc of MacnaghtenJs 
machinations, ancl thcy laid a snare for him into which he 
fcll with open cyes. Emissaries were sent to him with 
the sinister proposals that the British should remain in 
Afghanistan until the spring, when they werc to witlldraw 
as of their own accord; that the head of Ameenoolla 
Khan, onc of the most ponrerful and obnoxious of thc 
rebel leaders, should be presented to the Envoy in return 
for a stipulated sum of money; and that  for all those 
services the British Government should requite Akbar 
Khan with a present of thirty lal<hs of rupces, and an 
annual pension of four lalihs. Macnaghten refused 
peremptorily the proffer of Ameenoolla's head, but did 
not rcjcct co-operation in that chiefs capture by a 
dubious device in which British troops were to partici- 
pate ; he did not hesitate to accept the general terms of 
the proposals ; and he consented to hold a confcrcnce 
with Akbar IChm on the following day to carry into 
effect the projected measures. 
On the morning of the 23d thc deceived and doomecl 
man, accompanied by his staff-officers, Lawrence, Trevor 
and Macl<enzie, rode out from cantonments to keep the  
fatcful tryst on the bank of the  Cabul river. His manner 
was 'distracted and hurried.' When he tolcl Lawrence of 
the nature of the affair on which he was going, that shrewd 
officer immediately warned him that it was a plot against 
him. ' A plot ! ' he replied hastily, ' let me alone for that ; 
trust me for that  ! ' and Lawrence desisted from useless ex-  
postulation. Poor old Elphinstone had scented treachery; 
but the Envoy had closed his mouth with the impatient 
words : ' I understand these things better than you !' A s  
h e  rode out, h e  admitted the danger of the enterprise, but  
argued that if it succeeded it was worth all risks. ' A t  all 
events,' hc ended, 'let the loss be what it may, I would 
rather die a hunclred deaths than live the last six weeks 
over again.' The escort halted, and the four British gentle- 
men advanced to  the place of rendezvous, whither came 
presently Akbar Khan and his party. Akbar began the 
conference by asking the Envoy if he was ready to carry 
out the proposals prcsented t o  him overnight. 'Why not?' 
was Sir Willian1's short reply. A number of Afghans, 
armed to  the teeth, had gradually formed a circle around 
the informal durbar. Lawrence and Maclenzie pointcd 
out this environment to some of the chicfs, who affected to 
drive off the intruders with their whips ; but Akbar obscrved 
that it did not matter, as they 'were all in the secret.' 
'Suddenly,' wrote Maclenzie, ' I heard Alcbar call out, 
" Uegeer ! begeer ! " (" Seize ! seize ! ") and turning round I 
saw him grasp the Envoy's left hand with an expression 
on his face of the most diabolical ferocity. I think it was 
Sultan Jan who laid hold of thc Envoy's right hand. 
They dragged him in a stooping posture down thehillock, 
thc only words I heard poor Sir William utter bcing, " Az 
barae I<hooda " (" For God's sake "). I saw his face, how- 
ever, and it was full of horror and astonishment.' Neither 
Mackenzie nor Lawrence, the surviving companions of 
the Envoy, witnessed the actual end. ' Whether,' writes 
&ye, 'he  died on the spot, or whether hc was slain by 
the infuriated gliazees, is not very clearly known; but 
the fanatics threw then~selves on the prostrate body and 
haclied it with thcir Icnives.' There is no doubt that the 
head of the unfortunate Macnaghten was paraded in 
triumph through the streets of Cabul, and that the 
mangled trunk, after being dragged about the city, was 
hung up in the great bazaar. Of the  three officers who 
accompanicd the Envoy to the conference, Trevor was 
massacred, Lawrencc and Maclcenzie wcre saved with 
L 
I difficully by fricndly chiefs, and brought into the city, 
wherc they and Captain Skinner joined the hostages, 
Captains Connolly and Airey, under the safe roof of the 
venerable Mahomed Zernaun Khan. 
That "ikbar and the confederate chiefs sprcad a snare 
for the Envoy is plain, and that they regarded his accept- 
ance of their deceitful proposals as a proof of his faithless- 
G 
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lless to the treaty obligations to which he 11x1 bound 
himself. I t  was no elemcnt in thcir reasoning that since 
thc)r had not rcgarclcd thc treaty the British functionary 
might without breach of faith hold that it did not bind 
]lime But it is improbable that the murder of Mac- 
naghten was actually included in their schemc of action. 
Their intention seems to have been to seizc him as a 
hostage, with intcnt thus to secure the evacuation of 
Afghanistan and the restoration of Dost Mahomecl, T h e  
ill-fated Envoy's espressions on his may to the rendez- 
vous indicate his unhinged statc of mind. I-Tc went forth 
to sure treachery; Alcbar's gust of sudden fury con- 
vertecl the planned abduction into savage murder, and his 
abrupt pistol bullet baullcccl the more wily and lcss ruth- 
less project which had probably hcen dcviscd in cold 
blood. 
The escort brought back into cantonments tidings that 
the Envoy had been seized. The garrison got undcr arms, 
and remained passive throughout the day. The defences 
were manned a t  night, in the appt-ehcnsion that thc noise 
and disturbance in the city portended an assault ; but that 
clamour was caused by thc mustering of the Afghans in 
espectation that thc British would attack the city, bent on 
vengcance on the murderers of the Envoy. Action of that 
nature was, ho\vcver, wholly absent from the prostrate 
nlil~ds of the military chiefs. On thc following after110011 
Captain Lawrence transmitted certain overtures from thc 
chicfs, as the rcsult of a conference held by them, when, 
notwithstanding severe cornmcnts on the conduct of the 
Envoy, professions were made of sincere regret for his 
death. With ccrtain alterations and additions, the treaty - 
drawn up by Macnaghtcn was taken by the chiefs as  the 
basis for the negotiations which they clesirecl to renew. 
Major Pottinger, as now the senior 'political' with the 
force, was called on by General Elphinstone to undertake 
the task of conducting negotiations with the Afghan 
leaders. The high-souled Pottinger rose a t  the summons 
from the sickbed to which he had bcen confined ever since 
his wonderful escape from Charikar, and accepted the 
thankless and distasteful duty. I t  is not necessary to  
recount the details of ncgotintions, cvery article and 
every stagc of which display thc arrogance of the men 
who knew themselves masters of thc situation, and revcal 
not less the degrading humiliation to which was sub- 
mitting itself a strong brigade of British troops, whose arms 
were still in the soldiel-s' hands, and ' over whose ranks 
hung banncrs blazoned with victories that shall be memor- 
able clown the ages. On the sombre and cheerless Christ- 
mas Day Pottinger rose in the council of men who wore 
swords, and rcrnonstrated with soldierly vigour and 
powerful argument against the degrading terms which 
the chiefs had contumeliously thrown to them. He  pro- 
clucerl letters from Jellalabacl and Peshawur giving in- 
formation of reinforcements on the way from India, and 
urging the maintenance of resistance. He  argued that 
to conclude a treaty with the Afghans would be a fatal 
error, and suggested two alternative courses which offered 
a prospect of saving their honour and part of the army- 
the occupation of the Balla Hissar, which was the pre- 
ferable measure, or the abandonment of camp, baggage, 
and encumbrances, and forcing a retreat down the passes. 
Thc council-Pottinger must have written s a rca~ t i ca l l~  
when he  tcrmcd it a ' council of war1-unanimously dc- 
cided that to remain in Cabul and to force a retreat 
WCI-c alike impracticable, and that nothing remained but 
the endeavour to release the arrny by agreeing to thc 
conditions oKered by the cncrny. 'Under thcsecircutn- 
stances,' in the words of I'ottingcr, 'as the Major-General 
coincided with the officers of tllc council, ancl refused to 
attempt occupying the Balla Ilissar, and as his second 
in command declared that impracticable, I comidered it 
my duty, notwithstanding my repugnance to ancl dis- 
approval of the  measure, to  yield, and attempt to carry 
on a negotiation.' 
This Pottingcr accordingly did. T h e  first demand 
with which he had to comply was to give bills for the 
great sums promised by the Envoy to  the chiefs for 
thcir services i n  furthering and supporting his treaty. 
This imposition had to be submitted to, since thc Afghans 
stopped the supplies until the extortion was complied 
with. The  next concession required was the surrender 
of thc artillery of the force, with thc exceptiorl of six 
field and threc mule guns ; and the military chiefs en- 
dured this humiliation, against which even the demor- 
alised soldiery chafed. Then the demand for hostages 
had to  be complied with, and four officers were sent on to 
join the two hostages alreacl y in Afghan hands. The chiefs 
had demanded four married hostages, with their wives 
and children, and a circular was sent round offering to 
volunteers the inducement of a large stipend; but the 
sentiment of repulsion was too strong to be overcorne by 
thc bribe. T h e  sick and wounded who could not bear 
the march were sent into t he  city in accordance with an 
article of the treaty, two surgeons accompanying thcir 
patients. 
' 
The treaty, ratified by the leading chiefs and scnt into 
cantonments on New Year's Day 1842, providcd that thc 
British troops, within twenty-four hours after receiving 
transport, and under the protcction of certain chiefs and 
an adequate escort, should begin their march of evacua- 
tion, the Jcllalabad garrison moving down to Pesha\vur 
in advance ; that thc six hostages left in  Cabul should bc 
well treated, and liberated on thc arrival at l'csha\vur of 
Dost Mahomcd ; the sick and woundcd lelt behind to be 
at liberty to return to India on their recovery; all small 
arms and ordnance stores in the cantonment magazine to 
be made over to the Afghans 'as a token of friendship,' 
on which account also, they were to have all thc British 
cannon except as above mentioned; the Afghans to 
escort the Ghuzncc garrison i n  safety to Pcshawur; 
and a further stipulation was that the British troops 
in Candahar and Wcstern Afghanistan werc to rcsign 
the territories occupicd by them and start quicltly for 
India, provisioned and protected from molestation by 
1he way. 
Sevcre and humiliating as were those terms, thcy werc 
not obtained without difficulty. Thc tcrtns put for\varct in 
the earlier drafts or the treaty werc yet more csacting, 
and the tone of the demands was abrupt, contemptuous, 
and insulting. l'ottingcr had to plcacl, to entreat, to be 
abject; to beg the masterful Afghans 'noL to ovcrpowcr 
the weak with sufferings'; ' t o  be good enough to cscuse 
thc women from the suffering ' of remaining as hostagcs ; 
ancl to entreat thcm 'not to forget kindness' slio\vii by us 
in f ~ r m e r  days. Onc blushes not for but with thc gallant 
Pottinger, loyally carrying out the miserable duty put 
upon him. The shame was not his; it lay on the council 
of superior officers, who overruled his remonstrances, and 
ground his face into the dust. 
Our people were made to pass under the yolic every 
hour of their wretched lives during those last winter days 
in the Cabul cantonments. The  fanatics and the common 
folk of the city and its environs swarmed around our 
petty ramparts, with their foul sneers and their blackguard 
taunts, hurled with impunity from where they stood a t  the 
in~zz les  of the loaded guns which the gunners were for- 
bidden to  fire. Officcrs and rank and filc were in a 
condition of smouldering fury, but no act of reprisal or 
retribution was permitted. If the present was one con- 
tinuous miscry, thc future lowered yet morc gloomily. 
I t  was of common knowledge as wcll in the cantonments 
as in the city, that the engagements made by the chiefs 
werc not worth the paper on which they had been written, 
and that treachery was bcing concerted against the force 
on  its impending travail through the passes. It was told 
by a chief to one of the officers who was his friend, that 
Alibar Khan had sworn to have in his posscssion the 
British ladies a s  security for the safc restoration of his 
own family and relatives, and, strange forecast to be ful- 
filled almost to the very letter, had vowed to annihilate 
every soldier of the British army with the exception of onc 
man, who should reach Jcllalabad to tell the story of the 
massacre of all his comrades. I'ottinger was well aware 
how despcrate was the situation of thc hapless pcople on 
whose behalf he had bent so  low his proud soul. Mohun 
La1 warned him of thc treachery thc chiefs were plotting, 
and assured him that unless their sons slloulcl accompany 
the army as hostages, it would be attacked on thc march. 
Day after day the cleparture was dclayed, on the pretest 
that the cliicfs had not completed their preparations for 
thc safe conduct of the force and its encumbrances. Day 
after day the snow was falling \vith a quiet, ruthless 
persistency. The bitter night frosts werc destroying the 
sepoys and the calnp follomcrs, their vitality \veakened 
by scmi-starvation and by the lacl< of firewood which 
had long distressed tlicm. At length on J a n ~ ~ a r y  911, 
Sturt the engineer officer got his instructioiis to throw 
down into the ditch a section of the eastern rampart, 
and so furnish a freer esi t  than the gates could afford. 
The supply of transport was inadequate, provisions wcre 
scant, and the cscort promised by the chiefs mas not 
forthcoming. Pottinger advised waiting yet a little 
longer, until supplies and escort should arrive; but 
for once the military chiefs were sct against thc 
policy of delay, and firm orders were issucd that the 
cantonmc~its should be evacuated on the following 
day. 
Sliali Soojali remained in Cabul. The resolution 
became him bctter than anything elsc we know of the 
unfortunate man. It may be he rcasoncd that he had a 
chance for life by remaining i n  tlie Balla Hissar, and 
that from wliat hc lcnew, there was no chance of life 
for anyone participating in  thc fateful march. I le  be- 
haved fairly by the British authorities, sending more 
than one solemn warning pressing on them the occupa- 
tion of the Balk I-Iissar. And there was some dignity in  
his appeal to Brigadier Anquctil, who commanded his 
own contingent, ' if it were well to forsake him in the 
hour of need, and to deprive him of the aid of that 
f'm-ce which he had hitherto been taught to regard as 
his own ? ' 
C H A P T E R  V I I  
THE ill-omened evacuation by our doomcd people of the 
canlonments wherein for two months they had under- 
gone every extremity of humiliation and contumely, was 
begun on the dreary winter morning of January 6th, 
1842. Snow lay decp on plain and hill-side ; the cruel 
cold, penetrating through the warmest clothing, bit fiercely 
into the debilitated and thinly clad frames of the scpoys 
and the great horde of camp followers. The military 
force which marched out of cantonments consisted of 
about 4500 armed men, of whom about Ggo wcre 
Europeans, 2840 native solclicrs on fool, and 970 native 
cavalrymen. The gallant troop of Company's Horse- 
Artillery marched out with its full cornplcment of s is  
guns, to which, with thrcc pieces of the mountain train, 
the artillery arm of the departing force was restrictcd by 
thc degrading terms imposed by the Afghan chiefs. In 
good heart and resolutely commancled, a body of cliscip- 
lined troops thus constitulecl, and of a lighting slrength so 
respcctablc, might have bcen trusted not only to hold its 
own against Afghan onslaught, but if necessary to taltc 
the oifensivc with success. 13ut alas, the heart of thc 
IlapIcss force had gone to water, its discipline was a ! 
\\rrccl\r, its chicfs were feeblc and apathetic ; its steps were 
doggcd by thc incubus of some 12,000 camp followers, 
\\,it11 a great company of women and children. The  
awful fate brooded ovcr its forlorn banners of expiating 
by its utter annihilation, the wretched folly and sinistcr 
prosecution of thc cntcrprise whosc dcservecl failure was 
to be branded yet deepcr on thc gloomiest page of our 
national history, by thc impending catastrophe of which 
the dark shadow already lay upon thc blighted column. 
The advance bcgan to move out from cantonments 
at ninc A.ar. The march was delayed at the river by 
the non-completion of the te~nporary bridge, and the 
whok of the advance was not across until after noon. 
Thc main body under Shelton, which was accompanied by 
the ladies, invalids, and sick, slowly followed. I t  as well 
as the advance was disorganised from the first by the 
throngs of camp followers with thc baggage, who could 
not be prevented from mixing themselves up with thc 
troops. The Afghans occupied the cantonments as 
portion after portion was evacuated by our people, rend- 
ing the air with their exulting crics, and committing every 
kind of atrocity. It; was late in the afternoon before 
the long train of camels following the main body had 
cleared the cantonments ; and meanwhile the rear-guard 
was masscd outside, in the space bet\~cen the rampart 
and the canal, among the chaos of already abandoned bag- 
gage. It  was exposed there to a vicious jezail fire poured 
into it by the Afghans, who abandoned the pleasures of 
plunder and arson for the yet greater joy of slaughtering 
the Feringhees. When the rear-guard moved away in the 
twilight, an officer ancl fifty mcn werc lcft dcad in Lhc 
snow, thc victims of the Afghan fire from the rampart of 
the cantonment; and owing to casualties in thc gun teams 
it had becn found neccssary to spike and abandon two of 
the horse-artillery guns. 
The rear-guard, cut into from behind by the pestil- 
ent ghazees, found its route encumbered with heaps 
of abandoned baggage around which s\varmed Afghan 
plunderers. Otlicr Afghans, grccdicr for blood than for 
booty, were hacking and slaying among thc nuniberless 
sepoys and camp follo\vcrs who had dropped out of 
the column, and were lying or sitting on the waysidc in 
apathetic despair, waiting for death and careless whetlicr 
i t  came to  thcm by knife or by cold. Babes lay 
on the snow abandoncd by their rnothcrs, themselves 
prostrate and dying a few hundred yards further on. 
It was not until two o'clock of thc following morning 
that the rear-guard rcacl~ecl tlie straggling and chaotic 
bivouac in which its comraclcs lay in the snow a t  the 
end of thc first short march of s is  miles. Its wcary 
progrcss had bccn illuminated by tlic conflagration raging 
in the cantonments, which had been fircd by the Afghan 
fanatics, rabid to erasc every relic of the detested un- 
believers. 
I t  was a night of bitter cold. Out in the opcn among 
the snow, solcliers and camp follo\\~crs, fooclless, firelcss, 
and shelterless, froze to death in numbers, and numbers 
more werc frost-bitlen. The cheery msrning noise of 
ordinary camp life was unheard in the rnournfd bivouac. 
Captain Lawrence outlines a melancholy picturc. ' The 
sileiice of tlie Inen betrayed their despair and torpor. I n  
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the morning I found lying close to me, stiff, cold, and 
quitc dead, in full regimentals, with his sword drawn in his 
hand, an old grcy-haired conductor named Macgregor, 
who, utterly exhausted, had lain down there silently to 
die.' Already defection had set in. One of the Shah's 
infantry regiments and his detachment of sappers and 
miners had descrtecl bodily, partly during the march of 
the previous day, partly in the course of the night. 
No orders were given out, no bugle sounded the 
march, on the morning of the 7th. The column heaved 
itself forward sluggishly, a mere mob of soldiers, camp 
followers and cattle, destitute of any semblance of 
order or discipline. Quite half the sepoys were already 
unfit for duty ; in hundreds they drifted in among the 
non-combatants and increased the confusion. The ad- 
vance of the previous day was now the rear-guard. After 
plundering the abandoned baggage, the Afghans set to 
harassing the rear-guard, whose progress was delayed by 
the disorderly multitude blocking the road in front. The  
three mountain guns, temporarily separated from the 
infantry, were captured by a sudden Afghan rush. In vain 
Anquetil strove to rouse the 44th to make an effort for 
their recapture. Green was more successful with his hand- 
ful of artillerymcn, who followed him and the Brigadier 
and spilted the pieces, but being unsupported were com- 
pelled a second time to abandon them. On this march it 
bzcame necessary also, from the exhaustion of their teams, 
t o  spike and abandon two more of the horse-artillery guns ; 
s o  that thcre now remained with the force only a couple 
of six-pounders. While the rear-guard was in action, a body 
of Afghan horse charged on thc flailk, right into the heart 
of the baggage column, snrcpt anpay much plunder, and 
spread confusion and dismay far and wide. The  rear of 
the column would probably ]lave bcen entirely cut off, 
but that reinforcements from the advance under Shelton 
pushed back the enemy, and b y  crowning the lateral 
heights kept open the thoroughfare. A t  Uootkhal< was 
found Akbar Khan, professed to  have been com- 
missioned to escort the force t o  Jellalabad, and who 
blamed our peoplc for lla\ring marched out prcmn- 
turcly from thc cantonlncnts. H c  insistcd on thc halt 
of the column a t  I3ootl<llnl< until the following morning, 
when he \roulci provide supplies, but he demanded an 
immcdiatc subsidy of I 5,m rupees, and that Pottingcr, 
Lawrence and Maclccl~zic sllould be given up to him as 
hostages that the force would not march beyond Tezecn 
until tidings should arrive that Sale had evacuated 
Jellalabad. Thow officers by the General's instructicrns 
joined the Afghan chief on the following morning, and 
Altbar's financial rcquisitiol~ was obscquiously fulfilled. 
Aftcr two days' marching our pcoplc, \\rho had brought out 
with them provisions for but five and a half days, espect- 
ing within that timc to rcach Jcllalabad, were only ten 
miles forward on thcir march. 
Another night passed, with its train of horrors-star- 
vation, cold, exhaustion, death. Lady Sale relates that 
scarcely any of the baggage now remained ; that there 
was no food for man or bcast ; that snow lay a foot decp 
on the ground ; that even water from thc adjacent stream 
was difficult to obtain, as the carriers were fired on in 
fetching it ; and that she thought herself fortunate in  
being sheltered in a small tcnt in which ' we slept ninc, 
a l l  touclljng each otl~cr.' Daylight brought merely a 
lnorc bitter realisation of utter misery. Eyre expresses 
his wonderment at the effcct of two nights' cxposure to 
the fi-ost in clisorganising the force. ' I t  had so nipped 
even thc strongest men as  to complctely prostrate their 
p i r c r s  and incapacitate them for service ; even the 
cavalry, who suffered less than the ~ c s t ,  were obliged 
to be lifted on their horses.' In fact, only a few hundred 
serviceable lncn remained. At the sound of hostile fire 
the living struggled to their feet from their lairs in thc 
snow, stiffened with cold, all but unable to move or hold 
a wcapon, leaving many of their more fortunate com- 
lades stark in death. A turrnoil of confusion reigned. 
The Afghans wcre firing into thc rear of the mass, and 
there was a wild rush of camp followers to the front, who 
stripped thc baggage cattle of their loads and carricd the 
animals off, leaving the ground strewn with ammunition, 
treasure, platc, and other property. The ladies wcre 
no longer carried in litters and palanquins, for thcir 
bearers were mostly dead ; they sat in thc bullet fire 
packed into pannicrs slung on camels, invalids as some 
of them mere-onc poor lady with her baby only five days 
old. Mess stores were being recltlessly distributed, and 
Lady Sale honestly aclcnowledges that, as she sat on hcr 
horse in the cold, she felt very gratcful for a tumbler of 
sherry, which at any othcr time would havc rnade ller 
' vcry unlaclylikc,' but which now merely tvarmcd her. 
Cups full of sherry were drunk by young chilclrcn with- 
out in the least affecting their heads, so strong on them 
was the hold of the cold. 
It was not until noon that the living maw of Inen and 
animals was oncc morc in motion. Thc troops wcrc in  
utter clisorganisation; the baggage was mixed u p  \\lith thc 
advancc guard ; thc camp followers wcrc pu~hing ahead 
in precipitate panic. The task before the wretched con- 
gcrics of peoplc mas to thrcad tlic stupcndous gorge of 
the Khoorcl Cabul pass-a dcfilc about five milcs long, 
hcmmcd in on cither hand by steeply scarped hills. 
Down thc bottom of the ravinc dashcd a mountain 
torrent, whose edges wcrc lined with thiclc layers of ice, 
on which had formcd glacier-like masses of snow. The 
'Jaws of Dcath'  wcrc barely entered whcn thc slaughter 
began. With the advance rode several Afghan chiefs, 
whosc followers, by their command, shouted to the Ghilzais 
lining the heights to hold their fire, but the tribesmen 
gave no heed to the mandate. Lady Sale rode with the 
chiefs. The Ghilzai. firc a t  fifty yards mas closc and 
deadly. Thc men of the advance fell fast. Lady Salc 
had a bullct in her arm, and threc more through hcr 
dress. But thc weight of the hostile fire fell on the main 
column, thc baggage escort, and thc rear-guard. Some of 
the ladies, who mostly were on camels which wcrc led 
with thc column, had strange advcnturcs. On onc camcl 
was quite a group. In one of its pannicrs wcrc Mrs I3oyd 
ant1 her little son, in the other Mrs Mainwaring, with hcr 
own infant and Mrs Anderson's eldest child. The camel 
fell, shot. A I-Iindustance trooper took up Mrs Boyd e 7 ~  
troupe, and carried her through in safety ; another horse- 
man behind whom her son rode, was killed, and the boy 
fell into Afghan hands. The  Anderson girl sharecl thc 
samc fate. Mrs Mainwaring, with her baby in her arms, 
nttemptccl to mount a baggagc pony, b ~ t  the load upsct, 
and she pursued Ilcr way on foot. An Afghan horscman 
rode at hcr, threiltcned her with his sword, and tried to  
drag  away tllc shawl in which she carricd her child. She 
was rcscued by a sepoy grenadier, who shot the Afghan 
dead, and thcn conducted the poor lady along the pass 
through thc dcad and dying, through, also, the close fire 
wl~icll struck down people ncar to hcr, almost to the exit 
of the pass, when a bullet lcilled t l ~ c  hivalrous scpoy, and 
Mrs Mainwaring hacI to continue her tramp to the bivouac 
alone. 
A very fierce attack was made on the rear-guard, con- 
sisting of the 44th. In  the narrow throat of the pass thc 
regimcnt was compelled to halt by a block in front, and in 
this stationary position suffered severely. A flanking fire 
told heavily on the handful of European infantry. The  
belatcd stragglers masked their fire, and a t  length the 
soldiers fcll back, firing volleys indiscriminately into the 
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stragglers and the Afghans. Near the exit of the pass 
a comlnancling position was rnaintaincd by some cletach- 
rnents which still helcl together, strengthened by the only 
gun now remaining, the last but one having bcen aban- 
cloned in the gorge. Ullcler cover of this stand the rear 
of the mass gradually drifted forward while the Afghan 
pursuit was checl~ecl, and at length all the surviving force 
reached the camping ground. Thcrc had bcen left dead 
in the pass about 500 soldiers and over 2500 camp 
followers. 
Akbar and the chiefs, taking the hostages with them, 
rodc forward on the track of thc retreating force. Alcbnr 
professed that his object was to stop the firing, but  
R/lackenzie writcs that Pottinger said to him : ' Mackenzie, 
rcmember i f  I am killed that I hcard Akbar Khan shout 
"Slay them ! "  in Pushtoo, although in Persian he called 
out to stop thc firing.' The hostages had to be hidden 
away from the ferocious ghazees among rocks in the 
ravinc until near cvening, when in . passing through 
the region of the heaviest slaughter they 'came upon 
one sight of horror after another. All the bodies were 
stripped. Therc were childrcn cut in two. I-Iindustanee 
women as well as men-somc frozcn to clcath, somc 
literally cl~oppccl to pieces, many with thcir throats cut 
from ear to car.' 
Snow fcll all night on the unfortunates gathcrecl tent- 
less on the Khoorcl Cabul camping ground. On the 
morning of thc 9th the confuscd ancl disorderly march 
was resumed, but after a milc hacl bccn travcrsed a halt 
Tor thc clay was orclerecl at  the instance of Akbar 
I<han, \vho scnt into camp by Captain Skinner a pro- 
posal that thc laclics and chilclrcn, with whosc clcplor- 
able condition hc profcsscd with apparcnt sincerity 
to syrnpathisc, shoulcl bc maclc ovcr to his protcction, 
and that the marrictl officcrs should accompany their 
wives ; hc plcdging hi~nsclf to preserve the party from 
furthcr harclships and clangers, ancl afford its mem- 
bers safe escort through the passes in rcar of thc force. 
The Goncral had little faith in the Sirtlar, but hc was fain 
to givc his conscnt to an arrangement which promised 
alleviation to thc wretchcdncss of the ladies, scarce any of 
whom hacl tasted a mcal sincc Icaving Cabul. Some, still 
\vcak from cl~iltlbirth, were nursing infants only a few clays 
old ; othcr poor creatures were momentarily apprehend- 
ing thc pangs of motl~crhood. There wcre invalids whosc 
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on ly  attire, as thcy rock in the camel pannicrs or shivercd 
on tllc snoi\r, \\ras the nightdresses they wore when leaving 
the c;ultonmcnts in  their palanquins, and none possessed 
nll~.tIlillg sa\~c the clothes on their backs. I t  is not sur- 
Ixising, tl~cn, that dark and cloubtful as was the future to 
wllic]i tlic~r \\lcrc consigning themselves, the ladies pre- 
ferrctI its rislts and chanccs to the awfi~l certainties which 
lay bcfore the cloo~iiecl column. Thc Afghan chief had 
cunningly made it a conclitio~~ of his proffcr that the 
husbands sliould accompany their wives, and i f  there 
was a strugglc in the breasts of the former between 
public and private duties, thc Gcncral liumancly decided 
thc issuc by ordering thcrn to share the fortunes of their 
families. 
Akbar l<linn scnt in no supplies, and the march was 
rcsumctl on tlic morning of thc 10th by a force attenuated 
by starvation, cold, and despair, diminished furthcr by 
cstcnsivc desertion. Aftcr much exertion thc aclvancc, 
consisting of all that rcmained of the 44tl1, thc solitary 
gun, and a detachment of cavalry, forced a passage 
to thc front through the rabble of camp follo\vers, 
and mnrchcd unmolested for about two miles until the 
Tunghce Tarilii was rcached, a deep gorge not more 
than tcn fcct widc. Rlen fell fast in the horrid defile, 
struck cio\vn by thc Afghan lirc from thc heights ; but 
thc pass, i f  narrow, was short, and thc advancc having 
strugglccl through it nioved on to the halting-place a t  
Kubbar-i-Jubbar, and waited thcre for the arrival of the 
main body. Rut that body was never to emerge from out 
the sliamblcs in the narrow throat of the Tunghee Tarilii. 
Thc aclvancc was to lcarn from the fcw stragglers who 
rcachccl it the ghastly truth that it now was all that 
remained of thc strong brigadc which four days before 
had marched out from the Cabul cantonrncnts. The 
slaughter from the Afghan fire had blocked thc gorge 
with dcacl and dying. The Ghilzai tribesmcn, at the turn 
into tke pcn a t  thc other cncl of which was the bloclml 
gorge, had closccl up fiercely. Thcn the sleep slopes 
suddenly sivarmccl with Afghans rushing s\vorcl in hand 
clown to thc \vorlz of butchcry, and thc rnassacrc stinted 
not while living victims remainecl. Thc rcar-guard rcgi- 
rncnt of scpoys was cslcrminatecl, saw for two or thrcc 
clespcratcly \vounclccl officcrs w11o contri\recl to rcach tllc 
aclvance. 
Thc remnant of the army consistccl now of about 
seventy files of thc 44tl1, about loo troopcrs, ancl n cle- 
tachmcnt of horsc-artillery with a singlc gun. The  
General sent to Akbar Khan to rcmonstratc ~vith him on 
the attack 11e had allo\vccl to be made aftcr having guar- 
anteed that thc forcc should mcel with no furthcr ~uoles- 
tation. Alibar protested his rcgret, ancl plcatlcd his 
inability to control the wild Ghilzai hillmcn, over ivho~n, 
in their lust for blood and plunder, thcir own chiefs I ~ a d  
lost all control ; but he was willing to guarantee thc safe 
conduct to Jcllalabacl of the European officers and men 
if they \vould lay clown their arms and commit thelllsclves 
wholly into his hands. This sinistcr proposal the General 
refused, and the march was continued, led in disorder by 
the remnant of the camp followers. In the steep descent 
from the Huft Kotul into the Tezeen ravine, the solcliers 
following the rabble at some distance, came suclclcnly on 
a fresh butchcry. 'The Afghans had sucldenly fallen on 
t l ~ c  conf~~secl throng, and the descent was covered with 
dead and dying. 
During thc n~arch from Kubbar-i-Jubbar to the Tezccn 
valley Shelton's doggcd valour had mainly saved tlic force 
fl.om rlestri~ction. With a few stauncli soldiers of liis OWII 
rcgimcnt, tlic one-armed \rctcsan, restored now to liis 
,)roper mh'er of stubborn fighting man, had covercd the 
rear ;mcl rcpelled the Gliilzai assaults with persevering 
energy and dauntless fortitude. And lie it was who 11ow 
suggestdl  sincc Altbar Khan still held to his stipulation 
that tlie forcc sl~oulcl lay down its arms, that a resolute 
cffort should be made to press on to Jugclullulc by a rapid 
night march of four-and-twcnty miles, in the hopc of clear- 
ing thc passcs in that vicinity bcforc the enemy shoulcl 
havc time to occupy them. 
That thc attcmpt woulcl prove successful was doubt- 
ful, sincc thc force was already exhaustecl ; but it was the 
last chancc, and Shelton's s~~grgcstion was acloptccl. In  
tlic c;dy moonlight tlic march silently began, an i l l  omen 
marking tlie start in thc sliapc of the forced abandon- 
ment of the last gun. Fatal delay occurrecl between 
Sell Baba and Kutti Sung because of a panic among the 
camp followers, ~ h o ,  scarcd by a fcw sliots, clriftcd back- 
wards and forwards in a mass, retarding the progress of 
thc column and for thc timc cntirely arrcsting the ad- 
vance of Shelton's and his rear-guard. -The force could 
not closc up until thc morning, tcn miles short of Jug- 
dulluk, and already the Afghans were swarming 011 every 
acljacent height. All the way down tlie broken slope 
to Jugdulluk the little column trudged tlirougli the 
ga~l~itlet  of jczail fire which lincd the road with dead 
and wounded. Shelton and his rear-guard handful per- 
formed wonders, again ancl again fending off with closc 
lire and levellcd bayonets the ficrce rushes of Ghilzais 
charging sword in hand. The harassed advance reached 
Jugdulluk in thc afternoon of the ~ ~ t h ,  and took post 
behind some ruins on a height by the roadside, the sur- 
viving officers forming line in support of the gallant 
rear-guard struggling forward through its cnvironment of 
assailants. As Shclton and his bravc felloars burst 
through the cordon they were grectcd by checrs from 
the knoll. But therc was no rcst for the cshar~stccl 
pcoplc, for the Afghans promptly occupied commanding 
positions whcncc they maintained a fire from which thc 
ruins afforded but scant protection. To men parchcd 
with thirst the stream a t  the foot of their knoll was but 
a tantalising aggravation, for to attempt to rcach it was 
certain dcath. The snow thcy devoured only increased 
their sufferings, ancl but little stay was afiordcd by the 
raw flesh of a few gun bullocks. Tl~roughout the day 
volley aftcr volley was pourcd down upon thc weary band 
by the incsorable encmy. Frequent sallics \verc madc, 
and thc heights wcre cleared, but the positions were soon 
reoccupied and the ruthless fire was rene\vcd. 
Captain Skinncr, summoned by Alcbar, brought back 
a message that General Elphinstone should visit him to 
take part in a conference, and that Brigadier Shelton and 
Captain Johnson should be givcn over as hostages for the 
evacuation of Jellalabad. Compliance was held to bc im- 
perative, and the temporary conmand was entrusted to 
nrigadier Anquetil. Alibar was cxtre~ncly 11ospit;lble to 
his compulsory gucsts; but he insisted on including the 
Gcncral among his hostages, ancl was not moved by 
Elphinstonc's representations that he would prefer death 
to the  disgrace of being scparatcd from his command in 
its time of peril. The  Ghilzai chicfs camc into confercncc 
burning with hatred against thc British, and rcvelling i n  
the anticipated delights of slaughtering them. Altbar 
scemed sincere in his cffort to conciliate them, but was 
long unsuccessful. Their hatred seemed indeed stror~ger 
than their greed ; but a t  length toward nightfall Altbar 
announced that pacific arrangcrnents had becrl acccptecl 
by the tribes, ant1 that what I-cmained of thc force shoulcl 
be allowed to  ~narch unmolestccl to Jellalabacl. 
I-Iow futile was thc compact, i f  indcecl therc was any 
compact, was soon revealed. day among thc ruins 
on the linoll had passccl in dark and crucl suspense- 
in kunger, thirst, and exhaustion, in the presencc of 
frequent -. 'death; and as the evcning fell, in anguish and 
all but uttcr dcspair. As darlcness set in thc conviction 
enforced itself that to remain longer in thc accurscd place 
was madness ; and thc littlc band, [caving behind perforce 
thc siclc and w~unclecl, marched out, resolute to push 
through or dic fighting. In thc valley the only molestation 
at first was a desultury fire from the camping Ghilzais, 
who were rather talten by surprise, but soon bccamc wide 
awake to their opportunitics. Somc hurried forward to  
occupy the pass rising from the valley to the Jugdulluk 
crest; others, hanging on the rear and flanks of thc 
colu~nn encumbered with its fatal incubus of camp 
followcrs, mixed among the unarmed throng with their 
deadly knives, ancl Iiillcd ancl plundered with the dex- 
tcrity of long practice. Throughout the tcclious march 
up thc steeply rising clefilc a spattering fire came from 
the rocks and ridges flanking the track, all but blocked 
by the surging concoursc of miserable followers. T h c  
advance had to employ cruel lneasurcs to force its 
\\ray through the chaos toward the crest. As  it is ap- 
proachcd from the Jugdullulc direction the flanking cleva- 
tions reccde and merge in the transverse ridge, which is 
cronrncd by a low-cut abrupt rocky upheaval, worn clown 
sornewhat wherc thc road passes over the crest by the 
friction of traffic. Just hcrc the tribesmen had constructed 
a formidable abattis of prickly brr~shn~ood, which strctchecl 
athnmt thc road, and dnmrnecl back the fugitives in the 
s h a l l o ~  oval basin betivecn the termination of the ravinc 
and thc summit of the riclgc. In this trap mere caught 
our hapless people ancl the swarm of thcir native followers, 
and now thc end was vcry ncar. From behind the barrier, 
ancl around thc lip of the grcat trap, thc hillmcn fired their 
hasdest into thc secthing mass of soldiers and followers 
~vrithing in the awful Gehcnnn on which the calm moon 
shonc clown. On the edgcs of this \vhirlpool of clcath the 
fcll Ghilzais wcrc stabbing ancl haclting with the ferocious 
industry inspired by thirst for blood and lust for plunder. 
It is among thc characteristics of our diverse-natured racc 
to die game, ancl cvcn to thrill with a stlange fierce joy 
\vhen hope of cscapc from death has all but passed away 
ancl there remains only to scll life at thc highest possible 
premium of exchange. Among our pcople, facc to face 
with dcath on the rocky J ~ ~ g c l u l l ~ ~ l ~ ,  office~s and soldicrs 
alike fought with cool clcaclly rancour. The brigaclicr and 
the privatc engaged in the srunc fierce u z t Z h ,  fought sidc 
by sicle, and fcll sidc by side. Stalwait Captain Doclgin 
of the 4 t h  slcw five Afghans bcfore lic fell. Captain 
Niclloll of the horse-artillery, gunless now, rallied to him 
felv staunch gunners who werc all that remained to 
of his noble and historic troop, and led them on to 
with him a heroic death. 
All dicl not pcrish on thc rugged summit of tlic 
Jugclullulc. Tlic barrier was finally broken through, and 
a scant rcmnant of the force wrought out its escape from 
the slaughter-pit. S~nal l  detaclments, harassed by sudden 
o~islauglits, and delaycd by reluctance to descrt wounded 
colnracles, wel-c trudging in the clarlcncss clown the long 
slop" to thc Soorlchab. Thc morning of thc 13th dawncd 
llcar Gundamulc on tlic straggling group of somc twcnty 
officers and forty-five European soldiers. Its march 
arrested by sharp attacks, tlic little band moved aside to 
occupy a defensive position on an adjacent hillock. A 
local sirdar invited tlic senior oficer to consult with 
him as to a pacific a~rangenient, and while Major 
Griffitlls was absent on this errand there was a tem- 
porary suspension of hostilities. The Afghans meanwhile 
sivarmcd around thc detachrncnt with a pretence of friend- 
ship, but prcsently attempts were made to snatch from thc 
soldiers their arms. This conduct was stcrnly resented, 
and the Afghans were forced back. They ascended an 
adjacent elevation and set themelves to the work of 
deliberately picking off officer after officer, Inan after man. 
The few rounds re~naining in tlie pouches of the soldiers 
were soon exhausted, but thc detachment stood fast, a ~ l d  
calmly awaitecl tlie inevitable end. Rush after rush 
was driven back from its stcadfast front, but a t  last, 
nearly all being Icilled or ~vgyncled, a final oqset of the 
enemy, sword in hand, terminated the struggle, anti corn- 
plcted the dismal tragedy. Captain Soutcr of the ~ t h ,  
with thrcc or four privates all of whoin as \\rell as himself 
were woundctl, was spared and carried into captivity ; he 
saved the colours of his regiment, whicl~ he had tied 
round his waist before leaving Jugdulluk. A group of 
mounted officers had pushed forward as soon as they hael 
cleared the barrier on the crest. Sis only rcachccl Futtch- 
abad in safety. There they wcrc treacl~crousl~ offcrcd food, 
and while they haltcd a fcw momcnts to cat tn.0 \vcrc 
cut clown. Of the four who rock away thrcc wcrc oIrcr- 
txken and killccl within four milcs of Jellalabacl ; onc 
oficcr alone survivcd to reach that haven of refugc. 
The  ladies, the married officers, and thc original 110s- 
tages, followed Alibar I<han down thc passcs to\saril 
J ~ g d ~ l l ~ l i ,  pursuing the line of retreat strewn with its 
ghastly tolxns of slaughter, and rccognising almost nt 
every step the bodies of friends oncl comrades. At Jug- 
dullulc they found General Elphi~~stonc, Brigaclier Shclton, 
and Captain Johnson, and Icarnccl thc fate \\,hich had 
overtalcen the marching force. On thc follo\ving clay 
Akbar quitted Jugdullulc with his hostngcs and thc 
ladies, a11 of whom werc virtually prisoners, and rodc 
a\vay tl~rougl~ the mountains in  a northerly clircction. 
On the fourth clay the fort of Uucliabacl in thc Lugh- 
Inan valley was renchcd, where Alcbar lcft the prisoners 
he went to attempt the reduction of Jellalabad. 
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THE SIEGE AND DEFENCE OF JELLALAJ3AD 
Sar.~'s brigade, retreating from Gunclamuk, reachecl 
Jellalabacl on the 12th November 1841. An investiga- 
tion into the state of thc fortifications of that place 
showed thcm, in their existing condition, to be incap- 
able of resisting a vigorous assault. But it was resolved 
to occupy the placc, and to Captain George Rroadfoot, 
as garrison engineer, \\?as committcd thc duty of making 
it defensible. This assuredly was no light taslc. The 
cncicntc was far too extensive for thc slender garrison, 
and its tracing was radically bad. The ramparts wcre 
so dilapidated that in places they wcre scarcely dis- 
cernible, and thc ruins strewn over what shoi~ld have 
bcen thc glacis afforded near cover to assailants, whose 
attitude was already so thrcatcning as to hinder tlic 
beginning of repairing operations. Their fire swept 
the defences, and their braves capered dcrisivcly to the 
strains of a bagpipe on the adjacent rocky elevation, 
which thenceforth went by the name of ' Piper's Hill.' 
A sortie on the 15th cleared the environs of the trouble- 
some Afghans, supplies began to come in, and Broad- 
root was free to sct his sappers to the taslc of repairing 
thc fortifications, in which work the entrenching tools hc 
had wrenched from the Cabul stores proved invaluable. 
How grcatly Sale had erred in shutting up his force in 
Jellalabad was promptly demonstrated. The connecting 
posts of Gundamuk and Peshbolalc had to be cvacuatcd; 
and thus, from Ju~nrood a t  the foot of thc Khybcr up to 
Cabul, there remained no inter~necliate post in 13ritish 
possession with thc solitary exception of Jellalabad, and 
communications werc entirely interrupted except through 
the medium of furtive messcngcrs. 
Thc  Jcllalabacl garrison \\.as lcft un~nolcstcd for nearly 
a fortnight, and tlic rcpairs were wcll advanced whcn on 
thc 29th the Afghans came down, invested the place, and 
pushed thcir slcirmishers close up to the walls. On 
Decembcr 1st Colonel Dennie headcd a sortic, which 
worsted thc bcsiegcrs with considcrablc slauglitcr and 
drove thcm from the vicinity. Bad ncws camc at i ~ ~ t e r -  
vals from Cabul, and at thc ncw year arrived a melan- 
choly letter from I'ottingcr, confirming thc rumours 
already rife of the ~nurclcr of thc Envoy, and of thc 
virtual capitulation to which thc Cabul force had sub- 
mitted, il mcclc latcr an official communication was 
~.eccived from Cabul, signed by General Elphinstonc and 
Major Pottingcr, formally announcing the convcntion 
\vhich thc Cabul forcc had cntcrccl into with thc chiek, 
ancl ordering thc garrison of Jcllalabad forthwith to 
- evacuatc that post ancl retire to Pcshawur, leaving behind 
with ' the new Governor,' an Afglian chicr who was the 
l~earer of thc humiliating missivc, thc rortrcss guns and 
such stores ancl baggzagc as thcrc laclcccl transport to 
remove. The council of war summoned by Sale was 
in favour of non-compliance with this man- 
date, 13roadfoot: urged with vigour that an order by a 
superior nrllo was no longer a frec agcnt and ~ 1 1 0  issued 
it duress, coulcl impose no obligation of obedience. 
sxlc pronounced llilnsclf untrammelled by a convention 
forcccl from people ' with knives a t  their throats,' and was 
rcsolutc in tile expression of his determination to 1101~1 
Jcllalabad u111css orclcrecl by the Government to with- 
dra\v. 
More and more ominous tidings pourcd i n  from Cabul. 
A, lcttcr rcceived on January 10th reportccl the Cabul 
force to bc still in the cantonments, living utterly a t  thc 
mercy of t11c Afghans ; another arriving on thc 12th told 
of thc abandonment of the cantonments and the be- 
ginning of the march, but that the forlorn wayfarers were 
lingcriag i n  detention a t  Bootkhalc, halted in their misery 
by the ordcrs of Akbar Khan. Those communications in 
a measure prcparcd the peoplc in Jellalabad for disaster, 
but not for L.he awful catastrophe of which Dr Bryclon 
had to tell, when in the afternoon of the 13th the lonc 
man, whose approach to the fortress Lady Rutler's paint- 
ing so pathetically depicts, rode through the Cabul gate 
of Jcllalabad. Dr Rrydon was covered with cuts and 
contusions, and was utterly exhaustecl. His first few 
hasty sentences esting~~ishecl a l hopc in the hearts of the 
listeners regaiding their Cabul comrades allc1 friends, 
There was naturally great excitement in Jellalabad, 
but no panic. The working parties \\rere called in,  the 
assembly \\'as sounded, the gates were closed, tile walls 
were lined, and the batteries were mannecl ; for it was 
bekved for the molnent that the enemy were i n  f u l l  
pursuit of fugi tivcs following in J3ryclon's track. Thc 
situation impressed Broadfoot with thc conviction that 
a crisis had come in the fortunes of the Jcllalabacl 
garrison. I l e  thought it his duty to lay before tlic 
General the conclitions of the critical moment which hc 
believed to have arrivcd, pointing out to him that the 
imperative alternatives wcre that he should eithcr firmly 
resolve on the clefcnce of Jcllalabacl to the last extremity, 
or that he shoulc~ make up his mincl to a retreat that 
very night, whilc as yct rctrcat was pactic;tblc. Salc 
decided on holcling on to thc placc, and immccliatcly 
runnounccd to the Comrnanclcr-in-Chicf his resolvc to 
persevere in a clcterminccl defence, relying on the pro- 
mise of the earliest possible relief. 
Because of the defection of his Silch auxiliaries ancl 
the faint-lncartcc111ess of his sepoys, Wild's cfforts to cross 
the thrcsholcl of the Khybcr hacl failed, ancl with the tid- 
ings of his failure there came to Salc the information that 
the cffort for his relief must bc inclcfinitcly postponed. It 
map be assumed that this intimation rvcakenecl in somc 
dcgrec the General's csprcsscd resolution to hold Jellala- 
bad with determination, and it is not to be denied that 
this resolution was in a mcnsure conditional on thc not 
unwarranted cspcctation of early rclief. Ncither hc nor 
.his adviser Macgregor appears to havc rcalised ho\v 
incumbent on thc garrison of Jellalabad it was to hold 
out to the last extremity, irrcspcctive of consequences to 
itself, unless it shoulcl receive a peremptory rccall from 
higher autho~ity ; or to havc recognised tlnc glorious 
opportunity presentccl of inspiriting by its staunch con- 
stancy ancl high-soulccl sclf-abnegation a weal; govern- 
lncnt staggering under a burclcn of calamity. Than Sale 
no bralrcr soldier ever worc sword, but a man may delight 
to llcacl forlorn hope and yct lack ncrve to carry with 
Ilig11 llcart a loacl of responsibility ; nor was Macgregor so 
constituted a4 to ani~nate his chief to noble cmprise. 
Fast oIl the I1ceIs of the gloomy tidings from thc IChybcr 
lnoutll tllerc came to them from Shah Soojah, ~ 1 1 0  was 
st i l l  the nominal sovcrcign at Cabul, a curt percmptol-y 
lcttcr obviously written under compulsio~~, of which the 
follonling \vcre the terms : ' Your people have concluded 
a treaty with us ; you arc still in Jcllalabacl ; what are 
your intentions? Tell us quicldy.' 
Sale summoncd a council of mar, which assembled a t  
his quarters on Janilary 27th. Its proceedings were re- 
corcled, and the documents laid bcforc it were preserved 
by Captain Henry I-Iavelock i n  his capacity as Sale's s tar-  
officcr. Record and papers were reclaimed from I-Iavc- 
lock's custody by Gcneral Salc bcforc the evacuation of 
Afghanistan, and had been long lost to sight. They have 
recently been deposited among the records of the India 
Office, but not before their latcst non-oflicial possessor had 
publishcd some extracts from them. I t  is to be hoped 
that the more important documents may be given to the 
public in full, since passages from documents, ,vhether 
intentiollally or not, may be so extracted as to be mis- 
leading. nroaclfoot, who had been a Inember of the 
council of war, and who was apparently aware of the 
suppression of the official recorcls, wrote in 1843 a de- 
tailed narrative of its proceedings while his recollection of 
them was still fresh, and this narrative he sent to Have- 
lock desiring him to note 'any points erroneously stated, 
distinguishing bctween what you may merely not rcmem- 
bcr and  \\rhat you know I am rnistalccn in.' Havclock, 
who was a loyal and ardcnt admircr of General Sale, 
having sparscly annotatctl Broadfoot's narrative, returned 
it with the statement that  he  had compared it with 
memoranda still in his possession, and that he considerctl 
that it 'contributes a fair and correct staternent of that  
which occurred.' T h c  officers comprising the council to 
whom Salc and Macgregor addressed thcrnselves were 
Colonel Dcnnic of the 13t11, Colonel Montcath of thc 
35th N. I., Captain5 13aclchousc ancl Abbott of the 
artillcry, Captain Olclficld commancling thc cavalry, and 
Captain 13roaclfoot thc garrison engineer. T h e  follow- 
ing is a summary of the proceedings, as rccorded by 
Broad foot and authenticatcd by I-lavelock. 
Aftcr a Tcw formal words from Gcncral Sale, hc called 
on Macgrcgor to submit a mattcr on \vhich that  political 
officcr and himself were agreecl. Macgregor then de- 
scribed thc si tu;~tion from the point of view of Salc and 
himsclf, ancl cspressccl thcir unitcd conviction that nothing 
\\las to bc hoped Tor from tlic Government. Reserving 
his own liberty of  action, he sought the opinion of thc 
officers on olicrs reccivcd from Alcbar IChan to treat for 
thc evacuation of Afghanistan, ant1 he laid before thcm 
a draft ans\\,er to Shah Soojah's curt letter, professing the 
rcadincss of thc garrison to evacuate Jcllalabad on his 
requisition, sincc it was held only for him, but naming 
certain conditions : thc cschange of hostages, the restora- 
tion of British prisoners and hostages in exchange for thc 
Afghan hostages on arrival of the force a t  Pcshawur, 
escort thither ' in safcty and honour,' with arms, colours, 
and guns, anc l  aclcquate assistance of supplies ancl trans- 
port. Both Sale and Macgregor frankly owned that they 
were resolvecl to yield, and negotiate for safe rctreat. 
Grea t  excitement from the first had pervaclecl the assem- 
blage, and \\:hen i\lIacgregor had finished his statement 
Broadfoot arose in his wrath. I-Ie dcclinccl to believe that 
the Government had abandoned the Jellalabacl garrison to 
its fate, and t h e  .\\cis a general outburst of indignation 
when Sale produced a letter carrying that significance. 
Broadfoot waxed so warm in his remonstrances against 
thc proposed action that an acljournment was agrecd to. 
N e x t  day Sale ancl Macgrcgor urged that it was impossi- 
blc t o  hold out much longer, that latcr retrcat woulcl be 
impracticable, and that thc schcrne they proposed was 
safe and honourable. Broadfoot denounced it as dis- 
graceful, contenclcd that they coulcl hold Jellalabacl in- 
definitely-'could colonise i f  they lilced '-and retreat at 
discretion. I le  denied that the place was held for Shall 
Soojah, ancl challenged their right to surrender the post 
unless by Government order. I-Iostages he proclailned 
wol-thless while the Afghans held hcavier pledges of ours 
in the shape of prisoners and hostages. I-Ie denounccd as 
disgraceful the giving of hostages on our part. Monteath's 
remark that nobody would go as a hostage roused Oldfielcl 
to express himself tersely but pointedly on the subject. 
' 1 for one,' he cxclaimecl in great agitation, '\\rill fight 
here to the last drop of my blood, but I plainly declare 
t h a t  I will never be a hostage, and I am surprised that 
anyone  should.propose such a thing, or rcgard an Afghan's 
word as  worth anything.' The resolution to trcat for the 
abandonmcnt of Jcllalabad was carried, Oldficld only 
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voting with Broadfoot against it, but thc stipulations 
regarding hostages were omitted. Rroadfoot continucd 
to press modifications of the conditions set out in thc 
proposed rcply, pleading, but in vain, that the restoration. 
of the prisoners in Afghan hands beforc departure of the 
garrison should be insisted on ; and that since evacuation 
was resolvcd on, it should a t  least be conducted as a 
military operation, and not degradingly under cscort. 
Then, and little wonder, he objected to cspressions in 
the draft lctter as too abject, and hc  was succcssf~~l in
procuring the alteration of thcm. Thc  lctter was writtcn 
out, signcd by Macgregor, and despatched to  Cabul. I t  
was agreed that those members of the council who chose 
to do should record in writing the reasons for their votcs, 
and this was done by Dennie, Monteath, Abbott, and 
Broad foot. 
Broadfoot, pending an answer from Cabul, set the 
garriso~i to work in digging a clitch round thc fortifica- 
tions. The rcply from the Shah, to thc cffcct ' I f  you are 
sincere in offcrs, Ict all the chief gentlemen affix thcir 
seals,' was laid beforc thc reassembled council on Fcbruary 
12th. The implied imputation on thc good faith of British 
officcrs might well liavc stung to indignation the rnecltest ; 
but the council's opinion was taken as  to the expediency 
of complying with the dcrogatory request made by tlie 
Shah, as wcll as of a stipulation-a modification of what 
Broadfoot had originally urged in vain-for the surrender 
of all priso~iers, hostages, sick, and woundcd unclcr detcn- 
tion in Afghanistan, on the arrival a t  Pcshawur of the 
Jellalabad brigade. The members of council, who in the 
long interval since tlie previous rnceting had bccn graclu- 
I 
ally regaining their self-respect and mental equipoise, 
unanimously dcclined to accept the proposals tendered 
them by their commanding officer and his political ally; 
and a letter written by Monteath was accepted, which 'was 
not a continuation of the negotiation.' 
Thus ended the deliberations of the memorable council 
of war, whose eleventh hour resolve to '  hold the fort ' mainly 
avcrted thc ruin of British prestige in India and throughout 
the regions bordering on our Eastern Empirc ; and the 
credit of its final decision to repudiatc the humiliating 
proposals of Salc and Macgregor belongs to Gcorge Broad- 
foot, who was firmly though silently baclced by Ilavelocl<. 
The  day after that decision was formulated a letter came 
from Peshamur informing the garrison that every e f i r t  
would he made for its rclief; ancl thenceforth there was no 
morc talk of surrender, nor was the couragc of the little 
brigade impaircd evcn \+-hen thc cartlqual<e of Fcbruary 
19th shook tllc ncwly repaired fortifications into wreck. 
Broad foot's vehement cnergy infected the troops, and by 
the end of the month the parapets wcrc entirely restored, 
the bastions rcpaired, and every battery re-establislled. 
After the council of war had rcjected the proposals 
laid before it, a decision which in effect involved the 
maintenance of the dcfcnce to the last extremity, nearly 
two months passcd without the occurrence of any im- 
portant event, exccpt the spccdily retrieved mi s fo r t l~~e  
of the earthquake of February 19th. Thc close invest- 
ment of the place by k\l<bar Khan thwarted thc efforts of 
the foraging parties to obtain much needed supplies. 
Those efforts were not vigorous, for Sale, aware of his 
garrison's poverty of ammunition, was bent on a passivc 
defence, and steadily refused his consent t o  vigorous 
sorties. The policy may have had its abstract merits, 
but it was certainly unsatisfactory in this respect, that 
perseverance in it involved the unpleasantness of ap- 
parently inevitable starvation. General Pollocl< had 
arrived in Peshawur, and was making energetic efforts t o  
get his force in order for the accomplishment of the relief 
of Jellalabad. But he foresaw serious delays, and so late 
as the middle of March was still unablc to specify with any 
definiteness thc probable date of his arrival at- that place. 
The European troops in Jellalabad would be out of meat 
rations early in April, and I-Iavclock's calculation was that 
the grain, on which mainly subsisted the native soldiers, 
who had been on half rations since the new year,would 
be exhausted before the middle of that month. Sale 
modified his policy of inactivity when he learned that 
the blocliading Afghans were attempting to drive a mine 
under a salient of the defences, and Dennie on March 
I ~ t h  led out a sally, destroyed the works, and thrust back 
Akbar's encroachments. The gcncral lack of vigour, 
however, on the garrison's part emboldened the Afghans 
so much that they actually grazcd thcir flocks of sheep 
within Goo yards of the walls. This was too impudent, 
and thc General consented to a raid, which resulted in thc 
acquisition of some 500 sheep, an invaluable addition to 
the commissariat resources. It  is worth recording that 
the native regiment gave up its share of the sheep to the 
soldiers of the r3th, on the ground that Europeans needcd 
animal food more than did natives of India. 
On April 6th the Afghan lcader firccl a salute in 
triumph for a supposititious repulsc of Pollocli in the 
I<Ilyber. In regard to what then happened there is a 
strange conflict of testimony. General Sale, in a private 
letter \vrittcn sis weeks latcr, states: ' I  made my  
arrangements wit11 Macgregor to sally the next day, 
provided \ve did not hcar that Pollocli had forced the 
pass.' Akbar's salutes, and the information of spies that 
Pollocli had fallen back, 'made us look very grave-our 
case desperate, our provisions nearly out, and no relief 
at hancl. I therefore dccided to play a bold strolcc to 
relieve ourselves, and give courage to Pollock's force in 
case of success. If we failed in thrashing Alcbar, we 
\\~ould have left our bones 011 the field.' Abbott's diary 
of April 5th and (5th rccorcls that spies reported that 
Pollock had been repulsed a t  Ali Musjid, and that the 
]leads of three of his officers had been sent in to Alcbar, 
~vhcreupon 'all thc commanding officers waited on the 
General, beseeching him to attack Akbar instantly. 
Thc 13th and the battery got all ready for work, but 
the old Gcneral was obstinate, and refused to act.' Baclr- 
house's diary (April 6th) mentions that Pollock having 
bccn reported repulsed, and Akbar having fired a salute, 
thc officers commanding corps and detachments wcnt 
in a body and proposed to thc General to attack Alcbar 
instantly, but without success. ' Immediately thc matter 
was broached, thc General set his face against anything 
of the I h d ,  and disagreed about evcry point-illsisted 
that the enemy had 5coo or 6000 mcn in camp, and wcrc 
too strong for us ; and then, thc next minute, that it was 
no use going out ;LS we ~0~11dn't punish them, as they 
~ ~ ~ k l ' z r ' t  s t ~ ? ~ d ;  and concluding with usual excuse for in- 
activity, " It isn't our game." Words ran precious high. . . ' 
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Whether spontaneously or under pressure, General 
Sale must have ordered a sortie in force; for at dawn 
of the 7th thrce infantry columns marched out by thc 
Cabul gate, the right commanded by Haveloclc, the 
centrc by Dennie, the left by Monteath, General Sale 
being in command of the whole force. Akbar, reputed 
about 5000 strong, mas in formation in front of his camp 
about three miles west of Jellalabad, his left flank rest- 
ing on the river, with an advanced post of 300 men in 
the 'patched up'  fort about midway between his camp 
and Jellalabad. Thc  prescribed tactics were to march 
straight on the enemy, with which Monteath and Ilave- 
lock complied ; but Dennie, whether with or without 
orders is a mattcr in dispute, diverged to assail the 
'patched up '  fort. The outer defences were carried, 
gallant old Dennie riding at the head of his men to 
receive his death wound. In vain did the guns for which 
Sale had sent batter a t  the inner keep, and the General 
abandoning the attempt to rcduce it, led on in person 
the centre column. Meanwhile Havelock and Monteath 
had been moving steadily forward, until halted by orders 
when considcrably advanced. Haveloclc had to form 
square once and again against the Afghan l~orsemen, 
who, however, did not dare to charge home. The artillery 
came to the front at the gallop, and poured shot and 
shell into Akbar's mass. The  three columns, now 
abreast of each other, deployed into line, and moving 
forward at the double in the teeth of the Afghan 
musketry fire, s\vept thc enemy clean out of his posi- 
tion, capturing his artillery, firing his camp, and putting 
him to utter rout. Akbar, by seven o'clock in the 
April morning, had been signally beaten in the open 
field by the troops he had boasted of blockading in the 
fortress. 
T h e  garrison of Jellalabacl had thus wrought out its 
own relief. Thenceforth it experienced neither annoy- 
ance nor scarcity. Pollock arrived a fortnight after the 
dashing sally which had given the garrison deliverance, 
and the head of his column was played into its camp 
on the Jellalabad plain by the band of the 13th' to. the 
significant tune 'Oh,  but ye've been lang o' com'ing.' 
The magniloquent Ellenborough dubbed Sale's brigade 
' the Illustrious Garrison,' and if the expression is over- 
strained, its conduct was without question eminently 
creditable. 
C H A P T E R  I X  
I IETlZIBUTION A N D  R E S C U E  
1.r was little wonder that the unexpected tidings of the 
Cabul outbreak, and the later shock of the catastrophe 
in the passes, should have temporarily unnerved the 
Governor - General. But Lord Auckland rallied his 
energies with creditable promptitude. His successor 
was on the voyage out, and in thc remnant of his term 
that remained he could not do more than make disposi- 
tions which his successor might find of service. Every 
soldier of the 'Army of Retribution ' was despatched to 
the frontier during Lord Aucltland's rulc. Lord Auck- 
land .appointed to thc comnland of the troops wllich he 
was sending forward a quict, stcadfast, expcricnccd officcr 
of the artillery arm, who had fought under Lalce at Deig 
and Bhurtpore, and during his forty years of honest scr- 
vice had soldiered steadily from the precipices of Nepaul 
to the rice-swamps of thc Irrnwaddy. Polloclc was essen- 
tially the fitting man for the service that lay before him, 
characterised as lie was by strong sense, shrewd sagacity, 
calm firmness, and self-command. When his superior 
devolved on him an undue onus of responsibility he was 
to prove himself thoroughly equal to the occasion, and 
the sedate, balanced man murmured not, but probably 
was rather amusecl when he saw a maker of phrases 
essaying to deck himself in his laurels. There were 
many things in Lord Auckland's Indian career of which 
it behoved him to repent, but it must go to his credit 
that he gave I'ollocl< high command, and that he could 
honestly proclaim, a s  he made his preparations t o  quit the 
great possession whose future his policy had endangered, 
that he had contributed toward the retrieval of the crisis 
by promptly furthering 'such operations as might be re- 
quired for-the maintenance of the honour and interests of 
the British Government.' 
, Brigadier Wild reached Peshawur with a brigade of 
-four sepoy rcgiments just before the new year. H e  was 
-.destitute of artillery, his sepoys were in poor heart, and 
.the ,Sikh contingent was utterly untrustworthy. To  force 
.the Khyber seemed hopeless. Wild, however, made the 
attempt energetically enough. But the Sikhs 'mutinied, 
xexp.clled their officers; and marched back to Peshawur; 
Wi-Id's -sepoys, behaving badly, were driven back with 
.loss from the mouth of the pass, and Wild himself was 
.wounded. When Pollock reached Pesha\vur on February 
6th). 1842, he found half of Wild's brigade sick in hospital, 
and  , t he  whole of it in a state of utter demoralisation. 
.A second brigade commanded by Brigadier-Genel'al 
.MiCaskill, had accompanied Pollock, the sepoys of which 
promptly fell under thc evil influen'ce of Wild's c1is.pirited 
and disaffected regiments. Pollock had to resist the press- 
ing  appeals for speedy relief made to him from Jelldabad, 
ancl patiently to devote weeks and months to the restora- 
tion o f .  the morale and discipline of the disheartened 
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.sepoys of his command, and to the reinvigoration of their 
physique. By lcindness combined with firmness he was 
able gradually to inspire them with perfect trust and faith 
in him, and when in the end of March there reached him 
a third brigade, comprising British cavalry and horse- 
artillery, ordered forward by Lord Aucicland on receipt 
of tidings of the destruction of the Cabul force, he 
felt himself at length justified in advancing with con- 
fidence. 
Before daylight on the morning of April 5th I'olloclc's 
army about Sooo strong, consisting of cight infantry 
regiments, three cavalry corps, a troop and two batteries 
of artillery, and a mountain train, marched from the 
Jurnrood camping ground into the portals of the Khyber. 
Pollock's scheme of operations was perfect in conception 
and complete in detail. His main column, with strong 
advance and rear-guards, was to pursue the usual road 
through the pass. It  was flanked on each side by a 
chain of infantry detachments, whose assigned duty 
was to crown the heights and swcep them clear of 
assailants in advance of the head of the central column. 
The Afreedi hillmen had blocked the throat of the 
pass by a formidable barrier, behind which they were 
gathered in force, waiting for the opportunity which was 
never to  come to them. For the main body of Polloclc's 
force serenely halted, while thc flanking columns, brealc- 
ing into skirmishing order, hurried in the grey dawn 
along the slopes and heights, dislodging the Afreedi 
pickets as they advanced, driving them bcfore them 
with resolute impetuosity, and pushing forward so far 
as  to take in reverse with their concentrated fire the 
grcat barrier and its defenders. The clansmen, recog- 
nising the frustration of their devices, dcserted the posi- 
tion in its rear, and rushed tumultuously away to crags 
and sungahs where ltnife and jezail might still be plied. 
The  centre column then advanccd unmolested to the 
deserted barricade, t h r o ~ ~ g h  which the sappers soon 
cleared a thoroughfare. T h e  guns swept with shrapnel 
the hill-sides in front, the flanking detachments pushed 
steadily fi~rther and yet further forward, chasing and 
slaying the fugitive hillmen ; and the Duke of Welling- 
ton's observation was that morning fully made good, 
that ' h e  had ~iever heard that our troops were not equal, 
as well in their personal activity as  in their arms, to con- 
tend with and overcome any  natives of hills whatever:' 
Thc  whole British force, in ils order of three columns, 
the centre in the bed of thc hollow, the wings on the 
flanking ridges, steadily if slowly moved on in the 
assured consciousness of victory. I t  was sunset before 
the rear-guard was in camp under the reoccupied Ali 
Musjid. T h c  Sikh troops who were to keep open 
Polloclis communicatio'ns with Peshawur movcd simul- 
taneously on Ali Musjid by a more circuitous route. 
While Pollock was halted opposite the throat of the 
Khyber waiting for the demolition of the Afreedi barri- 
cade, the  ill-starrcd Shah Soojah was being murdered, on 
his way from the Balla Hissar of Cabul to revicw on 
the Siah Sung slopes the reinforcements which Akbar 
Khan was clamouring that he should lcacl down to aid 
that Sirdar in reducing Jellalabad before relief should 
arrive. Ever since the outbreak of November Shah 
Soojah had led a dog's life. He had reigned in Cabul, 
but he had not ruled. The  Sirdars dunned him for 
money, and jeered a t  his protestations of poverty. I t  is 
not s.0 much a matter of surprise that he shoulcl have 
been murdered as that, feeble, rich, and loathed, he should 
-have been let live so long. . I t  does not seem'worth while 
to discuss the vexed question whether or not he was faith- 
ful to his British allies. He  was certainly eritit'led to  
argue that he owed US nothing, since what we did in re- 
gard to him was nakedly for our own purposes. Shah 
Soojah's second son Futteh Jung had himself proclaimed 
his father's successor. The vicissitudes of his short reign 
need not be narrated. While Pollock was gathering his 
brigades at Gundamuk in the beginning of the following 
September, a forlorn Afghan, in dirty and tattered rags, 
rode into his camp. This scarecrow was Futteh Jung, who, 
unable to endure longer his sham kingship and the ominous 
tyranny of Akbar Khan, had fled from Cabul in disg~iise 
to  beg a refuge in the British camp. 
Pollock's' march from Ali Musjid to Jellalabad wa.s 
slow, but almost unmolested. He fouiid, in his own words, 
'the fortress strong, the garrison healthy ; and escept fo; 
wine and beer, better off than we are.' One principal object 
of his commission had been accoinplished; he had relieved 
the garrison of Jellalabad, and was in a position to ensure 
its safe withdraival. But his commission gave him a con-' 
sidcrable discretion, and a great company of his country- 
men and countrywomen were still i n  Afghan durance. T h c  
calm pulsed, resolute commander had views'of his own as 
to  his duty, and he determined in his patient, steadfast 
way to tarry awhile on the Jellalabad plain, in the hope 
that the course of events might play into his hands. 
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Maclaren's brigade, which in the beginning of Novem- 
ber I S ~ I  General Elphinstone had instructed General 
Nett to  despatch with all speed to Cabul, rcturned to 
Candahar early in December. Nott in despatching it had 
deferred reluctantly to superior authority, and probably 
Maclaren not son-y to have in the snowfall a pretext for 
retracing his steps. At ta  Mahomed Khan, sent from 
Cabul t o  foment mischief in the Candahar regions, had 
gathered to his banner a considerable force. Gencral 
Nott  quietly waited until the Sirdar, a t  the head of some 
10,000 men, came within five miles of Candahar, and then 
he crushed him after twenty minutes' fighting. The 
fugitives found refuge in the camp of the disaffectcd 
Dooranee chiefs, whose leader Meerza Ahmed was sedul- 
ously trying to tamper with Nott's native troops, severe 
weather hindering the General from attacking him. Near 
the end of Fcbruary there reachcd Nott a letter two 
months old from Elphinstone and Pottinger, ordering him 
to evacuate Candahar and retire to India, in pursuance 
of the  convention into which they had entered. The  
Dooranee chiefs astutely urged that Shah Soojah, no 
longer supported by British bayonets, was now ruling in 
Cabul, as an argument in favour of Nott's withdrawal. 
Nott's answer was brief: ' I will not treat with any person 
whatever for the retirement of the British troops from 
Afghanistan, until I have received instructions from the 
Supreme Government -a blunt sentence in curious con- 
trast to  the missive which Salc and Macgregor laid before 
the Jellalabad council of war. When prescntly there 
came a communication from 'Government intimating that 
the continued occupation of Candahar was regardcd as 
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conducive to the interest of the state, Nott and RaivIin- 
son were in a position to congratulate themselves on 
having anticipated the wishes of their superiors. The 
situation, however, became so mcnacing that early in 
March its Afghan inhabitants were expelled from the 
city of Candahar to the last soul ; and then Nott, leaving 
a garrison in the place, took the field in force. The  old 
soldier, wary as he was, became the victim of Meerza's 
wily strategy. As he advanced, the Afghans rctired, 
slcirmishing assiduously. Leaving Nolt in the Turnuk 
valley, they doubled back on Candahar, and in the early 
darltness of the night of the loth March they furiously 
assailed the city gates. They fired one of the gates, and 
the swarming ghazces tore down with fury its blazing 
planks and the red-hot ironwork. The garrison behaved 
valiantly. Inside thc burning gate thcy piled up a ram- 
< part of grain bags, on which they trained a couple of gulls 
1 
loaded \(rith case. For three hours after thc gate fell did 
the fanatics hurl assault after assault on the interior 
barricade. They were terribly critical hours, but the 
garrison prevailed, and at midnight, with a loss of many 
hundreds, the obstinate assailants sullenly drew OK Nott, 
although urgently summoned, was unable to reach Canda- 
har until the 12th. 
Candahar was forlunatcly preservcd, bu t  a t  the end 
of Marc11 the unpleasant tidings came that Gl~uznee, 
which British valour had carried by slorrn three years 
before, had now reverted into Afghan possession. Tllc 
siege had lasted for nearly threc and a half months. In 
mid-December the besiegers occupied the city in force, 
introduced by the citizcns through a subterranean way ; 
and thc garrison, consisting chicfly of a regiment of 
sepoys, u~it l~clre~v into the citadel. Thc bittcr wintcr and 
the scant rations took the heart out of the nativcs of the 
warm and fertile Indian plains; but nevertheless it was not 
until March 6th that the garrison, under pledge of bcing 
escorted to  Pcshawur with colours, arms, and baggage, 
marched out. T h e  unfortunates would have done bettcr 
to have dicd a soldierly death, with arms in their hands 
and  the glow of fighting in their hearts. As the evcnt 
was, faith- with them was brokcn, and save for a few 
officers who were madc prisoners, most were slaughtered, 
or perished in a vain attempt to  escape. 
During his long isolation Nott's resources had been 
scriously clcpleted, and hc had orclcred up from Scinde a 
brigade, escorting much needecl treasurc, ammunition, and 
medicines. Brigadier England was entrusted with the 
co~nmancl of this force, whose assemblage at Quetta 
mas cxpccted about the  cnd  of March. Pcnding its 
gathering England had moved out toward the cntrancc 
of the Kojulc Pass, where he  met with a sharp and 
far from creditable repulse, and fell back on (21ietta 
miserably disheartened, suggesting in his abjectness that: 
Not t  should abandon Candahar and rctirc on him. The 
stout  old soldier a t  Candahar waxed wroth at the limp- 
ness of his subordinate, and addressed to England a 
biting letter, orclering peremptorily the latter's prompt 
advance t o  Candahar, engaging to dry-nursc him through 
the  Kojulc by a brigade sent down from Candahar for thc 
purpose, and remarking sarcastically, ' I am wcll aware 
that  war cannot bc made without loss ; but yct perhaps 
British troops can opposc Asiatic armies without defeat.' 
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Thus exhorted England moved, to find his march 
through the Kojuk protected by Wymcr's sepoys from 
Candahar, who had crowned the latcral heights before 
he venturcd into the pass; and he rcached Candahar with- 
out maltreatmcnl: on the 10th May, bringing to  Nott the 
much needed supplies which renclcred that resolute man 
equal to any enterprise. 
I t  remained, however, to be seen whether any enter- 
prise was to be permitted to him and to his brother 
commander lying in camp on the Jellalabad plain. Lord 
Ellenborough, thc successor of Lord Auckland, had struck 
a firm if somewhat inexplicit note in his earliest manifesto, 
dated March 13th. A single scntence will indicate its 
tenor : 'Whatever course we may hereafter take must 
rcst solely on military considerations, and hence in thc 
first instance regard to the safety of our detached 
F garrisons in Afghanistan ; to thc security of our troops 
t now in the ficld from unnecessary risks; and finally, to 
the rc-cstablishmcnt of our military reputation by the 
infliction upon the Afghans of some signal and dccisive 
blow.' Those were brave \vords, if only they had bccn 
adhered to. But six weeks later his lordship was ordcr- 
ing Nott to  evacuate Candahar and fall back on Quetta, 
until thc season should permit further retirement to  the 
Indus ; and instructing I-'ollocl<, through thc Commandcr- 
in-Chief, to withdraw without delay evcry British soldicr 
from Jellalabad to I'eshawur, exccpt under certain 
specified eventualities, none of which were in course of 
occurrence. Pollocl< teinporisecl, holding on to his ad- 
vanccd position by the plea of inability to retire for want 
of transport, claiming mildly Lo find discretionary powers 
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in the Government instructions, and cautiously arguing 
in favour of an advance by a few marches to a rcgion 
where bettcr climate was to be found, and whcnce he  
might bring to bear stronger pressure for thc liberation 
of the prisoners. Nott was a narrower man than Pollock. 
Whcn he got his orders he regarded thcm as strictly 
binding, no lnattcr how unpalatable the injunctions. ' I 
shall not lose a moment,' hc wrotc, ' in making arrange- 
mcnts to carry out my orders, without turning to the 
right or the left, and without inquiring into the reasons 
for the measures enjoined, whatever our own opinions or  
wishes may bc.' He reluctantly began preparations for 
withdrawal. Carriage was ordered up from Quctta, and 
a brigade was dcspatchcd to withdraw the garrison of 
IChelat-i-Ghilzai, and to dcstroy thc fort which Craigie 
had so long and valiantly defended. 
It  would be tedious to dctail the vacillations, the 
obscurities, and thc tortuosities of Lord Ellenborough's 
successive communications to his two Gcnerals in Afghan- 
istan. Pollock had bccn permitted to remain about Jellal- 
abad until the autumn should bring cooler marching 
weather. Nott had been detained at Candahar by the 
necessity for crushing menacing bodies of tribal levies, 
bu t  as July waned his preparations for withdrawal were 
all but complete. O n  thc 4th of that month Lord 
Ellcnborough wrote to him, reitcrating injunctions for 
his withdrawal from Afghanistan, but permitting him the 
alternatives of retiring by the direct route along his l ine 
of communications over Quetta and Sukkur, or of boxing 
the compass by the curiously circuitous 'retirement' via 
Ghuznee, Cabul, and Jellalabad. Pollock, for his part, 
was permitted, if he thought proper, to advance on Cabul 
in order to facilitate Nott's n?ithclrawal, if the latter should 
elect to  'retreat' by the circuitous route which has just 
been described. 
One does not care to charactcrisc the 'heads I win, 
tails you Iose' policy of a Governor-General who thus 
shufflcd off his responsibility upon two soldiers who 
previously had been sedulously rcstricted within narrow 
if varying limits. Their relicf from thosc trammcls sct 
them free, and it was their joy to acccpt thc devolvcd 
responsibility, ancl to act with soldierly initiative and 
vigour. The  chief crcdit of the qualified yct substantial 
triumph over official hcsitation certainly belongs to 
Pollock, who gently yct firmly forced thc hand of the 
Governor-Gencral, \vhile Nott's merit was limitcd to a 
ready acceptance of the responsibility of a proffered 
option. A letter from Nott intimating his determination 
to retire by way of Cabul ancl Jellalabad reached Pollock 
in the middle of August, who irnmcdiately advanccd from 
Jellalabad ; and his troops having conccntratcd at Gunda- 
muli, he marched from that position on 7th Scptcmbcr, his 
second division, commanded by MiCaslcill, following next 
clay. P0110~1i was woefully short of transport, and thcre- 
fore was compelled to leave some troops behind at 
Gundamuk, and even then could carry only half the com- 
plement of tentage. I3ut his soldicrs, who carried in their 
haversaclcs scven days' provisions, would gladly have 
marched without any baggage at all, and thc chief him- 
self was eager to hurry forward, for Nott had written that 
he expected to reach Cabul on 15th September, and 
Pollocl; was burning to be there first. I n  the Jugdulluk 
I< 
Pass, on the Sth, he found the Ghilzais in considcrable 
force on the heights. Regardless of a heavy artillcry fire 
they stood their ground, and so galled Pollocl<'~ troops 
with sharp discharges from their jczails that it became 
neccssary to  send infantry against them. They were dis- 
lodged from the mountain thcy had occupied by a por- 
tion of the Jellalabacl brigade, Icd by gdlant old General 
Sale, who had his usual luck in the shape of a wound. 
This Jugdullulz fighting was, however, little more than 
a skirmish, and Pollock's people were to experience 
more severe opposition before they should emerge from 
the passes on to the Cabul plain. On the morning of the 
13th the concet~trated force had quitted its camp in 
the Tezcen valley, and had cornlnittcd itself without clue 
precaution to the passage of the ravine bcyoncl, whcn 
thc Afghan levies with which Akbar Khan had manned 
thc flanking heights, opencd their fire. The Sirdar had 
been dissuaded by Captain Troup, onc of his prisoners, 
from attempting futilc ncgotiatio~~s, and advised not to 
squander lives in useless opposition. Akbar had replied 
that  he was too dceply committed to recede, and that his 
people were bent on fighting. Thcy wcre not baullwd in 
the aspiration, which assuredly their opponents shared 
with at lcast cqual zeal. I'olloclc's advance-guard was 
about the middle of the defilc, when the enemy were 
suddenly discoverccl blocl<ing thc pass in front, and hold- 
ing the heights which Po1locl~'s light troops should liave 
crowned in advance of the column. Alcbar's force was 
calculated to be about 15,ooo strong, and the Afghans 
fought resolutely against the British regiments which 
forced their way up thc  heights on the right and Icft. 
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The ghazees cldshed down to nicet the red soldiers half- 
way, and up among the precipices there were many hand- 
to-hand encounters, in which the sword and the bayonet 
fought out the issue. The Afghans made their last stand 
on the rocky summit of the Huft Kotul ; but frorn this 
commanding position they were finally driven by Broad- 
foot's bloodthirsty little Goorkhas, who, hillmcn thein- 
selves from their birth, chased the Afghans from crag to 
crag, using their fell l<ookcrics as they pursucd. It  was 
Alcbar I<han's last effort, and the quelling of it cost 
Polloclc the trivial loss of tliirty-two Idled and 130 
woundcd. Thcrc was no more opposition, and it was well 
for the Afghans, for thc awfi~l spectacles presented in the 
Khoord Cabul Pass traversed on the following day, kindled 
in Pollock's soldiers a white heat of fhy.  ' The bodies,' 
wrotc Baclchouse in his unpublished diary, ' lay in heaps 
of fifties and hundreds, our gun wheels crushing thc bones 
of our late comrades at every yard for four or five miles ; 
indeed, the wholc inarch frorn Gundamuk to Cabul may 
be said to have been over the bodies of the massacrcd 
army.' Polloclc inarched unmolested to Cabul on the 
15th, and camped on the old racecourse to the east of 
the city. 
Nott, in evacuating Candahar, divided his force into 
two portions, the weaker of which General England took 
back to India by Quetta and S d i k ~ r ,  while on August 
9th Nott himself, with two European battalions, the 
'beautiful sepoy rcgilnents' of which he had a right to 
be proud, and his field gui~s,  marched away from 
Candahar, his face sct towards Cabul. His march was 
uneventful until about midway between Khelat-i-Ghilzai 
and Gl~uznee, wiicn on the 28th the cavalry, unsupported 
and badly handled in a stupid and unauthorised foray, 
lost sevcrely in officcrs and men, took to flight in panic, 
and so gave no little encouragement to the enemy hang- 
ing on Nott's flank. Two days later Shumshoodeen, the 
Afghan lcader, drew up some ro,ooo men in order of battle 
on  high ground left of the British camp. Nott attaclted 
with vigour, advancing to turn the Afghan left. I n  
reprisal the enemy threw thcir strength on his left, sup- 
porting their jezail fire with artillery, whereupon Nott 
changed front to  the left, deployed, and then charged. 
T h e  Afghans did not wait for close quarters, and Nott 
was no morc seriously molested. Reaching the vicinity of 
Ghuznee on Scptcmbcr 5th, he clcarcd away the hordcs 
hanging on the heights which encircle the placc. Dur- 
ing the 11igllt the Afghans evacuated Ghuznce. Soon aftcr 
daylight the British flag was waving from thc citadel. 
Having fulfilled Lord ~llenborough's '  ridiculous order to  
carry away from the tomb of Sultan Mahmoud in the 
environs of Ghuznee, the supposititious gatcs of Somoath, 
a once famous I-Iindoo shrine in thc Rombay province of 
Kattiawar, Nott inarched onward unmolested till within 
a couple of marches of Cabul, when near Maidan he had 
some stubborn fighting with an Afghan force which tricd 
ineffectually to  block his way. On the 17th he marched 
into camp four miles west of Cabul, whence he could dis- 
cern, not with entire complacency, the British ensign 
already flying from the Balla I-Tissar, for Pollock had won 
the  race to  Cabul by a couple of days. 
For months there had bcen negotiations for the release 
of the British prisoners whom Akbar Khan had kept in 
durance ever since they came into his hands in the course 
of thc disastrous retreat from Cabul in January, but they 
had been unsuccessful, and now it was known that the 
unfortunate company of officers, women, and children, 
had been carried off westward into the hill country of 
Bamian. Nott's officers, as thc Candahar column was 
nearing Cabul, had more than once urged him to detach a 
brigade in the direction of Bamian in the hope of effecting 
a rescue of the prisoners, but he had steadily refused, lean- 
ing obstinately on thc absence from thc instructions sent 
him by Government of any permission to engage in thc 
cnterprise of attempting their release. H e  was not less 
brusque in the intimation of his declinature when Polloclc 
gave him the opportunity to send a force in support of 
Sir Richmond Shalcespear, whom, with a detachment of 
I<uzzilbasl~ horse, Pollock had already despatched on the 
mission of attempting thc liberation of the prisoners. 
The narrow old soldier arguccl cloggedly that Governmcnt 
had thrown the prisoners overboard.' Why, thcn, should 
he concern himself with their rcscuc? If his superior 
officer should give him a firm order, of coursc he would 
obey, but he would obcy under protcst. Pollock disdained 
to impose so enviable a duty on a recalcitrant man, and 
committed to Sale the honourable and welcome servicc- 
all the morc welcome to that officer because his wife and 
daughter were among the captives. At the head of his 
Jellalabad brigade, he was to push forward by forced 
marclles on the track of Shakespear and his horsemen. 
The strange and bitter experiences of the captives, 
from that miserable January Sabbath day on which thcy 
passcd under the 'protection' of Akbar Khan until the 
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mid-Scptember noon when Shalccspear galloped into 
their midst, are recorded in full and interesting detail in 
Lady Sale's journal, in Vincent Eyrc's C ~ ~ t h i l y ,  and in 
Colin Mackenzie's biography published undcr the title of 
S t o r m  n d  Suitshhe of n Soklieu's Life. Here it is 
possiblc only briefly to  summarisc thc chief incidents of 
the captivity. The unanimous testimony of the released 
prisoners was to  the effect that Akbar Khan, violent, 
bloodyJ and passionate man though he was, behaved 
toward thcm with kindness and a certain rude chivalry. 
Thcy remained for nearly three months at Budiabad, 
living in great squalor and discomfort, For the whole 
party there were but fivc rooms, cach of which was 
occupied by from five to ten officers and ladies, the few 
solcliers and non-coinmissioncd officers, who wcre mostly 
woundcd, being quartered in sheds and cellars. h'Iac- 
kenzic drily remarks that thc hardships of tllc common 
lot, and the close intimacy of prison life, brought into 
full relief good and evil qualities ; 'conventional polish 
was a good deal rubbccl off and replaced by a plainness 
of spcech quite: unheard of in good society.' Ladies and 
gentlemen were necessitated to occupy the same room 
during the night, but the men 'clearccl out'  early in the 
morning, leaving the ladies to themselves. The dirt and 
vcrmin of their habitation werc abominably offensive to 
people to  whom scrupulous cleanlincss was a second 
nature. Rut the captives wcrc allowecl to take cxercise 
within a limited range ; they had among them a few 
boolcs, and an old newspaper occasionally came on to thcm 
from Jellalabad, with which place a fitful correspondence 
in cypher was surreptitiously maintained. They had a few 
packs of playing cards ; they made for themselves back- 
gammon and draught-boards, and when in good spirits they 
sometimes played hopscotch and blindman's -buff with 
the children of the party, T h e  Sundays were always 
lcept scrupulously, Lawrence and Maclienzie conducting 
the service in turn. 
Thc earthqualie which shook down thc fortifications of 
Jellalabad brought their rickety fort about the ears of the 
captives. Several escaped narrowly with their livcs when 
walls and roofs yawned and crumbled, and all had to 
turn out and slecp in the courtyard, whcre they suffered 
from cold and saturating dews. After the defeat of 
Akbar by  thc Jellalabad garrison on April 7th) therc 
was keen expectation that Sale would march to their 
rescue, but he came not, and there were rumours among 
the guards of their impcnding massacre in revenge for 
the crushing reverse Alcbar had experienced. Presently, 
however, Mahomed Shah Khan, Alibar's lieutenant, 
arrivcd full of courtesy and 1-eassurance, but with thc 
un\velcome intimation that the prisoners must prepare 
themselves to leave Budiabad at once, and move to a 
greater distance from Jellalabad and thcir friends. For 
some preparation was not a difficult taslc. 'All my 
worldly goods,' wrote Captain Johnson, ' might be stowed 
away in a towel.' Othcrs who possessed heavicr impedi- 
menta, were lighter~ed of the encumbrance by the Gllilzai 
Sirdar, who plundered indiscriminately. The European 
soldiers werc left behind at Budiabad, and the band of 
ladics and gentlemen started on the aftcrnoon of April 
~ o t h ,  in utter ignorance of their destination, under the 
escort of a strong band of Afghans. At thc ford across 
thc Cabul rivcr the cavalcade found Alibar Khan wounded, 
haggard, and dejected, seated in a palanquin, which, weak 
as h c  was, he gave up to  Ladies Macnaghten and Sale, 
who wcre ill. A couple of days were spent at Tczcen 
among the melancholy relics of the January slaughter, 
whence most of the party were carricd several milcs 
further into the southern mountains to the village of 
Zandeh, while General Elphinstone, whose end was fast 
approaching, remained in the Tezecn vallcy with Pot- 
tinger, Maclcenzie, Eyre, and onc .or two others. On the 
evening of April z3d the poor General was finally released 
from suffering of mind and body. Akbar, who when too 
late had offered to  frec him, scnt thc body down to 
Jellalabacl under a g~~arc l ,  and accompanied by Moore 
the Gcncral's soldier servant ; and Elphinstone lies with 
Colonel Dcnnic and the dead of the dcfencc of Jellala- 
bad in thcir nameless graves in a waste place within the 
walls of that place. Toward the end of May the captives 
were moved up the passes to thc vicinity of Cabul, where 
Akbar Khan was now gradually attaining the ascendant. 
Prince Futteh Jung, howevcr, still lleld out in the Bnlla 
Hissar, and intcrmittcnt firing was heard as the weary 
cout'2ge of prisoners reached a fort about three milcs short 
of Cabul, which the ladies of the proprietor's zenana had 
evacuated in their favour. Hcre they lived if not in con- 
tentment a t  lcast in considerable comfort and amenity. 
They  had the privacy of a delightful garden, and enjoyed 
the freedom of bathing in the adjacent river. After the 
strife between Alibar Khan and Futteh Jung ceascd 
they werc evcn permitted to exchange visits with their 
countrymen, the hostages quartered on the Balla Hissar. 
They were able to obtain money from the Cabul usurers, 
and thus to supply themselves with suitable clothing and 
additions to their rations, and their mails from India and 
Jellalabad were forwarded to them without hindrance. 
The summer months were passed in captivity, but it was 
no longer for them a captivity of squalor and wretched- 
ness. Life was a good deal bclter worth living in the 
pleasant garden house on the bank of the Logur than it 
had bcen in the noisomc squalor of Budiabad and the 
vermin-infested huddlernent of Zandeh. But they still 
lived under thc long strain of anxiety arid apprehension, 
for none of them knew what thc morrow might bring 1 
forth. While rcsicling in the pleasant quarters in the 
Logur valley the captives of the passes werc joined by 
nine officers, who were the captives of Ghuznee. After 
the capitulation the latter had bccn treated with clue1 
harshness, shut up in one small room, and debarred from 
fresh air and exercise. Coloriel Pallner, indeed, had 
undergone the barbarity of torture in thc cncleavour to 
forcc him to disclose the whereabouts of treasure which 
he was suspected of having buried. 
Alcbar had full and timely intimation of thc mutual 
intention of the B~itish generals at Jellalabad and Canda- 
har to march on Cabul, and did not fail to recognise 
of what value to him in extremity might be his continued 
possession of the prisoners. They had been warned of 
their probable deportation to the remote and rugged 
Bamian; and the   oil some journey thither was begun on 
the evcning of August 25th. A couple of ailing families 
alone, with a surgeon in charge of them, were allonred to 
remain behind; all the others, hale and sick, had to  travel, 
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the former on horseback, the latter carried in  camel 
panniers. The escort consisted of an irregular regiment 
of Afghan infantry commanded by one Saleh Mahomed 
Khan, who when a subadar serving in one of the Shah's 
Afghan regiments llad deserted to Dost Mahorned. The 
wayfarers, female as wcll as male, wore the Afghan 
costume, in order that they might attract as little notice 
as possible. 
Bamian was reached on September 3d, where the 
wretchedness of the quarters contrasted vividly with the 
amenity of those left behind on the Cabul plain. But 
the wretchedness of Bamian was not to be long endured. 
An intimacy had been struck up between Captain ~ b h n -  
son and Saleh Mahomed, and the latter cautiously hinted 
that a reward and a pension might induce him to carry 
his charges into the British camp. On September I ~ t h  
there was a private rnccting between the Afghan com- 
mandant and three British officers, Pottinger, Johnson, 
and Lawrence. Saleh Mahomcd intimated the receipt of 
instructions from the Sirdar to carry the prisoners over 
the Hindoo Koosh into Khooloom, and leave them there 
to seeming hopeless captivity. But on the other hand a 
messenger had reached Saleh from Mohun La1 with the 
assurance that General Pollock, if he restored the 
prisoners, would ensure him a reward of 20,000 rupees, 
and a life pension of 12,000 rupees a year. Saleh 
Mahomed demanded and received a guarantee from the 
British officers ; and the captives bound themselves to 
make good from their own resources their redemption 
money. The  Afghan ex-Subadar proved himself honest ; 
the captives mere captives no longer, and they proceeded 
to assert themselves in the masterful British manner. 
They hoisted the national flag ; Pottinger became oncc 
again the high-handed 'political,' and ordered the local 
chiefs to come to his durbar and receive dresses of 
honour. Their fort was put into a statc of defence, and 
a store of provisions was gathered in case of a siege. But 
in mid-September came the tidings that Altbar had been 
'defeated a t  Tezeen, and had fled no one knew whither, 
whereupon the self-emancipated party set out on thc 
march to Cabul. A t  noon of the 17th they passed into 
the safc guardianship of Shakespear and his horscrnen. 
Three days later, within a march of Cabul, there was 
reached the column which Sale had taken out, and on 
September 21st Polloclt grceted the company of men and 
women whose rescue had been wrought out by his cool, 
strong stcadfastness. 
Little more remains to be told. There was an 
Afghan forcc still in arms a t  Istalif, a beautiful village 
of the inveterately hostile Kohistanecs; a division 
marched to attack it, carricd the placc by assault, burnt 
part of it, and scvcrely smote the garrison. Utter de- 
struction was the fatc of Chariltar, thc capital of the 
Kohistan, whcre Cod rington's Goorkha regiment had 
been destroyed. Pollock determined to set a mark ' 
on Cabul to cornmeinorate the retribution which the 
British had exacted. Hc  spared the Balla Hissar, and 
abstained from laying the city in ruins, contenting 
himself with the destruction of the principal bazaar, 
through which the heads of Macnaghten and Burnes 
had been paraded, and in which their mangled bodies 
had bcen exposed. Prince Futteh Jung, tired of his 
vicissitudes in the character of an Afghan monarch, 
cedcd what of a throne he possessed to another puppet 
of his race, and gladly accompanied thc British armies 
to India. Other waifs of the wreck of a nefarious and 
disastrous enterprise, among them old Zemaun Khan, 
who had been our friend throughout, and the family of 
the ill-fated Shah Soojah, were well content to return to 
the exile whic11 afforded safcty and quietude. There also 
accompanied the march of the humane Polloclc a grcat 
number of the mutilated and crippled camp followers of 
Elphinstone's army who had escaped with their lives 
from its destruction. On the 12th of October the forces 
of Pollock and of Nott turned their backs on Cabul, 
which no British army was again to see for nearly forty 
years, and set out on their march clown the passes. 
Jellalabad and Ali Musjid wcre partially destroyed in 
passing. Pollock's division reachccl Peshawur without 
loss, thanks to the precautions of its chief; but with 
M'Caslcill and Nott the indomitable Afghans had the 
last worcl, cutting off their stragglers, capturing their 
baggage, and in the final skirmish killing and wound- 
ing some sixty men of Nott's command. 
Of the bombastic and grotesque p a n s  of triumph 
emitted by Lord Ellenborough, whose head had bcen 
turncd by a success to which he had but scantly con- 
tributed, nothing need now be said, nor of the garish 
pageant with which hc received the armies as they re- 
entered British territory a t  Ferozepore. As they passed 
down through thc Punjaub, Dost Mahorned passed up 
on his way to reoccupy the position from which he hacl 
been driven. And so ended thc first Afghan war, a 
period of history in which no redeeming features are 
perceptible except the defence of Jellalabad, the dogged 
firmness of Nott, and Pollock's noble and successful 
constancy of purpose. Beyond this effulgence thcre 
sprcads a sombre welter of misrepresentation and 
unscrupuIousness, in trigue, moral deterioration, and cl is- 
honour unspeakable. 

Second A f g h a n  W a r  

P A R T  I 1  
T H E  S E C O N D  A F G H A N  W A R  
C I - I A P T E R  I 
'SIlE FIRST CAMPAIGN 
A BRIEF period of peace intervencd between the ratifica- 
tion o f  the treaty of Gundamulc on May 30th' 1879, and 
the renewal of hostilities consequent on the massacre at 
Cabul of Sir Louis Cavagnari and the whole e&urclge of 
the mission of which he mas the head. There was no- 
thing identical or even similar in the motives of the two 
campaigns, and regarded purely on principle they might 
be regarded as two distinct wars, rather than as successive 
campaigns of one and the same nrac But the interval 
between them was so short that the ink of the sig- 
natures to the treaty of Gundamulc may be said to have 
been scarcely dry when the murder of the British Envoy 
tore t h a t  docuinent into bloody shreds; and it seems the 
simplest and most conveiiient method to designate the two 
years of hostilities from November 1878 to Scptcmber 
1880, as the ' second Afghan war,' notwithstanding the 
three months' interval of peace in the summer of 1879. 
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Dost Mahomcd died in 1863, and aftcr a long struggle 
his son Shere Ali possessed hirnsclf of the throne be- 
queathcd to him by his fathcr. Thc relations between 
Shcre Ali and the successive Viceroys of India were 
friendly, although not close. Thc consistent aim of the 
British policy was to maintain Afghanistan in the position 
of a strong, friendly, and independent statc, prepared in 
certain contingencies to co-opcrate in lceeping a t  a dis- 
tance foreign intrigue or aggression ; and while this objcct 
was promoted by donations of money and arms, to abstain 
from interference in the internal affairs of the country, 
while according a fricndly rccognition to thc successive 
occupants of its throne, without undertaking indefinite 
liabilities in their interest. The  aim, in a word, was to 
utilisc Afghanistan as a ' buffcr ' state between the north- 
western frontier of British India and Russian advances 
from the direction of Central Asia. Shere Ali was nevcr 
a very comfortable ally; he was of a saturnine and suspi- 
cious nature, and he seems also to have had an overween- 
ing sense of the value of the position of Afghanistan, inter- 
posed between two great powers profoundly jealous one 
of the other. He did not succeed with Lord Northbroolc 
in an attempt to work on that Viceroy by playing off the 
bogey of Russian aggression ; and as the consequence of 
this failure he  allowed himself to display marked evidences 
of disaffected feeling. Cognisance was talcen of this ' atti- 
tude of extreme reserve,' and early in 1876 Lord Lytton 
arrived in India charged with instructions to break away 
from the policy designated as that of ' rnastcrly inactivity,' 
and to  initiate a new basis of relations with Afghanistan 
and its Ameer. 
Lord Lytton's instructions directed him to despatch 
without delay a mission to Cabul, whose errand would be to 
require of the Ameer the acceptance of a permancnt Kesi- 
dent and free access to the frontier positions of Afghan- 
istan on the part of British officers, who should have oppor- 
tunity of conferring with the Ameer on matters of common 
interest with 'becoming attention to their friendly 
councils.' Those wcse demands notoriously obnoxious 
to the Afghan ~nonarch and the Afghan people. Com- 
pliance with thcm involved sacrifice of indcpenclencc, and 
the Afghan loathing of Feringhec officials in their midst 
had been ficrcely evinccd in the long bloody struggle and 
awful catastrophe recorded in earlier pagcs of this volume. 
Probably the Ameer, had he desired, would not havc 
dared to concede such demands on any terms, no matter 
how full of advantage. But thc terms which Lord Lytton 
was instructed to tender as an equivalent were strangely 
meagre. The A w e r  was to receive a money gift, and 
a precarious stipend regarding which the new Viceroy was 
to 'deem it inconvenient to commit his government to 
any permanent pecuniary obligation.' The desiderated 
recognition of Abdoolah Jan as Shere Ali's successor was 
promised with the qualifying reservation that thc promise 
'did not imply or necessitate any intervcntion in the 
internal affairs of the state.' The guarantee against 
foreign aggression was vague and indefinite, and the 
Government of India reserved to itself entire ' freedom of 
judgment as to the character of circumstances involving 
thc obligation of material support.' 
The  Ameer replied to the notice that a mission was 
about to proceed to Cabul by a courteous declinature to 
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receive an Envoy, assigning several specious reasons. 
H e  was quite satisfied with the existing friendly relations, 
and desircd no changc in thcm;  he could not guarantee 
the safety of the Envoy and his peoplc ; if he admitted a 
British mission, he would havc no cxcuse for rcfusing to 
rcceivc a Russian one. A n  intimation was conveyed to 
the Ameer that i f  he should persist in his refusal to receive t 
thc mission, the Viccroy would have no other alternative 
than t o  regard Afghanistan as a statc which had ' volun- 
tarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of the 
British Government.' T h e  A~nce r  arrangcd that the 
Vakeel of the Indian Government should visit Sirnla, 
carrying with him full explanations, and charged to lay 
before the Viceroy sundry gricvanccs which were distress- 
ing Shere Ali. That  functionary took back to Cabul 
certain minor concessio~ls, but conveyed the message also 
that those concessions were contingent on the AmeerJs 
acceptance of British officers about his frontiers, and 
that it would be of no avail to send an Envoy to the 
conference a t  Peshawur for which sanction was given, 
unless he wcre commissioned to  agree to this condition as 
the funclarnental basis of a treaty. Before the Valceel 
quitted Sirnla he had to listen to  a truculent address from 
Lord Lytton, in the course of which Shere Ali's position 
was genially lilcened to  that of ' an  earthen pipkin 
between two iron pots.' Before Sir Lewis Pelly and thc 
Ameer's representative met a t  Peshawur in January 1577, 
Shere Ali had not  unnaturally been perturbed by the 
pcrrnanent occupation of Quetta, on the southern vergc of 
his dominions, as indicating, along with other military 
dispositions, an intended invasion. The Peshawur con- 
ference, which from the first had little promise, dragged 
on unsatisfactorily until terminated by thc dcath of the 
Amcer 's  representative, whereupori Sir Lewis Pelly was 
recalled by  Lord Lytton, notwithstanding the latter's 
cognisance that Shere Ali was despatching to Pesbawur 
a fresh Envoy authorised to assent to all the British de- 
mands.  The  justification advanced by Lord Lytton for 
this procedure was the discovery purported to  have been 
made  b y  Sir  Lewis Pelly that the Ameer was intriguing 
with General Icaufmann a t  Tashlcend. Since Shere Ali 
ivas a n  independent monarch, it was no crime on his part 
to c n t e r  into negotiations with another power than Great 
Britain, although if the worried and distracted man did so 
the cha rge  of folly may be laid to him, since the Russians 
were pret ty certain to betray him after having made a 
cat's-paw of him, and since in applying to them he in- 
volved himself in the risk of hostile action on the part of 
the British. The wisdom of Lord Lytton's conduct is not 
apparent .  The  truculent policy of ivliich he ivas the 
instrument  was admittedly on tlic point of triumphing ; 
and evcilts curiously falsified his short-sighted anticipa- 
tion of the unlil~elihood, because of the Russo-Turkish 
war t hen  impending, of any m@roche7went betwcen the 
A m e c r  and the Russian authorities in Central Asia. The  
Viceroy withdrew his Valceel from Cabul, and in the 
recognition of the Ameer's attitude of ' isolation and 
scarcely veiled hostility ' Lord Salisbury authorised Lord 
L y t t o n  to protect the British frontier by such measures 
as circumstances should render espedicnt, ' without regard 
t o  t h c  wishes of the Ameer or the interests of his 
dynasty. '  Lord Lytton took no measures, cspeclient or 
otherwise, in the direction indicated by Lord Salisbury ; 
the Amccr, as if he had been a petted boy consigned 
to the corner, was abandoned to his sullen ' isolation,' and 
the Russians adroitly used him to involve us in a war 
which lasted two years, cost us the lives of many valiant 
men, caused us to incur an expenditure of many millions, 
and left our relations with Afghanistan in all essential 
respects in the sarnc condition as Lord Lytton found 
them when he reached India with the ' new policy' in 
his pocket. 
I f  thc Russians could executc as thoroughly as they 
can plan skilfully, there jvould be hardly any limit to 
their conquests. When England was rnobilising her 
forces aftcr the treaty of San Stefano, and ordering into 
the Mediterranean a division of sepoys drawn from the 
three presidencies of her Indian Empire, Russia for her 
part was concerting an important diversion in the clirec- 
tion of the north-western fronticr of that  great possession. 
But for the opportune conclusion of the treaty of Berlin, 
the question as to the ability of sepoy troops stiffened 
by British regiments to cope with thc mixcd levies of 
the Tzar  might have been tried out on striclcen fields 
between the OXLIS and the Indus. When Gortschalcoff 
returned from Berlin to S t  Petersburg with his version of 
' Peace with HonourJ-Ressarabia and  Batoum thrown 
in-Icauf~nann had to countermand the concentration of 
troops that had been in progress on the northern frontier 
of Afghanistan. But the Indian division was still much 
in evidence in the Mecliterrancan, its tents now gleaming 
on the  brown slopes of Malta, now crowning the upland 
of Larnaca and nestling among thc foliage of Icyrenea. 
Kaufmatin astutely retorted on this demonstration by 
despatching, not indeed an,  expedition, but an embassy 
to Cabul; and when Stolietoff, the gallant defender of 
the Schipka Pass, rode into the Balla Hissar on August 
I ~ t h ,  1878, Shere Ali received him with every token of 
cordiality and regard. 
No other course was now open to Her Majesty's 
Government than to insist on the reception a t  Cabul of 
a British mission. The gallant veteran officer Sir Ncville 
Cl~amberlain, known to be held in regard by the Ameer, 
was named as Envoy, and an emissary was sent to Cabul 
in advance with information of the date fixed for the 
setting out of the mission. Shere Ali was greatly per- 
plexed, and begged for more time. ' I t  is not proper,' he 
protested, ' to use pressure in this way ; it will tend to a 
complete rupture.' But Sir Neville Chamberlain was 
satisfied that the Ameer was trifling with the Indian 
Government; and he had certain information that the 
Ameer, his Ministers, and thc Afghan outpost officers, 
had stated plainly that, i f  necessary, the advance of the 
mission would be arrested by force. This was what in 
effect happened when on September z ~ s t  Major Cavagnari 
rode forward to the Afghan post in the Khyber Pass. 
The officer who courteously stopped him assured him 
that he had orders to oppose by force the progress of 
Sir Neville and his mission, so Cavagnari shook hands 
with the Afghan major and rode hack to Peshawur. 
The  Viceroy sought permission to declare war im- 
mediately, notwithstanding his condition of unprepared- 
ness ; but the Home Government directed him instead to 
require in temperate language an apology and the accept- 
The Second A fghm w a r  
ance of a permanent mission, presenting at the salne time 
the ultimatum that if a satisfactory reply should not be 
received on or bcforc the 20th November hostilities nrould 
immediately commence. Mcanwliile military prcpara- 
tions were actively pushed forward. The scheme of 
operations was as follows: three columns of invasion 
were t o  move simultaneousIy, one througl~ the Khyber 
l'ass t o  Dakka, another through the Kuram valley, south 
of the I<hyber, with the Peiwar Pass as its objective, and 
a third from Quetta into the Pisheen valley, to  march 
forward to Candahar after reinforcement by a division 
from Mooltan. T o  General S i r .  Sam Browne was as- 
signed the command of the Khyber column, consisting 
of about ~ o , o o o  men, with thirty guns; to General 
Roberts the command of the Kuram valley column, 
of about 5,500 men, with twenty - four guns ; and to 
General Bicldulph the  com~nand of the Quetta force, 
numbering some 6000 men, with eighteen guns. When 
General Donald Stewart should bring up from Mooltan 
the division which was being concentrated there, he 
was t o  command the whole southern force moving on 
Candahar. T h e  reserve division gathering at Hassan 
Abdul and commanded by General Maude, would sup- 
port thc  Khyber force ; another reserve division massing 
a t  Suklzur under General Primrose, would act in sup- 
port of the Candahar force ; and a contingent contri- 
buted by the Silth Feudatory States and comlnancled 
.by Colonel Watson, was to do  duty on the Kurum line of 
communication. T h e  Generals commanding columns 
were t o  act independently of each other, taking instruc- 
tions direct from Army and Government headquarters. 
No answer to the ultimatum was received from the 
Aineer, and on the morning of Novembcr 21st Sir Sam 
Browne crossed the Afghan frontier and moved up the 
Khyber on Ali Musjid with his third and fourth brigades 
and the guns. Overnight he had detached Macphcrson's 
and Tytler's brigades with the commission to turn the 
Ali Musjid position by a circuitous march, the former 
charged to descend into the Khyber Pass in rear of the 
fortress, and block the escape of its garrison; the latter 
instructed to find, if possible, a position on the Rhotas 
heights on the proper left of the fortress from which a 
flank attack might be delivered. About noon Sir Sam 
reached the Shagai ridge and came under a brisk fire 
from the guns of Ali Musjid, to which his heavy cannon 
and Manderson's horse-battery replied with good results. 
The Afghan position, which was very strong, stretched 
right athwart the valley from an  entrenched line on the 
right to the Rhotas summit on the extreme lcft. The  
artillery duel lasted about two hours, and then Sir Sam 
determined to advance, on the expectation that the turn- 
ing brigades had reached their respective objectives. H e  
himself moved forward on the right upland ; on the op- 
posite side of the Khyber stream Appleyard led the 
advance of his brigade against the Afghan right. No 
co-operation on the part of the turning brigades had made 
itself maiiifest up till dusk; the right brigade had been 
brought to a halt in face of a precipitous cliff crowned by 
the enemy, and it was wisely judged that to press the 
frontal attack further in the meantime would involve a 
useless loss of life. Sir Sam therefore halted, and sent 
word to Appleyarcl to stay for the night his further ad- 
vance, merely holding the ridge which he had already 
carried. But before this order reached him Appleyard 
was sharply engaged with the enemy in their entrenched 
position, and in the fighting which occured before the 
retirement was effected two officers were killed, a third 
wounded, and a good many casualties occurred among 
the rank and file of the native detachments gallantly 
assailing the Afghan entrenchments. 
Early next morning offensive operations were about 
to be resumed, when a young officer of the 9th Lancers 
brought intelligence that the Afghan garrison had fled 
under cover of night, whereupon the fort was promptly 
occupied. Thc  turning brigades had been delayed by 
the difficult country encountered, but detachments from 
both had reached Kata  Kustia in timc to capture several 
llundrecl fugitives of the Ali Musjid garrison. The mass 
of it, however-its total strength was about 4000 men- 
effected a retreat by the Peshbolalz track from the right 
of thc entrenched position. Sir Sam Brownc's advance 
to Dalzka was made without molestation, and on 20th 
December he  encamped on the plain of Jellalabad, where 
he remained throughout the winter, Maude's reserve 
division keeping open his communications through the 
Ichyber Pass. The  hill tribes, true to their nature, gave 
great annoyance b y  their continual raids, and several 
punitive expeditions were sent against them from time 
to time, but seldom with decisive results. The tribesinen 
for the most part carried off into the hills their moveable 
effects, and the destruction of their petty forts apparently 
gave them little concern. For the most part they main- 
tained their irreconcilable attitude, hanging on the flanks 
of  o u r  detachments on their return march through the 
la te ra l  passes to their camps, and inflicting irritating if 
n o t  very severe losses. Occasionally they thought proper 
t o  make nominal submission with tongue in cheek, 
breaking out again when opportunity or temptation 
presented itself. Detailed description of those raids 
a n d  counter-raids would be very tedious reading. It  was 
w h e n  starting to co-operate in one of those necessary but 
tantalising expeditions that a number of troopers of the 
10th I-Iussars were drowned in a treacherous ford of 
t h e  Cabul river near Jellalabad. 
General Roberts, to whom the conduct of operations 
in t h e  Kuram district had been entrusted, crossed the 
frontier on November arst, and marched up the valley 
w i t h  great expedition. Thc inhabitants evinced friendli- 
ness ,  bringing in live stock and provisions for sale. 
Reaching  I-Iabib Killa on the morning of the 28th, he  
received a report that the Afghan force which he knew 
t o .  b e  opposed to  him had abandoned its guns on the 
h i ther  side of the 'Peiwar Kotul, and was retreating in 
confusion over that summit. Roberts promptly pushed for- 
w a r d  in two columns. Building on the erroneous informa- 
t i on  that  the enemy were in a hollow trying to withdraw 
the i r  guns-in reality they were already in their entrenched 
positioi~ on the summit of the Kotul-he ordered Cobbe's 
( t h e  left) column to turn the right of the supposed Afghan 
position, and debar the enemy from the Kotul, while the 
o t h e r  column (Thelwall's) was ordered to  attack in front, 
t h e  object being to  have the enemy bctween two fires. 
Cobbe's leading regiment near the village of Turrai found 
i t s  advance blocked by precipices, and a withdrawal was 
ordered, the advantage having been attained of forcing 
the.:enerny to  disclose the position which he was holding. 
Further reconnaissa~~ces proved that the Afghan line of 
defence extended along the crest of a lofty and broken 
mountainous range from the Spingawai summit on the 
left t o  the Peiwar Kotul on the right centre, the right 
itself resting on commanding elevations a mile further 
south. The  position had a front in all of about four miles. 
I t  was afterwards ascertained to have been held by about 
3500 regulars and a large number of tribal irregulars. 
General Roberts' force numbered about 3100 men. 
H i s  scheme of opcrations he explained to his corn- 
manding officers on the evcring of December 1st. With 
the bulk of the force he hi~nself was to malie a circuitous 
night march by his right on the Spingawai Kotul, with 
the object of turning that  position and taking the main 
Afghan position on  the Peiwar Kotul in reverse; while 
Brigadier Cobbe, with whom wcre to remain the 8th 
(Queen's) and 5th Punjaub Infantry regiments, a cavalry 
regiment and six guns, was instructed to assail the 
.cnernyls centre whcn the result of the flank attack on his 
left should have made itself apparent. 
T h e  turning column, whose advance the General led 
in person, consisted of the 29th N. I. (leading),. 5th 
Goorlthas, and a mountain battery, all under Colonel 
Gordon's command ; followxl by a wing of the 72d 
Ilighlanders, zcl Punjaub Infantry, and 23d Pioneers, 
with four guns on elephants, under Brigadier Tllelwall. 
T h e  arduous march began at ten P.M. Trending a t  first 
rearward t o  the Peiwar village, the course followed was 
then to the proper right, up the rugged and steep Spin- 
gawa i  ravine. In the darl<ncss part of Thclwall's force 
los t  its way, and disappeared from lien. Furthcr on a 
coup le  of  shots were fircd by disaffected Patl~ans in the 
r a n k s  o f  t h e  29th N. I. That regimcut was promptly 
depr ivcd  of the lead, which was taken by thc Goorkha 
regiment ,  a n d  the column toiled on by a track described 
by General Roberts as ' nothing but a mass of stones, 
h e a p e d  into ridges and furrowed into deep hollows by 
the action of the water.' Day had not broken when the 
head  of the  column reachcd thc foot of the steep asccnt 
to t h e  Spingawai ltotul. T h e  Goorlillas and the 72d 
rushed  forward on the first stockaclc. I t  was carricd 
wi thout  a pause save to bayonet the defenders, and 
stoclcade after stockade was swept over i n  rapid and 
brill iant succession. I n  half-an-hour Gencral Roberts 
was in  f ~ ~ l l  possesion of the Spingawai defences, and the 
Afghan  left flank \vas not only turned but driven in. 
C o b b c  was ordered by signal to co-opcrate by pressing 
o n  his frontal attack ; and Roberts himself hurried for- 
ward  on his enterprise of rolling up the Afghan left and 
shak ing  its centrc, Rut  this provccl no easy t~sl i .  The 
A f g l ~ a n s  made a good defence, and gave ground rcluct- 
ant ly.  T h e y  made a resolute stand on the further side 
o f  a narrow dcep-cut ravine, to dislodge them from which 
effort after effort was ineffectually madc. The General 
t hen  determined to desist from pressing this line of 
attaclc, and to make a sccond turning movement by 
urhich he hoped to reach the rear of the Afghan centre. 
H e  led t h e  7zd wing, thrce native rcgilnents, and ten 
guns ,  in a direction which should enable him to thrcaten 
t h e  linc of the A f ~ h a n  retreat, Brigadier Cobbc since 
174 The Second A f r h n ~ r  PVar 
morning had been steadily although slo\vly climbing to- 
ward the front of the Peiwar ICotul position, After an 
artillery duel which lastcd for three hours the Afghan 
fire was partially quelled ; Cobbe's infantry pushed on 
and up  from ridge to ridge, and at length thcy reached 
a crest within Soo yards of tlic guns on the I<otul, 
whence their rifle fire compelled the Afghan gunncrs to 
abandon thcir batterics. Meanwhile RobertsJ second 
turning movement \vas developing, and thc defcnders of 
the Kotul placed b e t w e n  two fires and their line of re- 
treat compromised, began to wavcr. Brigadier Cobbe 
had bccn wounded, but Colonel Drcw led forward his 
gallant youngsters of thc Sth, ancl after toilsomc climbing 
they cntercd the Afghan position, which its dcfcnclers 
had just abandoned, leaving many dead, eighteen guns, 
and a vast accu~nulation of storcs and ammunition. 
Colonel 13. Gough pursued with his cavalry, and pos- 
sessed himself of several more guns which the Afghans 
had relinquished in their precipitate flight. The decisive 
success of the Peiwar Kotul combat had not cost heavily ; 
the British losses were twenty-one killed and seventy- 
two wounded. 
His sick and wounded scnt back to Fort Icuram, 
General Roberts advanced to  Ali Khel, and thence 
made a reconnaissance forward to the S1iutargurclan 
Pass, whose summit is distant from Cabul little mo1.c 
than fifty miles. I t s  height is great-upwards of I 1,200 
feet-but it was regarded as not presenting serious ob- 
stacles to the advance by this route of a forcc from thc 
Kuram valley moving on  Cabul. A misfortune befell 
the baggage guard on one  of the marchcs in the trans- 
Peiwczr region when Captains Goad and Powell lost thcir 
lives in a tribal onslaught. The  some\vhat chequered 
experiences of General Robcrts in  the Khost valley 
need not be told in detail. After some fighting and 
more marching he withdrew from that turbulent region 
altogether, abjuring its pestilent tribesmen and all their 
works. Thc Kuram force wintercd in excellent health 
spite of the rigorous climate, and toward the end of 
March 1879 its forward concentration about Ali Kheyl 
was ordered, which was virtually accomplished beforc 
the snow had melted from the passes in the latcr we l t s  
of April. Adequate transport had been got together 
and supplics accumulated ; Colonel Watson's contingent 
was occupying the posts along the valley; and General 
Roberts was in full readiness promptly to obey the orders 
to advance which he had been led to expect, and on 
which his brother-general Sir Sam Browne had already 
acted to  some extent. 
The  march on Candahar of the two divisions under 
the command of General Stewart had the character, for 
the most part, of a military promenade. T h e  tramp 
across the deserts of Northern Reloochistan was arducus; 
the Bolan, the Gwaga, and the Kojult passes had to be 
surmounted, and the distances which both Biddulph and 
Stewart had to traverse were immensely in excess of 
those covcrcd by either of the forces operating from the 
north-wcstcrn fi-ontier line. But uneventful marches, 
however long ancl toilsome, do not call for detailed 
, description. Stewart rcde into Candahar on January 8th, 
1879, and the troops as thcy arrived encampcd on thc 
adjacent plain. The Governor and most of his officials, 
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together with the Afghan cavalry, had fled toward 
Herat ; the Deputy-Governor reinainccl to hand over 
the city to Gcneral Stewart. For commissariat reasons 
one division under Stewart presently moved by the 
Cabul road on Khelat-i-Ghilzai, which was found empty, 
the Afghan garrison having evacuated it. Simultane- 
ously with Stewart's departure from Candahar Bidclulph 
marched out a column westwarcl toward the Helmund, 
remaining in that region until thc third week in February. 
On i ts  return march to Candahar the rear-guard had a 
sharp skirmish a t  I<husl~k-i-Nalchud with Alizai tribes- 
men, of whom 163 were lcft dead on the field. Soon 
after the return of Stewart and Bicldulph to Candahal; 
ordcrs arrived that the former should retain in Candahar, 
Quetta, and Pishin a strong division of all arms, sending 
back to India the rcrnainder of his command under 
Bidclulph-the march to be made by the previously un- 
explored Thal-Chotiali routc to  the eastward of the 
Pisheen valley. 
Before Sir Sam Browne moved forward from Jellal- 
abad to Gundamuk he had been able to report to the 
Viceroy the death of Shere Ali. That unfortunate man 
had seen with despair the departure on December rot11 
of the last Russian from Cabul-sure toliell that he need 
hope for nothing from ICaufmann or the Tzar. His 
chiefs unanimous that further resistance by him was 
hopcless, he released his son Yalcoub Khan from his 
long harsh imprisonment, constituted him Regent, and 
then followed the Russian mission in the direction of 
Tashltend. Kaufmann would not so much as allow him 
to cross the frontier, and after a painful illness Shcrc 
Ali died on February arst, 1879, near Ballch in northern 
Afghanistan. Hc  was a man who deserved a better 
fatc than that which befell him. His aspiration was 
to maintain the independence of the kingdom which he 
ruled with justice if also with masterfulness, and he 
could not brook the degradation of subjection. But, 
unfortunately for him, he was the 'earthen pipkin ' which 
the ' iron pot '  found inconvenient. Therc had been 
plenty of manhood originally in his son and successor 
Yakoub Khan, b ~ ~ t  much of that attribute had witherecl 
in him during the long cruel imprisonment to which he 
had bcen subjcctcd by his frither. Shere Ali's dcath 
made him nominal master of Afghanistan, but the 
vigour of his youth-time no longcr characterised him. 
H e  reigned but did not rule, and how precarious was 
his position was evidenced by the defcction of many 
leading chiefs who came into the English camps and 
were ready to make terms. 
After thc flight of Shere Ali some corrcspondence 
had passed between Yakoub Khan and Major Cavagnari, 
but the former had not expressed any willingness for the 
re-establishment of friendly rclations. In February of 
his own accord he made ovcrtures for a reconciliation, and 
soon after intimated the death of his father and his own 
acccssion to the Afghan throne. Major Cavagnari, acting 
on thc Viccroy's authorisation, wrote to the new sovereign 
stating the terms on which the Anglo-Indian Government 
was prcpared to cngage in negotiations for peace. Yakoub 
temporiscd for some time, but influcnced by the growing 
defection of the Sirdars from his cause, as well as by the 
forward movements of the forccs commanded by Browne 
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and Robcrts, he intimated his intention of visiting Gull- 
clamuk in order to discuss matters in personal conference 
with Major Cavagnari. A fortnight later he was on his 
way down thc passcs. 
Instructions had been givcn by the Viceroy that 
Yakoub Khan should be received in the British camp 
with all honour and clistinctio~~. When his approach mas 
announced on May Sth, Cavagnari and a numbcr of 
British officers rodc out to meet him ; whcn he reacllcd 
the camp, a royal salute grected him, a guard of honour 
prescntcd arms, alicl Sir Sam Browne and his staff gave 
him a ceremonious welcome. Cavagnari had full powcrs 
to represent his Govcrnmcnt in the pending negotiations, 
as t o  the terms of which lic had receivecl from the 
Viceroy detailed instructions. Thc Amccr and his 
Gcneral-in-Chicf, Daoud Shah, came to the conference 
attired in  Russian uniforms. Thc ncgotiations wcre 
tedious, for the Ameer, his Minister, and his General 
made dificulties with a somewhat elaborate stupidity, 
but Cavagnari as a diplomatist possessed thc gift of 
being at once patient and firm ; and at length on May 
26th the treaty of peace was signed, and formally ratified 
by the Viceroy four clays later. By the treaty of Gun- 
clamulc Afghanistan was deprived for the timc of its 
traditional charactcr of a 'buffer state,' ancl its Ameer 
became virtually a feudatory of the British Crown. I-Ie 
was no longer an independcnt princc; although his 
titular rank ancl a nominal sovereignty remained to him, 
his position under its articles was to be analagous to  that 
of t he  mediatised princes of the German Empire. The  
treaty vested in thc British Government the control of 
the external relktions of Afghanistan. The Atneer con- 
sented to the residence of British Agents within his 
don~inions, guaranteeing their safety and honourable 
treatment, while the British Government undertoolc that 
its rcprescntatives should not interfcre with the internal 
administration of the country. The  districts of Pisheen, 
Kurmn, and Sibi were ceded to the British Government 
along with the permanent control of the Khyber and 
Michnai passes, and of the mountain tribcs inhabiting thc 
vicinity of those passes ; all other Afghan territory in 
British occupation was t o  be restored. The obligations 
t o  which the treaty committed the British Government 
were that it should support thc Ameer against foreign 
aggression with arms, money, or troops at its discretion, 
and that it should pay to him and his successor an annual 
subsidy of L60,ooo. Commercial relations between India 
and Afghanistan were to be protected and encouraged ; 
a telegraph line between Cabul and the I h r a m  was forth- 
with to be constructed ; and thc Amccr was to proclaim 
an amnesty relieving all and sundry of his subjects from 
punishment for services rendered to the British during 
the war. 
That  the treaty of Gundamulc involved our Indian 
Empire in serious responsibilities is obvious, and those 
responsibilities were the more serious that they were 
vague and indefinite, yet none the less binding on this 
account. I t  is probable that its provisions, if they had 
remained in force, would have been found in the long run 
injurious to the interests of Uritish India. For that realm 
Afghanistan has the value that its ruggedness presents 
exceptional obstacles to the march through it of hostile 
armies having the Indian fronticr for thcir objective, 
and this further and yet more important value that the 
Afghans by nature are frank and impartial Ishmaelites, 
thcir hands against all foreigners alike, no matter of what 
nationality. If this character be impaircd, what virtue 
thc Afghan has in our cycs is lost. I n  his implacable 
passion for inclepenclctice, in his fierce intolerance of the 
Feringhee intruder, he fulfils in relation to our Indian 
frontier a kindred ofice to that served by abattis, che7~~m.r 
dt. fvisc, ancl wire entanglements i n  front of a military 
position. The short-livcd treaty, for which the sanguine 
h h  Stanhopc claimed that it had gained for England 'a  
friendly, an indcpenclent, and a strong Afighanistan,' may 
now bc chicfly rcmembcred bccause of thc circumstnncc 
that it e w e  effect for the moment to Lord Uexonsfield's 
' scientihc fronticr.' 
Tlic \vitliclra\val of the two nortliern forces to posi- 
tions \vithin the new frontier began immediately on the 
ratification of the treaty of Gundamuk, the evacuation of 
Candahar being postponed for sanitary reasons until 
autumn. The march of Sir Sam Bro\vncJs force from 
the breezy upland of Gundamulc clown the passes to 
Peshawur, made as  it was in the fierce heat of micl- 
summer through a region of bad nanic for insalubrity, 
and pervacled also by virulent cholera, was a ghastly 
journey. That ~nelaricholy pilgrimage, every lialting- 
place in whose course \\!as marlced by graves, and from 
which the living emerged 'gaunt and haggard, marching 
with a listless air, their clothing stiff with dried perspira- 
tion, their faces thick with a mud of dust ancl sweat 
through which their red bloodshot eyes looked forth, 
many surering from heat prostration,' dwells in the 
memory of British India as thc 'death march,' and its 
horrors have been recounted in vivid and pathetic words 
by Surgeon-Major Evatt, one of the few medical officers 
whom, participating in it, it did not kill. 
C H A P T E R  I 1  
T I I E  O P E N I N G  OF T H E  SECOND CAMPAIGN 
T I ~ R E  wcre many who mistrusted the stability of the 
treaty of Gundamulc. Perhaps in his heart Sir Louis 
Cavagnari may have had his misgivings, for he was gifted 
with shrewd insight, and no man knew the Afghan nature 
better;  but outwardly, in his quiet, resolute manner, he 
professed the fullest confidence. Cavagnari was a remark- 
able man. Italian and Irish blood commingled in his 
veins. Both strains carry thc attributes of vivacity and 
restlessness, but Cnvagnari to the superficial observer 
appcared as phlegmatic as hc was habitually taciturn. 
This sententious imperturbability was only on the surface ; 
whether it was a natural characteristic or an acquired 
manner is not easy to dccide. Below the surface of 
mcasured rcticent composure t h e  lay a tcmperament of 
ardent enthusiasm, and not less ardent ambition. In 
subtlety hc was a match for tlie wiliest Oriental, whom 
face to face he dominated with a placid daimtless master- 
fulness that was all his own. The wild hill tribes among 
whoin lic went about escortless, carrying his life continu- 
ally in his hand, recognised the complex strength of his 
personal sway, and fcared a t  once and loved tlie quiet, 
firm man, the flash of whose eye was sometimes ominous, 

but who could cow the fiercest hill~nan without losing a 
tittle of his cool composure. 
Cavagnari had negotiated the treaty of Gundamuk, 
the real importance of which consisted in the Afghan 
acceptancc of a British Resident at Cabul. The honour, 
thc duty, and thc clangcr naturally fell to him of being 
the first occupant of a post crcated mainly by his own 
mingled tact and strength. Many of his friends rcgarded 
him in the light of the leadcr of a forlorn hope, and 
probably Cavngnari recognised with perfect cleasness the 
risks which encompassed his embassy ; but apart from 
mayhap a little added gravity in his leave-takings when 
he quitted Simla, he gave no sign. I t  was not a very 
imposing mission a t  whose head he rode into the 
Balla Hissar of Cabul on July 24t11, 1579. I-Iis com- 
panions were his secretary, Mr William Jenkins, a young 
Scotsman of the Punjaub Civil Scrvice, Dr Ambrose 
I<elly, thc mcdical oficer of thc embassy, and the gal- 
lant, stal\vart young Lieutenant W. R. P. Hamilton, V.C., 
commanding the modest escort of ceventy-five soldiers of 
the Guides. I t  mas held that an escort so scanty was 
sufficient, since the Ameer had pleclgcd himself person- 
ally for the safety and protection of the mission. The 
Envoy was received with high honour, and conducted to 
thc roomy quarters in the Balla I-Iissar which had becn 
prepared as the Residency, within easy distance of thc 
Arneer's palace. Unquestionably the mission was wcl- 
come neither to the Afghan rulcr nor to the people, but 
Cavagnari, writing to the Viceroy, made the best of things. 
The arrival at the adjacent Sherpur cantonments of thc 
I-icrat regiments in the beginning of August was cxtre~nely 
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unfortunate for thc mission. Those troops had been in- 
spired by their commander Ayoub Khan with intense 
hatred to the English, and they marched through the 
Cabul streets shouting objurgations against the British 
Envoy, and picking quarrels with the soldiers of his 
escort. A pensioned sepoy who had learned that the 
Afghan troops had been ordered to abuse the Eltchi, 
warned Cavagnari of the danger signals. Cavagnari's 
calm remark was, ' Dogs that bark don't bite.' The  old 
soldier earnestly urged, ' But these dogs do bite, and 
therc is danger.' 'Well,' said Cavagnari, ' they can only 
kill the handful of us here, and our death will be 
avenged.' The  days passed, and it seemed that Cavag- 
nari's diagnosis of the situation was the accurate one. 
T h e  last words of his last message to the Viceroy, de- 
spatched on  September zd, were 'All well.' The writer 
of those words was a dead man, and his mission had 
perished with him, almost as soon as the chcerful 
message borne along the telegraph wires reached its 
destination. 
I n  the morning of September gcl some Afghan regi- 
ments paraded without a r m  in thc Ualla Hissar to 
receive their pay. An instalrnent was paid, but the 
soldiers clanloured for arrears due. Thc demand was 
ref~ised, a riot began, and thc shout rose that the British 
Eltchi might prove a free-handed paymaster. There was 
a rush toward the Residency, and while some of the 
Afghan soldiers resortcd to stone-throwing, others ran 
for arms to thcir quarters, and lootcd the Arsenal in the 
upper Ralla I-Iissar. T h c  Residency gates had been 
closed on the first alarm, and firc was promptly opencd 
on the rabble. The place was never intended for defcnce, 
commanded as it was at close range from the highcr level 
of the Arsenal, whence a heavy continuous firc was from 
the first poured down. The mob of the city in their 
thousands hurried to co-operate with the mutinied 
soldiers and share in the spoils of the sack, so that the 
Residency was soon besieged. As soon as thc outbreak 
manifested itself Cavagnari had sent a mcssage to the 
Amecr, and the communication admittedly rcached the 
latter's hands. H e  had more than zoo0 troops in 
thc Balla Hissar, still at  least nominally loyal ; he had 
guaranteed tlle protection of the mission, and it bchoved 
him to do what in him lay to fulfil his pledge. But thc 
Ameer sat supine in his palace, doing no more than send 
his General-in-Chief Daoud Shah to remonstrate with 
the insurgents. Daoud Shah went on the errand, but 
it is questionable whether he showed any cncrgy, or 
indced dcsired that the besiegers should desist. I t  was 
claimed by and for him that he was maltreated and 
indeed wounded by the mob, and it appcars that he clid 
ride into the throng and was forcibly dismounted. I-Ic 
might perhaps have exerted hin~self with grcatcr deter- 
mination if he had received morc specific orders from his 
master the Amcer. That fceble or treacherous prince 
ncver stirred. To the frequent urgent mcssages sent him 
by Lieutenant Hamilton, hc replied vaguely : ' As God 
wills ; I am malting preparations.' Meanwhile the little 
garrison maintained with gallant staunchness hour aftcr 
hour the all but hopeless defence. 'While the fighting 
was going on,' rcported the pensioner who had previously 
lllarned Cavagnari, ' 1 myself saw the four Europcan 
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officers charge out a t  the head of some twenty-five of the 
garrison ; they drovc away a party holding somc broken 
ground. When chased, the Afghan soldicrs ran like 
sheep before a wolf. Later, anothcr sally mas made by 
a detachment, with but three officcrs a t  thcir head. 
Cavagnari was not with them this time, A third sally 
was made with only two officers leading, Hamilton and 
Jenkins ; and the last of thc sallics was made by a Silcl~ 
Jcmadar bravely leading. No more sallics were made 
after this.' About noon the gates wcre forced, and the 
Residency building was fired ; but the defenders long 
maintained their position on the roof and in a detached 
building. A t  length thc fire did its work, the \valls and 
roof fcll in, and soon the fcll deed was consummated by 
the slaughter of the last survivors of the ill-fated garrison. 
Hamilton was said to have died sword in hand in a final 
desperate charge. Tidings of the  illassacrc were carried 
with grcat speed to Massy's outposts in the Kurain 
valley. The news reached Simla by telegraph carly on 
the morning of the 5th. The authorities there rallied 
from the shock with fine purposeful promptitude, and 
within a few hours a telcgram was on its way to Gcneral 
Massy's headquarters at Ali Khcl instructing him to 
occupy the crest of the Shutargurdan Pass with two 
infantry regiments and a mountain battery, which force 
was t o  entrench itself thcre and await orders. 
T h e  policy of which Lord Lytton was thc fig~~rehead 
had comc down with a bloody crash, and the ' ~ n a s t e r l ~  
inactivity' of wise John Lawrence stood vindicated in 
the eycs of Europe and of Asia. But if his policy had 
gone to water, the Viccroy, althougl~ he was soon to 
default from the constancy of his purpose, saw for thc 
present clear before him the duty that now in its stead 
lay upon him of inflicting summary punishment on a 
people who had ruthlessly violated the sacred immunity 
from harm that shields alike among civilised and bar- 
barous communities the person and suitc of an am- 
bassador accepted under the provisions of a deliberate 
treaty. Burncs and Macnagl~ten had met their fate 
because they had gone to  Cabul the supporters of a 
detested intruder and the unwelcome representatives of 
a hated power. But Cavagnari had becn slaughtered 
notwithstanding that he dwelt in the Balla Hissar Resi- 
dency in virtue of a solemn treaty between the Empress 
of India and the Amrer of Afghanistan, notwithstanding 
that the latter had guaranteed him safety and protection, 
notwithstanding that Britain and Afghanistan had ratified 
a pledge of mutual friendship and reciprocal good offices. 
Lord Lytton recognised, a t  least for thc moment, that 
no consideration of present cxpeclicncy or of ulterior 
policy could intervene to deter him from the urgent 
impcrativc duty which now suddenly confronted him. 
The task, it was true, was besct with difficulties and 
dangcrs. Thc forces on the north-western frontier had 
been reduced to a peace footing, and the transport for 
economical reasons had been severely cut down. T h c  
bitter Afghan winter season was approaching, during 
which military opcrations could be conducted only under 
cstremely arduous conditions, and whcn thc line of 
communications would be liable to serious interruptions. 
The available troops for a prompt offensive did not 
amount to more than 6500 inen all told, and it was 
apparent that many circumstances might postpone their 
reinforcement. 
When men are in earnest, difficulties and dangers are 
recognised only to  be coped wit11 and overcome. Whcn 
the Simla council of war broke up on the afternoon of 
September 5th the plan of campaign had been settled, 
and the leader of the enterprise had been choscn. Sir 
Frederick Roberts was already deservedly esteemed one 
of the most brilliant soldiers of the British army. He 
had fought with distinction all through the Great Mutiny, 
earning the Victoria Cross and rapid promotion ; he had 
served in the Abyssinian campaign of 1865, and bcen 
chosen by Napier to carry home his final despatches ; 
and he  had worthily shared in the toil, fighting, and 
hon6urs of the Umbeyla and Looshai expeditions. In 
his command of the Kuram field force during the winter 
of 1875-g he  had proved himself a skilful, resolute, and 
vigorous leader. Tllc officers and men who servcd under 
him believed in him entl~usiastically, and, what wit11 
soldicrs is the convincing assurance of whole-souled con- 
fidence, they had bestowed on him an affectionate nick- 
name-they lmew him among themselves as ' little Bobs.' 
His administrative capacity he had proved in the post of 
Quarter~naster-General in India. Ripe in esperience of 
war, Roberts a t  the age of forty-seven was i n  the full 
vigour of manhood, alert in mind, and of tough and en- 
during physique. H e  was a very junior Major-General, 
but even among his seniors the conviction was general 
that Lord Lytton the Viceroy, and Sir I;. Ilaines the 
Commander-in-Chief, acted wisely in entrusting to him 
the most activc command in the impending campaign. 
Our rctcntion of the Kuram vallcy was to prove very 
usefill in the emergency which had sucldenly occurrccl. 
I ts  occupation enabled Massy to  seize and hold the 
Shutargurdan, and the force in thc valley was to con- 
stitutc the nucleus of thc little army of invasion and 
retribution to the comlnand of which Sir Frederick 
Roberts was appointed. The a p e s  a t  thc Shutargurdan 
of the salient anglc into Afghanistan which our posses- 
sion of the Kuram valley furnished was within little morc 
than fifty miles of  Cabul, whcreas thc clistancc of that 
city from Lundi Kotul, our advanced position a t  the 
hcad of the Khyber Pass, was about 140 miles, and the 
route exceptionally difficult. Iiobcrts' column of inva- 
sion was to consist of a cavalry brigade commanded by 
Urigadicr-General Dunham-Massy, and of two infantry 
brigades, the first commanded by Brigadier-General 
Macpher~on, the secollcl by Brigadier-General Balccr, 
three batteries of artillery, a company of sappcrs and 
miners, and two Gatling guns. Thc  Kuram vallcy bc- 
tween the Shutargurdan and the basc was to  bc garri- 
soned adequately by a forcc about 4000 strong, in 
protection of Roberts' co~n~nunications by that  line until 
snow should closc it, by which time it was anticipated 
that co~nmunication by  thc Khyber-Jellalabad-Gunda- 
mulc line would bc opcnccl up, for gaining and maintain- 
ing nrllich a force of about 6600 men was t o  be detailed 
under thc command of Major-General Bright, which was 
to furnish a movable column to establish communica- 
tions on\varcl to Cabul. A strong reservc force was to 
be gathercd between Pcshawur and Rawal Pincli under 
the command of Major-Gcncral Ross, to move forward 
as  occasion might require. 111 the south-west Sir Dona!cl 
Stewart was to recall t o  Candahar his troops, which, 
having begun their march toward India, were now mainly 
cchclonccl along the route to Quetta, when that General 
would have about goo0 men at his disposition to 
dominate the Candahar province, reoccupy Khelat-i- 
Ghilzai, ancl threatcn Ghuznee, his communications with 
the Indus being kept opcn by a brigade of Bombay 
troops commanclcd by nrigadicr-Gcneral Phayre. 
S i r  Frederick Robcrts left Simla on 6th September 
along with Colonel Charles Macgregor, C.B., the brilliant 
and daring soldier whom h e  had chosen as chief of staff, 
and travelling night and day they reached Ali IChel on 
the 12th. T h e  transport and supply difficulty had to be 
promptly  net, ancl this was cffccted only by making a 
clean sweep of all thc t-csources of the Pesha\vur district, 
greatly but unavoiclably to the hindrancc o l  the advance 
of the Khyber column, and by procuring carriage ancl 
supplies from thc friendly tribes of the ICuram. Not- 
withstanding the most strenuous exertions it was not 
until the 1st October that Roberts' little army, having 
crossed the Shutargurdan by detachments, was rendez- 
voused at and about the village of I<usl~i n the Logur 
plain, within forty-eight miles of Cabul. Somc sharp 
sl<irmisl~es had been fought as the troops traversed the 
rugged ground bet\w.cn Ali Khel and the Shutargurdan, 
but the losses were trivial, although the Gencral himself 
had a narrow escape. A couple of regiments and four 
guns under the command of Colonel Money were left in 
an entrenched camp to hold the Shutargurdan. 
T h e  maqsacre of the British mission had no sooner 
been perpetrated than Yalioub Khan found himself in a 
very bad way. The Cabul Sirdars sided with the dis- 
affected soldiery, and urged the Arneer to raise his banner 
for a j dnd  or religious war, a measure for which he had 
no nerve. Nor had he the nerve to remain in Cabul until 
Roberts should camp undcr the Balla Hissar and demand 
of him an account of the stewardship he had undertaken 
on behalf of the ill-fatcd Cavagnari. What reasons actu- 
ated the anxious and be\vilderecl Inan cannot precisely be 
Iinown ; whether he was simply solicitous for his own 
wretched sliin, whether he acted from a wish to save 
Cabul from destruction, or whether hc hopcd that his 
entreaties for delay might stay the British advance until 
the tribcs~nen shoulcl gather to  bar the road to the capital. 
H e  resolved to fly from Cabul, and commit himself to the 
protection of General Roberts and his army. The day 
before General Roberts arrived at Ih sh i  the Ameer pre- 
sented hilnsclf in Baker's camp, accompanied by his cldest 
son and some of his Sirdars, among whom was Daoud 
Shah the Commander-in-Chief of his army. Sir Frederick 
on his arrival a t  Kushi paid a formal visit to the Ameer, 
which the latter returned the same afternoon and took 
occasion to plead that the General should clelay his 
advance. Thc reply was that not even for a single clay 
would Sir Fredericli defer his inarch on Cabul. The 
Ameer remained in camp, his personal safety carefully 
protected, but under a species of honourable surveillance, 
until it should be ascertained j~~dicially wlicther or not 
he was implicated in the massacrc of the mission. 
Yalioub had intimated his intention of presenting 
himself in the British camp some clays in advance of 
his arrival, and as telcgraphic communication with head- 
quarters was open, his acceptance in the character of an 
honoured guest was presumably in accordancc with in- 
structions from Siinla. Thc  man who had made himself 
personally responsible for the salety of Cavagnari's 
mission was a strange guest with an army whose avowed 
errand was to exact retribution for the crime of its de- 
struction. I t  might seem not unreasonable to expect 
that, as an indispensable preliminary to his entertain- 
ment, he should have at least afforded somep~imzfaak 
evidence that he had been zealous to avert the fate which 
had befallen the mission, and stern in the punishment 
of an atrocity which touched him so nearly. Hut instead, 
he was taken on trust so fi~lly that Afghans resisting thc 
British advance were not so much regarcled as enemies 
resisting an invasion and a s  constructive vindicators of the 
massacre, as  they were held traitors to their sovereign 
harbouring in the British camp. 
O n  the morning of October zd the whole force 
marched from Kushi towarcl Cabul, temporarily cutting 
loose from communication with the Shutargurclan, to avoid 
diminishing the strength of thc column by leaving detach- 
ments to kecp the road open. All told, Roberts' army 
was the reverse of a mighty host. Its strength was little 
greater than that 01 a Prussian brigade on a war footing. 
Its fate was in its own hands, for befall it what might it 
coulc-l hope for no timely reinforceincnt. I t  was a mere 
detachment marching against a nation of fighting men 
plentifully supplied with artillcry) no longer shooting 
laboriously with jezails, but carrying arms of precision 
equal or little inferior t o  those in thc hands of our own 
soldiery. But the mcn, Europeans and Easterns, hillmen 
of Scotland and hillrnen of Nepaul, plainmen of I-Iamp- 
shirc ancl plainmen of the Punjaub, strode along buoyant 
with confidence and with health, believing in their leader, 
in their discipline, in themselves. - Of varied race, no 
soldier who followed Roberts hut camc of fighting stock ; 
ever blithely rejoicing in the combat, one and all burned 
for the strife now before them with more than wonted 
ardour, because of the opportunity it promised to exact 
vengeance for a dcecl of foul treachcry. 
The  soldiers had not long to  wait for the first fight of 
thc campaign. On the afternoon of the 5th Balccr's 
brigade, with most of the cavalry and artillery, and with 
the 92d Highlanders belonging to Macpherson's brigade, 
camped on the plain to the south of the village of 
Charasiah, Macpherson remaining one march in rear to 
escort thc convoy of ammunition and stores. North of 
Charasiah rises a semicircular curtain of hills ascending 
in  three successive tiers, the most distant ancl loftiest 
range closing in the horizon and shutting out thc vicw 
of Cabul, distant only about eleven miles. T h e  leftward 
projection of the curtain, as onc looks northward, comes 
down into the plain almost as far as and somewhat to 
the left of Charasiah, dividing the valley of Charasiah 
from the outer plain of Chardeh. T o  the right front of 
Charasiah, distant from it about three miles, the range is 
cleft by thc rugged and narrow Sung-i-Nawishta Pass, 
through which run the Logur river and the direct road to 
Cabul by Beni Hissar. Information had been received 
that the Afghans were determined on a resolute attempt 
to prevent the British force from reaching Cabul, and the 
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position beyond ~hakts iah  seemed so tempting that it 
was regarded as surprising that cavalry reconnaissances 
sent forward on three distinct roads dctected no evidences 
of any large hostile gathering. 
But next morning 'showed another sight.' At  dawn 
on the Gth Gencral Roberts, anxious to secure the Sung-i- 
Nawishta Pass and to rcndcr the track through it pass- 
able for guns, sent forward his pioneer battalion with a 
wing of the 92d and two mountain guns. That detach- 
ment had gone out no great distance when the spectacle 
before it gavc it pause. From the Sung-i-Nawishta dcfile, 
both sides of which were held, the semicircular sweep of 
the hill-crests was cronrncd by an Afghan host in great 
strength and regular formation. According to subse- 
quent informatioil no fcwer than tllirtccn regiments of 
the Afghan regular army took part in the combat, as 
well a s  large contingcnts of irregular fighting men from 
Cabul and the adjoi~~ing villages, while the British camp 
was threatened from thc heights on either side by formid- 
able bodies of tribesmen, to thwart whose obviously in- 
tcndcd attack on it a considerable forcc had to be retained. 
Thc dispositions of the Afghan commander Nek Mahomed 
Khan were madc with some tactical skill. The Sung-i- 
Nawishta Pass itself, the heights on either side, and a low 
detached cminencc fi~rther forward, wcre strongly held by 
Afghan infantry; in the mouth of the pass weie four 
Armstrong guns, and on the flanking height twelve 
mountain guns were in position. The projecting spur 
toward Charasiah which was the extreme right of the 
Afghan position, was held in force, whence an effective 
fire would bear on the left flanlc of a force advancing to 
a direct attaclc on the pass. But Roberts was not the 
man to play into the hands of the Afghan tactician. H e  
humoured his conception so far as to send forward on his 
right toward the pass, a sinall detachment of all arms under 
Major White of the gzd, with instructions to maintain 
a threatening attitude in that direction, and to seize the 
opportunity to co-operate with the flanking movement 
entrusted to Gencral Balcer as soon as its development 
should have shaken the constancy of the enemy. T o  
Baker with about 2000 infantry ancl four guns, was 
assigned the task of attacking the Afghan right on the 
projecting spur and ridge, forcing back and clispcrsing 
that flank; and then, having reached the right of the 
Afghan main position on the farthest ancl loftiest range, 
he was to wheel to his right and sweep its defenders from 
the chain of summits. 
Balm inoved out toward his left front agahst  the 
eminences held by the Afghan right wing, wl~ich Nelc 
Mahomed, having discerned the character of RobertsJ 
tactics, was now reinforcing with grcat activity. T h e  
72d Highlanders led the attaclc, supported vigorously by 
the 5th Goorlchas ancl the 5th Punjaub Infantry. The rc- 
sistance of the Afghans was stubborn, especially opposite 
our extreme left, ~vhence from behind their sungahs on a 
steep hill they poured a heavy fire on the assailants. A yet 
heavier fire came from a detached knoll on Baker's right, 
which the artillery fire gradually beat down. T h e  Afghans 
continued to hold the advanced ridge constituting their first 
,position until two o'clock, when a direct attaclc, accom- 
panied by a double flanking fire, compelled their with- 
drawal. They, however, fell back only to an intermediate 
loftier position about 700 yards in rear of the ridge from 
which thcy had been driven. Approached by successive 
rushes under cover of artillery fire, they were then attacked 
vigorously and fell back in confusion. No rally was per- 
mitted them, ancl by three o'cloclc the whole Afghan right 
was shattered and in full Right along the edge of the 
Chardell vallcy. Baker unfortunately had no cavalry, 
else the fugitives would have suffered severely. But the  
rout of the Afghan right had dccicled the fortunc of the 
day. Its defenders were alrcady dribbling away from 
the main position when Baker, ~vheeling to his right, 
inarched along the lofty crcst, rolling up and sweeping 
away the Afghan dcfencc as he moved tolvarcl the Sung- 
i-Nawishtn gorge. That defile had already been entered 
by tllc cavalry of White's dctachrnent, supported by some 
infantry. While Balcer had becn turning the Afghan 
right, White ancl his little force l m l  been distinguishing 
themselves not a little. After an artillcry preparation 
the detached hill had becn won as the result of a hancl-to- 
hand struggle. Later had fallen into the hands of White's 
people all the Afghan guns, and the heights to the im- 
inecliate right and left of the gorge had been carried, the 
defenders driven away, and the pass opened up. But  
the progress through it of the cavalry was arrested by 
a strongly garrisoned fort completely commanding t h e  
road. On this fort Baker directed his artillery fire, at 
the same time sending down two infantry regiments to 
clear away the remnants of the Afghan army still linger- 
ing in the pass. This accomplished, the fighting ceased. 
It  had been a satisfactory day. Less than half of Roberts' 
force had been engaged, ancl this mere brigade had routed 
the army of Cabul and captured the whole of the artillery 
it had brought into the field. The  Afghan loss was esti- 
mated at  about 300 Idled. T h e  British loss was twenty 
killed and sixty-seven wounded. On the night of the 
combat part of Baker's troops bivouacked bcyond the 
Sung-i-Nawishta, ancl on the following day  the whole 
division passed the defile and camped at  Beni Ilissar, 
within sight of the Balla Hissar and thc lofty ridge 
overhanging Cabul. 
On the afternoon of the 7th a violent explosion was 
heard in thc 13eni I-Iissar camp from the direction of the 
Sherpur cantonment north of Cabul, near the site of the 
British cantonments of 1839-41. N e s t  morning informa- 
tion came in that the Sherpur magazine had been blown 
up, and that the cantonmcnt had been abandoned by 
the Afghan regiments which had garrisoned that vast 
unfinished structure. General Massy led out part of 
his brigade on a rcconnaissance, and took possession of 
the deserted Sherpur cantonmcnt, and of the seventy- 
five pieccs of ordnance parked within thc walls. Massy 
had observecl from thc Siah Sung heights that  the A s ~ n a i  
heights, overhanging the Cahul suburb of Deh Afghan, 
were held by a large body of  Afghan soldiery, a force, it 
was afterwards learned, composed of the rcmnants of thc 
regiments defeated at Charasiah, three fresh regiments 
from the Kohistan, ancl tllc rabble of the city and ad- 
jacent villages, having a total strength of nearly 3000 men, 
with twelve guns, undcr the lcadership of Mnhomcd Jan, 
who later was to figure prominently as  thc ablest of our 
Afghan eneinies. Massy heliograpl~cd his information to 
General Robcrts, who sent Baler  with a force to drive 
the enemy from the heights ; and Massy was instructed 
t o  pass through a gap  in the ridge and gain the Charde1-1 
valley, where he might find opportunity to intercept the 
Afghan retreat toward the west. Massy pierced the 
ridge a t  thc village of A ~ ~ s h a r ,  and disposed his troops 
on the roads crossing the Chardeh vallcy. Meanwhile 
Baker found the ascent of the Shcr Derwaza heights so 
steep that  the afternoon was far spent before his guns 
came into action, and it was still latcc before part of his 
infantry effected their descent into the Chardeh valley. 
Reinforcements necessary to enable him to act did not 
reach him until dusk, when it ~vould have been folly to 
commit himself to a n  attack. A night patrol ascertained 
that the  Afghans had evacuated the position under cover 
of darlrness, leaving behind their guns and camp equi- 
page. O n  the 9th the divisional camp movcd forward to 
the Siah Sung hcights, a mile eastward from the Balla 
I-lissar, and there it was joined by Baker, and by Massy, 
who on his way to camp led his wcaried troopcrs thrtiugh 
the city of Cabul without mishap or insult. Thc Goorkha 
regiment was detachcd to  hold the ridge command- 
ing the Balla Hissar, and a cavalry regiment was quar- 
tered in the Sherpur cantonment to protect it from the 
ravages of the villagers. 
A melancholy interest attaches to the visit paid by 
Sir Frederick Roberts to  the Balla Hissar on the I ~ t h .  
Through the dirt and  squalor of the lower portion he 
ascended thea narrow lane leading to the ruin which a 
few weeks earlier had becn the British Residency. The  
commander of the avenging army looked with sorro\vful 
eyes on  the scene of heroism and slaughter, on the 
smokc-blacltened walls, the blood splashes on the whitc- 
washccl walls, the still sn~ouldering di;hris, thc half-burncd 
sl<ulls and bones in the blood-dabblcd chamber where 
apparently the final struggle had been fought out. I-Ic 
stood in the grcat breach in the quarters of the Guidcs 
where the gate had been blown in after the last of the 
sorties made by the gallant I-Tarnilton, and lingered in 
the tattered wreck of poor Cavagnari's drawing-room, its 
walls dinted with bullet-pits, its floor and walls brutally 
dcfiled. Next day he nladc a formal cntry into thc Balla 
I-Iissar, his road lined with his staunch troops, a royal 
salutc greeting the banner of Britain as it rose on thc 
tall flagstaff abovc the gateway. He  held a Durbar in 
the 'Audience Chamber'  in the garden of the Ameer's 
palace; in front and in flank of him the pushing throng 
of obsequious Sirdars of Cabul arraycd in all the colours 
of the rainbow; behind them, standing immobilc at atten- 
tion, the guard of British infantry with fixed bayonets 
which the soldiers longed to usc. The  Gcneral read the  
mild proclamation announcing the disar~namcnt of the 
Cabulcse and the punishment of fine which \\?as laid upon 
the city, but which never was exacted. And then he 
summarily dismissed the Sirdars, three only, the Mustaphi, 
Yahuja Khan the Ameer's father-in-law, and Zakariah 
Khan his brother, being desired to  remain. Their smug 
complacency was suddenly changed into dismay when 
thcy were abruptly told that they were prisoners. 
Anothcr ceremonial progrcss the Gcncral had to per- 
form. On the 13th hc marched through thc streets of 
Cabul at thc head of his little army, the bazaars and dead 
walls echoing to  the music of the bands and the wild 
scream of the bagpipes. In the Afghan quarter no 
salaams greeted the conqucring Fcringhees, and scowling 
faces frowned on the spectacle from windows ancl sicle- 
streets. Three clays later occurred an event which might 
have been a grcat catastrophe. Captain Shafto of the 
ordnance was conducting an exanlination into the con- 
tents of the arsenal in the upper Balla Hissar, and had 
already discovered millions of cartridges, and about 
I 50,ooo lbs, of gunpowder. Daoud Shah, however, es -  
pressed his belief that  at least a million pounds wcrc in 
store. Captain Shafto, a very cautious man, was pursu- 
ing his researches ; thc Goorlthas were quartered in the 
uppcr Balla Hissar near the magazine shed, and the 67th 
occupied the Amccr's gardcn lowcr down. On the ~ G t h  
a dull report was heard in the Siah Sung camp, followed 
irnmcdiately by the rising abovc thc Balla Hissar of 
a huge column of grey smol<e, which as it drifted away 
disclosed flashes of flamc and sudden jcts of smolte tclling 
of repeated gunpowder explosions. The  67th, powdered 
with dust, cscaped all but scathless ; but the Goorltha 
regiment had been heavily smitten. Twelve poor fellows 
were killed, and seven wounded ; among the formcr \vcl.c 
five principal Goorkha officers. 
T h e  Ralla Hissar was promptly evacuated. Occa- 
sional cxplosions occurred for several days, the hcaviest 
of those on the afternoon of the 1Gt11, which threw on the 
city a great shower of stones, beams, and bullets. By 
a jet of stones blown out through the Balla Ilissar gatc 
four Afghans were ldled, ancl two sowars and an Afghan 
badly hurt. Captain Shafto's body and thc remains of 
the Goorkhas werc found later, and buried; and the 
determination was formed to have no more to do with 
the Balla Ilissar, but to occupy the Sherpur canton- 
ment. Meanwhile General Hugh Gough was despatchccl 
with a small force of all arms to  escort to Cabul Money's 
gallant garrison of thc Shutargurdan, and to close for the 
winter the line of communication via the Kuram valley. 
Colonel Money had undergone with fine soldierly spirit 
and action not a fcw turbulent experiences since Robcrts 
had left him and his Silchs on the lofty crest of the 
Shutargurdan. T h e  truculent Ghilzais gave him no 
pcace; his method of dealing with them was for the 
most part with the bayonet point. The  last attempt on 
him was made by  a horde of Ghilzais some 17,000 strong, 
who completely invested his camp, and after the civility 
of requesting him to surrender, a compliment which 
he answered by bullets, made a close and determined 
attack on his position. This was on the 18th October ; 
on the following day Gough hcliographed his arrival a t  
Kushi, whereupon Money took the offensive with vigour 
and scattered to the wincls his Ghilzai assailants. On 
30th October the Shutargurdan position was evacuated, 
and on the gd November the Cabul force received the 
welcome accession of headquarters and two squadrons 
9th Lancers, Money's gd Sikhs, and four mountain guns. 
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SIR FREDE~ICIC ROBERTS had been hurried forward 
on Cabul charged with the duty of avenging the perpe- 
tration of a foul and treacherous crime, 'which had 
brought indelible disgracc upon the Afghan nation.' 
The  scriptural injunction to  turn the other cheek to 
the smiter has not yet become a canon of international 
law or  practice ; ancl the anti-climax to an expedition 
engagccl in with so stern a purpose, of a nominal clis- 
armament and a pctty fine never cxactecl, is self-evident. 
Our nation is given to walk in the path of precedent ; 
and in this juncturc the authorities had to their hand the 
most apposite of precedents. Pollock, by dcstroying the 
Char bazaar in which had been exposed the mangled re- 
mains of Burncs and Macnaghtcn, set a ' mark ' on Cabul 
the mcmory of which had lasted for decades. Cavagnari 
ancl his people had been slaughtered in the Balla Ilissar, 
and their bones were still mingled with the smouldering 
ruins of the Residency. Wise men discerned that the 
destruction of the fortress followed by a homeward march 
as  swift yet as  measured as had been the march of 
invasion, could not but havc made a deep ancl lasting 
impression on the Afghans ; while the complications, 
humiliations, and expcnse of the long futile occupation 
would have bccn obviated. Other counsels prevailed. 
T o  discover, in a nation virtually acccssory as a whole 
after the fact to thc slaugllter of the mission, thc men 
on whom lay thc suspicion of having becn the instiga- 
tors and the perpetrators of the cruel decd, to accorcl 
them a fair trial, and to send t o  the gallows those on 
whose hands was found the blood of the massacred 
mission, was held a more befitting and not less telling 
course of retributive action than to raze the Balla 
Hissar and sow its site with salt. Sldfully and pati- 
ently evidence was gathered, and submitted to the 
Military Commission which General Roberts had ap- 
pointed. This tribunal took cognisance of crimes 
nominally of two classes. I t  tried men who were ac- 
cuscd of having been conccrnecl in the clestruction 
of the British mission, and thosc charged with treason 
in having offercd armed rcsistance to the British troops 
acting in support of the Ameer, who had put himself 
under their protection. Of the five prisoners first tried, 
condemned, and duly hanged, two were signal criminals. 
One of them, the Kotmal or Mayor of Cabul, was provcd 
to have superintended the contu~nelious throwing of thc 
bodies of the slaughtered Guides of the mission escort 
into the ditch of the Balla Hissar. Another was proved 
to have carried away from thc wrecked Residency a head 
believcd to have been Cavagnari's, and to  have exhibited 
it on the ridge above the city. The  other three and 
many of thosc who were subsequently executed, suffercd 
for the crime of ' treason' against Yalcoub Khan. Pro- 
bably there was n o  Afghan who did not approve of the 
slaughter of the Envoy, and who would not in his heart 
have rcjoiced at the annihilation of the British force ; but 
it seems strange law and stranger justice to hang men 
for ' treason ' against a Sovereign who had gone over 
to the enemy. On the curious expedient of ternpor- 
arily governing in the name of an Ameer who had 
deserted his post to save his skin, cornmcnt would be 
supcrfluous. Executions continued ; few, however, of 
the mutinous sepoys who actually took part in the 
wanton attack on the British Residency had been 
secured, and it was judged expedient that efforts should 
be made to capture and punish those against whom 
there was evidence of that crimc, in the shape of the 
muster-rolls of the regiments now in the possession 
of the military authorities. I t  was known that many 
of the disbanded and fugitive soldicrs had i-cturned 
to their homes in the villages around Cabul, and 
carly in November General Baker took out a force 
and suddenly encircled the village of Indilcee, on thc 
edge of the Chardeh valley-a village reported full of 
Afghan sepoys. A number of mcn were brought out 
by the scared headmen and handcd over, answering 
to their names called over from a list carricd by Baker; 
and othcr villages in the vicinity yielded a consider- 
able harvest of disbanded soldiers. 13elore the Com- 
mission the prisoners made no attempt to conceal 
their names, or deny the regiments to which they had 
belonged; and forty-nine of them were found guilty and 
hanged, nearly all of wholn belonged to the regiments 
that had assailed the Residency. 
On  12th November Sir Frederick Roberts proclaimed 
an amnesty in favour of all who had fought against the 
British troops, 011 condition that they should surrender 
their arms and return to their I~omcs ; but exempted 
from the benefit were all concerned in the attack on the 
Residency. The amnesty was well timed, although 
most people would have preferred that fewer sepoys 
and more Sirdars should have been hanged. 
Our relations with the Hmeer during the earlier part 
of his residence in the British camp were not a little 
peculiar. Nominally he was our guest, and a certain free- 
dom was accorded to him and his retinue. There was 
no doubt that the Sirdars of the Hmeer's suite grossly 
abused their privileges. Whether with Yaltoub Khan's 
cognisancc or not, they authorisecl the use of his name 
by the insurgent leadcrs. Nek Mahorned, the insurgent 
commander at Charasiah, was actually in the tents of 
the Ameer on the evening before the fight. T o  all 
appearance our operations continued to have for their 
ultimate object the restoration of Yaltoub Khan to his 
throne. Our administrative measures werc carried on 
in his name. T h e  hostile Afghans we designated as  
rebels against his rule ; and his authority was pro- 
claimed as the justification of much of our conduct. 
But the situation gradually becaine intolerable to 
Yaltoub Khan. H e  was a guest in the British camp, 
but he was also in a species of custody. Should our 
arms reinstate him, he could not hope to hold his throne. 
His harassecl perplexity came to a crisis on the morning 
of the 12th October, the clay of General RobertsJ durbar 
in the Balla I-Iissar, which he had been desired to attend. 
What he specifically apprehended is unltnown ; what 
he did was to  tell General Roberts, with great escite- 
lnent, that he would not go to the durbar, that his lifc 
206 The Second A fqhnn War 
was too miserable for long endurance, that he ur0~11cI 
rather bc a grass-cuttcr in the British camp than remain 
Amecr of Afghanistan. H e  was firmly resolved to resign 
the throne, and begged that: he might be allowed to do 
so a t  once. Gencral Robcrts csplained that the accept- 
ance of his resignation rested not wit11 hi111 but with the 
Viceroy, pending wliose decision matters, the Gcncral 
desired, should remain ,as they were, affairs continuing 
to be conductcd in the Ameer's name as before. TO 
this t h e  Ameer consented ; his tents were moved to thc 
vicinity of General Roberts' headquarters, and a some- 
what closer surveillance over him was maintained. 
Secrecy meanwhile was preserved until the Viceroy's 
reply should arrivc. T h e  nature of that rcply was intimated 
by the proclamation which General Roberts issued on the 
aSth Octobcr. I t  announced that the Ameer had of his 
own free will abdicated his throne and left Afghanistan 
without a government. ' The British Government,' the 
proclamation continued, ' now commands that all Afghan 
authorities, chiefs, and sirdars, do continuc their functions 
in maintaining order. . . Thc British Government, after 
consultation with the principal sirdars, tribal chiefs, and 
others rcpresenting thc interests and wishes of the various 
provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future 
permanent arrangements to be made for the good govern- 
ment of thc peoplc.' 
Th i s  adi?ztehz assumption of the rulership of Afghan- 
istan may have been adopted as the only policy which 
afforded even a remote possibility of tranquillity. But it 
was essentially a policy of speculative makeshift. T h e  
retributive and punitive object of the swift march on 
Cabul can scarcely be regarded as having been .fulfilled 
by the esccution of a numbcr of subordinate participants 
and accessories in the destruction of the mission and by 
the voluntary abdication of Yalcoub Khan. That the 
Afghan ' authorities, chiefs, and sirdars,' would obey the 
command to ' maintain order' issued by thc leader of a 
few thousand hostile troops, masters of little more than 
the ground on which they were encamped, experience 
and common sense secmed alike to render improbablc. 
The  Afghans suborclinatcd their internal quarrels to their 
common hatred of the masterf~~l foreigners, and the des-' 
perate fighting of December proved how fiercely they 
, . 
wcre in earnest. 
Yakoub Khan had been regarded as merely a wealc 
and unfortunate man, but the shadows gradually darkened 
around him until at  length he came to be a man under 
grave suspicion. General Roberts became satisfied from 
the results of thc procecdings of the court of inquiry, that 
the attacli on the Resiclency, if not actually instigated by 
him, might at least have becn' checl<ed by active esertion 
on his part. Information was obtained which convincecl the 
Gencral that the ex-Ameer was contemplating a flight to- 
ward Turltestan, and it was considered necessary to place 
him in close confinement. He remained a close prisoner 
until December 1st. On the early morning of that clay he 
was brought out from his tent, and after taking farewell 
of the General and his staff, started on his journey to 
Pesllacwu-, surrounded by a strong escort. If the hill tribes 
along his route had cared enough about him to attempt 
his rescue, the speed with which he travelled affor'ded. 
. . 
them no'time to  gather for that purpose. . . 
During those uneventful October and November days, 
when the little army commanded by General Roberts lay 
in its breezy camp on the Siah Sung heights, there was 
no little temptation for the unprofessional reader of the 
telegraphic information in the newspapers to hold cheap 
those reputedly formidable Afghans, mhosc resistance a 
single sharp skirmish had scemingly scattered to the 
winds, and who were now apparently accepting without 
active remonstrancc the dominance of the few thousand 
British bayoncts glittering there screnely over against 
the oncc turbulent but now tamed hill capital. One 
may be  certain that the shrewd and careful soldier who 
comrnandcd that scant array did not permit hirnsclf to 
sharc in the facilc optiinism whether on thc part of a 
govern~nent or of thc casual reader of complacent tele- 
grams. It mas true that the Govcrnment of India had 
put or was putting some 30,ooo soldiers into the ficld on 
thc apparent errand of prosecuting an Afghan war. But 
what availcd Roberts this host of fighting men whcn he 
had to realise that, befall him what might in the imme- 
diate or  near future, not a man of it was available to 
strengthen or to succour him ? The quietude of thosc 
cool October days was very pleasant, but the chief knew 
well how precarious and deceitful was the calm. For the 
present the Afghan unanimity of hostility mas affectcd in 
a measure by the fact that the Ameer, who had still a 
party, was voluntarily in the British camp. But when 
Yakoub's abdication should be announccd, hc Iinew the 
Afghan nature too wcll to doubt that the tribal blood- 
feuds would be soldcred for the time, that Dooranee and 
Barakzai would strikc hands, that Afghan regulars and 
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Afghan irregulars would rally under the sarnc standarcls, 
and that the fierce shouts of 'Deen! deen!' would resound 
on hill-top and in plain. Cut loose from any basc, with 
slo~vly dwindling strength, wit11 waning stock of ammuni- 
tion, it was his part to hold his ground here for the winter, 
he and his staunch soldiers, a firm rock in the midst of 
those surging Afghan billows that wcre certain to rise 
around him. Not only would he withstand them, but he 
would mect them, for this bold man linew the valuc in 
dealing with Afghans of a rcsolute and vigorous offensive. 
Hut it behoved him above all things to malie timcly choicc 
of his wintes quarters where hc slioulcl collcct his supplies 
and house his troops and the followers. After careful 
delibcration the Sherpur cantonment was selected. I t  
was overlarge for easy defence, but hard work, careful 
engincering, and steadfast courage would redcem that 
evil. And Sherpur had the great advantagc that besides 
being in a mcasurc a ready-made dcfcnsive position, it 
had shelter for all thc European troops and most of thc 
native soldicry, and that it would accommoclate also the 
horses of the cavalry, tllc transport animals, and all the 
needful supplies and stores. 
An Afghan of the Afghans, Shcre Ali nevertheless 
had curiously failed to discern that thc nrarlilic strength 
of the nation which he ruled lay in its intuitive aptitude 
for irregular fighting ; and hc had industriously set him- 
self to the effort of warping the combative genius of his 
people and of constituting Afghanistan a military power 
of thc regular and disciplincd type. H e  had created a 
large standing army the soldiery of which wore uniforms, 
underwent rcgular drill, obcycd words of comrnancl, and 
0 
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carried arms of precision. He  had devoted great pains to 
the manufacture of a formidable artillery, and what with 
presents from the British Government and the imitative 
&ill of native artificers he was possessed at the outbreak 
of llostilities of several hundred cannon. His artisans 
were sk i l f~~l  enough to turn out in large numbers very fair 
rifled small-arms, which they copied from British models ; 
and in the Ualla Hissar magazine were found by our 
people vast quantities of gunpowder and of admirable 
cartridges of local manufacture. There were many 
rcasons why the Cabul division of Shere Ali's army 
should be quartered apart from his turbulent and refrac- 
tory capital, and why its cantonment shouldtake thc form 
of a,permancnt fortified camp, in which his soldiers might 
be isolated from Cabul intrigues, while its prosimity to 
the capital should constitute a standing menace to the 
conspirators of the city. I-Iis original design apparently 
was t o  enclose the Bellmaroo heights within the walls of 
his cantonment, and thus form a great fortified square 
upon the heights in the centre of whicll should rise a 
strong citadel dominating the plain in every direction. 
The Sherpur cantonment as found by Roberts consisted 
of a fortified encientc, enclosing on two sides a great 
open space in the shape of a parallelogran~ lying along 
the southcrn base of tllc Bellmaroo heights. When the 
British troops took possession, only thc \vest and s0ut.h 
faces of the encientc wcre completed ; although not long 
built those were already in bad repair, and the esplosion 
of the great magazine \vlicn the Afghan troops abandoned 
the cantonment had ~ ~ ~ r c c l ~ c c l  a section of the western face. 
The eastern face had becn little more than traced, and the 
northcrn side had no artificial protection, but was closed 
in by the Bchmaroo heights, whosc centre was cleft by a 
broad and deep gorge. The- dcsign of thc encientc was 
peculiar. There was a thick and high exterior wall of 
mild, with a banquette for infantry.. protected by a 
parapet. Inside this wall was a dry ditch forty fect wide, 
on the inner brink of which was the long range of barrack- 
rooms. Along the 'interior front of the ban-ack-rooms 
was a verandah faccd with arches supported by pillars, its 
continuity brokcn occasionally by broad staircases con- 
ducting to the roof of the barracks, which affordcd a 
scconcl linc of defence. The closing in of thc verandah 
would of course give additional barraclc accommodation, 
but there were quarters in the barraclc-rooms for at lcast 
all the European troops. In -the southern face of thk 
enciente were threc gdteways, and in the centre of the 
western face thcre was a fourth, each gate' covered ade- 
quately by a curtain. Hctwecn each gate were semi- 
circular bastions for guns. In thc interior therc was 
space to  manceuvre a division of all arms. There was a 
copious supply of water, and i f  thc aspect of the great 
~ ~ n t o n m e n t  was grim because of the absence of trees and 
the utter barrenness of the cnclosed spacc, this a.!sthctic 
consideration went for little against its ~nanifes-t aclvant- 
ages as  snug and deferisible winter quarters. Shere Ali 
had ihdeed been'all unconsciously a friend in need to the 
British force wintering in the heart of that unfortunate 
potentate's. dominions. I-Iurnan nature is perverse and 
exacting, and thcre were those who objurgated his 
memory because he had constructed his cantonmcnt a 
fern sizes too large, to be. co,~nfortably dcfcndcd by Sir 
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Frederick Roberts' little force. But this was maoifcstly 
~~nrcasonable ; and in serious truth the Sherpur canton- 
mcnt was a real godscnd to our pcople, Supplies of all 
kinds were steadily being accumulated thcrc, and the 
woodwork of the houses in the Balla Nissar was being 
carried to Sherpur for use as firewood. On the last clay 
of October the force quitted the Siah Sung position 
and took possession of Shcrpur, which had undergone a 
rigorous process of f~~migation and clcansing. The 
change was distinctly for thc bettcr. Thc force was 
compacted, and the routine military duties were appreci- 
ably lightened since there were necdcd merely piqucts 
on the  Behmaroo heights and sentries on the gatcs ; thc 
littlc army was healthy, temperate, and in  excellent case 
in all respects. 
The  dispositions for field scrvicc made at the outsct 
of the campaign by the military authorities have already 
becn detailed. Regarded simply as disposit~ons they 
left nothing to be desired, and certainly Sir Frederick 
Roberts' force had been organiscd and cquippecl with 
a fair amount of expedition. But it was apparent that 
the equipment of that body of 6500 men-and that equip- 
ment by no mcans of an adequate character, had exhausted 
for the time thc resources of the Government as regarded 
transport and supplies. Promptitude of advance on the 
part of the force to which had been assigned the line of 
invasion by the Khybcr-Jellalabad routc, was of scarccly 
less moment than the rapidity of the stroke which Roberts 
was colnmissioned to clcliver. The former's was a treblc 
duty. One of its tasks was to open up and maintain 
Roberts' communications with India, so that the closing 
of the Shutargurdan should not lcave him isolated. 
Another duty resting on the Khyber force was to con- 
stitute for Roberts a ready and convenient rcservc, on 
which he might draw when his occasions demanded. No 
man could tell how soon after the coinmencement of his 
invasion that necessity might arise ; .it was a prime nzison 
d'&e of the Khyber force to be in a position to give him 
the hand when he should intimate a need for support. 
Yet again, its presence in the passcs dominantly thrust- 
ing forward, woulcl llave the effect of retaining the eastern 
tribes within their own borders, and hindering them from 
joining an offensive combination against the little force 
with 1v11ich Roberts was to strike a t  Cabul. But delay 
on delay marlced the mobilisation and aclvance of the 
troops operating in the Khyber linc. There was no lack 
of earnestness anywhere ; the eagerness to push on was 
universal from the commander to  the corporal. But the 
barren hills and rugged passes could furnish no supplies ; 
the base had to furnish everything, and there was no- 
thing a t  the base, neither any accumulation of supplies 
nor means to transport supplies if they had been accumu- 
lated. Weelcs elapsed before the organisation of the 
force approached completion, and i t  was only by a 
desperate struggle that General Charles Gough's little 
brigade received by the end of September equipment 
sufficient to enable that officer to advance by short 
marches. Roberts was holding his durbar in the Balla 
I-Iissar of Cabul on the day that the head of Gough's 
advance reached Jellalabad. No man can associate the 
idea of dawdling with Jenkins and his Guides, yet the 
. Guides reaching Jellalabad on October 12th were not a t  
Gundamuk until the  23d, and Gundarnuli is but thirty 
miles beyond Jcllalabad. The anti-climax for the time 
of General Bright's exertions occurred on November Gth. 
On tha t  day 11c with Gough's brigade reached so far 
Cabul\vard a s  Kutti Sung, two marches beyond Guncla- 
muk. Thcre he met  General Macpherson of Roberts' 
force, who had marchcd down from Cabul with his 
brigade on the errand of opening communications with 
the head of the Iihybur column. The two brigades had 
touch of each other for the period of an interview between 
the Generals, and then they fell apart and the momentary 
union of communication was disrupted. General Bright 
had t o  fall back toward Gundarnuli for lack of supplies. 
T h e  breach continued open only for a few days, and 
then i t  was closed, not from down country but from up 
country. Roberts, surveying the rugged country to the 
cast of Cabul, had discerned that the hill road toward 
Jugdulluk by Luttabund, was a t  once opener and shorter 
than the customary tortuous and overhung route through 
the Khoord Cabul Pass and by Tezcen. The  pioneers 
were set  to work t o  improve the former. Thc Lutta- 
bund road became the habitual routc along which, from 
Cabul downwards, were posted detachments maintaining 
the communications of the Cabul force with the Khyber 
column and India. Nearly simultaneo~s with this 
accomplishment was the accordance to Sir Frederick 
Roberts of the local rank of Lieutena~it-General, a 
promotion which placed him in command of all the 
troops in Eastern Afghanistan down to Jurnrood, and 
enabled him to order up reinforcements from the 
Khyber column a t  his discretion, a power he refrained 
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from exercising until the moment of urgent need was 
impending. 
After his interview a t  Kutt i Sung with General Bright, 
Macpherson, before returning to  Cabul, made a short rc- 
connaissance north of the Cabul river toward the Lugh- 
man valley and into the Tagao country inhabited by 
the fanatic tribe of the Safis. From his camp a t  Naghloo 
a foraging party, consisting of a company of thc 67th 
escorting a number of camels and mules, movocl westward 
toward a villagc near the junction of the l'anjshir and 
Cabul rivers, thcrc to obtain supplies of grain and forage. 
Thc little detachment on its march was suddenly mct by 
the fire of about row Safi tribesmen. Captain Poole, 
observing that the tribesmen wcrc moving to  cut him OFT, 
withdre\v his party through a defilc in his rear, and taking 
cover undcr the river bank maintained a steady firc 
while the camels werc being retired. T h c  Safis werc 
cxtrernely bold and they too shot very straight. Captain 
I'oole was sevcrely wounded and of his handful of fifty- 
six men eight were either killed or wounclcd, but their 
comrades resolutcly held' their position until reinforce- 
ments ca'me out from the camp. The  Safis, who retired 
with ' dogged reluctance, werc not finally routed until 
attaclced by British infantry in front and flank. After 
they broke the cavalry pursued them for six miles, doing 
severe execution ; the dead of the 67th wcre recovered, 
but thc poor fellows had been mutilated almost past 
recognition. Gencral Macphcrson returned to Sherpir  
on the 20th November, having left a strong garrison 
temporarily a t  Luttabund to strengthen communicatio~ls 
and open out effect~~ally thc new routc castward. 
General Roberts, with all his esertions, hacl been un- 
able to accuinulate sufficient winter of grain for his native 
troops and forage for his cavalry and baggage animals. 
Agents had been purchasing supplies in the fertile district 
of Maidan, distant from Cabul about twenty-five miles in 
the Ghuznee direction, but thc local people laclced carriage 
to convey thcir stocks into camp, and it was necessary 
that the supplies should be brought in by the transport 
of the force. The  country toward Ghuxnee was reported 
to be in a state of cliscluiet, and a strong body of troops 
was detailed under the  command of General Baker for 
the protection of the transport. This force marched out 
from Sherpur 011 November zrst, and nest day camped 
on the edge of the pleasant Maidan plain. Balcer en- 
countered great difficulties in collecting supplies. The 
villages readily gave in their tribute of grain and forage, 
but evinced extreme reluctance to  furnish the aclditional 
quantities which our necessities forced us to requisition. 
With the villagers it was not a question of money; the 
supplies for which Bal<erJs commissaries demanded money 
in hand constituted their provision for the winter season. 
But the stern maxim of war is that soldiers must live 
although villagers starve, and this much may be said in 
our favour that we are the only nation in the world. 
which, when compelled to  rcsort to forced requisitions, 
invariably pays in hard cash and not in promissory 
notes. Baker's ready-money tariff was far higher than 
t f e  current rates, but nevertheless he had to resort to 
strong measures. In  one instance he was defied outright.. 
A certain Bahadur Khan inhabiting a remote valley in 
thc Bainian direction, ref~lsed to sell any portion of his 
great store of grain and forage, and declined to comply 
with a summons to present himself in Raker's camp. I t  
was known that he was undcr the influence of the aged 
fanatic Moulla the Mushk-i-Alum, who was engaged in 
fomenting a tribal rising, and it was reported that he was 
affording protection to a number of the fugitive sepoys 
of the ex-Ameer's army. A political officer with two 
squadrons of cavalry was sent to bring into camp the 
recalcitrant Bahadur Khan. His  fort: and village were 
found prepared for a stubborn defcnce. Received with 
a heavy fire from a large body of men while swarms 
of hostile tribesmen showed themselves on the adjacent 
hills, the horsemen had to withdraw. I t  was judged 
necessary to punish the contumacious chief and to dis- 
perse the tribal gathering before i t  should make more 
head, and Balcer led out a strong detachment in light 
marching order. Therc was no fighting, and the only 
enemies seen were a few tribcsrnen, who drew off into the 
hills as the head of Bal<er's column approached. Fort, 
villages, and valley were found uttcrly dcsertcd. There 
were no means to carry away the forage and grain found 
in the houses, so the villages belonging to Bahadur Khan 
were destroyed by fire. Their inhabitants found refuge 
in the surrounding villages, and thcre was absolutely no 
foundation for the statements which appeared in English 
papers to the effect that old men, women, and children 
were turned out Lo die in thc snow. In the words of 
Mr Hensman, a correspondent who accompanied the 
column : 'Therc were no old men, women, and children, 
and there was no snow.' British officers cannot be sup- 
posed to have found pleasure, on the verge of thc bittcr 
Afghan winter, in the destruction of the hovels and the 
winter stores of food belonging to a number of miserable 
villagers ; but experience has proved that only by such 
stern measurcs is there any possibility of cowing the ran- 
cour of Afghan tribesmen. No elation can accompany an 
operation so pitiless, and thc plea of stcrn necessity must 
be advanced alike and accepted with a shudder. Of the 
nccessity of some such form of reprisals an example is 
afforded in an experience which befell Gencral Baker a 
few days later in this same Maidan region. H e  visited 
the villagc of Beni-Badam with a small cavalry escort. 
The villagers with every demonstration of friendliness 
entertained the officers ancl men with milk and fruit, and' 
provided corn and forage for their horses. There were 
only old men in thc village with the women and children, 
but no treachery was suspected until suddenly two large 
bodies of armed men were scen hurrying to cut off the  
retreat, and it was only by hard fighting that the General 
with his escort succccded in escaping from the snare. 
Next  day hc dcstroyed the village. Baker probably acted 
on gcncral principles, but had he cared for precedents he 
would have found them in the conduct of the Germans in 
thc Franco-Prussian war. He  remained in the Maidan 
district until the transport of the army had brought 
into Sherpur all the supplies which he had succecded 
in obtaining in that rcgion, and thcn returned to the 
cantonment. 
By the terms of the proclamation which he issued on 
the 28th October Sir Frederick Roberts was announced 
as thc dominant authority for the time being in Eastern 
ancl Northern Afghanistan. I-Ic occupied this position 
just as far as and no further than he co~~lcl  make it good. 
And he could ma le  it good only over a very circum- 
scribed arca. Even more than had becn true of Shah 
Soojah's government forty years previously was it true 
of Roberts' government now that it was n government 
of sentry-boxes. I-Ie mas firm inaster of the S h e r p ~ ~ r  
cantonment. General Hills, his nominee, held a some- 
what precarious sway in Cabul in the capacity of its 
Governor, maintaining his position there in virtue of the 
bayonets of his military guard, the support of the 
adjacent Sherpur, and the waiting attitude of the popu- 
lace of the capital. East of Cabul the domination of 
Britain was represented by a series of fortified posts 
studding the road to Gundamuk, whencc to Jumrood the 
occupation was closer, although not wholly'undisturbed. 
When a column marchcd out  from Sherpur the British 
pomcr was dominant only within the area of its fire zone. 
The  stretch of road it vacatcd as it moved on ceased to  
bc territory ovcr wl~ich thc Uritisli held dominion. This 
narrowly restricted nature of his actual sway Sir Frcdcriclc 
Roberts could not but recognise, but how with a force of 
7000 mcn all told was it possiblc for him to  enlarge its 
borders? One espcdient suggested itself which could 
not indeed extend the area of his real pomcr, but which 
might have the cffect, to usc a now familiar cspression, of 
widening the sphere of his influence. From among the 
Sirdars who had regarded it as  their interest to  cast in 
their lot with thc British, he selectcd four to represent 
him in the capacity of governors of provinces which his 
bayonets mere not long enough to reach. T h e  experiment 
made it disagreeably plain that  thc people of the pro- 
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vinces to which he had deputed governors wcrc utterly 
indisposed to have anything to do either with them or 
with him. The governors wcnt in no statc, they had 
no great sums to disburse, they were protected by 
no armed escorts, and they wcre regarded by the 
natives much as the Southern states of the Amcrican 
Union after the Civil War regardcd the 'carpet bag'  
governors whom the North inlposed upon them. The 
Logur Governor was treated with utter contempt. The 
Kohistanees despitefully used Shahbaz Khan, and when 
a brothcr of Yaltoub Khan was sent to use his influ- 
ence in  favour of the worried and threatened governor, 
he was reviled as a 'Kafir ' and a ' Feringhce,' and 
ordercd peremptorily back to Sherpur i f  he had any 
regard for his life. Sirdar Wali Maliomcd, the gover- 
nor-nominate to the remotc Turkestan, found pretext 
after pretext for delaying to proceed to take up his 
f~~nctions, and had never quitted the British camp. 
When Baker returned from Maidan he reported that he 
had left the district peaceful in chargc of the governor 
whom he had installed, the venerable and amiable 
Hassan Khan. Baker's rear-guard was scarccly clear of 
the valley when a mob of tribesmen and sepoys attacked 
the fort in which the old Sirdar was residing, shot him 
through the head, and then hacked his body to pieces. 
It was too clear that governors unsupported by bayonets, 
and whose only weapons were tact and persuasiveness, 
were at an extreme discount in  the condition which 
Afghanistan presented in the end of Novernbcr and 
the beginning of Decembcr. 
C H A P T E R  I V  
T H E  DECEMBER STORM 
THE invader of Afghanistan may count as inevitable a 
national rising against him, but the Afghans are a people 
so immersed in tribal quarrels and domestic blood feuds 
that tlle period of the outbrcalc is curiously unccrtain. 
The  British force which placed Shah Soojah on the 
throne and supported him there, was in Afghanistan 
for more than two years before the waves of the national 
tempest rose around it. The national combination 
against Roberts' occupation was brcalcing its strength 
against the Sherpur defences while as yet the Cabul 
field force had not been within sight of the capital for 
more than two months. There secms no relation bctween 
opportunity and thc period of the inevitable outburst. 
If in November 1541 the Cabul Sirdars had restrained 
themselves for a fern days longer two more regiments 
would have becn following on Sale's track, and the 
British force in the cantonments would have been propor- 
tionately attenuated. Roberts might have been assailed 
with better chance of success when his force mas dis- 
persed between the Siah Sung camp, the Balla Hissar, 
and Sherpur, than when concentrated in the strong de- 
fensive position against which the Afghans beat in vain. 
Perhaps the rising ripencd faster in 1879 than in 1841 
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because in the former period no Macnaghtcn fomented 
intrigues and scattered gold. Perhaps Sllerc Ali's military 
innovations may havc instilled into the masses of his time 
sornc rough lessons in the art and practicc of spccdy 
mobilisation. T h e  crowning disgrace of 1842 was that 
a trained army of regular soldiers should havc been anni- 
hilated by a few thousand hillmcn, among whom there was 
no symptom either of rcal valour or of good leaclcrship. 
T o  Roberts and his forcc attaches thc ci-cdit of having 
defeated the persistent and clespcratc efforts of levics a t  
lcast ten times superior in numbers, well armed, far from 
undisciplined, courageous bcyond all experience of Afghan 
nature, and under the guidance of a leader who had some 
conception of strategy, and who ccrtaiidy was no rncan 
tactician. 
In  the Afghan idiosyncrasy therc is a considerable 
strain of practical philosophy. The blood of the mas- 
sacred mission was not dry whcn it was recognised in 
Cabul that stcrn retribution would inevitably follow. 
Well, said the Afghans among themselves, what must 
be must be, for they are all fatalists. The seniors rc- 
called the memory of thc retribution Polloclr exacted- 
how he c a m ,  destroyed Islalif, sct a 'mark '  on Cabul 
by sending thc great bazaar in fragments into thc air, and 
tlicn departed, This time Istalif was not compromised ; 
if 1Zobcrts Sahib should be cletermined to blow up thc 
Char Chowk again, why, that infliction must be endurcd. 
I t  had bcen rebuilt aftcr Pollock Sahib's engineers had 
worked their will on i t ;  it could be rebuilt a second time 
when Roberts Sahib shoulcl have turncd his b, CLC 1 c on 
the city, as pray God and thc Prophct he might do with 
no more delay than Polloclc Sahib had made out yonder 
on the Logur plain. S o  after a trial of Roberts' mettle 
at Charasiah, and finding the testing sample not quite to 
their taste, the Afghans fell into an attitude of cxpectancy, 
and were mightily relicved by his proclamation read at 
the Balla Hissar durbar of October 12th. After a rcason- 
able amount of hanging and the exaction of the fine laid 
on the city, it was assumed that he would no doubt cle- 
part so as to get home to India before the winter snows 
should block the passes.  it the cspected did not hap- 
pen. Thc British Gcneral established a British Governor 
in Cabul who had a heavy hand, ancl policcd the place 
in a fashion that stirred a lurid fury in the bosorns of 
haughty Sirdars who had been wont to d o  what seemed 
good in their own eyes. H e  engaged in the sacrilegious 
work of dismantling the Balla Hissar, the historic fortrcss 
of the nation, within whose walls wcrc the royal palace 
and the residences of the principal noblcs. Those were 
bitter things, but they could be borne if they were mere 
temporary inflictions, and if the hated Feringhees would 
but take thcrnselves away soon. But that hope was 
shattcrcd by the' proclamation of Octobcr zSth, when the 
abdication of the Ameer was intimated and the British 
mj in Afghanistan was announced. Ycs, that pestilent 
zcz6nr~insti little Gene:al, who would not follow the ex- 
an~ple  of good old Pollock Sahib, ancl who hkld Yalcoub 
Khan and sundry of his Sirdars in closc imprisonment 
in his camp, had now the insolence to proclaim himself 
virtually the Atneer of Afghanistan ! Far from show- 
ing symptom of budging, Re was sending out his governors 
into the provinces, he was gathering tribute in kind, and 
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he had taken possession of Shere Ali's monumental can- 
tonment, under the shadow of the Behmaroo heights 
on which Afghan warriors of a past generation had 
slaughtered the Feringhee soldiers as if they had been 
shecp ; and it was the Feringhee General's cantonment 
now, which hc was cunningly strengthening as if hc 
meant to make it his permanent fortress. 
Yakoub Khan had gaincd little personal popularity 
during his brief and troubled reign, but he was an Afghan 
and a Mahomedan ; and his deportation to India, fol- 
lowed shortly afterwards by that of his three Ministers, 
intensified the rancour of his countrymen and co-reli- 
gionists against thc handful of presumptuous foreigncrs 
who arrogantly claimed to sway the destinies of Afghan- 
istan. Cherchez In f;?vzlm is thc keynote among Western 
peoples of an investigation into the origin of most 
troubles and strifes; thc watchword of the student of 
the springs of great popular outbursts anlong Eastern 
nations must be Che?dw Ies #I&YES. The Pcter the 
Hermit of Afghanistan was the old Mushk-i-Alum, the 
fanatic Chicf Moulla of Ghuznee. This aged enthusiast 
went to and fro among the tribes proclaiming the sacred 
duty of a Jchnd or religious war against the unbelieving 
invaders, stinlulating the pious passions of the follolvers 
of the Prophet by fervent appeals, enjoining the chiefs to  
merge their intestine strifes in the common universal 
effort to crush the foreign invaders of the Afghan soil. 
T h e  female relatives of the abdicated Ameer fomentcd 
the rising by appeals to popular sympathy, and by the 
more practical argument of lavish clistribution of treasure. 
T h e  flame spread, tribesmen and disbandccl soldiers sprang 
to arms, the banner of the Prophet was unfurled, ancl thc 
nation hcaved with the impulse of fanaticism. Musa 
Khan, the boy heir of Yakoub, was in thc hands of the 
R~ushlt-i-Alum, and the combination of fighting tribes 
found a compctent leader in Mahomed Jan, a Warduk 
general of proved courage and capacity. The plan of 
campaign was comprehcnsive and well deviscd. The  
contingent from the country to the south of the capital, 
from Logur, Zurrnat, and the Mangal and Jadran dis- 
tricts, was to seize that section of thc Cabul ridge 
cstcnding from Charasiah northward to the cleft through 
which f low the Cabul river. Thc northcrn contin- 
gent from the ICohistan and I<ohclaman was to occupy 
the Asrnai heights and thc hills furthcr to the north-west; 
while the troops from the Maidan and Wardulc territories, 
lcd by Mahomed Jan in person, were to cornc in from thc 
westward across the Chardch valley, take possession of 
Cabul, and rally to their banners the disaffected popula- 
tion of the capital and thc surrounding villages. The  
concentration of thc three bodies cfrected, the capital 
and the ridge against which it leans occupied, the next 
step would be the invcstrnent of the Sherpur canton- 
ment, preparatory to an assault upon it in force. 
The British gcncral through his spics had information 
of those projects. T o  allow the projected concentration 
to  be effected would involve scrious disadvantages, ancl 
both experience and ternpcrament enjoined on Roberts 
the offensive. The Logur contingent was regarded as 
not of much account, and might be headcd back by a 
threat. Mahorncd Jan's force, which was reclconccl soinc 
5000 strong, neecled to bc handlcd with greater vigour. 
P 
Mcer Butcha and his ICohistances werc less formidable, 
and might be dealt  with incidentally. Roberts took a 
measure of  wise precaution in telegraphing to Coloncl 
Jenkins on the 7th Deccmbcr to march his Guiclcs 
(cavalry and infantry) from Jugdulluk to Sherpur. 
On the 8th General Macpherson was sent out toward 
the west with a column consisting of 1300 bayoncls, 
three squadrons, and cight guns. Following thc Ghuznec 
road across the Chardeh vallcy, hc was to march to 
Urgundeh, in the vicinity of which place it was espectcd 
that  he would find Mahomed Jan's lcvies, which he was 
to attack and drive backward on Maidan, taking care to  
prevent their retreat to the westward in the direction of 
Bamian. 011 the iollowing day General Balcer marched 
out with a force made up of goo infantrymen, two and a 
half squadrons, and  four guns, with instructions to march 
southward toward the Logur vallcy, deal with the tribal 
gathering there, then bend sharply in a south-westerly 
direction and talzc up a position across the Ghuznee 
road in the Maidan valley on the line of retreat which it 
was hoped that Macphcrson would succeed in enforcing 
on Mahomcd Jan. I n  that casc thc Afghan leadcr would 
find himself between two fircs, and would bc punished so  
severely a s  to rendcr it unlilccly that he would give 
fiirthcr trouble. T o  afford timc for Balcer to reach the 
position assigned to him lWacpherson remained halted 
during the 9th a t  Aushar, a village just bcyond the 
debouche of the Nan~ichee Pass, a t  the north-western 
estremity of the Asmai heights. On that day a cavalry 
recoimaissance discovered that the Kohistanee levics in 
considerable strength had already gathcred about Karcz 


Meer, some ten miles north-west of Cabul, and that 
masses of Afghans presumably belonging to the force of 
Mahomed Jan were moving northward in the Kohistan 
direction, apparently with the object of joining Meer 
Butcha's gathering a t  Karcz. I t  was imperative that thc 
latter should be dispersed before the junction could be 
effected, and Sir Frederick Roberts 11ad IIO option but to 
order Macpherson to alter his line of advance and move 
against the Kohistanees. Necessary as was this cliverg- 
ence from the original plan of operation, it had the effect 
of sending to wreck the combined movement from which 
so much was hoped, and of bringing about a very critical 
situation. If Lockhart's reconnaissancc had been made 
a day earlier, Macpherson might probably have utilised 
to good purpose by  dispersing the I<ohistanees, the day 
which as it was he spent halted a t  Aushar. He  might 
have accomplished that object equally well if, instead of 
the cavalry reconnaissance made by Lockhart, Macpher- 
son himself had bccn instructcd to devote the 9th to a 
reconnaissancc in force in the direction of Karez Meer. 
The country being held unsuited for the action of 
wheeled artillery and cavalry, Macpherson left his cletails 
of those arms a t  Aushar, and marched on thc morning 
of the 10th on  Karez with his infantry and mountain 
guns. As  his troops crowned the Surkli Kotul they saw 
before them an imposing spectacle. T h e  whole terrain 
around Karez swarmed with masses of armed tribesmen, 
whose banncrs were flying on every hillocl~. Down in the 
Pughman valley to the Ieft rear, were discerned bodies of 
the hostile contingent from thc mcst, between which and 
the Kohistanees no junction had fortunately as yet 
been made. Macpherson's disposit~ons werc simple. 
His mountain guns shelled with effect the Kohistanee 
tribesmen, and then he moved forward from the Surkh 
Kotul in three columns. His skirmishers drove back 
the forward stragglcrs, and then the main columns 
advancing a t  the double swept the disordered masscs 
before them, and forced them rearward into their in- 
trenched position in front of thc I<arcz village. There 
thc resistance was half-hearted. After a brief artillery 
preparation the columns carried the position with a rush, 
and thc Kohistanees were routed with heavy loss. Meer 
Butcha and his Kohistances well beaten, Macpherson 
camped for the night near Karez. Baker had reaclicd 
his assigned position in the Maidan vallcy, and there 
seemed a fair prospect that the opcrntion against 
Mahomed Jan as  originally designed might be carried 
out notwithstanding the interruption to its prosecution 
which had been found necessary. For therc was good 
reason to  believe that the Afghan commander and his 
force, whose strength was estimated a t  about 5000 men, 
werc in the vicinity of Urgundeh, about midway betwcen 
Macpherson at Karez and Rakcr in the Maidan valley. 
If Mahomed Jan would be so con~plaisant as to remain 
where he was until h4acpherson could reach him, then 
Roberts' strategy would have a triumphant issue, and 
the Warclul; general and his followers might be relegated 
to the  category of negligable quantities. 
Ordcrs wcrc sent  to Macpherson to march as early as 
possible on the morning of thc I rth, follow up the enemy 
who had been observed retiring toward the west and 
south, and endeavour to drive them down toward General 
Ralcer. He  was furthcr informed that the cavalry and 
horse-artillery which he had left a t  Aushar would leave 
that village at nine A.M. under the command of Brigadier- 
General Massy, and would cross the Chardeh valley by 
the Urgundeh road, on which he was directed to join 
them on his march. The  specific instructions given to 
General Massy were as follows : ' T o  advance from Aushar 
by the road leading directly from the city of Cabul 
toward Urgunclell and Ghuznee ' (the main Ghuznee 
road), ' t o  proceed cautiously and quietly feeling for 
the enemy, to communicate with General Macpherson, 
and to act in conformity ~ i t h  that officer's movements, 
but on no account to commit himself to an  action until 
General Macpherson had engaged the enemy.' 
Macpherson marched a t  eight A.&I., moving in a south- 
westerly direction toward Urgundeh by a direct track in 
rear of the range of hills bounding the western edge of 
the Chardeh valley. T o  the point a t  which it was pro- 
bable that he and Massy should meet he had considerably 
further to travel than had the latter from t h c  Aushar 
camp, and Macpherson's force consisted of infantry while 
that of Massy was cavalry and horse-artillery. Massy left 
Aushar a t  nine A.M. in consideration of the shorter dis- 
tancc he had to  traverse, and he headed for Killa Kazee, 
a village near thc foothills of the western ridge about 
four miles from Aushar as the crow flies. We did not 
coinply with the letter of his instructions to follow the 
Ghuznee road because of the wide detour marching by it 
would have involved, but instead made his way straight 
across country. T h a t  he should have done this was un- 
fortunate, since the time he thus gained threw him forward 
into a position involving danger in advance of any possible 
co-operation on the part of Macpherson, who was still far 
away from the point of intended junction while Massy 
was comparatively near it. Massy's force consisted of 
two squadrons 9th Lancers and a troop of 14th Bengal 
Lancers, escorting four horse-artillery guns. Me had 
detached a troop of 9th Lancers to endcavour to open 
communication with Macpherson, in compliance with his 
instructions. As he approached Killa Kazee, Captain 
Gough commanding the troop of 9th Lancers forming 
the advance guard, sent back word that the hills on 
either side of the Ghuznee road some distance beyond 
the village were occupied by the enemy in considerable 
force. Massy, in his unsupported condition and destitute 
of any information as to Macpherson's whereabouts, would 
have shown discretion by halting on receipt of this intel- 
ligence pending further devclopmcnts. But he probably 
believed that the Afghans flanking the road were casual 
tribesmen from the adjacent villages who were unlikely 
to make any stand, and he determined to move on. 
What  he presently saw gavc him pause. A great 
mass of Afghans some zoo0 strong were forming across 
thc Ghuznee road. From the hills to right and left 
broad streams of armed men were pouring down the hill- 
slopes and forming on the plain. The surprise was 
complete, the situation full of perplexity. That  gather- 
ing host in Massy's front could be none other than 
Mahomed Jan's entire force. So  far from being in re- 
treat soutliward and westward, so far from waiting 
supinely about Urgundeh until Macpherson as per pro- 
gramme should drive it on to thc muzzles of Baker's 
Martinis, here it was inside our guard, in possession of 
the interior line, its front facing toward turbulent Cabul 
and depleted Sherpur, with no obstruction in its path 
save this handful of lancers and these four guns ! Massy's 
orders, it was true, were to act in conformity with Mac- 
pherson's movements, and on no account to commit him- 
self to an action until that officer had engaged the enemy. 
Yes, but could the framer of those orders have anticipated 
the possibility of such a position as that in which Massy 
now found himself? There was no Macpherson within ken 
of the perpkxed cavalryman, nor the vaguest indication of 
his movements. The  enemy had doubled on that stout 
and shrewd soldier ; it was clear that for the moment he 
was not within striking distance of his foe, whether on 
flank or on rear. No course of action presented itself to 
Massy that was not fraught with grave contingencies. 
If he should keep to the letter of his orders, the Afghan 
host might be in Cabul in a couple of hours. Should he 
retire slowly, striving to retard the Afghan advance by 
his cannon fire and by the threatening demonstrations of 
his cavalry, the enemy might follow him up so vigor- 
ously as t o  be beyond Macpherson's reach when that 
oficer should make good his point in the direction of 
Urgundeh. If on the other hand he should show a bolcl 
front, and departing from his orders in the urgent crisis 
face to face with which hc found himself should strain 
every nerve to 'hold ' the Afghan masses in their present 
position, there was the possibility that, at  whatever sacri- 
fice to himself and his little force, he might save the 
situation and gain time for Macpherson to come up and 
strike Mahomed Jan on flank and in rear. 
F o r  better or for worse Massy committed himself to 
the rasher enterprise, and opened fire on the swiftly 
growing Afghan masses. The first range was held 
not sufficiently effective, and in the hope by closer fire 
of deterring the enemy from effecting the formation 
they were attempting, the guns were advanced to the 
shorter ranges of 2500 and zoo0 yards. The shells did 
csecution, but contrary to  precedent clid not daunt the 
Afghans. They made good their formation under the 
shell fire. Mahomed Jan's force had been estimated of 
about 5000 strong; according to Massy's estimate it 
proved to be double that number. The array was well 
led ; it never wavered, but came steadily on with waving 
banners and loud shouts. Thc guns had to be retired ; 
tllcy came into action again, but owing to the rapidity of 
thc Afghan advance at shorter range than before. The 
carbine fire of thirty clismounted lancers 'had no appreci- 
able effect.' The outlook was already ominous when at 
this moment Sir Frederick Roberts came on the scene. 
As was his wont, he acted with decision. The action, it 
was clear to him, could not be maintained against odds 
so overwhelming and in ground so unfavourable. H e  
immediately ordered Massy to retire slo\vly, to search for 
a ' road  by which the guns could be withdrawn, and to 
watch for an opportunity to execute a charge under cover 
of which the guns might be extricated. I-Ie despatched 
an aide-de-camp in quest of Macpherson, with an order 
directing that officer to wheel to his left into the Chardeh 
valley and hurry to Massy's assistance ; and he ordered 
General Hills to gallop to Sherpur and warn General 
I-Iugh Gough, who had charge in the cantonment, to be 
on the alcrt, and also to send out at  spced a wing of the 
72d to the villagc of Dell Mazung, in the throat of 
thc gorge of the Cabul river, which the I-Iighlanders were 
to hold to extremity. 
Thc enemy mcre coming on, the guns were in immi- 
nent dangei; ancl the moment had come for the action of 
thc cavalry. The gallant Cleland gave the word to his 
lancers and led them straight for the centre of the Afghan 
line, the troop of Bengal Lancers following in support. 
Gough, away on the Afghan left, saw his chief charging 
ancl hc eagerly 'conformed,' crushing in on the cnemy's 
flank at thc head of his troop. ' Self-sacrifice ' the 
Germans hold the duty of cavalry; and there have been 
few forlorner hopes than the errand on which on this ill- 
starred day our zoo troopers rode into the heart of 
10,000 Afghans flushed with unwonted good fortune. 
Through the dust-cloud of the charge werc visible the 
flashes of the Afghan vollcys and the sheen of the British 
lance heads as they came clo\vn to the 'engage.' There 
was a short intesval of suspense, the stour and bicker of 
the nttlke faintly heard, but invisible bchind the bank of 
smolte and dust. Then from out the cloud of battle 
riderless horscs came galloping back, followed by 
brolten groups of troopcrs. Gallantly lcd home, the 
charge had failed-what other result could have been 
cxpccted ? Its career had becn blocked by sheer weight 
of opposing numbers. Sisteen troopers had been Itillecl, 
seven were wounded, two officers hacl been slain in the 
hand-to-hand strife. Cleland came out with a sword cut 
and a bullet wound. Captain Stewart Macltenzie had 
been crushed undcr his fallen horsc, but distinguishecl 
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himself greatly, and brought the regiment out of action. 
As the-dust settled it was apparent that the charge had 
merely encouraged the enemy, who as they steadily 
presscd on in good order, were waving their banners in 
triumph and brandishing their tulwars and knives. The 
fire from the Sniders and Enfields of their marksmen was 
well directed and deliberate. While Cleland's broken 
troopers mere being rallied two guns were brought into 
action, protccted in a measure by Gough's troop and the 
detachment of Bengal Lancers, which had not suffered 
much in the charge. But the Afghans came on so 
ardently that  there was no alternative but prompt retreat. 
One gun had to be spiked and abandoned, Lieutenant 
Hardy  of the  Horse-Artillery remaining by it until sur- 
rounded and killed. Some 500 yards further back, near 
the village of Baghwana, the three remaining guns stuck 
fast in a deep watercourse. At General Roberts' instance 
a second charge was attempted, to give time for their 
extrication ; but it made no head, so that thc guns had 
to be abandoned, and the gunners and drivers with their 
tcalns accompanied the retirement of the cavalry. Some 
fugitives both of cavalry and artillery hurried to the 
shelter of the  cantonlncnt somewhat precipitately; but 
the grcat majority of Massy's people behaved well, rally- 
ing without hesitation and constituting the steady and 
soldierly little body with which Roberts, retiring on Deh 
Mazung as slowly as possible to give time for the 
Highlanders from Shcrpur to reach that all-important 
point, strove to  delay the Afghan advance. This in 
a measure was accomplished by the dismounted fire of 
the troopers, and the retirement was distinguished by the 
steady coolness displayed by Gough's men and Neville's 
Bcngal Lancers. Deh Mazung was reached, but no 
Highlanders had as yet reached that place. The 
carbines of the cavalrymen were promptly utilised fi-om 
the cover the village afforded ; but they could not have 
availed to stay the Afghan rush. There was a short 
interval of extreme anxiety until the 200 incn of the 
72d, Bro~vnlo\v leading them, became visible advancing 
at  the double through the gorge. ' I t  was litcrally touch 
and go who should reach the village first, the I-Iighlandcrs 
or the Afgl~ans,' who were streaming toward i t  ' liltc ants 
on a hill,' but the men of the 72d swept in, and swarming 
to the house tops soon checl<ecl with thcir breechloaders 
the advancing tide. After half-an-hour of futile effort 
the Afghans saw fit to  abandon the attempt to force the 
gorge, and inclining to their right they occupicd the 
Taliht-i-Shah summit, the slopes of the Sher Derwaza 
heights, and the villages in the south-eastern section of 
the Chardeh valley. 
Macpherson, marching from the Surlih Kotul toward 
Urgundeh, had observed parties of Afghans crossing his 
front in the direction of the Chardeh valley, and when 
the sound reached him of Massy's artillcry fire he  
wheeled to his left through a break in the hills opening 
into the Cliardeh valley, and approached the scene of the 
discomfiturc of Massy's force. This he did a t  12.30 P.M., 
four and a half hours after leaving the Surkh Kotul. As  
the length of his march was about ten miles, it may be 
assumed that hc encountered difficulties in the rugged 
track by which h e  moved, for Macpherson was not the 
man to linger by the way when there was the prospect of 
a fight. H a d  it becn possible for him to havc marched 
two hours earlier than h e  did-and his orders were to 
march as early as possible-his doing so would have madc 
all t h e  cliKerence in the world to Massy, and could 
scarcely havc failed to change the face of the day. H'c 
did not discover t he  lost guns, but he struck the Afghan 
rear, which was speedily brolten and dispcrscd by the 
67th and gd Sikhs. Macpherson's intention to spend the 
night a t  Icilla Kazee was changed by the reccipt of an 
order from Gencral Roberts calling him in to Dch 
Mazung, where he arrived about nightfall. Sir Frederick 
Roberts then returned t o  Sherpur, for thc defence of 
which General Iiug11 Gough had maclc thc best disposi- 
tions in his power, and thc  slendcr garrison of which was 
to receive in thc course of thc night an invaluable acces- 
sion in the shapc of the Guides, goo strong, whom 
Jenkins had brought u p  by forced marches from Jug- 
dulluk. 
T h e  misfortunes of the  clay were in a measure retrieved 
by a well-timed, ready-wittccl, and gallant action on the 
part of that brilliant and lamented soldier Colonel Mac- 
gregor. A wing of the 72d had been called out to hold 
the gorge of the Cabul rivcr, but thc Nanuchcc Pass, 
through which led the direct road from the scene of the 
combat to Sherpur, remained open ; and there was a time 
when the Afghan army was heading in  its direction. 
Macgregor had hurried t o  the open pass in timc to rally 
about him a number of Massy's people, who had lost their 
officers and were malting their way confi~sedly tou,arcI 
the r c f ~ ~ g e  of Sherpur. Remaining in possession of this 
important point until all danger was over, he noticed that 
the ground about Bagwana, wherc the guns had been 
abandoned, was not held by the enemy, and there seemed 
to him that the opportunity to recover them presented 
itself. Taking with hirn a detachment of lancers and 
artillcrymen, he rode out and met with no molestation 
beyond a few shots from villagers. From Macpherson's 
baggage guard, mct as it crossed tllc valley toward 
Sherpur, he requisitionecl sixty infantrymen who entered 
and held nagwana, and covered him and the gunners 
during the long and arduous struggle to extricate the 
guns from their lair in the deep and rugged watcrcoursc. 
This was at length accomplished, scratch teams were im- 
provised, and thc guns, which were uninjured although 
the ammunition boxes had been cmptied, were brought 
into the cantonment to the general joy. 
The result of the day's operations left General Balter 
momentarily belated. 13ut on the morning of thc I 1t1-1 
that officer, finding that no Afghans wcre being driven 
down upon him i n  accordance with the programmc, 
quitted the Maidan country and rnarchcd nortlnvarcl 
toward Urgundch. A11 attack on his baggage and rear- 
guard was foiled ; but as he reached his camping ground 
for the night at  Urgundeh the Afghans were found in  
possession of the gorge opening into the Chardeh valley, 
through which ran his road Lo Cabul. They were dis- 
lodged by a dashing attack of part of the 92cl Highlanders 
led by Lieutcnant Scott Napier. I t  was not until the 
morning of the 12th that Balter was informed by hclio- 
graph from Shcrpur of the occurrences of the previous 
day, and received directions to return to the cantonment 
without delay. In thc course of a few hours hc was insidc 
Sherpur, notwithstanding that his march had becn con- 
stantly molested by attaclcs on his rear-guard. 
T h e  casualties of the I rth had been after all not very 
serious. All told they amounted to  thirty men lcilled and 
forty-four wounded ; fifty-one horses lcilled and sixteen 
wounclcd. But the Afghans were naturally elated by thc 
success they had unqucstionably achieved ; the national 
rising had been inaugurated by a distinct triumph, the 
news of which would bring into thc field incalculablc 
swarms of fierce and fanatical partisans. I t  was clear 
that Mahomed Jan had a quick eye for opportunities, and 
some skill in handling men. That he could recognise the 
keypoint of a position and act boldly and promptly on 
that recognition, his tactics of the I 1t11 made abundantly 
obvious, and his coimnanding position on thc morning of 
the 12th still further demonstrated his tactical ability. 
L'auu'ace, etrcore I'mu'nce, e l  lotljows I'uudrrcc is the game 
to be played by the commander of disciplined troops 
against Asiatic levies, and no man was more sensible of 
this than the gallant soldier who now from the bastion 
of Sherpur could see the Afghan standards waving on the 
summit of the Talcht-i-Shah. Indeed he was i~npressed 
so thoroughly by the force of the maxim as to allow him- 
self to hope that some 560 soldiers, of whom about onc- 
third were Europeans, backed by a couple of mountain guns, 
would bc able to carry by assault the lofty peal;, strongly 
held by  resolute Afghans in protected positions, supported 
by several thousands of thcir fcllows lying out of sight until 
an attack should devclop itself, to  meet which they were 
a t  hand to reinforce the garrison of the Takht-i-Shah. 
From thc gorge of the Cabul river there runs due south 
to  near Charasiah a lofty and rugged range, the highest 
point of which, the Takht-i-Shah, is about midway from 
either extremity. From this main ridge there project 
eastward at right angles two lateral spurs. The shorter 
ancl more northerly of those runs down to the Balla 
Hissar, the longer and more southerly obtruding itself 
into the plain as far as the village of Beni Hissar. This 
latter spur quits the main ridge no great distance south 
of the Takht-i-Shah peak, and on the 12th the Afghan 
reserves were nlasscd in rear of the peal;, both on the 
main ridge and on this spur. The steep faces of the 
mountain were strewn with great smooth boulders ancl 
jagged masses of roclc ; the ascent, everynrherc laborious, 
was complicated in places by sheer scarps, and those 
formidable impediments were made still more difficult by 
frequent sungahs, strong stone curtains behind which the 
defenders lay safe or fired with a minimum of esposure. 
On the summit was a great natural cavity which had 
been made bomb proof by art, and f~~r the r  cover was 
afforded by caves and lines of roclc. The most northerly 
portion of the ridge described is known as the Sher 
Derwaza heights, which Macpherson had occupied on 
the morning of the rzth, ancl his brigade it was which 
furnished the little force already mentioned as charged 
to attempt the task of storming the Talcht-i-Shah. 
For  several hours Morgan's two mountain guns in- 
dustriously shelled that peak, and then the infantry made 
their effort. The  Afgllans fought stubbornly in defence 
of a lower hill thcy held in advance of the Takht-i-Shah, 
but after a hard struggle they had to abandon it to 
Macpherson's resolute men. But the esertions of thc 
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latter t o  ascend the peak were baulkcd by its rugged 
steepness and the fire of the Afghans holding the sungahs 
on its face. Sir Frederick Roberts had to recognise that 
the direct attack by  so  weak a force unaided by a diver- 
sion, could not succeed, and hc ordered further efforts to 
be deferred. Thc  casualties of the abortive attempt in- 
cluded three officers, onc of whom, Major Cook, V.C. 
of the Goorkhas, than whom the British army contained 
no better solclier, died of his wound. Nlacpherson was 
directed to hold t he  ground he had won, including the 
lower advanced hill, and was informed that on the follow- 
ing morning he was to expect the co-operation of General 
Baker from the  direction of Beni I-Iissar. 
T h e  lesson of the result of attempting impossibilities 
had been talcen to heart, and the force which Baker led 
out on thc morning of the 13th was exceptionally strong, 
consisting as it clicl of the gzd I-Iighlanders and Guides 
infantry, a wing of the 3cl Sikhs, a cavalry regiment, and 
eight 'guns. Marching in the direction of the lateral spur 
extending from the main ridge eastward to Beni Ilissar, 
Baker observed that  large masses of the enemy were 
quitting the plain villages about Ueni Hissar in which 
they had  taken shelter for the night, and were hurrying 
to  gain the summit of the spur which constituted the 
defensive position of the Afghan reserve. Baker's cot@ 
d'ct.2 was quick and true, By gaining the centre of the 
spur h e  would cut in two the Afghan line along its 
summit, and so isolate and neutralise the section of it 
from the centre t o  the Beni Ilissar extremity, toward 
which section the reinforcements from the plain villages 
were climbing. But to accomplish this shrewd stroke it 
was necessary that he should act with promptitiide and 
energy. His guns opcncd fire on the summit. Tlic 
Sikhs, extended athwart the plain, protected his right 
flank. His cavalry on the left cut into the bodies of 
Afghans hurrying to  ascend the eastern extremity of the 
spur. With noble emulation the I-Iighlanders and the 
Guides sprang 11p the rugged slope, their faces set towarcls 
the centre of the summit line. Major White, who alrcady 
had earned many laurels in thc campaign, led on his 
I-Iighlanclers ; the Gtiidcs, burning to Inale the most of 
their first opportunity to distinguish themselves, followed 
eagerly the gallant chief who had so often led them to 
victory on other fields. Licutenant Forbes, a young 
officer of the 92d heading the advancc of his regiment, 
reached the summit accompanied only by his colour- 
sergeant. A band of ghazees rushed on the pair and 
thc sergeant fell. As Forbes stood covcring his body 
he was overpo\verecl and slain. The  sudden catastrophe 
staggered for a moment the soldiers following their officel; 
but Lieutenant Dick Cunyngharn rallied them imine- 
cliately and led them forward at speed. For his conduct 
on this occasion Cunyngham received the Victoria Cross. 
With rolling volleys Highlanders and Guides reachccl 
and won the summit. T h e  Afghans momentarily clung 
to the position, but the British fire swept them away and 
the bayonets clisposecl of the ghazees, who fought and 
died in defence of their standards. Thc scverance of the 
Afghan line was complete. A detachment was left to  
maintain the isolation of some 2000 of the enemy who 
had been cut off; and then swinging to their right. 
Baker's regiments swept along the summit of the spur 
to\v,lrcI the main ridgc and thc Taltht-i-Shah, thc High- 
landers leading. As they advanced they rolled up the 
Afghan linc and a panic set in among the enemy, who 
sought safety in flight. Assailed from both sides, for 
Macpherson's men from the conical hill were passing up 
the north sidc of thc peak, and shaken by the steady fire 
of the mountain guns, the garrison of the Takht-i-Shah 
evacuated the position. Balier's soldiers toiled vigorously 
upward toward the peak, lieen for the honour of winning 
i t ;  but the credit of that achievement justly fell to their 
co~nrades of Macpherson's command, \\rho had striven so 
valiantly to carn it the day before, and who had gained 
possession of the pcalc and the Afghan standards flying 
o n  its summit, a few minules before the arrival of White's 
Mighlanclers and Jenlcins' Guides. As the midclay gun 
was fired in  the canton~ncnt thc flash of the heliograph 
from the peak told that the Taliht-i-Shah was won. 
While I3alier was sweeping thc spur and climbing the 
lofty peak of the main ridge, his reserve, which remained 
in the plain, was in sharp action against masses of assail- 
ants from the city and otl~cr bodics from the villages 
about Beni Hissar. Those were beaten off by the 3cl 
Sikhs and Uakcr's flanks were thus cleared, but the 
rcsolute Afghans, bent on interfering with his return 
march, surged away in thc direction of thc Siah Sung 
ridge and gatliered thereon in considerable s tre~~gtl l .  
T h e  guns of Sherpur shellecl them smartly, but they held 
their ground ; and Massy went out to disperse thcm \\rith 
the cavalry. The Afghans showed unwonted resolution, 
confronting the cavalry with cstraordinary steadiness in 
cegulnr formation and withholding their firc ulltil the 
troopers wcrc close upon them. But the horseinen were 
not to be denied. Captains Butson and Chisholme led 
their squadrons against the Afghan fianlts, and the 
troopers of the 9th avenged the mishap which had be- 
fallen that gallant regiment two days before, riding 
through and through the hostile masses and scattcring 
them over the plain, Rut in the charge Butson was killed, 
Chisholme and Trower were mounded; the sergeant- 
major and three men were Idled and seven were wounded. 
Brilliant charges were delivered by the  other cavalry 
detachments, ancl the Siali Sung heights werc ultimately 
cleared. The Guides' cavalry attacked, defeated, and 
pursued for a long distance a body of Kohistanees march- 
ing from the north-east apparently with intent to join 
Maliomed Jan. T h e  casualties of the day were sixteen 
lcilled and forty-five wounded ; not a heavy loss con- 
sidering the amount of hard fighting. The  Afghans 
were estimated to have lost in killed alone from 200 to 
300 men. 
The operations of the clay werc unquestionably suc- 
cessful so far as thcy went, but the actual rcsults attaincd 
scarcely warrantecl the anticipation that  the Afghans 
would acltnowledge themselves defcatecl by breaking up 
their combination ancl dispersing to their homes. I t  was 
true that they had been defeated, but they had fought 
with unprecedentecl stubbornness and gave little evidence 
of being cowed. Throughout the day the villages around 
Cabul had evinced a rancorous hostility which had a 
marlced significance. Not less significant was the parti- 
cipation in the fighting of the day o n  thc part of thc 
population of Cabul. As Raker was returning to Sherpur 
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in the  evening he had been fircd upon from the Balla 
Hissar, and his flanking parties had found ambushes of 
armed Afghans among the willows between the city and 
the cantonrncnt. But for the sltill and couragc of the 
non-commissioned officer in charge a convoy of wouncled 
on its way to Sherpur would certainly havc been 
destroyed. But there was a stronger argument than any 
of those indications, significant as they werc of thc un- 
broken spirit of the Afghans, telling against the pro- 
bability that the operations of the day would havc the 
cffect of putting down the  national rising. Thc hordes 
which had gathcred to the banners of the Mushk-i-Alum 
and Mahorned Jan cornbincd with thc fanaticism of thc 
jthnd a fine secular greed for plundcr. Was it likely that 
they would scatter resignedly, leaving untouched the rich 
booty of the city that had been almost within arm's- 
length as they looked down on it from the peak of the 
Taliht-i-Shah, and whose minarets thcy werc within 
sight of on thc spur and in the villages of Bcni-Hissar? 
W a s  that ever likely? And was it not made more and 
yet  morc unlikely when on the afternoon of the 13th 
Macphcrson, acting on orders, moved his camp to the 
Balla Hissar heights, evacuating Deh Mazung and leaving 
open to  the enciny thc road into the city through the 
Cahul 'gorge? The following morning \VRS to sho\v how 
promptly and how frcely the Afghans had taken advanl- 
age of the access to the capital thus afforded them. I t  
must never be forgottcn that a t  this time our people in 
Afghanistan held no n o r e  territory than thc actual 
ground thcy stood upon and the terrain swept by their 
firc. No trustwortl~y intelligence from outside that region 
was procurable; and of this thcrc can bc no clearcr 
cvidence than that thc General was under the belief that 
the enemy had bcen ' foiled in their western and southern 
operations.' 
The  morning of the 14th effectually dispelled the 
optimistic anticipations indulged in overnight. A t  day- 
break a large body of Afghans, with many standards, 
were discerned on a hill about a mile northward of the 
Asmai ridge, from which and from the Kohistan road 
they were moving on to the crest of that ridge. They 
were joincd there by sevcral thousa~~cls coming up  the 
slopes from out thc village of Deh Afghan, the northern 
suburb of Cabul. It  was estimated that there were about 
Sooo men in position along the summit of thc ridge, and 
occupying also a low conical hill beyond its north-western 
termination. Thc  array of Afghans displayed itself 
within a mile of the west facc of thc Shcrpur canton- 
ment, ancl formed a menace which could not be broolcccl. 
To Gcncral Baker was entrusted thc task of dislodging 
the enemy from the threatening position, ancl the1 c was 
assigned to  him for this purpose a force consisting of 
about 1200 bayonets, eight guns, and a regiment of native 
cavalry. His first object was to  gain possession of the 
conical hill alrcady rnentioncd, and thus debar th6 Afghan 
force on thc Asmai heights from receiving accessions 
cither from the masses on the hill further north or by 
thc Kohistan road. Undcr cover of the artillery fire the 
Highlanders and Guides occupied this conical hill aftcr a 
short conflict. A detachment was left to hold it and then 
Colonel Jcnkins, who commanclecl the attack, set about 
the arduous task of storming from thc northmarcl the 
formidable position of the Asmai heights. The assault 
was led by Brownlow's staunch Highlanders, supported 
011 the right by the Guidcs operating on the enemy's 
flank ; and the fifghan position was heavily shclled by 
four of Baker's guns, and by four more in action ncar 
thc south-western corncr of the Sherpur cantonment. 
Macphcrson from his position on thc 13alla I-Iissar 
hill aidcd the attack by the fire of his guns, and 
also by despatching two companies of the 67th to 
cross the Cabul gorge and opcrate against thc cncmy's 
lcft rcar. 
I n  the face of a hcavy firc thc I-Iighlanders and Guides 
climbed with great speed and steadiness thc ruggcd hill- 
side leading upward to the Afghan breastwork on the 
northcrn cdgc of the summit. Their approach and the 
crushing shrapncl fire from thc guns near Shcrpur had 
caused nun~erous Afghans to mow donrnward from thc 
position toward Dell Afghan, hcavily smitten as thcy 
went ; but the ghazees in the breastworlcs made a strcnu- 
ous resistance and died under thcir banncrs as the 
Highlanders carried the defences with a rush. The  crest, 
about a quarter of a mile long, was travcrscd under heavy 
fire and the southern breastwork on the peak was ap- 
proached. I t  was strong and strongly held, but a cross 
fire was brought to bear on its garrison, and then the 
frontal attack led by a lance-corporal of the 72d was 
delivcrcd. After a hand-to-hand grapplc in ~vhich 
Highlanders and Guides were freely cut and slashed by 
the knives of the ghazccs, the position, which mas found 
full of dead, was carricd, but  with considcrable loss. Thc 
whole summit of thc Asmai heights was now in Britisli 
possession, and everything seemcd auspicious. The 
Afghans streaming clown from the heights toward the 
city werc being lacerated by shell fire and musketry firc 
as thcy descended. When they took refuge in Deh 
Afghan that suburb was heavily shelled, and it was 
gradually evacuated. 
Scarcely had Jenkins won the summit of the Asmai 
ridge when the fortunc of the day was suddenly over- 
cast ; indeed while he was still engagcd in the attain- 
ment of that object premonitory indications of serious 
mischief were unexpectedly prcsenting themselves. A 
vast host of Afghans described as numbering from 
15,m to 20,000, debouchcd into thc Chardeh valley 
from the direction of Indilee, and were moving north- 
wards, apparently with the object of forming a junction 
with the masscs occupying thc hills to the north-west of 
the Asmai heights. About the samc time cavalry scout- 
ing in the Chardeh vallcy brought in the information that 
large parties of hostile infantry and cavalry werc hurrying 
across the vallcy in thc direction of thc conical hi11 the 
defencc of which had been entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Clark with I 20 I-Iighlandcrs and Guidcs. Kccognising 
Clark's wealmess, General Baler  had judiciously reinforced 
that officer with four mountain guns and roo bayonets. 
 TI,^ guns opcned fire on the Afghan boclies marching 
from the IWla Kazee direction, and drovc thcm out of 
range. But they coalesced with the host advancing froin 
Indiltee, and the vast mass of Afghans, facing to thc 
right, struck the whole range of the British position from 
near the Cabul gorge on the south to and beyond the 
conical hill on thc north. The  most vulnerable point was 
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the section a t  and about that  eminence, and thc necessity 
for supplying Clark with further reinforcements became 
urgentlymanifest. Baker sent  up a second dctachment, and 
200 Sikhs came out from Sherpur at the double. Rut the 
Afghans, crceping stealthily in great numbers up the slope 
from out the Chardeh valley, had the shorter distance to 
travel, ancl were beforehand with the reinforcements. 
Their tactics werc on a par  with their resolution. The 
left of their attack grasped and held a I<noll north of the 
conical hill, and from this position of vantage brought a 
cross fire to bear on  Clark's detachment. As their direct 
attaclc developed itself i t  cncountercd from the conical 
hill a heavy rifle fire, ancl shells at  short range tore 
through the loosc rush of ghazces, but thc fanatics spcd 
on and  up without wavering. As  they gathered behind a 
mound for the final onslaught, Captain Spens of the 72d 
with a handful of his Highlanders went out on the forlorn 
hope of dislodging them. A rush was madc on him ; he 
was overpowerecl and slaughtered after a desperate resist- 
ance, and the  Afghan charge swept up the hill-side. In 
momentary panic the dcfenders gave ground, carrying 
do~vr~hi l l  with thcm the reinforcement of Punjaubccs 
which Captain I la l l  was bringing up. Two of the 
mountain guns were lost, but  there was a rally at the foot 
of the  h i l l  undcr cover of which thc other two n7crc ex- 
tricated. T h c  Afghans refrained from descending into 
the plain, and directed their cfforts toward cutting off the 
occupants of the position on the Asmai summit. They 
ascended by two distinct directions. One body from 
the conical hill followcd the  route takcn by Jcnkins in the 
morning; another scaled a spur trending clowt~~va~-d to 
the Chardeh valley from the southern estrcmity of the 
Asmai ridge. 
I t  was estimatcd that the Afghan strength disclosed 
this day did not fall short of 40,000 men ; and General 
Roberts was reluctantly compelled to abandon for the 
time any further offensive efforts. His  reasons, stated 
with perfect frankness, may best be given i n  his own 
words. ' U p  to this time,' he wrote, ' I had no reason to 
apprehend that the Afghans were in sufficient force to 
cope successfully with disciplined troops, but the resolute 
and determined rnanncr in which the conical hill had 
bccn recaptured, and thc information sent to  me by 
Brigadier-General Macpherson that large masses of the 
enemy were still advancing from the north, south, and 
west, made i t  evident that the numbers combined against 
us were too overwhelming to admit of my comparatively 
small force meeting thcm. I therefore determined to 
withdraw from all isolatcd positions, and to concentrate 
the whole force at Sherpur, thus securing thc safety of 
our large cantonment, and avoiding what had now bc- 
come a useless sacrifice of life.' The orders issued to 
Generals Balm- and Macphcrson to retirc into the can- 
tonment were eexecutcd with skill and steadiness. 
Jenkins' evacuation of thc Asmai position was conspicu- 
ously adroit. When thc order to quit reachcd that able 
officer, Major Stockwell of the 72d was out with R small 
dctachrnent, maintaining a hot fire on the Afghari boclics 
ascending by the southcrn spur from the Chardeh valley. 
I-Ie fell back with great deliberation, and whcn hc re- 
joined the retirement down thc hill face looking toward 
Sherpur mas leisurely procecdcd with, thc hostile advance 
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from the northern sidc being held in  check by thc fire of 
covering partics from Jenkins' left flank. Gcneral Mac- 
pherson's retirement mas rnastcrly. Flanlting his march 
through the Cabul gorgc with two cornpanics of the 67th 
who stallcd off a rush of ghazccs from thc Asmai crest, 
hc continued his march through thc suburb of Dell 
Afghan, his baggage in front undcr a strong guard. 
Some few shots were exchanged before thc suburb was 
cleared, but the casualtics werc few and presently thc 
brigade cntercd thc cantonment. General Baker con- 
tinued to hold a covcring position with part of his force, 
until the troops from thc heights and Macpherson's com- 
mand had rnadc good their retiremcnt, and he was thc 
last t o  withdraw. By duslc the wholc forcc was safely 
concentrated within the cantonment, and thc period of 
the defensive had begun. The casualtics of thc day werc 
serious ; thil-ty-five Icilled, and 107 woundcd. T h i n g  
the week of fighting the little forcc had lost somewhat 
hcavily ; thc killed numbered eighty-three, the wounded 
192. Eight officers were killed, twelve wcre wounded. 
C H A P T E R  V 
ON THE DEFENSIVE IN SIIERPUR 
ALTI-IOUGII overlarge for its garrison, thc Sherpur can- 
tonment had many of the fcaturcs of a strong cleknsive 
position. On the southern and western faccs thc massive 
and continuous cncientc rnadc it impregnable against any 
force unprovided with siege artillery. But on thc eastern 
face the wall had been built to the elevation only of sevcn 
feet, and at eithcr end or the Behmaroo heights, which 
constituted the northern line of defence, there were open 
gaps which had to be rnadc good. Thc space between 
thc north.western bastion and the heights was closed by 
an entrenchment supported by a ' laager ' of Afghan gun- 
carriages and limbers, thc ground in front strengthened 
by abattis and wirc entanglements, beyond which a 
village flanking the northern ancl western faces was 
occupied as a dctached post. The open space on the 
north-eastern angle was similarly fortified ; the villagc of 
Rchmaroo was loopholec1, ancl outlying buildings to the 
front were placed in a state of dcfcnce. The unfinishccl 
eastern wall was heightcncd by logs built up in ticrs, and 
its front was covered with abattis, a tower and garden 
outside bcing occupied by a dctachmcnt. A series of 
block houses had been built along the crcst of the 
Bchmaroo heights supporting a continuous entrenchment, 
gun emplacements made in the linc of clefencc, ancl thc 
gorge clividing the heights strongly fortificd against an 
attack from the northcrn plain. The enciente was 
clividecl into sections to each of which was assignecl a 
commanding officcr with a specified detail of troops ; and 
a strong reserve of Europcan infantry was uncler the 
command of Brigadier-Gcncral Balm-, ready a t  short 
notice to reinforce any threatened point. It  was presum- 
ably owing to the absorption of the troops in fighting, 
collecting supplies, and providing winter shelter, that 
when the concentration within Shcrpur bccamc suddenly 
necessary the clefenccs of the position were still seriously 
dcfective; and throughout thc period of investment the 
force was unrcrnittingly engagccl in the task of strengthen- 
ing them. Nor had thc military precaution becn taken of 
razing the villages and enclosures within the fire zone of 
the enciente, and they remained to afford cover to the 
encnly during the period of investment. 
Before the enemy cut the telegraph wire in thc early 
morning of the 15th Sir Fredcricl< Roberts hacl informed 
the authorities in India of his situation and of his need for 
rcinforcements; and he had also ordcred up Gcneral 
Charles Gough's brigade without loss of time. Gough 
was already at Jugdulluk when he rcceived the order 
calling him to Cabul, but hc had to wait for reinforcements 
and supplies, and the tribesmen were threatening his 
position and the line of communication in rear of it. H e  
did not move forward until the ~ 1 s t .  On the following 
day he reached Luttabund, whence he took on with him 
the garrison of that post, but although his march was 
unmolested it was not until the 24th that 115 reached 
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Sherpur, a day too late to participate in repelling the 
assault on the cantonment. 
While General Roberts' force was busily engaged in 
making good the defences of Sherpur, the Afghans re- 
frained from attempting to back their success on the 
Asmai heights by an assault on the defensive position 
which seemed to invite an attack. During the first two 
days of their possession of the city they were enjoying the 
fruits of their occupation i n  thcir own turbulent manner. 
Roberts' spics reported thcm busily engaged in sacking 
the I-Iindoo and Kuzzilbash quarters, in looting and 
wrecking the houscs of chiefs and townsfolk who had 
shown friendliness to the British, and in quarrelling among 
themselves over the spoils. Requisitioning was in fill1 
force. Thc old Moulla Mushk-i-Alum was the temporary 
successor of General Hills in the office of Governor of 
Cabul; and spite of his ninety years he threw extra- 
ordinary energy into the work of arousing fanaticism and 
rallying to Cabul thc fighting men of the surrounding 
country. The  jtllnd of which he had been the chief 
instigator had certainly attained unexampled dimensions, 
and although it was not in the nature of things that 
every Afghan who carried arms should be inspired with 
religious fanaticism to such a pitch as to be utterly reck- 
less of his life, swarms of fierce ghazees made formidable 
the levies which Mahomed Jan  commanded. 
On the 17th and 18th the Afghans made ostentatious 
demonstrations against Sherpur, but those were never 
formidable, although they made themselves troublesome 
with some perseverance during thc daytime, consistently 
refraining from night attacks, which was remarkable 
since ordinarily they are much addicted to the chnflo. 
There never was any invcstrnent of Sherpur, or indeed 
any approximation to invcstrnent. Cavalry reconnais- 
sances constantly went out, and piquets and videttes 
were habitually on external du ty ;  infantry detachments 
sallied forth whenever occasion demanded to dislodge 
the assailants from points occupied by them in incon- 
venient proximity to the defences. The  Afghan offensivc 
was not dangerous, but annoying and wearying. It was 
indeed pushed with some rcsolution on the 18th) when 
several thousand men poured out of the city, and skir- 
mished forward under cover of the gardens and enclosures 
on the plain bctween Cabul and Sherpur, in the direction 
of thc southern front and the south-western bastions. 
The Afighans are admirable skirmishers, and from thcir 
close cover kept up for hours a brisk fire on the soldiers 
lining the Sherpur dcfcnces, but with singularly little 
cffcct. The  return rifle firc was for the most part 
restricted to volleys directed on those of the enemy who 
offered a sure mark by exposing themselves; and shell 
fire was chiefly used to drive the Afghan sliirmishers 
from their cover in the gardens and enclosures. Some of 
those, notwithstanding, were able to get within 400 yards 
of the enciente, but could make no furthcr headway. On 
the morning of the 19th it was found that in the night thc  
enemy had occupicd the Meer Alihor fort, a fcw hundred 
yards beyond the eastern face, and close to the Rcsidcncy 
compound of the old cantonments of 1839-42. T h e  firc 
from this fort was annoying, and General Baker went out  
on the errand of destroying it, with 800 bayonets, two 
mountain guns, and a party of sappers. As the fort was 
being approached through the dense mist a suddcn volley 
from it struck down several men, and Lieutenant Monte- 
naro of the mountain battery was mortally wounded. 
T h e  fort was heavily shclled from the south-eastcrn 
bastion ; its garrison evacuated it, and it was blown up. 
Mahomed Jan and his coadjutors could hardly flatter 
themselves that as yet thcy had made any imprcssion on 
the steadfast defcncc which the British forcc was main- 
taining in tlie Sherpur cantonment. The  Afg-llan lcader 
had tried force in vain ; lie knew thc history of that 
strange period in the winter of 1841 during which Afghan 
truculence and audacity had withcrcd the spirit of a 
British force not much less numerically strong than the 
little army now calmly withstanding him. Things had 
not gone very well with that little army of late, possibly 
its constancy might have been impaired, and its chief 
might be willing, as had been Elphinstonc and the Eltchi, 
to listen to  terms. Anyhow there could bc  no harm in 
malcilig a proffcr based on thc old lines. S o  thc Afghan 
leader proposed to Gencral Roberts, apparently in all 
seriousness, that  thc British army should forthwith 
evacuate Afghanistan, encountering no molestation in 
its march; that  the British General before departing 
should engage that Yakoub Khan slioukl return to 
Afghanistan as its Anlecr ; and that thcrc should bc left 
behind tkvo officers of distinction as  hostages for the 
faithful f~~lf i lment  of tlie contract. ' We have a lalth of 
men ; they are like wolves eager to rush on thcir prey! 
W e  cannot much longcr control thcm !'-such were said 
to have becn the terms of a message intended to disturb 
- the equanimity of thc British commandcr. Meer B u t c h  
R 
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and his Kohistanees, again, were not to all appearance 
anxious for [he restoration of Yakoub. They professed 
themselves content to accept our staunch friend Wali 
Mahomed as Amcer, if only the British army would 
be good enough to march home promptly and leave to 
Afghans thc administration of Afghan affairs. I t  was 
not likely that a man of Roberts' nature would demean 
himself to take any notice of such overtures. For  thc 
moment circumstances had enforced on him the wisdom 
of accepting the defcnsive attitude, but he knew himself, 
nevertheless, the virtual master of thc situation. I-Ie 
had but one serious anxiety-the apprehension lcst the 
Afghans should not harden their hearts to deliver an 
assault on his position. 
That  apprehension was not long to give him concern. 
On the zot11, as a menace against the southern face of 
Sherpul; the enemy took strong possession of the 
Mahomed Shereef fort, stormcd so gallantly by Colonel 
Grifliths on  6th Novembcr 1841 ; and thcy maintaincd 
thernselvcs thcre during the two following days in facc 
of the fire of siege guns mounted on the bastions of 
the enciente. On thc 21st and 22d large numbers of 
Afghans quitted the city, and passing eastward behind 
the Siah Sung heights, took possession in great force 
of the forts and villages outside the eastern face of 
Sherpur. On thc zzd a spy brought in the intelligence 
that Mahomed Jan and his brother-chiefs had resolvcd to 
assault the cantonment early on the following morning, 
and the spy was able to communicate thc plan of attack. 
The zoo0 men holding the King's Garden and thc 
Mahomccl Shereef fort had bccn cquippcd with scaling 
ladders, and were to malie a false attack which might 
become a real one, against the western section of the 
southern front. T h e  principal assault, however, was to  
be made against the eastern face of the Behmaroo village 
-unquestionably the weakest part of thc defensive posi- 
tion. The 23d was the last day of the Mohurrum-the 
great Mahomedan religious festival, when fanaticism 
woulcl be a t  its height ; and further to stimulate that  
incentive to valour, the Mushli-i-Alum would hirnsclf 
kindle the bcacon fire on the Asrnai height which 
was to be the signal to the faithful to rush to the 
assault. 
The  information provcd perfectly accurate. All night 
long the shouts and chants of the Afghans filled the air. 
Purposeful silence reigned throughout the cantonment. 
In the darkness the soldiers mustered and quictly fell 
into thcir places ; the oficcrs commanding sections of the 
defence made thcir dispositions ; the reserves were silently 
standing to their arms. Every eye mas toward the 
Asmai heights, shrouded still in the gloom of the night. 
A long tongue of flame shot up into the air, blazed 
brilliantly for a few moments, and then \vaned. At  thc 
signal a fierce fire opened from the broken ground before 
one of the gateways of the southern face, the flashcs 
indicating that the marl<smcn wcrc plying their rifles 
within 200 yards of the enciente. The bullets sped harm- 
lessly over the defenders sheltercd behind the parapet, 
and in the dusk of the dawn reprisals were not attempted. 
But this outburst of powder-burning against the southern 
race was a rnerc incident ; what mcn listened and watched 
for was the development of the true assault on the 
castern end of the great parallelogram. The scction corn- 
lnancIers there were General Hugh Gough in charge of 
tllc eastern end of thc Behmaroo heights, and Coloncl 
Jen1;ins from the village clown to the Native I-Iospital 
and beyond to thc bastion at the south-eastern corner. 
The troops cngaged were the Guicles from thc ridge clown 
to Behmaroo village and beyond to the Native I-Iospital, 
in which were 100 men of the 28th Punjaub Infantry, and 
bctwcen the Hospital and the corner bastion the 67tl1, 
rcinforcecl by two companies of 92d I-Iighlanders from 
thc reserve, which later sent to the clcfence of the eastern 
facc aclclitional contributions of rncn and guns. 'From 
beyond Behmaroo and the castern trenches and walls,' 
\\.rites Mr IIensman, ' came a roar of voices so loud and 
~ncnacing that it scemecl as if an army fifty thousand 
strong was charging clo\vn on our thin line of men. Lcd 
by thcir ghazccs, thc main body of Afghans hidden in t11c 
villages ant1 orchards on thc cast siclc of Sherpur had 
rushed out in one clcnse mob, and were filling the air wit11 
their shouts of " Allah-il-Allah." The roar surged for- 
ward as their linc advanced, but it was answered by such 
a roll of musketry that it was drowned for thc moment, 
and then merged into the general din which told us that 
our rncn with Martinis and Sniclers werc holding their 
own against thc attacking force.' Whcn the first attack 
thus graphically described was made the morning was 
still so dark and misty that the outlook from the trenchcs 
was restricted, and the order to the troops was to hold 
their fire till the assailants should bc distinctly visiblc. 
The detachment of the 28th opcned fire somcwhat prc- 
maturely, and prescntly thc Guides holding Behmaroo 
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and thc trenches on the slopes followed the example, and 
sweeping with their fire the terrain in front of then1 broke 
the force of the attack while its leaders were still several 
hrmdred yards away. Between the Hospital and the 
corner bastion the men of the 67th and 92d awaited wit11 
impassive discipline the word of permission to begin firing. 
From out the mist at length emerged dense masses of 
men, some of whom were brandishing swords and knives, 
while others loaded and fired while hurrying forward. The 
order to fire was not givcn until the leading ghazees wcre 
within eighty yards, and the mass of assailants not more 
distant than zoo yards. Heavily struck then by volley 
on volley, they recoiled but soon gathered courage to 
come on again ; and for several hours there was sharp 
fighting, repeated efforts being made to carry the low 
eastern wall. S o  resolute mere the Afghans that rnore 
than once they rcached the abattis, but each time were 
driven back with heavy loss. About- ten o'clock there 
was a lull and it: seemed that the attacking force was 
owning the frustration of its attempts, but an  hour later 
there mas a partial recrudescence of the fighting and the 
assailants once rnore came on. The attack, ho~vever, was 
not pushed with much vigour and was soon beaten down, 
but the Afghans still maintained a threatening attitude 
and the fire from the defenccs was ineffectual to dislodge 
them. The General resolved to take their positions in 
flank, and with this intent sent out into the open through 
the gorge in the Bellmaroo heights, four field guns 
escorted by a cavalry regiment. Rending to the right, 
the guns camc into action on the right flank of the 
Afghans, and the countcr-strole had immediate effect. 
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The enemy wavered and soon were in full retreat. The 
Kohistanee contingent, some 5000 strong, cut loose a n d  
marched away northward, with obvious recognition t h a t  
the game was up. The fugitives were scourged wi th  
artillery and rifle fire, and Massy led out the cavalry, 
swept thc plain, and drove the lingering Afghans f rom 
the slopes of Siah Sung. The false attack on t h e  
southern face from the King's Garden and the Mahomed 
Shereef fort never made any head. Those positions were  
steadily shelled until late in the afternoon, when t h e y  
were finally evacuated, and by nightfall all the villages 
and enclosures between Sherpur and Cabul were entirely 
deserted. Some of those had been destroyed by sappers 
from the garrison during the afternoon, in the course of 
which .operation two gallant engineer officers, Captain 
Dundas and Lieutenant Nugent, were unfortunately 
killed by the premature explosion of a mine. 
Mahomed Jan had becn as good as his word ; he h a d  
delivered his strolte against Sherpur, and that strolte h a d  
utterly failed. With its failure came promptly the col- 
lapse of the national rising. Bcfore daybreak of the 24th 
the formidable combination which had included all the 
fighting elements of North-Eastern Afghanistan, a n d  
under whose banners it was believed that more t h a n  
I O O , ~  armed men had mustered, was no more. Not 
only had it broken up ; it had disappeared. Neither i n  
the city, nor in the adjaccnt villages, nor on the surround- 
ing heights, mas a man to be scen. So hurried had been 
the Afghan dispersal that the dead lay unburied where 
they had fallen. His ninc days on the dcfcnsive h a d  
cost General Roberts singularly little in casualties; h i s  
losses were eighteen Idled and sixty-cight wounded. The 
cnerny's loss from first to last of the rising was reckoned 
to be not under 3000. 
On the 24th the cavalry rodc far and fast in pursuit of 
the fugitives, but they overtook none, such haste had the 
fleeing Afghans made. On the same day Cabul and the 
Balla Hissar were reoccupied, and General Hills resumed 
his functions as military governor of the city. Cabul had 
the aspect of having undcrgonc a sack at  the hands of 
the enemy ; the bazaars were broken up and dcserted and 
the Hindoo and Ihzzilbash quarters had been relentlessly 
wrecked. Sir Frederick Roberts lost no timc in dcspatch- 
ing a column to the Kohistan to punish Meer Butcha 
by destroying that chief's forts and villages, and to ascer- 
tain whether the tribesmen of the district had dispersed 
to their homes. This was found to be the case, and the 
column returned aftcr having been out five days. After 
making a few examples the General issued a proclamation 
of amnesty, excluding therefrom only five of the principal 
leaders and fomentors of the recent rising, and stipulating 
that thc tribesmen should send representatives to Sherpur 
to receive explanations regarding the dispositions con- 
templated for the government of thc country. This 
policy of conciliation bore good fruit ; and a durbar was 
held on January gth, 1880, at  which were present about 
200 sirdars, chiefs, and headmen from the Kohistan, 
Logur, and the Ghilzai country. Rewards were pre- 
sented to those chiefs who had remained friendly; the 
General receivcd thc salaams of the assembled sirclars 
and then addressed them in a firm but conciliatory 
speech. 
The country rclnained still in a disturbed state, but 
there was little likelihood of a second general rising. 
General Roberts was resolved, however, to be thoroughly 
preparcd to cope with that contingency should it occur. 
Sherpur was encircled by a military road, and all cover 
and obstructions for the space of 1000 yards outside 
the encicnte were swept away. Another road was con- 
structed from Behmaroo village to the Siah Sung hcights 
and yet another from the south-eastern gateway direct to 
the Balla Hissar, on both of which there were bridges 
across thc Cabul rivcr. Along the northern face of Cabul 
from Deh Afghan to the Balla Hissar, a road broad 
enough for guns was made, and another broad road cut 
through the lower Ralla Hissar. Anothcr military road 
was built through the Cabul gorge to the main Ghuznee 
and Bamian road in the Chardeh valley. Strong forts 
were built on the As~nai  and Sher Derwaza heights and on 
the spur above the Ralla Hissar, which, well garrisoned 
and supplicd adequately with provisions, water, and 
ammunition, would enable Cabul as well as Sherpur to be 
hcld. The  latter was greatly strengthened, the eastern 
point of the Rehmaroo heights being converted into some- 
thing like a regular fortress. Later, in March, when the 
Cabul force had increased to a strength of about I 1,500 
men and twenty-six guns, the command was formed into 
two divisions, of which thc first remained under the 
Lieutenant-General, the second bcing commanded by 
Major-General John Ross. The  line of comrnunications 
was in charge of Major-Gcneral Bright, and Brigadicr- 
General Hugh Gough was the cavalry commander in suc- 
cession to Brigadier-General Massy. On the zd of .Ifla!,, 
Sir Donald Stewart arriving a t  Cabul from Candahar, 
took over the chief command in North-Eastern Afghanistan 
from Sir Frederick Roberts. Sir Donald's march from 
Candahar, which was an eventful one, is dealt with in the 
next chapter. 
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WHILE Sir Frederick Roberts had been fighting hard in 
North-Eastern Afghanistan, Sir Donald Stewart had been 
experiencing comparative tranquillityin his Candahar com- 
mand. As soon as the news reached him of the destruc- 
tion of Cavagnari's mission he had promptly concentrated 
his troops, and so early as the third week of September 
(1879) he was in a position to carry out his orders to 
create a diversion in aid of Roberts' advance on Cabul by 
making a demonstration in the direction of Ghuznee and 
placing a garrison in Khelat-i-Ghilzai. NO subsequent 
movements of importance were undertaken in Southern 
Afghanistan during the winter, and the province en- 
joyed almost unbroken quietude. In Herat, however, 
disturbance was rife. Ayoub Khan, the brother of 
Yakoub Khan, had returned from exile and made good 
his footing in Herat, of which formerly he had been 
conjoint governor with Yakoub. In December he began 
a hostile advance on Candahar, but a conflict broke out 
between the Cabul and Herat troops under his command, 
and he abandoned for the time his projected expedition. 
In the end of March Sir Donald Stewart began the 
march towardcabul which orders from India had prescribed. 


He left behind him in  Candahar the Bombay division of 
his force under the  command of Major-General Primrose, 
whose line of communication with the Indus valley was to 
be kept open by Phayre's brigade, and took with him on 
the northward march the Bengal division, consisting of 
two infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade. The  first 
infantry brigade was commanded by Brigadier-Gencral 
Barter, thc second by Brigadier-General Hughes, and the 
cavalry brigade, which divisional hcadquartcrs accom- 
panied, by Brigadier-General Palliser. Khelat-i-Ghilzai 
was reached on 6th April ; the Bengal portion of its 
garrison joined the division and the advance was resumed 
on the following day. Until Shahjui, the limit of thc 
Candahar province, the march was uneventful ; but beyond 
that place extreme difficulties were experienced in pro- 
curing supplies, for the villages were found descrtecl and 
the inhabitants had carried off, destroyed, or l~idden their 
storcs of grain. The force was embarrassed by a horde 
of Ilazaras, who swarmed in wild irregularity on its 
flanl;s, plundering and burning with great vindictivc- 
ness, eagcr to w e a k  vengcance on their Afghan focs. 
And it had another although more distant companion- 
ship, in the shape of several thousand hostile tribesmen 
and ghazees, whose fanaticism their moullas had been 
assiduously inciting, and who marched day by day 
parallel with the British right flank along the foothills at 
a distance of about eight miles, Their attitude was 
threatening but it was not thought wise to  meddle with 
thcm, since their retrcat ovcr the hills could not well bc 
cut OH; and sincc the policy of non-interference would 
tend to encourage them to  venture on a battle. The 
soundness of this reasoning was soon to be made 
manifest. 
On the night of April 18th the division was cncamped 
a t  Mushaki, about thirty miles south of Ghuznee. The  
spies that cvening brought in the information that the 
enemy had resolved on fighting on the following morning, 
and that the position thcy intended to take up was the 
summit of a low spur of the Gul Kol1 mountain ridgc, 
bounding on thc [vest the valley followed by the road. 
This  spur was said to project in a north-easterly 
direction toward the Ghuznee river, gradually sinking into 
the plain. During a great part of its length it flanked 
and overhung the road, but near where it mcrgecl into the 
plain the road passed over it by a low saddle at a point 
about six miles beyond Mushaki. A t  dawn of the 19th 
the column moved off, Yalliser leading the advance, which 
Sir Donald Stewart accompanied, Hughes commanding 
the centre, Barter bringing up the rear and protecting the 
baggage. An hour later the encmy were visible in great 
strength about three miles in advance, presenting the 
aspect of a vast body formed up on the spur and on the 
saddle crossed by the road, and thus threatening Stewart 
a t  once in front and on both flanks. Thc British general 
a t  once made his dispositions. His guns were on the 
road in column of route. The  three infantry regiments 
of Hughes' brigade came up to the left of and in line 
with the leading battery, thc cavalry took ground on the 
plain on its right, and a reserve was formed consisting of 
an infantry regiment, two companies sappers and miners, 
and the General's escort of a troop and two companies. 
Orders were sent back to Barter to send forward without 
delay half the infantry of his brigade. In the formation 
clescribcd the force resumed its advance until within 
striking distance. Then the two batteries came into 
action on either side of the road ; thc horse-battery on 
the right, the flat ground to its right being covered by 
the zd Punjaub Cavalry; the field-battery on the left. 
Sir Donald Stewart's proper front thus consisted of thc 
field and horse-batteries with their supports, but since it 
was apparcnt that thc greatest strength of the enemy was 
on the higher ground Ranking his left, it behoved him to 
show a front in that direction also, and for this purpose he 
utilised Hughcs' three infantry regiments, of which the 
59th was on the right, the ad Sikhs in the centre, and 
the 3d Goorkhas on the left. Part of the reserve infantry 
was sent to make good the interval between the left of 
the artillery and the right of the infantry. 
The  guns had no sooner come into action than thc 
enemy in great inasses showed themselves on spur and 
saddle and plain, bent seemingly on an attempt to 
envelop the position hclcl by, the British. 'Suddenly,' 
writes Henstnen, 'a  commotion was observed in thc most 
advanced lines of the opposing army ; the rnoullas coulcl 
be secn haranguing the irregular host with frantic energy, 
thc beating of the tom-toms was redoubled, and then as 
if by magic wavcs on waves of men-ghazees of the most 
desperate type-poured down upon the plain, and rusl~ed 
upon Gcneral Stewart's force. The  main body of the 
Afghan army remained upon the hill to watch the ghazees 
i n  their reclcless onslaught, and take advantage of any 
success they might gain. T h e  fanaticism of the 3000 or 
4000 men who made this desperate charge has pcrhaps 
never been equalled ; they had 500 or 600 yards t o  cover 
before they could come to close quarters, and y c t  they 
made nothing of the distance. Near l~a l l  were well armed 
with tulwars, knives, and pistols. Some carried rifles and 
matchlocks, while a few-and those must have bcen 
resolute fanatics indeed-had simply pikes made  of 
bayonets, or pieces of sharpened iron fastened on long 
shafts. Their attack brolcc with greatest violcnce on our 
flanks. 011 our left flank thc 19th Bengal Lancers were 
still moving into position when the ghazecs rushed in 
among them. In an instant they werc hidden in the  cloud 
of dust and smoke, and then they galloped toward the  right 
rear, and struck into the reserve in rear of the Lieutenant- 
I General and his staK All was confusion for a moment ; the ammunition mules were stampeded, and wit11 the 
riderless horses of the lancers ltillecl or wounded in the 
m W e ,  dashed into the headquartcr staff. T h e  ghazecs 
had continued their onward rush, and were cngaged in 
hand-to-hand fighting with our infantry. Some of them 
penetrated to within twenty yards of the knoll on which 
thc staff were watching the action, and so critical was the 
moment that Sir  Donald Stewart and evcry man of his 
staff drew their swords and prepared for self-defence.' 
The  hurried retirement of the lancers had left the left flank 
bare. It  was turned by thc fierce rush of thc fanatics, who 
were actually in rear of the leftward infantry regiment 
and in the heart of the British position. The Goorkhas had 
been thrown into momentary confusion, but their colonel 
promptly formed them into rallying squarcs, whose firc 
mowed down the ghazces and arrested the headlong 
vehemence of their turning movement. But  it was not 
the British left only which was temporarily compromiscd 
by the furious onslaught of the fanatics. Their enveloping 
chargc broke down the defence of the weakly-manned 
interval between the left of the artillery and the right of 
the infantry. The  cletach~nents holding that interval 
were forced back, fighting hand-to-hand as the sheer 
weight of the assault compelled them to give ground ; 
the Sgth, in its effort to throw back its right to cover 
tlic interval and protect the guns, was thrown into 
confusion and gave ground; and thc guns, their case 
shot exhausted ancl the Afghans within a few yards 
of their muzzles, had to be retircd. The onslaught 
on t h e  right front of the horse-battery was clelivcred 
with great determination, but was held a t  bay and 
finally crushed by the repeated charges- of the zd Pun- 
jaub cavalry. 
Every man of the reserves was hurricd into the fight- 
ing line ; thc soldiers were steadied by the energctic 
efforts of their oficers and settled down to a steady and 
continuous fire from their breechloaders; thc guns 
poured their shells into the hostile masses ; and the fire 
of the forty-pounders on the left effectually arrested the 
attempt of the Afghan horse to move rouncl that flank. 
The hard-fought combat lasted for an hour; at ten 
oJcloc1< the 'cease fire' sounded, and 'the British victory 
was signal. The enemy Iiras dispersing in full flight, ancl 
the cavalry was chasing the fugitives across the plain on 
the right. How reclclcss had been the whirlwind charges 
of t h e  ghazees was evidenced by the extraordinary 
number of their dead whose corpses streived the battlc- 
field. In no previous conflict between our troops and thc 
S 
Afghans had the latter suffered nearly so hcavil~.  More 
than 1000 dead were countcd on tile field, and many 
bodies wcrc carried away; on a inoderate computation 
their total loss must have bccn between 2000 and 3000, 
and that in an estimatcd strength of from I~,OOO to 
r5,ooo. Tlle casualties of the British force werc 
scventeen ltilled and 124 woundccl, of whom four d'icd of 
their wounds. The  injuries consisted almost wholly of 
sword slashes and knife stabs received in hand-to-hand 
encounters. The pursuit was soon recalled, but the 
I-Iazaras took up the chase with ardour and in the rancour 
of vengeance slew and spared not. 
Sir Donald Stcwart tarried on the field only long 
enough to bury his dead and have his wounded attended 
to ;  and soon aftcr noon his force resumed its march. 
Ghuznce was reached on the z ~ s t ,  where there was a halt 
of three clays. I t  hat1 bcen reported that the indomitable 
Mushk-i-Alum was raising the tribesmen of Zurmut and 
Shilgur to avcnge the defeat of Ahmed Khel, and a 
cavalry reconnaissance made on the zzd had found a 
gathcring of 2000 or 3000 mcn about the villages of 
Urzoo and Shalez, six miles south-east of Ghuznee. On 
the morning of the zgd a strong column commanded by 
Brigadier-General Palliser moved on thc villages, which 
were found occupied in considerable force. They were 
too solidly built to bc much injured by artillery fire, and 
the Afghans lay close in the  shelter they afforded. 
Palliser hesitated to commit his infantry to an attack. 
Sir Donald Stewart having arrived, ordered the infantry 
to carry the villages without delay, and the affair was 
soon over, the tribesmen suffering severely from the rifle 
fire as they evacuated the villages, and later in the 
pursuit made by the cavalry and horse-artillery. On 
the following day  the march toward Cabul was re- 
sumed. 
On the 16th April Major-General Ross had been 
despatched from Cabul by Sir Frederick Roberts on the 
mission of joining hands with Stewart's division. On 
the 20th Ross opcned heliographic communication 
with Sir Donald, and was informed of the latter's vic- 
tory at Al~med Khcl. But thc junction of the two 
forces was not accomplished until the 27th ; and in the 
interval the force commanded by General Ross had 
received considerable annoyance at the hands of tribal 
levies gathered by local chiefs. The tribesmen interfered 
with the roadmalting opcrations of his sappers i n  the 
vicinity of Sheikabad, and some fighting occurrcd in very 
rugged country on the 23d. Trivial loss was esperi- 
enced by his command, but the de~nonstrations of the 
tribesmen evinced with what inveterate determination, 
notwithstanding so Inany severe lessons, the Afghans 
persisted in their refusal to admit thernsclves conquered. 
Driven away with sevcrc loss on the 25th, those indomit- 
able hillmen and villagers were back again on thc follo\v- 
ing morning on the overhanging ridges ; nor were they 
disperscd by the ' resources of civilised warfare until 
more of them had paid with their lives the penalty of 
their obstinate hostility. On the 28th, at Sheikabad, Sir 
Donald Stewart took leave of the division which he had 
lcd from Candahar, and proceeded to Cabul with General 
Ross' force to assume the chief command in North- 
Eastern Afghanistan, His division turned aside into 
the Logur valley, where i t  remained at until the final 
concentration about Cabul in anticipation of the evacua- 
tion. By the reinforcement brought by Stewart the 
Cabul field force was increased to a strength of. about 
18,ooo men. 
C I - I A P T E R  V l I  
T H E  AMEER AUDURRAI-IMAN 
THE occupation of Afghanistan by the British troops had 
been prolonged far beyond the period originally intended 
by thc authorities. But the strain of that occupation was 
great, and although it had to be maintained until there 
should be found a ruler strong enough to hold his own 
after the evacuation, the decision was definitely arrived 
at to withdraw from the country before the setting in 
of another winter. Mr Lepel Griffin, a distinguished 
member of the political 'departmcnt of the Indian Civil 
Service, reached Cabul on aoth March, his mission being 
to further the selection and acceptance of a capable ruler 
to be left in possession. The  task was no easy one. 
There was little promise in any  of the Raralczai pretenders 
who were in Afghanistan, and in the address which Mr 
Grifin addressed in Durbar t o  a number of sirdars and 
chiefs in the middle of April, he preserved a tonc at  once 
haughty and cnigmatical. One thing he definitely an- 
nounced, the Viceroy's decision that Yaltoub Khan was 
not to return to Afghanistan. The State was to be dis- 
membered. As to the future of I-Ierat the speaker maclc 
no allusion; but the province of Candahar was to be 
separated from Cabul and placcd under an independent 
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Barakzai prince. No decision could for the present be 
given in regard to thc choice of an Ameer to rule over 
Cabul. Thc Government desired to nominate an Ameer 
strong enough to govcrn his pcople and steadfast in his 
friendship to thc British ; if those qualifications could be 
secured the Government was willing and anxious to 
recognise the wish of the Afghan peoplc, and nominate 
an Ameer of their choice. 
Bu t in effect the choice, so far as  the English were con- 
cerned, had been already virtually made. On the 14th of 
March Lord Lytton had telegraphed to the Secretary of 
State advocating the ' early public recognition of Abdur- 
rahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and the 
despatch of a deputation of sirdars, with British con- 
currcnce, to offer him the thronc, as sole means of saving 
thc country from anarchy'; and the Minister had 
promptly replied authorising the nomination of Abdur- 
rahman, should he be found 'acceptable to the country 
and would bc contented with Northern Afghanistan.' 
Abdurrahman had ltnown stra~lge vicissitudes. H e  was 
the eldest grandson of the old Dost; his father was 
Afzul Khan, the elder brother of Shere Ali. After the 
death of the Dost he had becn an exile in  Bokhara, but 
he returned to Ballih, of which province his father had 
bcen Governor until removcd by Sherc Ali, made good 
his footing there, and having clone so adva~lced on Cabul, 
taliing advantage of Shere Ali's ahsencc a t  Candahar. 
The capital opened its gates to him in March 1866; he 
f o ~ ~ g h t  a successf~~l battle with Shere Ali a t  Sheiliabad, 
occupicd Ghuznee, and p~~oclaimccl his father Amcer. 
Those were triumphs, but soon the wheel came ro~~ncl  f ~ ~ l l  
circle. Afzul had but a short life as Amccr, and Abdur- 
rahman had to rctirc to Afghan Turlcestan. Yakoub, 
then full of vigour and enterprise, defeated him a t  Bamian 
and restored his father Shere Ali to the throne in the 
winter of 1868. Abclurrahman then once more found 
himself an exile. In 1870, after much wandering, he 
reached Tashlzend, where General Kaufmann gave him 
permission to reside, and obtained for him from the Czar 
a pension of 25,000 roubles per annum. Petrosvky, a 
Russian writer who professed to  be intimate with him clur- 
ing his period of exile, wrote of him that, ' T o  get squarc 
some day with the English ancl Shere Ali was Abdur- 
rahman's most cherished thought, his dominant, ncver- 
failing passion.' His hatred of Shere Ali, his family, 
and supporters, was intelligible and natural enough, but 
why he should have entertained a bitter grudge against the 
English is not very apparent; and there has been no overt 
manifestation of its cxistence since he becamc Ameer. 
To Mr Eugene Schuyler, who had an interview with him 
at Tashl~encl, he expressed his conviction that with 
It;50,000 wherewith to raise and equip an army he could 
attain his legitimate position as Ameer of Afghanistan. 
Resolutely bent on an effort to  accomplish this purposc, 
he was living penuriously and saving the greater part of 
his pension, and he hinted that he might have Russian 
assistance in the prosecution of his endeavour. The  
selection of a man of such antecedents and associations 
as the ruler of a ' buKer ' state in friendly relations with 
British India was perhaps thc greatest leap in the dark 
on record. Abdurrahrnan came straight from the position 
of a Russian pensionary ; in moving on Afghanistan he 
obeycd Russian instructions ; his Tashlcend patrons had 
furnished Aim with a modest equipment of arms and 
money, the valuc of which hc undertook to repay if 
succcssfi~l. It  is of course possible that those function- 
aries of a notoriously simple and ingenuous government 
started and cq~lipped hi111 in pure friendly good nature, 
although thcy had previously consistently deterred him. 
I3ut there was not a circumstance in connection with 
Abdurrahman that  was not suspicious. Three distinct 
hypotheses seem to  present themselves in relation to this 
selection as our nominee ; that Lord Lytton had ex- 
traord inary, almost indeed preternatural foresight and 
sagacity ; that  he was estremely fortunate in his leap in 
the dark ; that he  clesircd to bring to thc nakecl redzictio 
ad n(lszwci'ci~is thc ' buffer state ' policy. When Abdur- 
rahman began his movcmcnt is uncertain. So  early as 
the middle of January i t  was rcported a t  Sherpur that 
he had left Taslikcnd, and was probably already on the 
Afghan sidc of the Oxus. In a letter of February 17th 
Mr Hensman speaks of him as being in Badaltshan, 
where his wife's lcinsmen were in power, and describes 
him as  having a following of 2000 or 3000 Turcoinan 
horsemen and posscssed according to native report of 
twelve lakhs of rupees. On thc 17th of March Lord 
Lytton telegraphed t o  the Secretary of State that he 
was in possession of ' authentic intelligence that the 
Sirdar was in Afghan Turlccstan, having lately arrived 
there from Badalcshan.' 
I t  was regarded of urgcnt importance to ascertain 
definitely the  disposition of Abdurrahman, and whethcr hc 
was disposed to throw in his lot with thc British Goi~ern- 

ment, and accept the position of its nominee in Northern 
Afghanistan. T h c  agent selected by Mr Griffin to open 
preliminary negotiations was a certain Mohamed S u n ~ a r ,  
Ghilzai, who had bcen all his life in the confidential 
service of the Sirdar's family. Surwar was the bearer of 
a formal and colourless letter by way simply of authen- 
tication; but he also carried full and explicit verbal in- 
structions. He  was directed to  inform the Sirdar that 
since he had cnterccl Afghan Turkestan and occupicd 
places thcrc by force of arms, it was essential for him to  
dcclare with what object he had 'come, and whethcr 
actuated by friendly or hostile feelings toward the British 
Government, which for its part hacl no ill-feeling toward 
him because of his long residence within the Russian 
Empire and his notoriously close relations with that 
power. That the British Government was able t o  benefit 
him very largely in comparison with that of Russia; and 
that wisdom and self interest alike suggcstecl that he 
should at once open a friendly correspondence with the 
British officers in Cabul. That  his opportunity was now 
come, and that the British Government was disposed to 
treat him with cvery consideration and to consider most 
favourably any representations he might make. I t  had 
no intention of annexing the country, and only desired to 
see a strong and friendly chicf established a t  Cabul ; and 
that conscquently the present communication was made 
solely in Abdurraliman's own interest, and not in that of 
thc British Government. H e  was desired to send a reply 
by Surwar, and later to repair to Cabul, whcre he should 
be honourably received. 
Sunvar returned to Cabul on nrst April, bringing a 
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reply from Abdurrahman to Mr Griffin's letter. The 
tone of the reply was friendly enough, but somewhat in- 
definite. In conversation with Surwar as reported by 
the latter, Abclw-ahman was perfectly frank as to his 
relations with the Russians and his sentiments i n  regard 
to them. I t  had been reported that he had made his 
escape clandestinely from Tashlcend. I-1x1 he cared to 
stand well with us a t  the expensc of truth, it would have 
been his cue to disclaim all authority or assistance from 
the Russian Government, to confirm the current story 
of his escape, and to profess his anxiety to  cultivate 
friendly relations with the British in a spirit of opposition 
to the power in whose territory he had lived so long 
virtually as a prisoner. But neither in writing nor in 
conversation did he make any conccalment of his friend- 
liness toward the Russians, a fecling which he clearly 
regarded as nowise incompatible with friendly relations 
with the British Government. ' If,' said he to Surwar, 
' the English will in sinccrity befriend me, I have no wish 
to hide anything from them '; and he went on to tell how 
the Russians had forbidden him for years to make any 
effort t o  interfere in Afghan affairs. This prohibition 
stood until information reached Tashlend of the deport- 
ation of Yalcoub Khan to India. Then it was that 
General Kaufmann's representative said to him : ' You 
have always been anxious to return to your country ; the 
English have removed Yakoub Khan ; the opportunity is 
favourable ; if you wish you are a t  liberty to go.' The 
Russians, continued Abdurrahman, pressed him most 
strongly to set out on the enterprise which lay before 
him. They lcnt him 33,000 rupees, and arms, ammuni- 
tion, and supplies ; he was bound to the Russians by no 
oath or promise, but simply by feelings of gratitude. ' I 
shoulcl never like,' said hc, ' to be obliged to fight them. 
I have eaten their salt, and was for twelve years cle- 
pendent on their hospitality.' 
Surwar reported Abdurrahman as in fine health ancl 
possessed of great energy. He had with him a force of 
about 3000 men, consisting of four infantry and two 
cavalry regiments, with twelve guns ancl some irregulars. 
He professed his reacliness, in preference to conducting 
negotiations through agents, to go himself to Charikar in 
the Kohistan with an escort, and there discuss matters 
with the English officers in person. Surwar testified that 
the Sirdar had with him in Turltestan no Russian or 
Russian agent, and this was confirmed through other 
sources. He had sent forward to ascertain which was the 
easiest pass across the Hindoo Koosh, but meanwhile he 
was to remain at Kondooz until he should hear again 
from Mr Griffin. 
While the wary Sirdar waited on events beyond the 
I-Iincloo Koosh hc was sending letters to the leading 
chiefs of the Kohistan and the Cabul province, desiring 
them to be ready to support his cause. That he had an 
influential party was made clcar a t  a durbar held by Mr 
Grifiin on April arst, when a considerable gathering of 
important chiefs united in the request that Abdurrahman's 
claim to the Anleership should be favourablyrcgarded by 
the British authorities. In pursuance of the negotiations 
a mission consisting of thrce Afghan gentlemen, two of 
whom belongecl to Mr Griffin's political staff, left Cabul 
on May znd carrying to Abdurrahman a letter from Mr 
&ifill ir;timating that' it had been decided to withdraw 
the British army from Afghanistan in the course of a f e ~  
months, and that the British authorities desired to leave 
the rulcrship in capable and frierldly hands; that they 
were therefore willing to transfer the Government to him, 
recognisc him as the head of the State, and afford him 
f;lci]ities and even support in reorganising the Government 
and establishing himself in the sovereignty. The mission 
found tl<e attitude of  Abdurrahman scarcely so satisfac- 
tory as had becn reported by Surwar, and its mcmbcrs 
were virtual prisoners, their tents surrounded by sentries. 
a Ion Abdurrahman's explanation of this rigour of is01 t' 
was that he could not otherwise ensure the safety of the 
envoys ; but another construction conveyed to them was 
that they were kept prisoners that they might not, by  
mising with the people, learn of the presence on the 
right bank of the Osus  of a Russian officer with whom 
Abdurrahman was saicl to be in constant communication 
and on whosc advice he acted. Their belief was that 
Abdurrnhman was entirely under Russian influence ; that 
Mr Griffin's letter after it had been read in Durbar in the 
camp was immediately despatched across the Oxus by 
means of mounted relays; and that Russian instructions as 
t o  a reply had not been received when they left Turlcestan 
to return to Cabul. They expressed their belief that the 
Sirdar mould not accept from British hands Cabul shorn of 
Candahar. They had urged him to repeat in the letter they 
were to  carry back to  Cabul the expression of his willing- 
ness to meet the British representative at Charikar which 
had been contained in his Ictter sent by Surwar ; but he 
demurred to committing himself cven to this slight 
~ s t e n t .  T h e  letter which he  sent by 1iray of reply to the 
weighty ~ ~ m ~ n u n i c a t i o n  Mr Grifin had addressed to him 
on the part of the Government of India that official 
characterised as ' frivolous and cmpty, and only saved by 
i ts  special courtesy of tone from being an impertinence.' 
An Afghan who had sat  a t  Kaufmann's feet, Abdurrah- 
man was not wholly a guileless man ; and the truth pro- 
bably was that he mistrusted the Greeks of Simla and the 
gifts they tcndered him with so lavish protestation that 
they were entirely for his own interest. There was very 
little finesse about the importunity of the British that hc 
should constitute himself their bridge of extrication, so 
that they might get out of Afghanistan without thc 
dangers and discredit of leaving chaos behind them. But 
Aburrahaman had come to  Imow himself strong enough 
t o  reduce to order that legacy of chaos if it should be 
lef t ;  and in view of his future relations with his fello\v 
Afghans he was not solicitous to be beholden to the 
foreigners to any embarrassing extent. H e  knew, too, 
the wisdom of 'masterly inactivity' in clelicatc condi- 
tions. And, again, he had no confidence in our pledges. 
On the 4 th  of August, the day after the meeting between 
him and Mr Griffin a t  Zimma, the latter wrote: 'They 
(Abdurrahman and his advisers) feared greatly our in- 
tcntion was to rid ourselves of a formidable opponent, 
and dreaded that if he had come straight into Cabul hc 
would have been arrested, and deported to India.' 
A Liberal Government was now in  office in England, 
and was urgent for the speedy evacuation of Afghanistan. 
Lord Lytton had resigned and had been succeeded as 
Viceroy by' the Marquis of Ripon. 1.ieutenant-General 
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Sir Donald Stewart was in chief command a t  Cabul. 
A great number of letters from Abdurrahman to chiefs 
and influential persons throughout Afghanistan were 
being intercepted, the tone of which was considered 
objectionable. H e  was reported to be in close corre- 
spondence with Mahomed Jan, who had never ceased to 
be our bitter enemy. The  fact that negotiations werc in 
progress between the British Government ancl Abdurrah- 
man had beconle matter of general I<nowledgc through- 
out the country, and was occasioning disquietude and 
excitement. So clear were held the evidences of what 
was termed Abdurrahman's bad faith, but was probably 
a combination of genuine mistrust, astute passivity, and 
shrewd playing for his own hand, that it became a serious 
question with the Indian Government on the arrival of 
the new Viceroy, whcther it was good policy to have 
anything more to clo with him. I t  was resolved that 
before breaking off intercourse the suggestion of Sir 
Donald Stewart ancl Mr Griffin should be adopted, 
that: a peremptory although still friendly letter, demanding 
a definite acceptance or refusal of the proffers made, 
within four clays after the receipt, should be sent to 
Abdurrahman, with a detailed explanation of the ar- 
rangements into which we were prepared to enter with 
regard to him and the future of Afghanistan. A letter 
was forwarded from Cabul on 14th June, in which Mr 
Griffin informed the Sirdar that since the British Govern- 
~ n e n t  admitted no right of interference by foreign powers 
in Afghanistan, it was plain that the Cabul ruler could 
have no political relations with any foreign power except: 
the English ; and if any foreign power should attempt to 
interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should 
lead to unprovoked aggrcssion on the Cabul ruler, then 
the British Government would be prepared to aid him, 
if necessary, to repel it. As regarded limits of the terri- 
tory, the latter stated that the whole province of Candahar 
had been placed under a separate ruler, except Sibi and 
Pisheen, which were retained in British possession. Con- 
sequently the British Government was unable to enter 
into any negotiations on those points, or in respect to 
arrangements in regard to the north-western frontier 
which were settled by the treaty of Gundamuk. Subject 
to those reservations, thc British Government was willing 
that Abdurrahman should establish over Afghanistan- 
including Herat when he should have conquered it-as 
complete and extensive authority as was swayed by any 
previous Ameer. The  British Government would exer- 
cise no interference in the internal government of those 
territories nor woulcl it demand the acceptance of an 
English Resident anynrherc within Afghanistan, although 
for convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse it might 
be agreed upon that a Mahommedan Agent of thc British 
Government should be stationed at Cabul. 
Abdurrahman's reply to this communication was vague 
and evasive, and was regarded by Sir Donald Stewart 
and Mr Griffin as so unsatisfactory that they represented 
to the Government of India, not for the first time, their 
conviction of the danger of trusting Abdurrahman, the 
imprudence of delaying immediate action, and the neces- 
sity of breaking off with him and adopting other means of 
establishing a government in Cabul before the impending 
evacuation. Lord Ripon, however, considcred that ' a s  
matters stood an arrangerncnt with Abdurrahman offered 
the most advisable solution, while he doubted whether it 
wauld hot be found very difficult to enter into any alter- 
native arrangement.' I-Iis Excellency's decision was 
justified by the event. Mcanwhile, indeed, Abdurrahman 
had started on June nSth for the Kohistan. I le  crosscd 
the I-Iindod Koosh and arrived on July 20th at Charilcar, 
where he was welcomed by a deputation of leading chiefs, 
while the old Mushlc-i-Alum, who for some time, thanl<s 
to Mr Griffin's influence, had been working in the interests 
of 'peace, intimated on behalf of a number of chiefs 
assembled in Maidan that they were ready to accept as 
Ameer the nominee of the British Government. 
So  propitious see~nccl tlie situation that it was con- 
sidered the time had cmnc for formally acknowledging 
Abdurrahman as thc ncw Ameer, and also for fixing 
approximately thc date of the evacuation of Cabul by the 
British troops. The ceremony of recognition was enacted 
in a great durbar tent within thc Sherpur cantonment on 
the afternoon of July 22d. The absence of Abdurrahman, 
and the notorious cause of that absence, detracted from 
thc intrinsic dignity of thc occasion so far as concerned 
the British . participation in it ; nor was the balance 
restored by the presence of three mcmbers of his suite 
whom he had deleg,~ted to represent him. A large 
number of sirdars, chief-5, and ~nalilcs were present, some 
of whom had fought stoutly against us in December. Sir 
.Donald Stewart, who presided, explained to the assenlb1e.d 
-Afghans that their presencc ancl that of thc ~f f icers  of the 
.British force had been called for in order that the public 
recognition by the British Government of thc Sirdar 
Abdurrahman Khan as Arneer of Cabul should be madc 
known with as much honour as possible. Then Mr 
Griffin addressed in Persian a short speech to the 
'sirdars, chiefs, and gcntlemcn' who constituted his 
audience. Having announccd the recognition of Abdur- 
rahman by ' the Viceroy of India and the Government of 
Hcr Most Gracious Majesty the Quecn Empress,' hc 
proceecled : ' I t  is to the Govcrnmcnt a source of satisfac- 
tion that the tribcs and chicfs have preferred as Amccr a 
distinguished member of the Barakzai family, who is a 
renowned soldier, wise, and experienced. His senti~ncnts 
towards the British Government are most fi-icndly; and 
so long as his rule shows that hc is anirnatcd by thesc 
sentiments, he cannot fail to receive the support of the 
British Government.' Mr Griffin then intimated that the 
British armies would shortly withdraw from Afghanistan; 
and in his formal farewcll thcrc was a certain appropriate 
dignily, and a wcll-earned tributc to thc conduct of our 
soldiers during their service within thc Afghan borders. 
' We trust and firmly bclicvc,' said Mr Griffin, ' that your 
rcmcmbrance of the English will not bc unkindly. W e  
have fought you in the field whencver you have opposed 
us ; but your religion has in no way bcen intcrfcred with ; 
thc honour of your women has becn respected, and cvery 
one has been secure in possession of his property. Wliat- 
ever has bcen necessary for the support of Ihe army has 
bccn liberally paid for. Sincc I came to Cabul I have 
been in daily intercourse with you, but I have ncvcr 
heard an Afghan make a complaint of the conduct of any 
soldier, English or native, belonging to  Her Majesty's 
army.' The durbar was closed by an earnest appeal by 
T 
Sir Donald Stewart to all thc sirdars and chiefs that 
thcy should put asidc their private feuds and unite to 
support thc ncw A~neer. 
On August 3cl Abdi~rrahman and Mr Griffin a t  
length met, about sixteen miles north of Cabul. His 
adherents were still full of excitement and suspicion ; 
but thc Arneer himself was calm, cheerful, ancl dignified. 
The conference between him and M r  Griffin lastcd for 
three hours and was renewed on the following day. 
' He appeared,' wrote Mr Griffin, 'animated by a sincerc 
desire to bc on cordial terms with the British Govern- 
mcnt, and although his expectations were larger than 
the Government was prepared to satisfy, yet he did 
not press them with any discourteous insistcncc, ancl the 
rcsult of the interview may bc considered on the whole to 
be highlysatisfactory.' Thc  tidings of thc Maiwand disaster 
had reached Sherpur by telegraph, and the Arneer was 
informed that it necessity might occur for marching a 
force from Cabul to Candahar. His reply was that the 
tribes might be hostile, but that i f  no long halts were 
made by thc way he would have no objections to such a 
march. I11 this hc showed his astuteness, since the defeat 
of Ayoub Khan by a British army would obviously save 
him a contcst. So willing to be of service on this mattcr 
was he that when the march was decided on he sent 
influential pcrsons of his party in aclvancc to arrange 
with the local ~nalilts to have supplies collected for the 
column. Thc arrangements made with him wcre that 
he was to fall heir to the thirty guns of Shere Ali's 
manufacture which thc out-marching army was to leavc 
in Shcrpur, and was to reccivc ~ g +  lakhs of rupccs 
(£rgo,5oo) ; ten lalths of which were given as an earnest 
of British friendship, and the balance was money belong- 
ing to the Afghan State, which had gone into thc com- 
missariat chest and was now restored. A t  the Ameer's 
carnest and repeated request the forts which had becn 
built around Cabul by the British army, were not 
destroyed as had becn intended, but were handed over 
intact to the new Ameer. 
It seemed that Sir Donald Stewart, who was to 
evacuate Sherpur on the I ~ t h  August, would lcave Cabul 
without seeing Abdurrahman. But a t  the last moment 
Mr Grifin succeeded in arranging an interview. I t  was 
held early in the morning of the evacuation, in a tent 
just outside the Sherpur cantonment, was quite public. 
and lasted only for quarter of an hour. Abdurrahman 
was frank ancl cordial. He said that his heart was full 
of gratitude to the British, and desired that his best 
thanlts should be communicatcd to  the Viceroy. At thc 
close of the interview he shook hands with all 'who 
cared to  wish him good-bye and good luclc,' and sent 
his principal officer to accompany the General on his 
first clay's march, which bcgan immediately after thc 
parting with Abdurrahman. Sir Donald Stewart's march 
down the passes was accomplished without incident, 
quite unmolested by the tribes. S~na l l  garrisons were 
temporarily left in the Khyber posts, ancl the war-worn 
regiments wcrc dispersed through the stations of North- 
. 
Western India. 
C H A P T E R  V I I I  
iLIAIWANT) ANT) THE G R E A T  hlARC1-I 
WIIEN in the early spring of 1880 Sir Donald Stewart 
quittcd Candahar with the Bcngal division of his force, he 
left there the Bornbay division, to  the command of which 
Gcneral Primrose acceded, General Phayre assuming 
charge of the communications. The provincc during thc 
carly summer was fairly quiet, but it was known that 
Ayoub I(11an was making hostilc preparations at Herat, 
although the reports as to his intentions and movements 
were long uncertain and conflicting. Shere Ali Khan, 
who had been Governor of Candahar during Stewart's 
residence there, had been nominated hercditary ruler of 
the province with thc titlc of ' Wali,' when it was cle- 
tcrmined to separate Canclahar from Noi-th-Eastcrn 
Afghanistan. On Junc zrst the Wali, who had somc 
days earlier crossed the Helmund and occupied Girishk 
with his troops, reported that Ayoub was actually on thc 
march toward the Canclahar frontier, and asked for the 
support of a British brigade to enablc him to cope with 
the hostile advance. Thcre was reason to believe that 
the Wali's troops were disaffectcd, and that he was in no 
condition to meet Ayoub's army with any likelihood of 
success. After Stcwart's departure the strength of the 
British forces at Canclahar was dangerously low-only 


4700 of all ranks; but it was important to thwart 
Ayoub's offensive moverncnt, ancl a brigade consisting of 
a troop of horse-artillcry, six companics of the 66t11, two 
Bombay nativc infantry regiments, and 500 native 
troopcrs, in all about 2300 strong, under the command of 
Brigadier-General Burrows, reachcd the lcft bank of tlic 
Helmund on July I ~ t h .  On the 13th the Wali's infantry, 
2000 strong, mutinied en m u s e  and marched away up 
the right bank of the river, taking with them a battery of 
smooth bore guns, a prcsent to  Sherc Ali Khan from the 
British Government. His cavalry did not behave quile so 
badly, but, not to go  into detail, his army no longer 
existed, and Burrows' brigade was the only force in the 
field to resist the advance of Ayoub Khan, ~vhosc regular 
troops werc reported to number 4000 cavalry, and from 
4000 to 5000 infantry exclusive of the zoo0 deserters 
from the Wali, with thirty guns and an irregular force of 
uncertain strength. 
Burrows promptly recaptured from the GValils infantry 
the battcry thcy wcre carrying 0% and punished them 
sevcrely. The mutineers had rcmoved or  destroyed thc 
supplies which the Wali had accumulatcc1 for the use of 
the brigade, and General Burrows therefore could no 
longer remain in thc vicinity of Girishlc. The Helmund 
owing to the dry scason was passable cverywhere, so that 
nothing was to be gained by watching the fords. I t  was 
determined to fall back to Khushk-i-Nalthud, a point 
distant thirty miles from Girishlc and forty-five from 
Candahar, where several roads from thc Helmund con- 
verged ancl where supplies mere plentif~~l.  At and near 
Khushk-i-Nakhud thc brigade remained from the 16th 
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until the morning of the 27th July. While waiting and 
watching thcre a despatch from army headquarters at 
Simla was communicated to  General Burrows from 
Candahar, autliorising him to attack Ayoub if he thought 
l~imsclf strong enough to beat him, and informing him 
that it was considered of the greatcst political importance 
that the forcc from Herat should be disperscd and pre- 
vcntecl from moving on toward Ghuznee. Spies brought 
in news that A p u b  had reachcd Girishk, and was dis- 
tributing his force along the riglit bank between that 
place and Hydrabad. Cavalry patrols failed to find the 
enemy until the zrst, when a delachment was encountered 
in thc village of Sangbur on the northern road about 
midway betwccn tbc Helmund and I<hushk-i-Nalthud. 
Nes t  day that village was found morc strongly occupied, 
and on thc 23d a reconnaissance in force came upon a 
body of Ayoub's horscmen in the plain bclow the Garmao 
hills, about midway between Sangbur and Maiwand. 
Those discoveries were tolerably clear indications of 
Ayoub's inlcntion to turn Burrows' position by moving 
along thc northern road to Maiwand and thence pressing 
on tlirougli the Maiwand pass, until at Singiri Ayoub's 
army should have interposed itself between the brigade 
and Candahar. There was certainly nothing impossible 
in such an endeavour, since Maiwand is ncarer Candahar 
than is Khushk-i-Nakhud. Why, in the facc of the in- 
format~on at his disposal and of tlic precautions enjoined 
on him to hindcr Ayoub from slipping by him toward 
Ghuznee through Mainland and up the Khaluez valley, 
General Burrows should have renlained so long at I<husl~k- 
i-Nakhud, is not intelligible. H e  was stirred at Icngth on 
the afternoon of the 26th, by the report that zooo of 
Yakoub's cavalry and a large body of his ghazces were 
in possession of Garmao and Maiwand, and were to be 
promptly followed by Ayoub himself with the main body 
of his army, his reported intention being to push on 
through the Maiwand pass and reach the Urgundab 
valley in rear of the British brigade. Later in thc day 
Colonel S t  John, the political officer, reported to General 
13urrows the intelligence which had reached him that thc 
whole of Ayoub's army was a t  Sangbur; but credence 
was not given to the information. 
The  somewhat tardy resolution was talcen to march 
to Maiwand on the morning of the 27th. There was the 
expectation that the brigade would arrive a t  that place 
before the enemy should have occupied it in force, and 
this point made good there might be the opportunity to  
drive out of Garmao the body of Yakoub's cavalry reported 
in possession there. There was a further reason why 
Maiwand should be promptly occupied ; the brigade had 
been obtaining its supplies from that village, and there 
was still a quantity of grain in its vicinity t o  lose which 
would be unfortunate. The brigade, now 2Goo strong, 
strucl<.camp on the morning of the 27th. The  march to 
Maiwand was twelve miles long, and an earlier start than 
6 3 0  would have been judicious. The soldiers marched 
fast, but halts from time to time were necessary to allow 
the baggage to come up ; the hostile state of the country 
did not admit of anything being left behind and the 
column was encumbered by a great quantity of stores 
and baggage. A t  Karezah, eight miles from I<h~~shlc-i- 
Nal<l~ucl and four miles south-west of Maiwand, inforrna- 
tion was brought in that the whole of Yalcoub's army was 
closc by on the left front of the brigade, and marching 
toward Maiwand. The spies had previously proved them- 
selves so untrustworthy that small heed was talcen of 
this report; but a little latcr a cavalry reconnaissance 
found large bodics bf cavalry moving in the direction 
indicated and inclining away toward Garmao ' as the 
brigade advanced. A thick haze made it impossible to 
discern what force, if any, was being covered by the 
cavalry. About ten A.M. the advance guard occupied the 
village of Mundabad, about three miles south-west of 
Maiwand. 'West  of Mundabad, close to the village, was 
a broad and deep ravine running north and south. 
Beyond this ravine was a wide expanse of level and 
partially cultivated plain across which, almost entirely 
concealed by the haze, Ayoub's army was marching east- 
ward toward Maiwand village, which covers the western 
entrance to the pass of the same name. If General 
Burrows' eye could have penetrated that haze, probably 
he would have considered it prudent to take up a defen- 
sive position, for which Mundabad presented many advant- 
ages. But he was firm in the conviction that the encmy's 
guns were not up, notwithstanding the raports of spies to 
the contrary; he believed that a favourable opportunity 
presented itself for taking the initiative, and he resolved 
to attack with all possible speed. 
Lieutenant Machine of the Horse-Artillery, a gallant 
young oficer who was soon to mcct a melancholy fate, 
precipitated events in a somewhat recI<lcss fashion. With 
the two guns he commandcd he crossed the ravine, 
galloped across the plain, and opened fire on a body of 
Afghan ca\.alry which had just come within view. General 
Nuttall, commanding the cavalry and horse-artillery, fail- 
ing to  recall Maclaine, sent forward in support of 
him the four remaining guns of the battery. Those 
approached to within 800 yards of the two advanced 
pieces, and Maclaine was directed to fall baclc upon the 
battery pending the arrival of the brigade, which General 
Burrows was now sending forward. It  crossed the ravine 
near Mundabad, advanced on the plain about a mile in a 
north-westerly direction, and then formed up. There 
were several changes in the dispositions ; when the en- 
gagement became warm about noon the formation was 
as follows :-The 66th foot was on thc right, its right 
flank thrown baclc to check an  attempt made to turn it 
by a rush of ghazees springing out of the ravinc in the 
British front ; on the left of t he  66th were four companies 
of Jacob's Rifles (30th Native Infantry) and a company 
of sappers, the centre was occupied by the horse-artillcry 
and smooth bore guns, of which latter, however, two had 
been moved to the right flank; on the left of the guns 
were the 1st Grenadiers somewhat refused, and on the 
extreme left two coinpanics of Jacob's Rifles. The  cavalry 
was in the rear, engagcd in efforts to prevent the Afghans 
from taking the British infantry in reverse. The  position 
was radically faulty, and indeed invited disaster. Both 
flanks were cn lair in face of an enemy of greatly superior 
strength; almost from the first cvery rifle was in the 
fighting line, and the sole rcserve consisted of the two 
cavalry rcgirnents. The baggage had followed the brigade 
across the ravine and was halted about 1000 yards in rear 
of the right, inadequately gnarded by cavalry detachment.. 
For half-an-hour no rcply was made to the British 
shell fire, and an offensive movemcnt at this timc might 
have resulted in success. But presently battery aftcr 
battery was brought into action by the Afghans, until 
half-an-hour after noon the fire of thirty guns was con- 
centrated on the brigade. Undercover of this artillery fire 
the ghazees from the ravine charged forward to within 
500 yards of the 66th, but thc rifle lire of thc British regi- 
ment drovc them back with heavy loss, and they recoiled 
as far as the ravine, whence they maintained a desultory 
fire. The enemy's artillery fire was well sustained and 
cffective; the infantry found some protection from it in 
lying down, but the artillery and cavalry remained ex- 
posed and suffercd scvcrely. An artillery duel was main- 
tained for two hours, greatly to thc disadvantage of the 
brigade, which had but twclve guns in action against 
thirty well-served Afghan pieces. The prostrate infantry 
had escaped serious punishment, but by two P.M. the 
cavalry had lost fourteen per cent, of thc men in the front 
linc, and 149 horses ; the Afghan horsemen had turned 
both flanks and the brigade was all but surrouncled, while 
a separate attack was being made on the baggage. Heat 
and want of watcr mere telling heavily on the sepoys, who 
were further demoralisecl by t l ~ c  Afghan artillery fire. 
A little later thc smooth borc guns had to bc with- 
drawn for want of ammunition. This was thc signal for a 
general advance of the Afghans. Thcir guns merc pushed 
forward with great boldness ; their cavalry strea~ned round 
thc British left; in the right rear were masses of mounted 
and dismounted irregulars who had seized the villages on 
thc British line of retreat. Swarms of ghazecs soon 
showed themselves threatening the centre and left ; those 
in front of the 66th were still held in check by the steady 
volleys fired by that regiment. A t  sight of the ghazees, 
and cowed by the heavy artillery fire and the loss of thcir 
officers, the two companies of Jacob's Rifles on the left 
suddenly fell into confusion, and broke into the ranks of 
the Grenadiers. That reginlent had behaved well but it 
caught the infection of dcmoralisation, the whole left 
collapsed, and the sepoys in uttcr panic, surrounded by 
and intermingled with the ghazees, rollcd in a grcat wave 
upon the right. The artillerymen and sappcrs madc a 
gallant stand, fighting thc ghazecs hand-to-hand with 
handspikes and rammers, while the guns poured canister 
into the advancing masses, Slade reluctantly limbcrecl 
up and toolc his four guns out of action ; Machine re- 
mained in action until t11c ghazees wcrc at the muzzles of 
his two guns, which fell into the enemy's hands. The  
torrent of mingled sepoys and ghazces broke in upon 
the GGth, and overwhelmed that regiment. T h e  slaughter 
of t l ~ e  sepoys was appalling-so uttcrly co\ved werc they 
that they scarcely attemptcd to defend themselves, and 
allowed themselves without resistance to be dragged out 
of thc ranks and killed. A cavalry charge mas ordered 
in the direction of the captured guns, but it failed and 
the troopers retired i n  disorder. The  infantry, assailed 
by hordes of fierce and triumphant ghazees, staggered 
away to the right, the GGth alone maintaining- any show 
of formation, until the ravine was crossed, when the 
broken remnants of the sepoy regiments toolc to flight 
toward the east and the General's efforts to rally them 
were wholly unavailing. T h e  66th with some of the 
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sappers and grenadiers, made a gallant stand round its 
colours in an enclosure near the village of Khig. There 
Colonel Galbraith and sevcral of his officers were killed, 
and  the little body of brave rncn becoming outflanlced, 
continued its retreat, making stand after stand until most 
were slain. The Afghans pursued for about four miles, 
but were checlccd by a detachment of rallied cavalry, 
and desisted. The fugitives, forming with wounded and 
baggage a straggling column upwards of six miles long, 
crossed the waterless desert sixteen miles wide, to Ilanz-i- 
Madat, which was reaclicd about midnight and where 
watcr was found. From Asu Khan, where cultivation 
began, to Koltoran near Candahar, the retreat was 
harassed by armed villagers and the troops had to figlit 
morc or lcss all the way. Officcrs and rncn were Itilled, 
Lieutenant Maclaine was taken prisoner, and five of thc 
smooth bore guns had to be abandoned because of 
the exhaustion of the teams. About rnidclay of the 28th 
the  broken remnants of the brigadc reached Candahar. 
When the casualties were ascertained it became evident 
how disastrous to the British arms had been the combat 
of Maiwand. Out of a total of 2476 engaged no 
fewer than 964 were Idled. The  wounded numbered 
167 ; 331 followers and 201 horses were ltilled and 
seven followers and sixty-eight horses wounded. Since 
Chillian~vallah the British arms in Asia had not suffered 
loss so severc. 
The spirit of the Candaliar force suffered materially 
from the Maiwand disaster, and it was held that there 
was no alternative but to accept the humiliation of a 
siege within the fortified city. The  cantonments were 
abandoncd, the whole force was withdrawn into Candahar, 
and was detailed for duty on the city walls. The  effective 
garrison on the night of the 28th numbered 4360, includ- 
ing the survivors of the Maiwand brigade. So  alert were 
the Afghans that a cavalry reconnaissance made on thc 
morning of the zgth, found the cantonments plundered 
and partly burned and the vicinity of Candahar swarm- 
ing with armed men. The whole Afghan population 
amounting to about 12,000 pcrsons, were compelled to 
leave the city, and then the work of placing it in a state 
of defcnce was energetically undertaken. Buildings and 
enclosures affording cover too close to the enciente were 
razed, communication along the walls was opened up, and 
gun platforms were constructed in the more commanding 
positions. The walls were both high and thick, but they 
werc considerably dilapidated and there were gaps and 
breaks in the bastions and parapct. The weak places as 
well as  the gates were fronted with abattis, the defects were 
made good with sandbags, and wire entanglements and 
other obstructions werc laid down outside the walls. 
While this work was in progress the covering parties 
werc in daily collision with the  enemy, and occasional 
sharp skirmishes occurred. 
On the 8th August Ayoub opened fire on the citadel 
from Picquet hill, an elevation north-westward of the 
city, and a few days later he brought guns into action 
from the villages of Dch Khoja and Deh Khati on the 
east and south. This fire, steadily maintained though it 
was day after day, had little cffcct, and the return fire gave 
good results. I t  was not casy to  invest the city since on 
thc west and north there was no cover for the besiegers, 
but in Dell IChoja on the east there was ample protection 
for batteries, and the ground on the south-west was very 
favourable. Its advantages were improved SO slcilfully 
that  it was at one time believed there was a European 
engineer in Ayoub's camp. Dell IChoja was inconveni- 
ently near the Cabul gate, and was always full of men. 
S o  menacing was the attitude of the Afghans that a sortie 
was resolved on against the villagc, which was conducted 
with resolution but resulted in utter failure. The attempt 
was made on the morning of the 16th. The  cavalry went 
out  to hinder reinforce~nents from entering the village 
from the eastward. An infantry force Soo strong com- 
manded by Brigadier-General Brooke and divided into 
three parties, moved out later covered by a heavy artillcry 
fire from the city walls. Thc village was reached, but was 
s o  full of enemies in occupation of the fortress-like houses 
that  it was found untenable, and the three detachments 
extricated themselves separately. In the course of the 
retirement General Brooke and Captain Cruicl<shank werc 
killed. The casualties were very heavy ; IOG werc killed 
and I r 7 were wounded. 
The tidings of the Maiwand disaster reached Cabul on 
the 29th July by telegram from Simla. The intention 
of the military authorities had already been intimated 
tha t  the Cabul force should evacuate Afghanistan in two 
separate bodics and by two distinct routes. Sir Donald 
Stewart lvas to march one portion by the Khyber route ; 
the other under Sir Frederick Robcrts was to retire by 
the ICuram valley, which Watson's division had been gar- 
risoning since Roberts had crossed the Shutargurdan 
in September 1879. But the Maiwand news interfered 
with those arrangements. Stewart and Roberts concurred 
in the necessity of retrieving thc Maiwand disaster by the 
despatch of a division from Cabul. Roberts. promptly 
offered to lead that division, and as promptly the offcr 
was accepted by Stewart. By  arrangement with the 
latter Roberts telegraphed to Simla urging that a force 
should be despatched from Cabul without delay ; and rc- 
cognising that the authorities might hesitate to send on 
this crrand troops already under ordcrs to rcturn to India, 
he took it on himself to guarantee that none of the soldiers 
~ o u l d  dcmur, providing he was authorised to give the 
assurance that after the work in the field was over they 
would not be detained in garrison a t  Candahar. The  
Viceroy's sanction came on the 3d. August. The  constitu- 
tion and equipment of the force were entrusted to the two 
generals; and in reply to questions His Excellency was 
informed that Roberts would march on the 8th and 
expected to reach Candahar on ad September. Sir 
Donald Stewart gave his junior full freedom to  select the 
troops to accompany him, and placed a t  his disposal the 
entire resources of the army in transport and equipment. 
I t  cannot truly bc said that it: was the dite of the Cabul 
field force which constituted the column led by Roberts 
in his famous march to Candihar. Of the native infantry 
regiments of his own original force which he had mustered 
eleven months previously in the Kurarn only two followed 
him to  Candahar, the 5th Goorlchas and 23d Pioneers, 
and the second mountain battery adllered to him staunchly, 
Of his original white troops the 9th Lancers, as ever, were 
ready for the march. ' I-Iis senior infantry regiment, the 
67th; would fain have gone, but the good old corps was 
u 
weak from casualties and siclzness, and the gallant Knowles 
denied himself in the interests of his men. The  two 
I-Iighland regiments, the 72d and gzd, had done an 
infinity of fighting and marching, but both had received 
strong drafts, were in fine condition, and were not to be 
hindered from following thc chief \vhom, though not 
of their northern blood, the stalwart sons of the mist 
swore by as one man. 
Sir Frederick Roberts had already represented that it 
would be impolitic to requirc the native regiments to 
remain absent from India and their homes for a longer 
period than two ycars. In the case of many of the regi- 
menls that term was closely approacl~cd, and the men 
aftcr prolonged absence ancl arduous toil needed rest and 
were longing to rcjoin thcir families. ' It was not,' in the 
words of General Chapman, 'with eager desire that the 
honour of marching to Candahar was sought for, and somc 
commanding officers of experience judged righlly the 
tempers of their men when they represented for the 
General's consicleration the claims of the regiments they 
commanded to be relieved as soon as possiblc from field 
service. . . . The enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick 
Roberts' force with exceptional rapidity to Candahar was 
an after-growth evolved by the enterprise itself, and came 
as a response to the unfailing spirit which animated the 
leader himself! The constitution of the force was made 
known by the general orders published on gd August. 
I t  consisted of three batteries of artillery commanded by 
Colonel Alurecl Johnson; of a cavalry brigade of four 
regiments commanded by Brigadier - Gcneral Hugh 
Gough i and of an infantry division of three brigades 
commanded by Major-Gcncral John Ross. The first 
brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Herbert 
Macpherson, the second by Brigadier-General T.  D. 
Baker, and the third by Brigadier-General Charles 
Macgrcgor. Colonel Chapman, R.A., who had served in 
the same capacity with Sir Donald Stewart, was now 
RobertsJ chief of stafC The marching out strength of the 
column was about 10,000 men, of \vhom 2835 were 
Europeans. Speed being an object and since the column 
might have to traverse rough ground, no ~vl~eclecl artillely 
or transport accompanied i t ;  the guns were carried on 
mules, l lx  baggage was sevcrely cut down, the supplics 
carried were reduced to a minimum, and the transport 
animals, numbering 8590, consisted of mules, ponies, and 
donleys. It was known that the country could supply 
flour, sheep, and forage. 
Thc time specificcl for the departure of the force fi'om 
Sherpur was kept to thc day. On the St11 the brigadcs 
moved out a short distance into camp, and on the follow- 
ing morning the ~nnrch begun in earnest. The distance 
from Cabul to Candahar is about 320 miles, ancl the 
march naturally clivides itself into three parts;  from 
Cabul to Ghuznec, ninety-eight miles ; from Ghuznec to 
IChelat-i-Ghilzai, one hundred and thirty-four miles ; and 
from Khelat-i-Ghilzai to Candahar, eighty-eight miles. 
Ghuznee was rcachecl on the scventh clay, the daily 
average bcing fourteen miles-excellent work for troops 
unseasoned to long continuous travel, traml~ing steadily 
in a temperature of from SqO to  p0 in the sllaclc. When 
possible the force moved on a broad front, the brigades 
and regiments leading by rotation, ancl halts mere made 
a t  specified intervals. The ' rouse ' sounded a t  2.45 A . N .  
and the march began at four; the troops were gcncrally 
in camp by two P.M. and tlie baggage was usually re- 
ported all in by five; but the rearguard had both hard 
work and long hours. Thcrc was no sign of opposition 
anywhere, not a single load of baggage was left behind, 
comparatively few men fell out foot-sore, and the troops 
were steadily increasing in endurance and capacity of 
rapid and continuous marching. 
At Ghuznee there was no rest day, and the steadfast 
dogged march was resumed on thc morning of the 16th. 
The  strain of this day's long tramp of twenty miles to 
Yergati was sevcre, but the men rallicd gamely, and the 
General by dint of care and expedient was able to keep 
up the high prcssurc. 'The  method,' writes Gencral 
Chapman, 'of such marching as was now put in practicc 
is not easy to describe; it combined the extreme of 
freedom in move~nent with carcfully regulated halts, and 
tlic closest control in every portion of the column ; it 
employed the individual intelligence of each man corn- 
posing the masses in motiop, and called on all for exertion 
in overcoming thc difficulties of thc march, in bearing 
its extraordinary toil, and in aiding the accomplishtncnt 
of the object in view.' On the 20th a distance of twenty- 
one miles was covered-the longest day's march made ; 
thc effort was distressing owing to thc heat and the lack 
of shade, but it was enforced by the absence of watcr. 
Therc mas no relaxation in the rate of marching, and 
Khelat-i-Ghilzai was reachcd on the eighth clay from Ghuz- 
nce, showing a daily average of nearly seventeen miles. 
The 24th mas a halt day at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, where 
Sir Frederick Roberts received a lctter from Gencral 
Primrose in Candahar, describing the sortie made on the 
village of Dell Khoja and giving details of his situation. 
I t  was resolved to evacuate Khelat-i-Ghileai and take on 
its garrison with the column, which on the 25th resumed 
its march to Candahar. On his arrival at Tir  Andaz 
on thc following day the General found a lctter from 
Candahar, informing him that at thc news of the approach 
of the Cabul force Ayoub Khan had withdrawn from his 
investment of Candahar, and had shifted his camp to the 
village of Mazra in the Urgundab valley, nearly due 
north of Candahar. On the morning of the 27th General 
Hugh Gough was sent forward with two cavalry regiments 
a distance of thirty- four miles to Robat, the main 
column moving on to Khel Akhund, half way to the 
former place. Gough was accompanied by Captain 
Straton the principal signalling officer of thc force, who 
was successf~~l in communicating with Candahar, and in 
the afternoon Colonel S t  John, Major Leach, and Major 
Adam rode out to Robat, bringing the information that 
Ayoub Khan was cnga~ccl in strengthening his position 
in the Urgundab vallcy, and apparently had the intention 
to risk t41e issue of a battle. O n  the 2Sth the whole forcc 
was concentrated a t  Robat ; and as  it was desirable that 
the troops should reach Candahar frcsh and ready for 
prompt action, the General decided to make the 29th a 
rest day and divide the nineteen miles from Robat to 
Candahar into two short marches. 
The long forccd march from Cabul may be regarded 
as having ended at Robat. The  distance between those 
two places, 303 miles, had been covered in twenty days. 
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It  is customary in a long march to allow two rcst days 
in each meek, but Roberts had grantcd his force but  a 
single rest day in the tmcnty days of its strenuous march. 
Including this rest day, thc avcrage daily march was a 
fraction over fifteen miles. As a feat of marching by a 
regular force of 10,000 men encumbered with baggage 
and followers, this achievement is unique, and it could 
have bcen accomplished only by thorough organisation 
and steady vigorous energy. Sir Frederick Roberts was 
so fortunate as to encounter no opposition. For this 
immunity he was indebted mainly to the stern lessons 
given to the tribesmen by Sir Donald Stewart a t  Ahmed 
I(he1 and Urzoo while that resolute soldier was marching 
from Candahar to Cabul, and in a measurc also to thc 
good offices of the new Ameer. But it must be re- 
membered that Robcrts had no assurance of exemption 
from hostile efforts to block his path, and that he marched 
ever ready to fight. It  will long be remembered how 
when Roberts had started on the long swift march, the 
suspense as to its issuc grew and swelled until the strain 
became intense. The safety of the garrison of Candahar 
was in grave hazard ; the British prestige, irnpaircd by 
thc disaster of Maiwand, was trembling in the balance. 
The  days passed, and there came no news of Roberts 
and of the 10,000 men with whom the wise, daring littlc 
chief had cut loosc from any basc and struck for his goal 
through a region of i l l  repute for fanaticism and bittcr 
hostility. The pessiinists among us held him to be 
rushing on his ruin. But Robcrts marched light ; hc 
lived on \\hat the country suppliccl ; hc gave the tribes- 
incn no time to concentrate against hiin ; and two days 
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in advance of thc time he had set himself he rcached 
Candahar at the head of a force in full freshness of vigour 
and burning with zeal for immediate battle. 
While halted at Robat on the 29th Sir Frederick 
heard from General Phayre that his division had been 
retarded in its march by lack of transport, but that he 
hoped to have it assembled a t  Killa Abdoolla on the 28th, 
and would be able to movc toward Candahar on the 30th. 
But as Killa Abdoolla is distant some eight marches from 
Candahar, it was obvious that General Phayre could not 
arrive in time to share in the impending battle. On the 
morning of the 31st the Cabul force rcached Candahar. 
Sir Frederick Roberts, who had been suffering from fever 
for some days, was able to leave his dliooly and mount 
his horse in time to meet Gencral Primrose and his 
officers to the east of Deh Khoja. The  troops halted and 
breakfasted outside the Shikapore gate, while General 
Roberts entered the city and paid a visit to the Wali 
Shere Ali Khan. On his arrival he assulncd command of 
the troops in Southern Afghanistan ; and he remained 
resting in thc city while the Cabul force marched to its 
selected camping ground ncar the destroyed canton- 
ments on the north-west of Candahar. A few shots were 
fired, but the ground was occupied without opposition. 
Baker's brigade was on the right, camped in rear of 
Picquet hill, in the centre was Macpherson's brigade 
sheltered in its front by Icarez hill, and on the left among 
orchards and enclosures was Macgregor's brigade, in rear 
of which was the cavalry. 
C H A P T E R  I X  
THE BATTLE OF CANDAI-IAR 
ALTHOUGH Yakoub Khan llad ceased to beleaguer 
Candahar, he had withdra~vn from that fortress but a very 
short distance, and the position he had taken up was of 
considerable strength. Thc Urgundab valley is separated 
on the north-west from the Candahar plain by a long 
precipitous spur trending south-wcst from the mountain- 
ous inass forming the eastern bounclary of thc valley 
further north. Where the spur quits the main range, 
due north of the city, thc Murcha Pass affords communi- 
cation between the Candahar plain and the Urgundab 
valley. The spur, its summit serrated by alternate 
hcights and depressions, is again crosscd lower down by 
an easy pass known as thc Babawali Kotul. I t  is con- 
tinued beyond this saddle for about a mile, still maintain- 
i n g  its south-westerly trend, never losing its precipitous 
character, and steeply scarped on its eastern face ; and it 
finally cnds in the plain in a steep descent of several 
hundred fect. The  section of it from the Babawali Kotul 
to its south-western termination is known as the Pir 
Paimal hill, from a village of that name in the vallcy near 
its extremity. Ayoub Khan had made his camp near 
the village of Mazra, behind the curtain formcd by thc 
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spur described, and about a mile higher up in thc valley 
than the point a t  which the spur is crossed by the road 
over the Babawali Kotul. H e  was thus, with that point 
artificially strengthened and defended by artillery, well 
protected against a direct attack from the direction of 
Candahar, and was exposed only to the risk of a turning 
movement round the extremity of the Fir Paimal hill. 
Such a movement might bc  made the reverse of easy. 
A force advancing to attempt it must do so exposed to 
fire from the ,commanding summit of the Pir Paimal ; 
around the base of that elevation there were several plain 
villages, and an expanse of enclosed orchards and gardens 
which strongly held were capable of stubborn defence. 
In the valley behind the Pir  Paimal hill there was the 
lofty detached Kharoti hill, the fire from which would 
mcet in the teeth a force essaying the turning move- 
ment ; and the interval behveen the two hills, through 
which was the access to the Mazra camps, mas obstructed 
by decp irrigation cha~~nels  whose banks afforded cover 
for defensive fire, and could be swept by a cross fire from 
thc hills 011 cither flank. 
Sir Frederick Roberts 'at a glance had pcrceived that 
a direct attack by the Babawali Kotul must involve very 
heavy loss, and he resolved on the alternative of turning 
thc Afghan position. A reconnaissance was made on thc 
afternoon of the j rs t  by Gcneral Gough, accompanied by 
Coloilel Chapman. He  penetrated to within a short dis- 
tance of the village of Pir Paimal, where it mas ascertained 
that the enemy were strongly entrenched, and where several 
guns were unmaslted. A great dcal of valuable informa- 
tion was obtaincd bcforc the cnemy began to intcrfcre 
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with thc leisurely withdrawal. The  cavalry suffered little, 
but the  Sikh infantry covering the retirement of the 
reconnaissance were hard pressed by great masses of 
Afghan reg~dars and irregulars. So  boldly did the cnemy 
come on that the thircl and part of thc first brigade came 
into action, and the firing did not ccasc until thc evening. 
Thc  enemy were clearly in the belief that the reconnais- 
sance was an advance in force which thcy had been able 
to chcclc and indeed drive in, and they were opportunely 
1 audacious in thc misapprehension that they had gained 
a succcss. The  information brought in decided the 
General to attack on the following morning; and having 
matured his dispositions, hc explained them personally to 
the commanding officers in the early morning of September 
1st. T h e  plan of attaclc was perfectly simple. Thc  
Babawali Kotul was to be plied with a brisk cannonade 
and threatened by demonstrations both of cavalry and 
infantry ; while the first and second brigades, with the third 
in 1-cserve, were to turn the extremity of the Pir Paimal hill, 
force the enemy's right in the interval between that hill 
and the Kharoti eminence, take in reverse the Babawali 
Kotul, and pressing on up the Urgundab valley, carry 
Ayoub Khan's principal camp a t  Mazra. The Bombay 
cavalry brigade was to watch the roads ovcr the Murcha 
and Babamali Kotuls, supported by infantry and artillery 
belonging to Gencral Primrose's command, part of whicll 
was also detailed for the protection of the city; and to 
hold thc ground from which the Cabul brigades were to 
advance. General Gough was to take the cavalry of thc 
Cabul column across the Urgundab, so as to reach by 
a wide circuit thc anticipated line of the Afghan rctrcat. 
Soon after nine mf. the forty-pounders on the right of 
Picquet hill began a vigorous cannonade of the Babawali 
I<otul, which was sturdily replied to by thc three field- 
guns  the enemy had in battery on that clevation. It  had 
becn early apparent that the Ayoub's army was in great 
heart,  and apparently mcclitating an offensive movement 
had moved out s o  far into thc plain as to occupy the 
villages of Mulla Sahibdad oppositc thc British right, 
and  Gundigan on the left front of the British left. Botll 
villages were right in the fair way of Roberts' inte~lded 
linc of advance; thcy, the adjacent enclosures, and the 
interval between t1.w villages were strongly held, and 
manifestly the first thing to be done was to force the 
enclny back from those advanced positions, Two 
batteries opened a hcavy shcll fire on the Sahibdad 
village, under cover of which Macpherson advancecl his 
brigade against it, the 2cl Goorkhas and 92d 1-Iighlanders 
in his first line. Simultanco~~sly Balcer moved out to the 
assault of Gundigan, clearing the gardens and orchards 
betwcen him and that village, and keeping touch as he 
advanced with the first brigadc. 
The  shell ,fire compelled the Afghan occupants of 
Sahibdad to lic close, and it was not until they were near 
the  village that  Macpherson's two leacling regiments en- 
countered much opposition. I t  was carried at the 
bayonet point after a very stubborn resistance ; the place 
was full of ghazees who threw their lives away reclclessly, 
a n d  continued to  fire on the British soldiers from houscs 
and  cellars aftcr the strcets had been cleared. The 92d 
lost several men, b u t  tllc Mqhans were severely pmished ; 
it was reported that 300 were killed in this village alone, 
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Whilc a detachment remained to  clear out the village, 
the brigade under a heavy fire from the slopes and crest 
of the Pir Paimal hill moved on in the direction of that 
hill's south-westcrn estremity, the progress of the troops 
impeded by obstaclcs in the shapc of dry water-cuts, 
orchards, and wallccl enclosures, every yard of which was 
infcstcd by enemies and had to bc made good by stcady 
fighting. 
While Macpherson was advancing on Sahibdad, Bakcr's 
brigade had been pushing on through complicated lanes 
and wallcd enclosures toward thc village of Gundigan. 
The opposition experienced was very resolute. The  
Afghans held their ground behind loopholed walls which 
had to  be carried by stonn, and they did not hesitate to 
t a l e  the offensive by making vigorous counter-rushes. 
Ualter's two leading regiments were the 72d and the  acl 
Sikhs. The  left wing of thc former supported by thc 
5th Goorkhas, thc old and tried comrades of the 72d, 
assailed and took tllc village. I ts  right wing fought its 
way through thc orchards between it and Sahibdad, in 
the course of \vhich work it came under a severe enfilading 
fire from a loopholed wall which the Silths on the right 
were attempting to turn. Captain Frome and several 
mcn had bcen strucl< down and thc hot firc had staggered 
the Highlanders, when their chief, Colonel Brownlow, 
came up on foot. Tha t  gallant soldier gave the  word for 
a rush, but immediately fell mortally wounded. Aftcr 
much hard fighting Baker's brigade got forward into 
opener country, but was then exposed to the fire of an 
Afghan battery near the extremity of the Pir Paimal spur, 
and to  the attacks of great bodies of ghazees, which were 
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withstood sloutly by the Silths and driven off by a 
bayonet attack delivered by the I-Iighlanders. 
The two brigades had acco~nplished the first part of 
their task. They were now in alignment with each 
o the r ;  and the work bcfore them was to accomplish 
t h e  turning movement round the steep extremity of the 
P i r  Paimal ridge. Macpherson's brigade, hugging the 
face of the elevation, brought: up the left shoulder 
a n d  having accomplished thc turning movement, suicpt 
up the vallcy and carried the village of Pir Pairnal 
b y  a series of rushes. Here, however, Major White 
comrnancling the advancc of the gzd, found hirnself 
confronted by grcat masses of the enemy, who appeared 
determined to make a resolute stand about tllcir guns 
which were in position south -west of the Babawali 
Kotul. Reinforcements were observed hurrying up from 
Ayoub's standing camp a t  Mazra, and the Afghan 
guns on the Kotul had bcen reversed so that their fire 
should enfilade the British advance. Discerning that 
in such circurnstances prompt action was imperative, 
Macpherson determined to storm the position without 
waitiug for reinforcements. The  92d under Major White 
lcd the way, covered by the fire of a field battery 
and  supported by the 5th Goorlthas and the 23d Pioneers. 
Springing out of a watercourse at the challenge of their 
leader, the Highlanders rushcd across the open ground. 
T h e  Afghans, sheltered by high banks, fired steadily and 
well ; their riflemen from the Fir Paimal slopes poured in 
a sharp cross fire; thcir guns wcre wcll servcd. But: the 
Scottish soldiers were not to  be denied. Their losses 
Iverc severe, but they took the guns at the point of the 
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bayonct, and valiantly supported by the Goorlchas and 
pioneers, shattered and dispcrscd the Inass of Afghans, 
which was reckoncd to have numbered some 8000 men. 
No chancc was given thc cncmy to rally. They were 
headed off from the Pir Pairnd slopes by Macpherson. 
Halcer hustled them out of cover in thc watercourses in 
the basin on thc left, and whilc one stream of fugitives 
poured away across thc rivcr, another rolled backward 
into and through Ayoub's camp at hlazra. 
While hlacphcrson had effected his turning movement 
closc under the ridge, Baker's troops on the left had to  
makc a wider swecl) bcfore bringing up the left shoulder 
and whecling into the hollow between the Fir Paimal and 
the Kharoti I ~ i l l .  Thcy swept out of their path what 
opposition they encountcrcd, and moved up thc centre of 
thc hollo\v, where thcir commander halted thcm until 
Macphcrson's brigade on the right, having accomplished 
its more arduous work, should come up and restore the 
alignment. Baker had sent Colonel Moncy with a half 
battalion away to the lcft to t a l e  possession of the 
Kharoti hill, \vhcre he found and capturcd threc Afghan 
guns. Prcssing toward thc northern end of the hill, 
Money to his surprise found himself in Full view of 
Ayoub's camp, which was then full of men and in rear 
of which a line of cavalry was drawn up. Money was too 
weak to attack alonc and seht to General Balccr for 
reinforcements \vhich, however, could not be spared him, 
and the gallant Moncy had perforce to rcmain loolcing 
on while the advance of Macpherson and Bakcr caused 
the evacuation of Ayoub's camp and the flight of his 
cavalry and infantry toward the Urgondab. Rut thc 
discovery and capture of five more Afghan cannon ncar 
Babawali village was some consolation for the enforcccl 
inaction. 
Considerable numbers of Ayoub's troops had earlicr 
pushed through the Babawali Pass, and moved down 
toward the right front of General Burrows' Bombay 
brigade in position about Picquct hill. Having assured 
himsclf that Burrows mas ablc to hold his own, Sir 
Frederick Roberts ordered Macgrcgor to  move the third 
brigade forward toward Fir Pairnal village, whithcr he 
himself rode. On his arrival there he found that the first 
and sccond brigades werc already quite a mile in aclvancc. 
The battle rcally had already been won but there being 
no open view to the front General Ross, who commanded 
thc whole infantry division, had no means of discern- 
ing this result ; and anticipating the likelihood that 
Ayoub's camp at Mazra would have to be talcen by storm, 
he halted the brigacles to replenish ammunition. This 
clclay gave opportunity for the entire evacuation of tllc 
Afghan camp, which whcn reached without any  furthcr 
opposition and entered a t  one P.M. was found to  he de- 
serted. The tents had bcen left standing ; ' all the rudc 
equipage of a half barbarous army had bcen abandoned 
-the meat in the cooking pots, the bread half ltneadccl 
in thc earthen vesscls, the bazaar with its ghee pots, dried 
fruits, flour, and corn! Ayoub's great marquee had bccn 
precipitately abandoned, and thc fine carpets covering its 
floor were left. But in the hurry of their flight tlic 
Afghans had found time to illustrate their ba~bari ty by 
murdering thcir prisoner Lieutenant Machine, whosc 
body was found near Ayoub's tent \ v i h  the throat cut. 
x 
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T o  this decd Ayoub does not seem to have been privy. 
T h e  sepoys who were prisoners with Machine testified 
that Ayoub fled about eleven o'clock, leaving the prisoners 
in charge of the guard with no instructions beyond a verbal 
order that they were not to be killed. It  was more than 
a n  hour later when the guard ordered thc unfortunate 
officer out of his tent and took his life. 
The victory was complete and Ayoub's army was in 
full rout. Unfortunately no cavalry were in hand for a 
pursuit from the Mazra camp. Thc scheme for inter- 
ccpting thc fugitive Afghans by sending the cavalry 
brigade on a wide movement across the Urgundab, and 
striking the line of their probable retreat toward the 
Khakrez valley, may have been ingenious in conception, 
bu t  in practice did not have the dcsircd effect. But 
Ayoub had been decisivcly beaten. He  had lost the 
wholc of his artillery numbering thirty-two pieces, his 
camp, an immensc quantity of ammunition, about 1000 
rncn killcd ; his army was dispersed, and he himself was a 
fugitive with a mere handful along with him of thc army 
of 12,000 rncn whom he had commanded in the morning. 
The battle of Candahar was an effective finale to thc 
latest of our Afghan wars, and it is in this sense that it 
is chiefly memorable. The gallant rncn who participated 
in the winning of it must have becn thc first to smile a t  the 
epithets of 'glorious and 'brilliant ' which werc lavished 
on  the victory. In truth, if it had not been a victory our 
arms would have sustained a grave discredit. The  
soldicrs of Roberts and Stcwart had becn accustomed 
to  fight and to conquer against heavy numerical odds, 
which werc fairly balanced by thcir discipline and the 
superiority of thcir armament. But in  the battle of 
Candahar thc numerical disparity was non-existent, and 
Ayoub had immensely the disadvantage as regarded 
trained strength. His force according to the reckoning 
ascertained by the British general, amounted all told to 
12,800 men. The strength of the British force, not in- 
cluding the detail of Bombay troops garrisoning Canda- 
har, was over ra,ooo. But this army 12,000 strong, 
consisted entirely of disciplined soldiers of whom over 
one-fifth were Europeans. T h e  accepted analysis of 
Ayoub's army shows it to  have consisted of 4000 regular 
infantry, Soo regular cavalry, 5000 tribal irregular in- 
fantry of whom an indefinite proportion was no doubt 
ghazees, and 3000 irregular horsemen. In artillery 
strength the two forces were nearly equal. When it is 
remembercd that Charasiah was won by some 2500 
soldiers of whom only about 800 were Europeans, con- 
tending against ro,ooo Afghans in an cxceptionally 
strong position and well provided with artillery, Sir 
Frederick Roberts' wise dccision to make assurance 
doubly sure in dealing with Ayoub a t  Candahar stands 
out very strikingly. Perforce in his battles around 
Cabul he had taken risks, but becausc those adventures 
had for the most part been successful he was not the man 
to weaken the certainty of an all-important issue by 
refraining from putting into the field every soldier a t  his 
disposal. And he was wisely cautious in his tactics. 
That  he was strong enough to  make a direct attack by 
storming the Babawali Kotul and the Pir Paimal hill 
was clear in the light of prcvious experience. But if therc 
was more ' brilliancy' in a direct attack, thcre was certain 
to bc hcavicr loss than would be incurred in the lcss 
dashing turning movement, and Sir Frederick with thc 
true spirit of a commander chose the more artistic and less 
bloody mcthod of earning his victory. I t  did not cost 
him clear. His casualties of the clay \yere thirty-six 
killed including three officers, and 218 wounded among 
whom were nine officers. 
Thc  battle of Canclahar brought to a close the latest 
of our Afghan wars. Sir Frederick Roberts quittcd 
Candahar on the 9th September, and marched to Quetta 
with part of his division. On the 15th October, at Sibi, 
he resigned his command, and taking sick leave to 
England sailed from ~ o m b a ~  on the 30th October. 
I-Iis year of hard and successful service in  Afghanistan 
greatly enhanced his reputation as a prompt, sl<ilful, and 
enterprising soldier. . ,  
The Pisheen and Sibi valleys arc the sole tangible 
results remaining to us of the two campaigns in Afghan- 
istan sketched in the second part of this volume-cam- 
paigns which cost the livcs of many gallant men slain in 
action or dead of disease, and involved the expenditure 
of about twenty lnillions sterling. Lord Beaconsfielcl's 
vaunted 'scientific frontier,' condcmned by a consensus 
of the bcst military opinions, was rejected by the Liberal 
Government which had recently acceded to power, whose 
decision was that both the Khyber Pass and the Kuram 
valley should be abandoned. On this subject Sir 
Frederick Roberts wrote with great shrewdness : ' W e  
have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best 
thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself, 
I t  may not bc very flattcring to our a?mw- p o p e ,  but I 
feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans 
sec of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in 
future years attempt to  conquer Afghanistan, or invade 
India through it, we should have a better chance of 
attaching the Afghans to our interest if wc avoid all 
interfcrcnce with them in the meantime.' During the 
winter of 1880-1 the Khybcr and the Icuram were evacu- 
atcd by the British troops, the charge of keeping opcn 
and quiet thc former being entrusted to tribal levies 
paid by the Indian Governmcnt. 
So far, then, as regarded the north-wcstern frontier, the 
stntus quo nntt had been fallen back upon. But there 
mas a keen difference of opinion in regard to the dis- 
position of the salient angle furnished by Candahar. 
Throughout the British occupation and the negotiations 
with Abclurrahman, the annexation of Candahar had 
been consistently repudiated. The intention on our part 
announced was to separate it from Cabul, and to place it 
under the independent rule of a Baralrzai prince. Such a 
prince had actually been appointed in Shere Ali Khan, 
and altl~ough that incompetent Sirdar was wise enough 
to abdicate a position for which he was not strong enough, 
this action did not relieve us from our pledges against 
annexation. Nevertheless many distinguished men whose 
opinions were abstractly entitled to weight, were strongly 
in favour of our retention of Candahar. Among thosc 
werc the late Lord Napier of Magdala, Sir Henry 
Rawlinson, Sir Edward I-Iarnley, Sir Donald Stewart, and 
Sir Frederick Roberts. Among the authorities opposed 
to the occupation of Candahar were such men as the late 
Lord Lawrence and General Charles Gordon, Sir Robert 
Montgomery, Lord Wolseley, Sir Henry Norman, Sir 
John Adye, and Sir Archibald Alison. 
While the professional cxperts differed and while the 
'Candahar debates' in Parliament wcre vehement and 
prolonged, the issue, assuming that fidelity to pledges was 
still regarded as a national virtue, was perfectly clear and 
simple. In the franlc words of Sir Lepel Griffin : ' W e  
could not have remained in Candahar without a breach of 
faith.' And he added with unanswerable forcc : ' Our 
withdrawal was in direct accordance with the reitcrated 
and solemn professions which I had been instructed to 
malte, and the assurances of the Government of India to 
the chiefs and people of Cabul. . . . The wisdom of the 
policy of retiring from Candahar may be a fair matter for 
argument, but it was one on which both Governments 
were agreed. I am convinced that withdrawal, after our 
public assurances, was the only practicable policy.' 
Lord Ripon acted on his instructions ' to kcep in view 
the paramount importance of effecting a withdrawal from 
Candahar on the earliest suitable occasion.' The  abdica- 
tion of the Wali Shere Ali Khan cleared thc air to  some 
extent. A British garrison under the comrnancl of General 
Hume wintered in Candahar. Ayoub Khan was a com- 
petitor for the rulership of the southern province, but he 
reccived no encouragement, and after some negotiation 
the Amccr Abdurrahman was informed that Candahar 
was reincorporated with the kingdom of Afghanistan, 
and it was intimated to him that the capital would be 
given over to the Governor, accompanied by a suitable 
military force, whom he should send. On thc 1st of April 
an Afghan force entered Candahar, followed presently by 
Mahomed Hassan Khan, the Governor nominated by the 
Ameer. General - Hume soon after marched out, and 
after halting for a time in the Pisheen valley to watch 
the course of events in Candahar, he continued his march 
toward India. The restless Ayoub did not tamely submit 
to the arrangement which gave Candahar to Abdurrahman. 
Spite of many arduous difficulties, spite of lack of money 
and of mutinous troops, he set out toward Candahar in  
July 1881. Mahomed Hassan marched against him from 
Candahar, ancl a battle was fought a t  Maiwand on thc 
aimiversary of the defcat of Gencral Burrows on the same 
field. Ayoub was the conqueror, and he straightway 
took possession of the capital and was for the time ruler 
of the province. But Abdurrahman, subsidisecl with 
English money and English arms, hurried from Cabal, 
encountered Ayoub outside the walls of Candaliar, and 
inflicted on him a decisive defeat. His flight to Herat 
was followed up, he sustained a second reverse there, 
and took refuge in Persia. Abdurrahman's tenure of thc 
Cabul sovereignty had been a t  first extremely precarious; 
but he proved a man a t  once strong, resolute, and 
politic, In little more than a year after his accession he 
was ruler of Shere Ali's Afghanistan ; Candahar ancl 
Herat had both come to him, and that without very 
serious exertion. H e  continues to reign quietly, steacl- 
fastly, and firmly ; and there never has been any serious 
friction between him and the Government of India, whose 
wise policy is a studied abstincnce from interference in 
the internal affairs of the Afghan lringdom, 
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11-13 ; ohje& of and prepnratio~ls for r4-1G. 
A F G I I A N  wna,  SECOND, tile policy oi  E : ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I  
lending to, 163.7 ' the force employed in, 
168 ; tangible resuits to England, 3-21. 
APRWDI ItlLLblEN OppOSC Polbck, 137. 
h r z u ~  KHAN, the Arneer eldest son of Dost 
I\laborned. and father' of Abclurrahmnn. 
278-9. 
A H M R U  KHBL. battle of. 268.76. 710. 
A ~ a r v  cnptni;l, n hobtn'p, G.' " 
~ ~ n n l :  K H A N  son o i  Do51 f i ~ ~ h o r n c c ~ ,  joins
his rather h t l r  n force, n8; covers his 
father's retreat 29; in Khooloom, 58; 
anlonq the Ghilrais, 62; in Cabal, 85, 92 : 
negotiations with Rlacnaghten, 93, 95, 96. 
interview with and murder o i  hlncnaghten: 
97.8 ; f o r c c . ~ ~  of his il~telltions, 102 ' meets 
the retreating British army a t  lhotkl;nl;, his 
demands log ; conduct to the fi~$tives, 
112-18. 1;: 12.t . o ~ ~ c r s  to treat, 137; Invests 
ldlal~bnd.'rzo-;. 178.0: resistance to Pol- 
15% 155. 
AKRAII K H A N  pnt  to  death by Timow, 58. 
AI.I KHII. 174 175 186 r o. 
ALI I\.IUS;IU I;ORT; thi, xev OF tllc Khyber 
pass, z;! ;!a, 138-9 ; pa~:tially dcs~royed,  
156; .In1 Ihwne's  attack npon, 169- 
ALISON Sir Arcl~ibald, ngniwt keeping 
~nnd.khar. 726. 
A s ,  38, 4. ' ' 
ANDERSON hlrs 11crcl1ild 111. 
ANQUETIL,' ~ l r i g h i e r ,  in 'cotrrmnnd o i  Shah 
Soojnh's con~ingcnt, r q ;  exertions during 
the rctrent, 108; rcplnces Sheltun in corn- 
n~nnll, 117. 
API~I.RVARD nt Sir S. Bmwne's attack 11p0n 
Ali Mosjih, 169, 170. 
Afi%lr\l HEIGHTS the, Afgilans driven from, 
1974 ; r e o c c a p h  225-6 247-52, 255 ; beacon 
on. 259 ; iortilicd ilg ~ i ;  I?. Roberrs, 26.1. 
ASU KHAN,  302. 
A.1l.n ~ I A I I O M E D  K I I A N . O V C ~ C O ~ ~ C ~ ~  Generid 
Nolt, 140. 
r\rrocx RIVER, the, 7. 
A o c a ~ n h m  Lord 3 ' becomes Govcrnor- 
General & Jndia h36' his andecided policy, 
treatment of ~ost ' f i~nbomcd's  nppcal g ; ! A  ~mlicy becomes warlike, ro a trenty \Gith 
I<trnject Singh nnd Shah soojail, 11 ; deter- 
mines Lo s11pport Shah Soajnll wit11 nn army, 
I ? ;  ol~jects of the cupedition, 1.1, r j ;  t!lc 
Sinlla ~nnniicsto, 3a  ; dis~greerncnt nv1111 
Macnaghtcn 33 ' forbid.; an expedition 
against ~ ~ e r k t ,  ,p'; the &me Governmcn~ 
presses lire recons~derat io~~ of the Afghan 
trcstionq 61 . after the disasters 135. has 
%c crediiof 1:ollock's appointrncl~t, 1 ~ 6 :  
I \USHAII  198 ; hInssp at  226 229, a31. 
Avou13 ~ I I A N ,  I~rotller o f ~ ; r $ o u b ,  in commnnd 
o r  I.Ierat ~.ogi~ncnts 184 ; irt possession of 
Hernt, 268, 2cp; lhs victory ;at hlniwancl, 
39.f-302 ; I r c s i ~ ~ e s  C ~ b n l  303-4; slliits to 
hlnrrn, 3 9 ,  314, 517 ;, d e r e X ~ d  by Sir F. 
Rolrr ts  319-24, 316 ,  drives hlahon~cd 
Haswn 'out o i  Cnndohar, defcntetl by Ab. 
d11rrn11111:111, 387. 
l 3 ~ n , \  WALI  Kwrur., pnss of thc, 314, 315; 
cannonaded, 316.17, 319; village of, 321, 
323. 
nKKHOUsli, Captain, on the council of ernr at 
Jeilalnbad, 127 . his diary, 132, 147. 
UADAKSHAN. 2d
~ ~ A U I A I I A D ,  ih;eiort of, the captives a t  the, 
121 150-3. 
B ~ G ~ W A N A ,  guns abandoned at, 236; re. 
C O V C ~ C ~ ,  239. 
I ~ I I A D U R  K H A N  rehlses to filrnih forage, 
216 17. 
B A ~ G A ~ I ,  43. 
~ K E R ,  1:rigndier-General, 189, 191, 193 ; 
b:1111e of Uharasinl~, I j 8 ;  pursues the 
rn~llinoos e oy.; 204 a 218-A ~ Z I A  216 ; in the 
hlaidan vn%y' L30-:. mar:hes to  Sherpur 
239; tnkcs t h ~ ' l ' n k h t k ~ h a h ,  z j q ,  2.15 ; ir; 
. t l ~ c  at tack on the cantonn~ents, -4 52 25.1 . 
tnkes the itleer Akhor fort z5& ill 111: 
Great hlarch, ;07 ; his positio; nt Grndnhar, 
the battle, 317.10. 
B A L K I I ,  177 178. 
BALI.A H I ! ~ \ H ,  the. 70. 70. 72.6. 78. 8 7 4 :  
eracunted, 94 i qg, I.+ i0~;~0r1.{8,'15'?,~;~~; 
167 ; Cavagnar~ at ,  183.7, 191, 197 ; b ~ r  1'. 
r\oberls at. 198.9 ; explos~ons in, evnc~~nt rd ,  
a m 3  ; 205, zro, 112, 213, 223, 241, 246, 263; 
road c u t  thrnugl~ 264. 
I ~ A N I A N ,  hill couniq, of, 28, 34, 4p.1, 62, 1.19, 
1 53-4, u16, 22G . ALldurrnh~n:~~~ defentcd by 
Ynkoub Khan ;;I. 270. 
. . 
324. 
B E I I ~ I A R O O  RIDGE, the, 80 ; villaqe of, 84.5, 
87, 210.12, za.+,q3.  258 a h  26i. 
BELLE\\., Capti~in, nt the 4orm:ngof the Rikn- 
bnslice fort, 79. 
I~ I ILOOCH PROVINCES, Ille I , .$?, 175. 
I3m1 I ~ ~ \ D A > I ,  llnker tr&ckeroasly attacked 
Rt 218. 
13l~d1 HISSAR, 193, rq ,241 2, 246: 
BUNTINCK,  Lord Wlfiinln,'7 ; h~ci opinion of 
the lirst Afghan expedition, 13. 
UEIILIN. Treaty of, 166. 
I~IIA\\ 'ULI 'ORP 18. 
I ~ H ~ R T ~ ~ o R I ? .  i35. 
I ~ I V I ~ U L I ' H ,  General, in command of the Qttetta 
force 168 175-6. 
BIRU,  hclliennnt, a t  the storming of the Rika- 
basl~ee fort, 79. 
I%OKII,\NA, 34. 278. 
I%oI.A~' PASS, lhe, 17, -0.1, 175, 
I ~ O O T K I I A K  65 1cq 124, 291. 
Ilovu, Mrs,'in ;lie rktrcnt, 111. 
U a ~ r o ~ o o r  Captain George, his snppcrs. 695,  
G8 ; in th; Gundnmuk council of war 69.  
garrison engineer nt  Jellalnhnd, ran; (Irb'e; 
Snlc to  hold th~: plncc 114-30 ; his account 
of  the council ofwar, I;G, 147. 
U a o ~ n r ; o o ~ ,  with Fraser's Ucngal Cavalry, 
killed a t  P I I ~ ~ I I ~  lh r rnh ,  .47. 
nltoanr;oo13, \Villinni Secretary to Sir A. 
Ilurnes, nlurdercd with him, 74. 
Rnoowc, I3rignrlicr.GcnernI, kdled in attack 
on Dch Khojn, 304, 
131~0ce~st~: Sir  S ~ I ,  in comn~nnd of the Khyhcr 
culunu;, 168; auack on t l ~ c  Ali Alusjid, 
rbo.70. 1 7 ~  : reoorts the death of Shere Ali. 
x78 1 ;ec'&rs 'Yakoc~b Khan, 178 ; corn: 
mends in ' th~:  Death hlarch.' 180. 
BROWNLOW, Colonel, of the 72d I-Iighlanders, 
i n  the attack on the cantonments, 237, 248 ; 
killed in the battle of Cnndahar, 318. 
13norrc1n.o~. Lord. S#r S I R  T O H N  C A M  H O W  
HOUbBl 
h v u o ~ ,  Dr, sole survivor of the Rhyber 
disaster. 124-5. 
nurrxas, Sir Alexnnder sent by Lord Auck- 
land to CabuI, 8 : fa;ourable to Dost hla-  
homed, roprimn~~dcd by his superiors, Ienves 
Cabul, I) ; ~e:e~lters ev1111 Shall Soojah, 30, 
34 ; h ~ s  o p ~ n ~ o ~  of Shah Soojnh's ministers, 
35 ; advice to hlacnaghten, 47 . his chnr- 
acter, 50 ; rnc~rclered, 73-4 ; r evhged ,  155, 
187, 202. 
nu~cnows,  Brigadier-Grnrral, io the hlniwand 
disaster, 295.304 ; in the battle of Ca~~dnhnr ,  
321. 
I~UTI.BR'S, Lady, p i c t ~ ~ r ~ ,  I? 
BUTSON, Captn~n,  kdled at  ~%erpur ,  qs .  
CAIIUI.  p ~ s s  or, K ~ o o n u ,  65 . description 
of, sfneghter in, I r r ,  113 ; ~dllock 's  army 
m:irches II >, 1.17, 21.1. 
CAIWI. ,  S ~ I  Soojal~ ousted from the throne 
of, 2, 7, 9, ro 17 22.3, 28 ; Shah Soojah re- 
enters, 30; britirh troops in, 32, 37-9, *, 
4.1-5 ; Dosr hlnhon~ed swrenders nt, J7-Zr, 
65, 67, 69, 70; murder of Ih~rnes nt, 74, 76, 
80-5, 93, 94. 97, IW. 103, 123 ; Shnh Sonjith 
murdered at. 138, 140, 144, 145 ; Nott  arrives 
a t ,  147.9, 152, 153; p~mishetl, 155-6, 161, 163-5. 
167 169 ; Cavngnnri a t ,  183, 184, 18995 ; 
tbe'sherpur cantonments, north of, 197.?, 202, 
204 m 210 ; Roberts uear mg-16, hla- 
~io~;leti plans to take, 215.8, 229 ; l~ostility 
of vill~ges round, 2.15 ; , hh~shk- i - r \ l~~m gov- 
ernor of, 255 ; re-occup~ed by Rober~s,  263 ; 
fortifications and comn~unications inrproved, 
264.5 ; Sir Lcpel Grinin :arrives at, 277.8 ; 
holds n durbar at, 283-4,28pgo. 30.1, 305,307. 
3233. 325-7. 
CANI-UELI.. sent bv Slinl~ Sooinh to nssisl 
llurnes hils, 75. ' 
CA~D, \ I I : \R  siege of by Shnh Soojai~. relieved 
by D o a  b1a11omeci, 7, 17 ; entered by Shah 
Soojoli and Kenne 20-3 ; occup~ed I) 
British troops 32 ; in~cpel idrnt  province o[ 
37.8, .)1-3. '&our. S l ~ a h  Soojnh's vicevoy 
at, ~z- .o ;6 ; British troops to l a v e ,  ror ; 
Nott  in I.Io-,~ ; Afglinns heate11 off, 1.11, 147, 
149, IS;, 168 ; G e ~ ~ e r a l  Stuart's I I I ~ I ~ I  on, 
175-6 ; evncoatcd, 180, 190, 165. 268 ; to  bc 
separated from Cabul, 277, 284, 287, 290 ; 
Shere Ali Khan overnor of 294 296 ; 
I3orrow's army witf;dr;twn into', 30?13 ; Sir 
F. Roberts marches on, 305-9 ; ;~rrives a t ,  
31 I . battlc of, 31q2.1 ; qltestlon of retention 
of, &5-6 ; b a t h  Iretwee~r Abdurrahn~:cn and 
Ayoub Khan at, 327. 
:AVACNARI. Sir 1.0uis. 161 : inelfecttt:~l 
attempt to ewer  Cabul, ;G7 ; coirer;pondencc 
will1 Ynkonb Khnn, 177-8 ; a t  Cabul, Iiis 
chnractcr. 182: the rnnssncrc, 183-6, 187, 
. . 
c I ; g ~ l  192, 199, 102, 203, 168. 
.\alnrml.nlN. Sir Neville, nl~ortive nl len~nl  - . .  . . . . -. . .  . . - 
to ~ I I I C I .  i\fgl;nnistan ns Envoy, 167. 
CHAWJEHS Colonel, dcfents the Ghilznis 57. 
cll,\t->t,\N )Colonel (now Major-Cc~icral) k. F., 
chief of \he stntT, 307 ; in the Great n l ~ c h ,  
106-8: reconnaissance bcrore the battle or  
h d i h n r ,  31.5. 
CHARASIAH, battle or, 193-7, 205, 225, 241, 
323. 
CIIAHDEH VALLEY. the, 193, 196, 198, 225.226, 
231, 134, 237 2 24 -51, 264. 
CHARIYAH,  &pi% o? the Kohistan, troops 
quartered in 34' dkastcr of, 80, 81, 99; 
punishn~mit df, 15;, 283, 284 ; Abdnrralinian 
nrrives 81, 288. 
C I I I S I I ~ L ~ I ,  Cnptain, w o ~ ~ n d e d  a t  the Senb 
Sung ridge. 245. 
CL,\NI<, Lirotenn~~t-Colonel, 249-50. 
CLYLAND,  gallrlnt conduct of, 735-6. 
C m a ~  d r ,  dcnlnnds right of way through 
the $unjmlli, .$j. 
CLIUIIORN, Colonel, defeated by Ecloochccs, 
43. 
COUIIIZ, lcnds the attack of the Peiwnr Kotul, 
171-4. 
C r ~ u u ~ c ~ n ~ ~ o s ,  commnndnnt of Chnrikar, 
80 ; killed, 81 ; reven ed, 155. 
C o r ~ a t ~ s s n w ~ \ . r  r o w ,  t fc ,  77, 
Cosor .~.~,  Licutennnt John, la4k hostage. 97. 
COOK, blnjor, V.C., of the Z d r ~ 1 1 n  rcg~nient, 
killed at  the 'hkht-i-Sl~ah, 2 . p  
COTTOP Sir \\'illoughby, con~mands first 
inbndydivision, 14 ; on the march to Cabul, 
16-21, 3 t ;  in ch id  conilnalld in Afghanistan, 
35349 ; a resppectal>le nonentity,' 57,63. 
CRAIGIE clefence of Khclat-i-Ghil7ai 144. 
C ~ I S I ~ I N : ~ ~ I I ~  Fraser's Bengal cavalry,  killed 
a t  1'11rwn11 D ~ l r n b  47. 
CKVICYSIIANK, Cn&in, killcd a t  the attack on 
Deh Kboja, 304. 
CUNVPIGMALI,  Lieutenant Mck ,  V.C., gallnnt 
co~~duc t  a t the Tnkl~t-i.Slln11, 213. 
D A D U R ,  rg, 30, 43. 
n~ wun 168-70. 
U A O U D ' S I I A I ~ ,  Ynkoub K h n d s  gcnernl 178, 
185 ; accompanies the A~nccr  to ~ o L c r l s  
U e r r s n w n ~ ,  58. 
DFIC 13.5. 
D&IE, Colonel or  the 13111, a t  the taking o 
Ghaniee, a+.$; in conunnnd nt  Ihrnian, 4) 
replaces Sale in comnmnd, 65, 66 ; hcnds ; 
sortie fro111 Jellalalad, 123 ; in the counci 
of war, 127, 1zS~.r3r ; ~ o m n ~ a n d s  the centr, 
a t  the great mrtw and  IS killed, 133. 1.52. 
DESKIS, Colonrl, 14. 
DOUGIN, Captain, wloor  in the retreat, 119. 
)OOKANEYS,  ~ I I c ,  52, 58, 60, I.~o. 
)OST ~ ~ I A I ~ o ~ I I ~ D ,  origin, 5 ; early cnrecr, G ; 
asks for terms, 28 ; foranken by h ~ s  troops, 29 . 
n fugitive, $3, 36; in I%okl~nrn a d ~liooloo111' 
43 ; at  D n m m  nncl Kolktnn,  44-6;surrc~~der; 
lo Al:~cnnglitcn, 47 ; senr into Ilr1tisl1 Indin, 
49 ; l o  bc allowed to return to Akhanistnn 
93, lor, IS.+; his return t o  his sovcrcigtity: 
156 ; dies 1863, 162. 
)REIV Colonel en tcn  the Peiwnr Kot111, 1 7 5  
) u x c ~ u  ~ c u e ' r n ~  15. 
)UNDA'S: ~nptnin,'killed at  Sherpur -62 
) U N H A ~ I - ~ ~ A S S Y ,  ~ r igad ie r -~enrml , -18~ .  
)uu,\Nn, on tlic stege of Hcrat. 3 ; on Lord 
At~ckland's ~nnnircato 12 . on hlacnaghten's 
nppointmcnt 18. nt s:eyc'of Ght~znec 25-6 : 
on the rastdrnti& of s'11n11 soojnl~,  & ;  on 
Dost Mnhomed's s~~r render ,  48 ; on the rc- 
treat on Jcllnlnbnd,70 ; on hlncn:~ghten's ill- 
faith, 92. 
i o w ~ ~ o a s ,  Sir I-icnry, on Lord At~ckland's 
~nnnifcsto, 12. 
~ I . L E N U O R O U G I ~  Lon], on Sale's brignde, 134 ; 
first nlnnifcsio 1.13 ; vacillntions, 144 ; 
orders the rclndvn~ 01 the antes of Somnntl~ 
from S u l m  Rlah~noud's tomb, 148; reception 
of the r c t t ~ r n i n ~  arsiies, 156. 
EI.LIS, h1r uritish El~voy to Pcrsin, 2. 
~ I . I W I N S T ~ N B  General I ; succceds Cotton 
in chief col(lmnnd, Gj 5 his cliancter and 
infirniitier, Gq5. orders Sale  to return LO 
Cnbul, 69. n b o d  to leave Indin, 70,73,73 ; 
orders thc)abandonment of the Co~nrn~ssa r~a t  
fort, 77; the Duke of \Vrllington's verdict 
on his position, 78; hopaless, 83, 88, 89; 
'scents trenchor).,' 96 ; calls upon I'utunger 10 
open ~~egotialions, m; in the retffint, 19 ; 
consents to liancl over the Indies, 113; m d  
thcir I~usl~nnds I 14 ; rcft~ses Akhr ' s  pro- 
posal that the kuropeans s h o ~ ~ l d  Iny down 
thcir nrrns, rrS ; conference, 3x7. made n 
I~ostnac, 118: at  Jocclullnk. 121. ,.lo: dcnth, 
. . , .  
152, i5j .  ' - - 
EI.I~IIINSCOSE, Mr, on the Afglinn expedition, 
12. 
ENGLAND,  Ilrigadicr, dcfented at  the K o j ~ ~ k  
pass, 1~i2.3 147. 
E V A ~ W  ~;rgaon-hl:~jor, on the Death 
hlnrch ' 181. 
E Y I ~ E ,  ~ h e c t i t ,  op in io~~  on Shclton's defcnt at  
Bch~nnroo, 88 ; descriptio~l o[ the suli'eriogs 
of the retrcnt, 1x0; 1115 'Elptlvity,' 150, 152. 
FANE, Sir Harry, Conirnnnder-in-Chief, 12 ; 
hends the especlition to Cahal, 14, 15. 
F A I ~ R I X W ~ O N ,  routs Uktar Khan at  Zemin. 
dnwxi-, 53. 
F l i~ozr r so~ t i ,  1)-18,156. 
FORUES, Licutel~ant of tlic gzd Highlanders, 
killcd at  the Takl;t-i-shah 243. 
YRASIIR'S RIWCAL C A V A ~ Y  a t  Purwau 
Durrnh, 46, 47. 
, - 
FUTI  E l l A B A D  121. 
l i u ~  roll A L I ' S I ~ ~ ~ I  of  Persia, o. 
P v ~ r ~ r r  JU&, second sun nnd successor of 
S l ~ a l ~  Sooiah, 139, 152 ' abdicates, I j5. 
F U T T E I ~  KHAX, c l d c ~ t  I)rotlicr of D o d  
Alahomed, his fate, 5. 
GALIIKAI . I .~ I ,  Colonel, killed at  hlniannd, 302. 
G,\nr~.\o H I L L S .  the. 106.8, 
62 ; g i n  term horn BIacgrcgor,G6.~8 ;:~itnck 
Snlc's force 68, 70; slnu lhter by, 111 thc 
I<huord cadtr~,  111, 11s; t a n g  on t l ~ e  rear 
of  the retrent 117-19 ; s l ; ~ i ~ g l ~ ~ e r  by, a t Jog; 
dulluk, 1rg;'ntlack Pollock, 146; harass 
filoucy nor, 263. , 
~ ~ t ~ n ~ s t t l ,  -.1,12, 294-6. 
G l l u z n m  17 20; sicge of, 23-7 ; occt~picd by 
British ;rndps, 32, 3.1, 36; snrrendered to the 
A b h m s ,  141, I.I?, 144 ; retaken Iry Notr, 
146, 153, 190, zr6, 231, 5268, 270, 27.1, 278, 
- . . . . . , - . 
z m ,  271, 272, 30.7: jr{-,zo. 
Goimoo; the C ; ~ I  la1 c?der, 56.8. 
GORUON, Colo~~el ,  his co~nmnnd in the attack 
on the Spi~~gmvai  and I'eiwar K o t ~ ~ l s ,  172. 
Goauos.  General Cliarles, ngninst keepina 
Candnl~ar, 326. 
G o a m u n u  R1wa. the, 46. 
C ;UI~~SCIIAI~OPF &G. ' 
GOUGH, ~ap ta i ; ,  with the 9th I.niicers, 2 3 ~ ;  
in the chnrge nf Dccwnber 11111, 235-7. 
GOUGH Genernl Charles. 213,214, ~5.1. 
COUGH: General Hngh, 901, 231, ~ 3 8 ~ ~ 6 0 ,  264, 
306 ~ ~ 3 1 5 , 3 1 6  
GNA$T, Dr, zall;~nt condt~ct at  Chnriknr, 82. 
GREEN, in the Xe~reat, 108. 
GRESADIERS 1st tile 299 301. 
GRIFFIN, ~ i r ' ~ e ; e ~ ,  ;is nilpsion to nrrnngc for 
the succession to Ynkoul~ Khan, 277-91 ; OII 
the relcntion of Cnndnlrar, 326. 
GRIPPITI IS ,  Major, gallnnt rnarch fro111 
Kubbnr-i-Jul~bnr, 75 ; s t o r m  hlnhomcd 
Slrcrcef's fort, 77, 120 258. 
Gutnss  the, 183, rlgl 203 213, 238. in the 
attncl; on the  em-ti&, 2)o-5,, 2i7, 249, 
so, 260. 
G U L  KOH RIDGE Lbe, 270. 
G U X I ) A N U K ,  Sale's cou~tcil of war at, 68-70 ; 
final tragedy of the Rrtrmt near 120 121 ; 
evncualed, 1.3 ; Pollock's troops Aoncdntrate 
at ,  145, 147,. 176, 21.1, 219; t rmty of 1879, 
161 ; conclus~on of, 178-Bu, 182, 183, 287. 
GIIXDIGAS, 317,318. 
GWAGA FASS, the, 175. 
A m l n  KII,I.A, 171. 
HADJI KIIAH KHAKUR, =I, 99, 30.. 
HACXES Sir F., Co~~ima~~cIer-~~~-Cl~tef ,  166. 
HAI.~., &ptntn 250, 
I i a s l m ~ o x , ~  1, ihcnant  W. R. P., V.C., wit11 
Cnvagnarr nt C ; h l  1825 ' killed 186 199 
H n r r r . ~ ~ ,  Sir ~ d w d d ,  111 iavollr br k&ml: 
Canclnhnr, 325, 
H A ~ ' Z - I - ~ ~ ~ \ U ~ \ T ,  302. 
HARI)Y, I.ic~~tcnant, killed, 236. 
HAWAN Annul., 168. 
H n s s , ~  KllAN, goycr11or of Maidan, killcd, 
. - 
2?0. 
H a u c ~ r o s ,  dcsperately wou~tdcd in thc 
Chnrikar disaster, 81. 
HAVELOCK, Coplain 1.lcnr-y aide-dc-camp Lo 
Sir \V. Cotton 16 ; on ~11;h Suoj:hls recep- 
tlon in ~ a n d a \ l n r  22. description of Shnh 
Soojah, 31 ; sta~dfficc; to  Sale 67 ; authenti- 
cates Uroadfoot's account of ~Alr:  s council of 
war at  Jcllalabnd, 126 127 130, 131 ; in the 
g r m t  sortie from ~ e l h i a b a d ,  133. 
HAV, a t  the siege of Ghuznec, 25. 
HAZARAS horde of 2%. 274 
Hrr~nltrnr; n rvm,  tile, 11, 53, 176, 27-6.  , 
I~ENS>IAN l\fr 217' 011 the def~llce 0 Shelplll., 
-h ; on'lhe h t l l d  ofAllmed I<l~ul, 271, 272 : 
on Abd~irml!nia~~, 280. 
HERAT, I'crs~n nnd 8 ; siege of, by the 
Pcrs~nns, 3, .I, lo, k5, 33, 3.1 ; i n d ~ p e ~ ~ d e n t ,  
37 ; AIncnaghtcn presses for an cspcdition 
ngainst, 40, 41, 176; Ayoub Khan 111 26.5 
277 287, 29.1, 2y6' Ayoub drivcll h.ol;l, 11; 
Al,$urrnllman. 997: 
2% 23 , 55, 263, 276. 
H I N D O O ~ & S H ,  the 6, 15.{.983, 188. 
H o n l t o u s ~  Sir Jobb4~arn  Lord Bro~~gh ton  
presidentof the Bmrd of kontrol, clnin~s tlri 
responsibility of the l in t  Afgl~an war in 
1851, contradictory statemant in I B ~ c ,  r r .  
H U P T  KOTUL, the, 66, 115 ; Inst stand of thc 
Afghans nt 1 . 1 ~  
I i u c ~ ~ r s ,  ~ r&ad ie r .~cncrn l ,  nt At~nlrd Khel. 
59-76. - 
e t i .  Genernl. 126. 227. 
I ~ u r n e a ,  mntinous scpo)x captured in, 204, 
9 4 0 .  
J ~ c o n ' s  Rtr:t.lrs (30th Nntive Inhn t ry )  nt the 
Llniwand ~lisastcr, 299% 301. 
JADKAN,  225. 
J A ~ I + : ,  Anderson encounters Ghilzais at, 38. 
JEI.LA!.ADAD, 28; British troops quartered in, 
34, 37, 38. 55 61 65 ; march on resolved 
111,011, 69 ; D U ~ I ~ C I ' ;  opinion of, 7q.78, 83, 84, 
99 lor 107 115 ; Akbar's condttlons lor 
th; ev~cun t t&~ of, 117, 118 121 . defencc 
of, 121-34, 138 ; P o ~ ~ o c ~  81' 139 'l.l.l. 14.5, 
150,. 157 ; I?llphi~~stone b u r i h  a; 152.53 ; 
parually <Iestroyctl, 157 ; Sir S. 'nrownc's 
C:IIIIV nmr. 170 : disaster to the ~ o t h  Hus- . . , .  ~ ~ -
snrs near, 171, 213, zr.l. 
JIINKIXS, Col~nel ,  of the Guides, 213, 226, 
238, a4.I ; storms thc Asnlai I~eights,' 2.1 g 
'250 ; adroit evacuntion of Asmai hCicK;s: 
25 I, 252, 260. 
J U N K ~ N S ,  William, Secretary t o  Cnvagnari, 
183-6. 
J o t t ~ s o ~ ,  Captain, in charge of the Trcasl~ry 
a t  Cabul, 73;  hostage, 117, 121. 151 ; i~ r -  
mnges the redett~p~ion of tllc c;iptivcs, 154. 
Ol lNSOX,  , Colonel A l ~ ~ r e d ,  commands llle 
nrtillcry ~n the Great March, 306. 
J u t m ~ r i  K H A N ,  brother to Dost Mahomerl, 
28 ; in charge oC Dost Nahorned's Canlily 
a t  Khooloom, 43. 
JIIGDULLUK VALLEY the, 68 ; retreati~lg 
col~~tntl harassed a;, 116-17 ; slaughter at. 
118-20; caplivcs arrive at, 121 ; Pollock 
?gaged wtth Gl~ilznis nt, 145-6, aI.1, 226, 
-38, 25.1. 
J I J L G X I I  FORT, the, Sale fails to tnke, 45. 
JUNROOD, 123, 137, 214. 
KATA KUSTIA, 170, 
K A T I . I A ~ A R ,  1.18.
Kxu~ntxh 'x ,  Gcneral, 165-7 176 279 285. 
Knve,  bir John, g ; histoky o! 111: Afghan 
war, 32. opinion of Ihtrnes, 50 ; nccolmt ol  
b~acnagiltrn':; murder, 97. 
K U A N ~ :  Sir John, C.01~1n1i1tldcr-in-CI1ief o r tile 
nornl:ay nrlny, 15 ; ~nnrchcs tow:trds Hy- 
derabad 19. his chamctcr 2 0 .  n~archcs OII  
Cab~tl, :z ;'siege of Gh;tzne:, 23-7, 29 ; 
camp nc:w CaLol, 30, 33, 5.1, .{I, 51. 
KLLLY, l)r Amhrose, with Cnvagnari, 183. 
Kriastt,\w, a t  siegc of Gh~tzncc, 27. 
K H A I ~ I Z  VALLEY the 296, 322. 
I < ~ a t : o ~ t  IIILI., d c ,  3;5, 316, 320. 
KIIEL AKIIUND,  309: 
K ~ l a ~ a l , ,  g ; occuplcd by h'olt, .lz-3. 
KHRLA'P, ~ S I I S  of. .yet h%~ERhn,  N ~ S S ~ l . : ~ .  
KIIELAT-I-GIIILZAI,  17 ; occ~~pi~lr l  by Nott ,  
38 ; gnrrisoacd, 56 ; garrison wi t l~dra \~ , l~ ,  
14.1, 7.17, 176, ~ p ,  268 269 ; one of the 
stages OII the Grent hlnrhl, 301-9. 
Kttlo, 302. ' 
K I I I V A ,  34. 
KHOUA UUSSII 67. 
KIIOOLOOM, 43'; Ak lm at, 55, 62, rj.1. 
K u o o ~ o o n r ,  \ k d i  of, 11. 
K ~ t o s , ~ ,  VALI.EY, thc, 175. 
KI IUSHK-I -Nnl i t~uo ,  skirnlish a t ,  176, 295-7. 
KHVDER-Jellalabad-G~~t~dnm~tk rolt c, the, 189, 
2x2. 
KHVUER PASS, the, 7, 34, 37, .+I ; the cl;ms of, 
56, 58 ; Gllilmis intercept the cotn~n~tnica- 
11011 by, 61,- 125. 132; Wild fails to force 
136 ; 1 ollocl marches through, 137 . ~ a v a g !  
nari turned back from 167-9 r70 ;7 189, 
291, 304 ; question of tile retllltioll o(13z4 ; 
cvacunred, 325. 
KILLA ADDOOLLA, 30 . 
KILLA I<A%ER, 23, ; i k s ~ y  at ,  232, 238, 249. 
 KING^ GARDEN, the, a t  Cabul, 258, 262. 
K~owt .as .  106. 
Ktton,\al.ih;, 225. 
Kou-I-NOOR, the, taken by Runject Sing11 
from Shah Soojah, 5, 30. 
KOHIS  AN, Dost ~ I a h o ~ n e d  ill, 4.1, 62, 80, 8r, 
83. 107, '20, 225, 226, 219, 220, 258, zG2, 
263 283 288. 
KOJU; PASS, the, 17, 20, zr  ; I3rigadier Bng- 
land repulsed at ,  1.12, 17j. 
KOKORAN. 702. 
KOLULI-U~L:KWAN 21.
KOTWAL OP CADU;, the, lricd lor l l ~ c  massacre 
of Cnvagn:~ri, etc., 203. 
KONDOOZ, 283. 
KOTTRRE, 13. 
K u ~ n , m - ~ - J u ~ n , i n ,  67, 75, 11.1, 116. 
Kunaa! vnLLav, ~ h c ,  168, 171, 174, 179, 186, 
188.90, 201, 30,13 305, 324. 
KUHDURRAII ,  80. 
K u s ~ l r ,  190; General Robcrts tnccts Yakotlb 
Khan  at ,  rgr, ~ g ? ,  -01. 
K u ~ r t  SUNG,  67, 116, 214, 215. 
captivity, 151,  IS^^ 
L x w ~ e ~ c t r ,  Lord his ' masterly inacti\4ty,' 
186 . against kecbing Calldahar, 326. LEAI n Jor, 309 
1 . 0 C t i t I ~ R ~  229. 
LOGUR VALLEV, the, 153; plain, r p ;  river, 
LAHORE, hlr  Clerk at, 12. 
LAKE, 135. 
LANCIIIIS the gth, 201, a32, 305. 
LANCERS:  Bcngal,.tlle, 232, 235-7, 272. 
LA\VI~EKCB,  Caplnln, warns  i \ l ;~c~~ag l~ len ,  96 ;  
mndc p~isoncr, 97 ; sends rncssages lrom 
thc chick toElphtnstot~e, 98 ; description pf 
the rctrent, 107 ; mnde hostage, ~ c g  ; 111 
193, 225, 22q, 263 276 
L O O D ~ A N A H  Shnk hoojnh's refuge in 6, 7. 
Lottu Dr, 'politicnl oficer in 111; Uamiall 
di. htllCt, I.. 43, 4.); killed a t  I'ur\r,an Durmh, 
Index 
LuTTAIIL'xD, z14, 215, 254. 
L v r r o s  I.ord, Viceroy, 1876, 162 ' his instrac- 
lions, '&p7 ; ra~if ics  the treat; of Gnndn- 
muk, 178, 183, 184 ' prepares to revellge 
Camgnari 186.8 208; decides that Ynkotrb 
Khnn doe: IIOI r & n  to A k l ~ n n i s t a ~ ~ ,  377 ; 
hl.+ct;srxoa, kigndicr.Gcnernl Charles, C.Ij., 
chief OF Sir b'. Roberts' stnff, rpo . recovers 
the p t n s  at hpl1\~:1nn,z38.9 ' III  ;he Grcnt 
Xlnrch, 307, 3" ; in 111e bnttli o i  Cnnclnhnr, 
3?'. 
hl,\cmr;.cua, hlnjor, dcccivcd by the Gl~ilrni 
chief of Tcreen, 66-7 ; S;l!c's ndviscr, lag-32 
~ ~ A C K E N Z I I ? ,  Cnptain Coltn, a t  the deienr of 
Dort hlahomed near Rnniian ,I.! ; gnllnt~t 
conduct of, 76 ; w i ~ h  hlacnnglltcn, 96-7 ; n 
I I U S I ? ~ ~  1 q  ; story of the 1Zetrmt 112. 
h l a c ~ k i ~ r r ,  Captain Stuart, ~ R I I ; I I ; I  conc111ct 
o(. 235. 
h l ~ c n s s o s ,  political onicer a t  Peshnwurl 37. 
h l a c ~ n l ; . ~ ~ .  Colonel, killed a t  the stormlng or 
the Rikabashee fort, 79. 
h l . \ c ~ ~ t x ~ . .  l.ieutcoant, of the Horsc Artillery, 
in the hlniwand disasler. 208-0, 301 : taken 
~ ~ . . .  . 
prisoner, 302 ; rn~trdered, 321. 
h l n c ~ n n ~ x ,  76, 140. 
~IACRAGIITLN, L d y ,  39; in the Retreat, 
1s:. 
h I a c r r , \ ~ ~ ~ e a .  Sir William H a y  envo to 
Shah Soojah, influence with ~ . o r d  Auck lhd ,  
18 ; his  use of bribery 21, 23 ; on the rrcep- 
lion of  the Slnh a t  ~ i n d n h n r  22 28 . cliten 
Cnbul with Shah Soojnh, 30'; eb~ivibcec~ o i  
the Slrnh's populnrily, 33-4 ; real sovcroign 
or  ATglrani~tnn . his mistnkes 16-7 : 
relations \\+h 1\1e~6;1ila1is. 38 ; con&s lo 
the nl~:~n~lon~nent of the Bnlla Hissnr, 39; 
relations \\tit11 Hcrat, .io.r; nervous rib0111 
111c con~niunicntion, j z ;  relntion willi, Dost 
hlnhorned, 44 ; proposes to put n price on 
his head 45 ; receives his surrcndcr 47, 4') ; 
his pecd~iar tcrnperanlcnt 50 ; his 'hnnllce, 
5, ; diacovcrs the u n p a p u l h ) '  or  the ,Shah, 
55 ; his conduct to the Gooroo and 
Ghilznis 56-8.  appointed Governor of 
~olnba;, 60;  tilled npon to retrench, 61.2; 
his condrrct to Elphinsto~~e, 64-5 : deqmtches 
Snle, G6-7, 70; his qunrtcrs a t  Cnbrll, 7 4, 
demands the reduction of the R&a- 
k h e e  fort 9 depression. 82-3 ; nrgotint~on 
a h a t  the k!cttc;u. 88-96 : ~nnrdered. 07-0 : 
. . , -. - .  
15.5, 187 zoz 222. 
h l n c r m n ~ o s , '  Brigadier-General, 169, 189 
ar -15 ; in the December o eratio~ls round 
C : ~ u ~ ,  226-52 ; im the Great Rarch, 307,311 ; 
m the battle of Candnhnr, 317-320. 
; \ l r l t > ~ o o ~  KHAN fort of, 76, 83. 
h l n l l ~ t o u ~  ~ ~ . \ ~ t , ' b r o t h e r  of Shall Soojah, a. 
~~, \Ho>IF:D Nnssns KHAN. Abdurrnltnin~~'s 
governor of Carrdahar, dcrcatrd by Ayoul ,  
327. 
h l n n o r ~ e o  JAN,  a Warduk general, dckndr  
the Asmar heights, 197 ; allacked by hlnrsy 
and Mncphcrson, 225 - 40, z.15, 246, 255, 
2i7:  nltnck on the Sherpur cantonnteats. 
258-62 286. 
I \ I A I I ~ > I ~ I  h l s m m ,  Shah of Persia, his 
nmbilion, desians on Herat. 2,4. 
MAIIO.\IEI> SIIAII  KHAN, Akbar's lientrnant, 
1 5 r  
~ I A I I O A I E D  SHEREEI: fort or, 76, 77, 92, 258, 
"6.7 
---. 
~ ~ A H O A I E D  SVR\\'AK, agetrt OF Sir Lepel 
Griffi~~, 281.4. 
M A I - I ~ V E D  ZKMAUN K I I A N ,  97, 1.56. 
 AIDAN AN PLAIN, 1110, 148, 216, 118, 220, 225, 
226, a39 a88. 
~ ~ A I N \ \ ~ ; \ ~ I R G ,  hlrs, in the Relreat, 111, 11% 
fi~,\ln~,!xr~, 2 0 ;  d i ~ s t ~ r n t ,  296-304 ; Ih?tlIe a t ,  
Ixtwccn hl??llomcd Haswn and Apoub, 327. 
~ I A N D B R R O N .  160. 
, < 
~ ~ A N G A I . ,  215. 
~ ~ A H S H A L I . .  Colonrl, routs Nusseer Khan, 
h l n ~ % v  Bri~pdier-Genernl, 186 ; occtlpics 
Shuthgurdsn pass, 189 ; takes possession o i  
the Sherpur cnntonmtn~s. 197 ; tn thc attncli 
on hrnhon~ed Jnrr, 231-8, 7,f.f ; in thc ~lcfcnce 
of the Sherpur ca~~tonments, 262, 264. 
h l n u u ~ r  General, 168, 170. 
 nor.^: Lientenant 80. 
hlnzan,  309,314, 31; ; Ayouh'sca~npat, dar ing 
bnttle of Candahar, 319-22. 
W'CASKILL Brigadier-Gcnernl with Pollock, 
136 135. 'in the last skirmishes 156. 
M E E ~  &OR FORT. the blown &, 256-7. 
h l m n  BUTCHA, a chief Af l<ohistn~~,  226, 229, 
230, ~57,263. 
~ IPYRZA HLIED, a Dooranee ch id ,  140-1. 
hlrwR,\n. Khnn of Khelat. m, 74, '$2. 
h f l c ~ r ~ i  PASS. the, 179 ' ' '. ' ' 
AI'NYILI. Dritish Envoy to Persia 
h l o ~ u ~  J h ,  agent for hlncnagh;e?s ' blood 
n~oney,' 90-1, roz 154. 
b l o ~ ~ . ~ ,  C O I O I X ? ~ ~ C ~ I  td. hold the Shutnrgurdan 
pass, r p ;  bro~~gh t  out by Gough, 201 ; in 
the lmttle oFChndnhar, jao. 
MONTEATH. Colonel. ~cn tnea ins t  he Ghilmis. 
63-5 ; in ihe council of,%;tr a t  ~ellalnl~ncl; 
127-30; at  thc great sortie, 133. 
h loN ' rE~nr~o ,  Captain, killed a t  the h l ~ c r  
A ~ I I O ~  Tort, 2s7. 
~ IONTGOSIERY,  Sir r\obcrt, ngninst l i e ~ ~ l i l l p  
Candahnr. 126. 
35. 
~ ~ O O L T A N  168. 
MOORE, ~ i ~ h i n s t o n e ' s  servant, 152. 
~ ~ O N G A N  2.11.
MULLA dnllrnom. 91+3. 
255 ; f i res  t h e   con o n  t h e  Asnlni IleiSllts, 
"59, 27.1. 
~ ~ ~ U S T A I ~ I ~ I ,  t h e ,  ~11nisIlcd for t h e  Cnv;~gnnri 
mnssncrr ,  199. 
N A G I I I . ~ ~ ,  215. 
N n N u c ~ ~ l r E  I ~ A S S ,  the, 226, 238. 
N A I Y I ? ~ ,  L i e u t e m n t  Scott, of the  g2d Hisll- 
lnnderaf39;  
N A P I E R ,  o r d  o f  Magdala, in f avo~l r  or keep- 
i n g  C a n d a h n r ,  325. 
N E K  hlAHONXD Afghan con~r~mndcr  nt 
t h e  ba t t l e  o f  ~ h a r a s i n l l ,  194-5, 205. 
N E I ~ A U I .  135.  
Nuvlr . l .e  o f  t h e  Benjinl Lnnccr s  217 
NICHOIL: C a p t n i n ,  his heroibn~ i; tbc'ltetrent. 
120. 
N I J R A O  8 1  83. 
~ o n r l n h ,  'sir H c n r s ,  against  kcrping Cnn- 
dahnr ,  326. 
N0~~r111111001i, Lord ,  relnlior~s wit11 Sllrre Ali, 
162. 
N o - r r ,  G c n r m l ,  14 ; in c o m n ~ n n d  nt Cnr~dnhnr, 
34  , o c c u p e s  Khelnr, 43 ; his ch;~ractcr  5 L  . d i s k p l i n r ,  52-3,; d i s w e c s  with hlacllagilterl: 
58.9, 7 6  ' rccelvcs orders  from Elpllinsione 
t o  evacu:itc Candnllnr, refuses to  obey, 
figbring w i t h  h lce rm A h n ~ e d  141 ; his letter 
t o  D r ~ g n d i e r  Ensland,  142'. Lord Ellen- 
1,orough repen t s  ordew t o  ~ ( a c u n t c  Canda- 
Ilnr, obeys ,  143-5 ; marches towards CnbuI, 
14 d r i v e s  A f ~ h n n s  01rt of Gl~uznec  118; 
r e k e s  t o  a i d  in the rescue of the priioners, 
119. 156-t .  
NUGENT, l eu tenan t  killed 262 
N v s s ~ e t r  K h n n  o f  k!hclnt, &.' 
N v w , \ d ,  Genera l ,  299. 
O r u p r s r . ~ ,  Cap ta in ,  in t h e  Coimcil of War  at  
Jel la lnbad,  127-8 
O R E N I I U I ~ G ,  3.1. 
0 s . u ~ ~  K I I A N  89. 
Owra , \ a r  p r s k s  Dost h l n h o ~ n c d ,  29, 30; raid 
o n  the Ghi l ln i s ,  38. 
PALI.ISRIZ, Urigndier-Gellenl ,  269-70, 27.1. 
I'AL>IEII, Colonel, tortured, 157. 
I ' n l . r ~ u l w r o ~ ' s ,  Lord,  u l t i m n t ~ m  to Persia, 4 .  
PANJSHIR I<IVER, l h ~ ,  215. 
~ n s h - l e V 1 T c J 1 ,  Genernl, 1. 
l ' n ' r m ~ s ,  173. 
P a , r r ,  C a p t a i n ,  a t  siege o f  Ghuznec 25-6. 
I + ~ r v n r ~  rBAss, ~ h c  168 171, 172 17,;. 
I'ELLV. S i r  ~ C w i s :  nt the  confehe of P c s h a  
wnr, 164-5. 
P m t o r ; v s r ~ v  .lo. 
Pnltsli\,  r e l i t i o n s  betwecn Great  Dritnin nnd 
303, 311, 317, 321. 
? r o ~ l i u ~ < s ,  the,  305 319 920. 
3 r s H a r r ~  var.r.au, h e ,  ;68, 179, 287 ; ret:~ined 
b y  W 32 327 
3 0 ~ L ~ ~ ~ < .  8cneia1,  30 ;  arrives in Pes11ny11r. 
131, 132; a t  Jrllalabad, 134 ; h i sq~~nl i f i ca t~o l~s ,  
135 ; his work. 136; the rcscue nrd rerribu- 
tion, 137.57 ; contrast between Nott  and, 
1.17 : arrrves a t  Cabul, 147 ; pu~~isllrncnt of 
dknstcr  nt Chnriknr. 81-2 ; conducts ncxotin- - .- 
tiolls for the rctrcnt, 99.103; a I~ostnge, log, 
112, 123s I.(O, 152, 154, 155. 
' O W ~ L L .  Cnp tn~n ,  killed, 175. 
?OYNUAH K I I A K  father to Dost BIahonled, 5. 
. 'nlnnose, G c d r n l ,  168. 269. 29.1, 3% 311 ; 
in the battle of Candnhnr. 316. 
< A T T R A Y ,  81. 
~ a w ~ r ~ s o x .  S i r  Henry.  52 ' his rvilrnir~gs to 
hlncnaghtcn, 53-.1; hlncn&htcll's prders to, 
r cqxc t lng  Uktn r  Khnn, 57, 141 ; III fnvour 
o f  retainins Cnndnhar, szs. 
. - 
[<A\\WI. I'INEI. 189. 
l 2 1 1 o . r ~ ~  HEII;H,I.S, the, 169. 
I Z I K A U A ~ H E E  r o w .  the, 79. 
RIPON Marquis  of V~ceroy,  285 ; ill f a \ . o ~ ~ r  
of tt:e settlcmcnt kit11 Abdurrni~mnn, 287-8: 
snnctions General Robcrts' March on Candn- 
h;tr, 305, 326. 
ROIIAT,  Great  hfnrch ends at, 39.10, 
l i o n o n ~ r s ,  Coloncl 15. 
R o n e n n ,  Sir  ~ r h e r i c k ,  in comn~and of the 
Kuram colun~n,  IGB ; his s c l ~ c n ~ c  of opcrn- 
t~ons ,  171-2 ; bntllr of the P~. iwnr K o u ~ l ,  
173-4, 1 5  178 ' his previolls career, 188; 
wt11 thc A m y  oi invnsio~i 183.92 ; b : ~ t ~ ~ e  oc 
Chamsinh 193-6 ; nt, C & I I ,  197-101 ; I C -  
vcngc fo: Cnvngnnrl, 202.4 ; i n t e r c u ~ ~ r s ~  
with Ynkoul) Khan, 205-8 ; ,ill the S l y p u r  
cantonment, 210-20; nctlve opeyit loy 
round C i ~ l ~ n l ,  211-52; 011 tlic d e f w l ~ ~ v c  111 
Shr rp~ l r ,  253.65, 275 ; the (:real Marc11 011 
Cnndnhnr, 304-11 ; battle OF Candnhnr, 311 
24 ; i n  fnvour of keeping Cnndabnr, 325. 
RORI:E. 1 7 ~  19. 
ROW, EIISISII ,  in the  retrent From Cl~nriknr, 8 
ROSS, h ln jor-Ge~~ernl  John, 189 264. 27 I 
the  G r c n ~  3lnrcl1, 307 ; ill ;hc lmtfe; I 
~. 
Cnndnhnr. 321. 
RUNJUI(.I. S l h ~ i l l  Sikh rlller of the l'unjnul 
lrcatlnerlt of  Shah Sooinli. 5 : occtlnie 
S A F I  TRIIIE.  IIIC, ensngc hIncpl~crson, 215. 
SAI.E. L a d y ,  her journal. 73, 9 2 ;  nccount o 
the Ret rea t ,  19-11 ; Akbnr's kindncss to, 152 
SALE,  S i r  1Iol1~r1, I J ,  22 ; nt siege of G1111mee 
24-27 ; in c o n ~ ~ n n n d  a t Cabul. 3.1 ' chasiiscl 
lhc I C o l ~ i ~ t ; ~ r ~ e e s ,  ,196 ; his cha;ncter, 5 
fighiinp ill  he Khoord Cnbul a t  1Jootklm~ 
65, 66, 6 ; nt G I I I I ~ : I ~ I I I ~ ,  68 ; o c c ~ ~ p i e s  JcI 
Iclnbnd, &. 70, 75, 76 ; dcfcnce of  Jell:~lxb:d 
122-34 ; t igli~ing w i ~ h  the Ghilzais n,t Jngdul 
luk, 1 4 6 ;  ordered lo rcscuc c;lpll\ws, r.19 
S c ~ s u t r .  r7,-19, 43, 1.12. 
S c o w ,  A h j o r  80. 
SCHUVI.EK, Alr E u r c n c ,  interviews ~\bdurrnh.  
SICII ~ I I A ,  116.
SEISI-AN, province of. 2, 23. 
SIIAIZTO,  Cnptnin, killed nt the  Enlln Ilissnr,  
2 0 0  
S l l , \ ~ A l  RIDGE, I ~ C ,  169. 
S I I A I I  ~ A G I I ,  l l ~ e ,  76. 
S ~ r . m n . \ z  K I I A N ,  220. 
SI!~\HJUI, 269. 
SIIAIII .KZ 27 J 
SIIAKRSI&R,  Sir Richmond, 1.19, 150, 155. 
S111<ll<~\l31\ll. 29. 275. 278. 
SHELTON. l i r ignd~er ,  ;irrivcs a t  Jell,alnlxxl, 55;  
c l ~ : ~ m c ~ c r .  73; nt Cnbul, 7.1 ; reccrres contra- 
d ic tory  orders from hl;~conglrtcn, 75 ; in' 111c 
h l l n  Hissnr, 76-8; takes t h e  Rikabnshee 
fort g ;  opposes the rcn~ovnl of the  troops 
' I I  Hishar, 83 ; :lltacks 13~11i:troo, into' t b u  n 
85.8 ; c o m n ~ n ~ ~ d s  II IC main body in Ihc Kc- 
treat, 106, 19 ; his doggcd valow, 116 ; n 
I~ostngc ,  117, 121. 
S I I ~ I < - ~ ) E R W A L A  IIRIGIITS,  the, 198, 237, "JI, 
264. 
S n w a  h1.1, tlic Amccr,son of Dosr BIahomcd, 
ncce?sion and chnrncter, 162;  r c h ~ s c s  lo 
recclvo n Resident, 163 ; n e g o t i ~ ~ t i o ~ ~ s  \villi 
Lord L y l ~ o ~ i .  16.1-5 ; cordinl ~cccl ) l ion  i t h e  
Russians, . r c f ~ ~ s c s  to receive Sir Neville 
Clmmberlnin, 167, 16g ; dent11 nt IJnlkh, 176, 
177 ; his mistakes, a q ,  211, zrz, 22.1, 278, 
. . 
192, 201, ?I], 304. 
S I I I I ,  179. 267 ; relairled 11). 115, 3zJ. 
S l ~ n s .  6, 18, .+I ,125, 
SlKll ~ ~ I ? u U I \ T O I ~ Y  STI\TES CONTISCRNT, 37, 
136, 138, 168. 
S I K H  REGIMENTS, 201, 238, TJVJ,  250, 271, 
316 318, 319. 
SISGII:I ,- 6. 
~ n l K N a ; & n ~ l n i n ,  n I~ostnge, 97, 113, 117. 
S L A D I ~ ,  n t  thc hla1w11nd dihaster, 301. 
S O I I N X ~ H ,  gates of, 1.18. 
S ~ O J A I I - ~ ! , L - ? ~ ~ O I . K ,  hhah, 2 ; early cnrccr,  
J 5 ; Inlrlgues, 6 ;  Lord Auckl:u~d deter -  
1l;illcs to rebtore him, 12, 14, r g  ; his share  
ill the  c s p c d i t i o ~ ~ ,  16-24 ; ~.aplnced on l h c  
throne, cntry inro Cnbul, ; his position, 
31-38 ; wit11 h l n c n n g h l c ~ ~  a t  Cnbul, 39-.to ; 
r c h ~ s c s  t o  see Dor t  Alaho~ncrl, qp ; qous t o  
J,cll:~lnbnd, 50 i his errors, 52, 53 ; d~snlTec- 
tlon townrds I I I ~ I  51 60 3-6 ; r e c o m m c ~ ~ d s  
t h e  occnpation aide u'da  Hishnr, 88, go, 
gr stipulntions wilh regard to, 93-5 ; re- 
nlnlns in Cnhul, 103 ; Icuer  to balc nt 
Jellnlnbnd, 126,127, 129; murdered, 138, 139, 
110. 221. 
: O O K K I I A I ~  120. 
, o o ~ r ! ~ t  &tnin, escapes f r o n ~  t l ~ c  s l a u p h ~ e r  
a t  ~ u b d n r n u k  121. 
;PENS, Ceptni; of the  72d Higl~landcrs ,  
killed, 25; 
iu txcaw, \ l  Kwrul.. thc, nunck on. bv Rohcr ts .  , . . .
172-3. 
i ~ , \ x n o u e ,  hIr, on lhc  trcxly OF G u n d n n ~ u k ,  
I 80. 
; ~ n w n n . r ,  Sir Donald, 168 ; marches in to  
C ~ I I ~ : I I I : I ~ ,  175, 176, I ,265 : begins 11;s rr~nrclr 
t o  C n b d ,  268 ; b n t t c  OF A h n ~ e d  Khel nnd 
Urzoo, 270.4 ; c o n t i n ~ i c d i i s  1i,:1rc11 to C n l n ~ l ,  
275-6; relations with Abdurrnhmnn, 286.91, 
294, ,30.(, 305, 307, 310, 322; in favour o i  
k e e p ~ ~ ~ g  C:~ndnlinr, 325. 
;.I. JOHN, Colond -97, 309. 
~ T O D U I M ,  c0lodei, 
; T O L I ~ ~ . ~ O F I I ,  defender of the Schipkn pass, 
received by S h r ~ e  Ali, 167. 
~ O R N S  ,\YO S U N S I ~ I N E  OF '\ SOI.UII~:I<'S 
Lrvrr,' by Colin Mnckcnzie, 150. 
TRATON, Captain, 3 9 .  
U K K U I I ,  17. 1.14, 147, 168. 
uL1alah' L ~ O U W I ~ A ~ N S ,  the, 38. 
ULThN JAN, 97. 
u~:rnu h l n ~ ~ s ~ r i u ~ ,  lomh of, 146. 
-.,-. 
T A S I Z K E N ~ ,  R lna in~~s  at, 165; Shcrc .4li nl, 
176 ; Al~durrnl~mnn at, 279, 280, 282. 
TI:ZT.EN 66, 67, 70, 1 9 ,  115, 116, 146, 151, 155, 
~H,\L-~;+srlAl.l. 116. 
?'IIELWALL, ~riind'ier, 171.3. 
'I'bro.wo?.r, cngiwur to Kenne 23, q. 
Tluoua ,  Princc, son of ~ l k h  Swjnh,  sup 
portcd by Kunjeet Sinfill, 17, 34, .+I ; 
Soojnh'r viceroy at  Cnndnl~nr, 52-3 ; crucltg, 
m~lrdcred, 97. 
TROUI', Cnpmn, 146. 
' I ' ~ N G I I E E T A R I K I ,  gorge of, sccneofslnughtcr, 
UKTAU Knna.  n discontented Doornllec chief, 
53 ; hlacnnghten o(rers reward for his hcad, 
57. 
URGUNDA~, 297, 309, 314, 316, 320, 32% 
U u s u a u ~ ~ : ~ ~ .  28, 226, 230.3, 237, 239. 
Uazoo, n k i r  of, 274, ~ I C .  
VAKIIEI.. tbc. obnoxious minister o r  Shnh 
\ V ~ u e ,  escorts I'rincc T i~naur  by lhc KhyL~er 
mute, 34, 37. 
WALI  h l h ~ l o b l ~ u ,  governor desigrlntc of 'l'llr- 
kcstan, 1x0, 258. 
WARREN. ~ V ~ I C I I ~ I C S  the Commissariat fort, 
77. 
WATSON Colo~lc!, in comlnnnd o r  thc Sikh 
~ e u d e / o r ~  co~~l~n j i cn t  168, ~ 7 5 ,  304. 
\Vm.l.es~rrv the ;\lnrq;li% c r ~ t ~ r i s l n  on Lord 
~ucklnnd'k dccision, 13. 
\VI{LLINCTON, Duke of, criticism 011 Lord 
Aucklnnd's dccision, 13 ; on ~lphin.;kmc's 
nr Cnlrul, 78 ; on E r ~ g l ~ s h  troops V .  
~?l%!~ 138. 
\VIIITE, b~njor ,  of  he 2d Hi@landcrs, 195.6 ; 
a t  thc attack on l%ni H t s ~ x ,  243-4; III 
h c  bntilc of Candnhar, 319. 
\VILLI. Urimdicr, ilrtc~l~pts to force I ~ C  Kl1ybrr 
VAIIUJA KIIAX, 190. 
YAKOIJU K H A N ,  so11 of Sherc Ali released and 
ma& r c g c ~ ~ t ,  1 ~ 6 ;  i n t e rco t~r s  'with Sir Sam 
Hrowne, 177-9 ; ql~estion of his complicity in 
thc Carngnnri mnssacrc. 183.5 ; takes refi~gc 
in the English cnmp, 191, y, Z O ~ : , Z O ~ - ?  1 n 
priwner, 2~3,214, 257 ; tho Iceroy s dec~s~on  
apninst his return to power. 277,179. ~ E z .  
YAR N ~ n o u l r u ,  Shnh Ka~nrnn's n~iwstcr, 41. 
TON, and ihc b l n ~ i  
EVENTS OF OUR OWN TIME. 
A Series of Vo!utties O ~ J  the u i ~ ~ f  I j /@~lmf  BZJPN~S ( f  the lllst flag Cenhcry, ench ~0?hifl2hg 300 p q e s  or vtort, h 
8v0, ~ i t h  Plnrrs, Portmiis ,  o r  other III71sfrcrtions, 10 be 
issued a t  intervals, cloth, price 5s. 
A limiltd hzrft p~z#c?- edition n/ sonte o/ t h ~ c  6ooA.s is firt6liJh1.d 
with Pr-oo/s of fhc PZ~ztt~s, Rox6rtrgkr 10s. 6d. rret. 
* Those marked with ( I  star * Anvc no l c z ~ ~ q k r  edition. 
TI-XE WAR I N  THE CRIMEA. By General Sir 
E L ~ V A R D  HAXILEY, K.C.13. Fourth Edition. With Five 
Maps and Plans, and Four Portraits on Copper. 
'S i r  Ed\r.ard Hamley has excepti0nd qun~ilicaliolls for the task hc lras endertlkes 
His, " War in tlis Crirrirn" is a \\'ell-kniitcd, historical narralive, written by a colnpetrnt 
criilc, and well-inbrnied observer.'-Thcs. 
THE INDIAN M U T I N Y  OF 1857. B y  Colonel 
MALLESON, C.S. 1. Second Edition. With Three Plans, 
and Four Portraits on Copper. 
I Eattles, sie~es,  and rapid laarchc.5 are clcscribcd ill a style spirited n~rd concise.'- 
Sn la rday  Rrwrr7u. 
' Color~cl iCIallaso~i's book is a valunhlc onc, nnd sl~ould bc ~ ~ r ~ i v e r s n l l ~  rend.'--(;rnjhir. 
* A C H I E V E M E N T S  IN E N G I N E E R I N G .  By Pro-  
fessor VERNON HARCOURT. With many Illustrations. 
' W e  llope this book will find its way into the hnnds of all youlrgengirrcers. All the in. 
rormntion has hccn careftrlly gathered from all the best sources, a d  is therefore 
accunte. '-En~i~~e~crinf h'mir7u. 
THE A F G H A N  WARS. 13y ARCHII~ALD FORIIES. 
With Portraits on Copper, and Plans. 
*THE D E V E L O P M E N T  OF N A V I E S .  By Captain 
EARDLEY WILBIOT, R.N. With many Illustralions. 
- - -- . 
IN PREPARATION. 
THE LIBERATION OF ITALY. W i t h  Portrnits 
on Copper. 
TIlE REFOUNDING O F  TI-IE GERMAN EMPIRE. 
With Portraits on Copper. 
THE EXPLORATION OF AFRICA. With  l'ortraits 
on Copper. 
THE CIVIL WAR I N  AMERICA. W i t h  Portraits 
on Copper. 
THE OPENING OF JAPAN. W i t h  Illustrations. 
Other Vuhr utes wi/IJo/la~cl. 
LONDON: SEELEY AND CO., I,Ih.IITISl3, ISSEX ST., STRl\ND. 
RECENTL Y PUBLISHED. 
PARIS. In Old and Prcsent Times. With especial 
reference to ihangcs in its Architecture and Topography. 
By P. G. I~AMEI~TON. With 70 Illustrations by A. 
BRUNET-DPUAINES, H. TOUSSAINT, and Others. Cloth, 
6s. 
T H E  RUINED ABBEYS OF YORKSHIRE. By 
W. C H t i a r n ~ R S  LEBROV. With many Illustrations, by 
A. BRUNET-DEUMNES and H. TOUSSAINT. New Edition, 
Price 6s.) cloth. 
OXFORD. Chapters by A. LANG. Illustrated by 
A. BRUNET-DE~AINES, H. TOUSSAINT, and R. IZPNT 
THOMAS. New Edition, 6s., cloth. 
CAMBRIDGE. By J. W. CLARK, M.A. With Illus- 
trations by A. BRUNET-DEDAINES and H. TOUSSAINT. 
New Edition, 6s., cloth. 
WINDSOR. By W. J. LOFTIE. Dedicated by pcr- 
mission to Her Majesty the Queen. With many IlIustra- 
tions by HERBEKT RAILTON. Price 6s.) cloth. 
STRATFORD-ON-AVON. In thc Middle Ages and 
the time of the Shakespeares. By S. L. LEE. With Illus- 
trations by EDWARD Ilur.~. New Edition, Gs., cloth. 
EDINBURGH. Picturesque Notes. By ROBERT 
LOUIS STEVENSON. With many Illustrations. Cloth, 3s. 
6d. Roxburgh, 5s. 
LONDON : SI-:I,LISY AND CO., I.I?vlITED, ESSlIS ST., STRAND. 
PICTURESQUE PARTS OF ENGLAND. 
THE PEAK O F  DERRYSHIRE. By J. LIWIAND. With 
Etchings and other Illustrations I>y I-IERTIERT RAILTON ant1 Al.l~Rl~n 
DAWSON. Cloth, 7s. 6d. L~rgc-Paper Copies (250 only), 12s. 6d. 
'When Mr Leyland throws in Hadtlon Hall and Chntsworth, Ash- 
I>onrne, and the Dove, his " Pcnlc" 1x1s elements of interest soKcient for 
three or font ordinary 11ool;s. . . . Altogelher bfr Leyland hns produced 
a delightful boob on n dclightfirl s~~bject ,  and it is impossible to lay it down 
withnut regret.'--Snlrrrhy A'minu. 
AN EXPLORATlON O F  EXMOOR. By J. LL. W. PAGE. 
With Mnp, Etchings, and other Ill~strations. Second Eklitiorl. 
Cloth, 7s. 6d. 
AN EXPLORATION O F  DARTMOOR. By J. LL. W. 
PAGE. Wit11 hfnp, Etchings, and olher Illustmtioos. Second Ecli- 
tion. Cloth, 7s. 6d. 
. 
NEW AND CHEAPER EDITION O F  
WESTMINSTER ABBEY. By I\'. J. LOFTIE. With 7 4  
Illustrntions by I - ~ E K ~ E R T  RAILTON. Cloth, 7s. 6tl. An Edition is 
puhlisherl, with Iz Coppcr-Plntcs, nt 21s. 
'Though a dozen 11001;s l~ave bcen writlen on \Veslminsler hbbcy, we 
know of none at once inorc completc ant1 ndmirablc, h o ~ h  from a l i tcrnry 
i111t1 nn nrtistic point of view, thnn thc volr~n~c beforc ns.'-hrblirlrc~,~' 
Ci~nt lnr ,  
LADY MARY WORTLEY MONTAGU. By ARTIUJR R. 
ROPES, M A .  Wilh g Portraits after Sir GODFREY Iix~,r.r.~w, kc. 
7s. Gtl, Largc-Paper Copics (150 only), 21s. nett. 
PREVIOUS VOLUMES OF THE SAME SERIES. 
MRS THRALE, afterwards M r s  Piozzi. B y  L. B. 
SIIELEY, M.A. Wilh 9 Illt~strnti~ns after I-ioc,\wlr, RDYNOI-DS, 
ZOIWANV, nntl Others. Cloh, 7s. Gtl. 
FANNEY BURNEY. Uy I,. B. SEELEY, M.A. With 9 
Illustrations nftcr I<I<YNOI.~S, GAIN~BOROUGH, COI'LKY, snd WEST. 
Cloth, 7s. Gtl. 
HORACE WALTOLE. By L. B. SEELEY, M.A. With  8 
Illustrations nftcr Sir  JOSIIUA R~wsor.ns and Sir T~roar~is LAW- 
I~ENCE. Cloth, 7s. 6cl. 
LONDON: SEELEY AND CO., LIMITED, I1SSIS ST., STRAND. 
WOl<KS BY ' MKS MARSHAIL. 
,- 
JUST PUBLISHED. 
\+'INCHESTER MEADS IN T H E  DAYS OF BISHOP 
KEN : a Story. By XIrs h~Innsrr , \~.~.  Fourth Thousand. With 
Eight Illustrntions. ss., cloth. 
' hIrs Marshall has done her worlc wcll, nncl produced an cxccllent 
book.'-Clrrrrrlr Bds .  
' hIrs Marshall has produced nnothcr of her plcasnnl stories of old timcs.' 
-Snhr~dny A'mim. 
UNDER SALISBURY SPIRE. A Tale of the Times of 
Georgc I-Ierhert. Sisth Thousancl. \ \hh Illustrntions. 5s., cloih. 
' Onc of tlic bcst works which have ever comc from Mrs Mnrshall's pcn.' 
-A/he~~(n t~n~.  
I N  T H E  CITY OF FLOWERS ; or, Adelaide's Awakening. 
\JTi1h Illustmtions. 5s., cloth. 
' Vcry wholcsonle reading. . . . Altogctlier tlic story is cscel1ent.'- 
C~mrdian. 
ON THE BANKS OF T H E  OUSE; 01; Life in Olney a 
IIundretl Years Ago. Fourtli Thousand. \\lit11 Illustmtions. 5s.) 
cl0111. 
' No hettcr story than this has Ixcn wriiten by hTrs hTarshall. To  any 
admirer of Cowpcr, the \vootlcots represcnting the old hnunts of the poct 
will bc of much intcrcst.'-C~tm.r/imr. 
IN FOUR REIGNS. The Recollections of Al~hea Alling- 
ham, 1785-1842, Piftli Thousand. With Illnstmtions. ~ s . ,  cloth. 
' The rcnder will closc tlic volume of hIrs Allingliam's ~.ecollcctio~~s with 
regret. Scldom does one meet with o book of socli n synipntlietic nnrl 
touching chnrnctcr. . . . 'rhc particulars which it nllbrds of the enrlicr 
life of our belovcd soverciqn are of nnosual interest, and will be engcrly re- 
ccivcd by all who unitc in'doing honour Lo the revcrcd name of Victoria.'- 
l~'f01X;il~~ h?. 
UNDER T H E  NIENDIPS. Fifth 'rhousand. With Illus- 
trations. Ss., cloth. 
'I'HE MIS'I'RESS 01; T A Y N E  COURT. 5s. Third Thou- 
sand. \\'ill1 Illustrations. Ss., cloth. 
IN T H E  EAST COUN'TRY. Fourth Thousand. With 
Ilh~stmtions. 5s.) cloth. 
IN COLSTON'S DAYS. Fifth Thousand. With Illustra- 
tions, 5s., cloth. 
-- --- 
LONDON: SEELEY AWD CO., LIMITED, ESSES ST., STRAND. 
A N E  W AND CHEAPER E D U I O f V  OF 
Mrs Marshall's Earlier Works. 
PRICE 3s. 6d. 
VIOLET DOUGLAS. 
CI-IRISTABEL KINGSCOTE. 
HELEN'S DIARY; or, Thirty Years Ago. 
I-IEIGHTS AND VALLEYS. 
LADY ALICE. 
MRS MAINWARING'S JOURNAL. 
Mrs Marshall's Popular Series. 
Is. Sewed ; I s .  6d., Cloth. 
T H E  TOWER ON T H E  CLIFF. Ninth Thousand, 
THE TWO SWORDS. Ninth Thousand. 
BRISTOL DIAMONDS. Ninth Thousand. 
H E R  SEASON IN BATH. Tenth Thousand. 
UP AND DOWN TI-IE PANTILES. Ninth Thou- 
sand. 
T H E  OLD GATEWAY. Fourteenth Thousand. 
ROMANCE O F  T H E  UNDERCLIFF. Sixth Thou- 
sand. 
. -  - . - - - 
LONDON : SEELEY AND CO., LIMITED, ESSEX ST., STRAND. 
WORKS BY PICOFESSOII CHURCH. 
- - . 
TI-IE H A M M E R :  A Story of the Maccabees. With 
Eight Illustrations. ss., cloth. 
A YOUNG MACEDONIAN. In the Army of 
Alexander the Great. With Sixteen Coloured Illustrations. 
ss., cloth. 
STORIES FROM HOMER. Twenty - first Thou- 1c 
sand. With Coloured Illustrations. 5s., cloth. 
' A book which ought to bccome an English classic. I t  is h ~ l l  of the 
p r e  Homeric I1nvoor.'-Spcrlnfor. 
STORIES FROM VIRGIL. Fifteenth Thousand. 
With Coloured Illustrations. 5s., cloth. 
' S a  erior to his ' I  Stories from Homer," good as they wcrc, and perhaps 
as pcrLct n specimen of that peculiar form of translation as cot~ld be.'-- 
TI'JIICS. 
STORIES FROM T H E  GREEK TRAGEDIANS. 
Tenth 'Thousand. With Coloured Illustrations. ss., cloth. 
' Not only R pleasant and cntcrlnining book for the lircside, but a slurc- 
howc of fncts Stom history to Ijc of real scrvice to them when they come 
lo rend n Creek play for tI~e~~~sclres.'-Stn~zda~-d. 
STORIES OF THE EAST FROM I-IEIIODOTUS. 
Eighth Thousand. With Coloured Illustrations. 5s., cloth. 
For a school prizc n morc suitnblc book will hardly 111: found.'- 
L i tz~nry  C h ~ r ~ r h s r n ~ ~ ,  
' h very quaint and delighthl book.'-Spcrfdov. 
T H E  STORY O F  TI-IE PERSIAN WAR FROM 
HERODOTUS. Fifth Thousand. With Coloured Il- 
lustrations. 5s., cloth. 
' W e  are inclined to Lhinlc this is the Ixst volumc or Professor Church's 
scries sinec the escellent " Stories from I-Io~~~er."'-Allrr~~n'tirr. 
S T O R I E S  FROM LIVY. Sixth Thousand. With 
Coloured Illustrations. 5s.) cloth. 
'The  lad who gets this book for n present will' Ilavc got n gcnuine 
classicnl trcas~~re.'-Scafs~~rarr. 
ROMAN LIFE IN THE DAYS OF CICERO. 
Fifth Thousand. With Color~red Illustrations. ss., cloth. 
' Thc Lcst prize-book of the season.'-jott~rral of Ed~tmfio~r. 


